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ANDRÁS SAJÓ* 
Pluralism in Post-Communist Law 
Abstract. This paper discusses problems related to the incorporation of constitutional rule of 
law into a pluralistic legal system, primarily in post-communist Hungary. Normative pluralism 
was characteristic of state socialism. Is this pluralism going to shape the emerging constitution-
driven law of post-communism? The paper concludes that although constitutional universalism 
brought a new dimension to law and in principle has helped to promote the centrality of law 
in the competitive world of normative orderings, it may in the long run remain an elitist tool, 
fundamentally ignored or circumvented by sub-legal forms of social interaction. 
Keywords: constitutional law, legal pluralism, post-communist law, post-modernity 
Al though pos t - communis t societ ies increasingly d i f fer f r o m each other, the case 
of Hungary is suf f ic ient to highl ight a normat ive p rob l em of legal p lu ra l i sm, 
which could be best descr ibed as the p rob lem of insuff ic ient centrality of f o r m a l 
law in pos t -communis t normat ive orders.1 "Un ive r sa l " const i tut ional ism wi th its 
specif ic value sys tem is best unders tood as a s ignif icant at tempt to secure a 
pr ime posi t ion for state law. Th i s paper poin ts to certain immanen t and social 
variables which limit the chances of success fo r creat ing consti tutional con t ro l 
over law and society. 
Part 1 of the paper d iscusses certain methodologica l p r o b l e m s of n o r m a t i v e 
p lu ra l i sm and the p l a c e of c o n s t i t u t i o n - d r i v e n law wi th in it . Par t 2 dea l s w i t h 
legal p lura l i sm u n d e r s tate socia l i sm. Par t 3 rev iews the role of un ive r sa l 
cons t i tu t ional i sm in shap ing a no rma t ive order of g o v e r n m e n t with a n e w 
legi t imacy af te r the co l l apse of socia l i sm and its social l imits . Part 4 is an 
ana lys i s of va r ious f o r m s of legal p lu r a l i sm ( internal a n d external ) a n d t h e 
Member of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Budapest, H-1014 Budapest, 
Országház u. 30. 
E-mail: sajoa@jog.mta.hu 
1
 Although they all started with a rather rudimentary legal-administrative normative 
system inherited from the Soviet regime, their social, cultural, economic, and other 
differences (as well as history and geography) make the post Soviet Empire countries 
different. The applicability of the Hungarian experience is certainly greater in Poland than in 
Russia, not to speak of Albania or Tadjikistan. Nevertheless, given the global importance of 
Russia, in certain contexts I will refer to Russia, at least to show how different the problem of 
pluralism can be in various countries. 
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relevance of the constitutional legal system to the competition of normative 
orders. The paper concludes that although constitutional universalism brought a 
new dimension to law and in principle has helped to promote the centrality of 
law in the competitive world of normative orderings, it may in the long run 
remain an elite tool, fundamentally ignored or circumvented by sub-legal forms 
of social interaction. 
1. Pluralism and Post-communist law 
Given the multiplicity of meanings attributed to legal pluralism it is important 
to clarify the implications of the term as applied to post-communist law. Certain 
connotations of the term were developed in reference to different socio-legal 
realities, which do not apply in Eastern Europe. (In other words, I find legal 
pluralism to be a strictly contextual phenomenon.) Roderick A. Macdonald's 
summary of the pluralist approach claims that the relations of the various 
elements are relative and hence they differ from one social setting to another: 
"The legal pluralist acknowledges and seeks out certain elements of inter-
normative relationships. The implicit is more important than the explicit. [...] 
The inter-relationship of normative regimes can never be a relationship of 
hierarchy, close-integration and vertical discipline. The legal pluralist imagines 
a process of mutual construction of a normative regimef...]. There can be no 
exogenous standards of fairness, justness and conformity that are not first 
filtered through the plural normative understandings of the regimes constructed 
and deployed by interacting parties." 
1 am not denying that there are certain social circumstances where there can 
never be a relationship of hierarchy among the normative regimes. However, 
it seems to me that the model that best describes Eastern Europe at the 
moment is one where "official law" does play a central role and competing 
partial normative regimes are always determined in their relationship (e.g. 
parasitism, manipulation, distortion, etc.) to official state law. As Karl Marx 
argued in a different context there is always a specific dominant form of 
production, which determines the place of other coexisting forms of production. 
Likewise, in contemporary societies in transition, notwithstanding post-
2
 Macdonald, R. A.: Metaphors of Multiplicity: Civil Society, Regimes and Legal 
Pluralism. Arizona Journal of International and Comparative Law 15 (1998): 69, 89-90. 
Macdonald here refers to Webber, J.: Rapports de force, rapports de justice: La genese 
d'une communauté normative entre colonisateurs at colonises. In: Le Droit soluble: 
Contributions quebecoises à l'étude de /'internormativite (ed. Belley, J. G.). 1996. 113. 
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modernist claims, it is state law (with all its internal pluralism) that directly and 
indirectly determines the place of other unofficial legal systems, and to a lesser 
extent that of other normative systems. 
Modem law was reintroduced in Hungary under the guidance of "universal 
constitutionalism". This resulted in considerable inefficiencies. The normative 
structure and supervisory capacity of constitutionalized state law is not a 
guarantee for setting a social agenda, nor for the actual steering of social life, 
and its institutions (family, race relations) or other spheres of life (e.g. business). 
The tensions that exist among the elements of the pluralistic legal system 
are partly related to the post-modem nature of state law. "If, as a conception of 
social organization, modernism was primarily about rationalism, universalism, 
certainty and order, post-modernism seems to be about empiricism, parti-
cularism, indeterminacy and disorder".3 Obviously, these post-modem features 
of indeterminacy might allow the existence of competing normative systems. 
The particularity of post-communist law is that it was imposed as if it could 
actually provide the values and efficiency of modem law. The indeterminacy 
that was already built into the law of Western countries, which served as the 
model in the legal transposition, was not acknowledged in the East. It is no 
wonder that post-communist state law appears to have been unable to reflect 
the basic characteristics assumed to be the cornerstones of modernity (as listed 
above). In the early years of the democratic transition there was a strong 
emphasis on the universal dimension of the constitution, human rights, and the 
rule of law as a par excellence project of enlightenment. In reality, the law 
that was transposed from the "West" and then transformed and formulated 
increasingly at the local level was indeterminate and porous, enabling more 
and more local plural normative subsystems to resurface, continue to exist or 
be created. Transferred "modem" law contributed to the malfunctioning of the 
social system, to the undermining of the legitimacy of the rule of law, and to 
diminishing the interest in and enthusiasm for the effort to enforce the new 
legal system. The indeterminacy of post-modern law in post-communism 
enabled the operation of normative regimes that are predominantly dependent 
on or related to the official law. This plurality (under the guidance of the 
official law) enabled the local domination of criminal or corrupt individuals, 
without providing to social relations some kind non-alienation or intimacy. 
Some post-modernists claim that post-modem plural polymorph law can 
actually provide such communal values instead of rights.4 The co-operation 
3
 Ibid. 72. 
4
 Ironically, the spontaneous orders of post-modernism were also promised by 
Hayek's minimalist rule of law. 
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that emerged in the distorted and parallel legal systems is hierarchical in 
nature or at least enables temporary dominance. One of the major short-
comings of both the official law and the competing normative systems is that 
at the moment neither is able to offer long term fixed relations. 
The more we move away in time from the collapse of state-socialism in the 
Soviet Empire the less appropriate it is to use the term "post-communist" with 
regard to the respective new legal systems to have emerged. The legal systems 
are increasingly departing from their common Soviet origins. From the socio-
legal perspective, which looks at law within the social system, the emerging 
legal systems are increasingly differentiated. Despite developing out of it, 
the post-communist legal system is not determined by the Soviet legal system. 
Even to a lesser extent was the Soviet political system and Soviet social model 
responsible for determining the future of the many societies formed on the 
former territory of the Empire. This is partly because despite the unifying 
umbrella of state socialism these societies were always rather different from one 
another. 
Nevertheless, there is still a good enough reason to discuss the problem of 
pluralism in the East Central European legal systems, notwithstanding that they 
have increasingly less in common (except for the insufficiency of human re-
sources and a sufficient social aptitude to follow closely the Western legal 
model that these countries imposed on themselves in the transition). This reason 
is clearly a normative one and is based on the following: Modem law—due to its 
formal qualities—represents (at least in principle and at varying social costs) 
a number of social and normative values such as predictability, security, im-
partiality, equality, and perhaps even a sense of justice. It also contributes to the 
establishment and functioning of the market. Modern law has a function of 
creating social order and—again, at a considerable social cost—it offers a kind 
of social peace. The centerpiece of a modern legal system founded on the rule of 
law is the constitution. Modem constitutions are not only tools for achieving 
social cohesion within a state governed by law but also offer a blueprint to circum-
venting governmental abuse of power. Further, they may satisfy the Kelsenian 
need for positivism by providing a solid hierarchy of norms and they offer a 
mechanism to implement the hierarchy through constitutional adjudication. 
Only pompous lawyers—but no sociologist of law—could be naive or 
corrupt or perhaps blind enough to overlook the fact that restraints imposed by 
modem law on governmental oppression are at best limited. Certain forms of 
social domination are perhaps more civilized because of certain legal forms. 
These legal forms help to disguise milder cases of dominance or structural 
oppression by the state or other social agencies, institutions, groups, and 
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structures. Still, the rule of law may have a socially beneficial effect in 
transitional societies if it successfully penetrates into and permeates all 
normative structures in society, or at least if it becomes an efficient model 
for all normative systems developed around state law. It is important to have 
a normative system that at least has the ambition to envelope all of society 
and which at least promises to provide—and in certain regards actually 
provides—particular solutions to social conflicts and aspirations that are not 
arbitrary in nature. To the extent that this system can effectively limit the power 
of government, it will indicate or signal that power can be limited honestly and 
credibly. 
Hence the special importance of the problem of pluralism in post-communist 
law. It is in this context that this article intends to determine the extent to which 
the values of modern law as expressed in the constitution and constitutional law 
actually exist in the law on the books and in the law in action. The paper also 
makes an attempt to show how state law permeates other normative structures 
which apply to the very same relations state law intends to govern, and I also try 
to locate the spheres which are outside of state law's reach, and to identify their 
various competing normative structures. In other words, even if some level of 
legal pluralism is likely inevitable, the normative issue for post-communist law 
is the examination of the extent to which the law of the state (that claims to be 
the depository of universal constitutional values) can maintain a central role for 
itself. The problem of the social impact of state law is further complicated by the 
constitutional mandate and mission of government and official law. After all, for 
reasons of legitimacy, the state tends to represent itself and its actions as being 
mandated or sanctioned by the constitution. 
The state—which is inevitably a major social player—generates a whole 
agenda for itself in the name of carrying out the goals of the constitution. As a 
result, state enacted and enforced law has a special and often central role in 
modem and post-modem societies. This is not to say that the law is monolithic 
and thus is the only normative system determining social action. State law is 
just one of the various competing normative orders. It is a relatively recent 
phenomenon that centralized state law became the dominant normative order, or 
at least that it could make such a claim. In many countries state law at the level 
of legal theory and constitutional law was held sovereign, i.e. not only supreme 
but exclusive too, from an official perspective. This supremacy was never 
complete however, as one can already see in Max Weber's complaints about the 
particularist corporative order recreated at the advent of the 20th century. 
Even the modem formal-rational legal system itself is subject to internal 
pluralism, as there are competing legal subsystems within it. These subsystems, 
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like for example the various branches of law in continental systems or the 
parallel enactments of competing state bodies (including branches of power and 
competing public administrations), are never fully harmonized, even though 
modem law tries to develop intellectual (substantive) and procedural means to 
resolve or at least control such conflicts. Internal pluralism refers to different 
phenomena. State law is composed of culturally different traditions and is 
generated by competing decision-making bodies, and to an extent these 
subsystems continue to resist attempts at normative and social homogenization. 
Note for example that even in England—a country that is seen by many as the 
model country for the rule of law—prisons had been beyond the reach of 
external judicial control until very recently. Today legal homogeneity attempts 
to extend judicial review to even these areas previously off-limit, but the limits 
of judicial and constitutional review in Hungary also designate the current limits 
of homogenization. 
It is also important to understand the notion of pluralism from the social 
actor 's perspective as well. Citizens have multiple—and to some extent 
conflicting—legal statuses. This plurality is of course partly the consequence 
of the existing multiplicity of competing roles of the individual who exists in a 
complex society. The applicability of a certain set of rules depends on the 
qualification of one's legal status. The alien (migrant) who spends six months at 
the same detention center first as an illegal entrant, then as an asylum seeker, 
then, after positive review as a non-resident alien, and finally as a resident alien 
notices enormous differences in treatment. 
Legal pluralism is often used to refer to the relationship of normative orders. 
It is undeniable that quite often a system of norms not created or enforced by the 
state prevails over state law. There are important pockets of non-modernized 
sectors in modern societies with their own partial normative systems. It is, 
however, misleading to call all these normative systems as "legal" or "law". In 
most of the actual cases the problem of state law is simply that it has to compete 
with many other forms of normative regulation. State law, and constitution 
driven law in particular, are often inefficient not only because of a lack of 
resources to guarantee that they can perform their declared function, but also 
because of the official value system they tend to impose on social organizations 
and institutions. On the other hand, the concepts of non-state-law tend to 
disregard the characteristics of modem law, those characteristics, which make 
formal and general law so important for modernity. In this context constitutional 
universalia are both formal (e.g. elements of the rule of law) and substantive 
(equality, rights). Constitutionalism is an attempt to structure government 
through checks and balances. From a societal perspective this means the 
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exclusion of certain means for particular social groups in their attempts to access 
state power. 
Only some of the normative orders that compete in contemporary society 
have features which make them similar to state law. A normative system may 
compete with official law in a number of ways. Some of these competing 
systems show considerable similarity to law in their structure (e.g. in terms of 
generality, sanctions etc.) If normative systems use similar or interfering codes 
and signals, then the issue of coordination and primacy comes up. It is in this 
context that the social primacy of state law within legal pluralism becomes 
relevant. Successful competitors with official law dispose of one of the basic 
characteristics of state law, namely reliance on the use of coercion (sometimes 
including official enforcement), and the generality and abstractness of rules. 
Non-state law may rely on legitimization related to its creation. Modem state 
norms are very often democratically legitimized—i.e. they are creations— 
while alternative systems have their roots in traditions and/or are supported by 
common practice. But even in non-state (unofficial) normative systems the 
beginning of the existence of the norms predate decision and action, and thus 
societal actors are aware of these norms by default. More or less systematically 
they cover entire areas of social life and they are enforced partly by the use 
of force, partly by communal sanctions. As such these competing normative 
systems challenge the constitutional order which insists on the domestic 
applicability of its universal values and arrangements. 
To the extent that local normative systems are pre-modem or post-modem in 
their particularism, there is a potential conflict with the modernity components 
of the "universalist" constitution. Actual constitutions and constitution-generated 
systems of norms depart from the alleged "universalism" both in the East and in 
the West. Some of the most obvious examples of constitutional concessions 
which create exceptions to universal principles of constitutionalism are the 
accommodations made for religious institutions or the institutionalization of 
the concept of the state of emergency. The acceptance of special personal, 
religious or ethnic legal regimes in the constitution allows for hidden 
adjustments in the legal system. This latter development is, however, very 
controversial as it may result in the extension of constitutional control to 
uncharted spheres of social interaction and hence may lead to new conflicts 
and previously unforeseen irrelevance. 
The concept of legal pluralism results in a paradigm change in legal 
thinking. This is directed against positivist concepts of law which are based 
on sovereignty and exclusivity. This positivism was reinforced by the "consti-
tutionalization" of law. Constitutionalization as one of the latest developments 
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of legal "universalism" means thai all branches of law are destined to be subject 
to an increased level of constitutional review, and in addition their internal value 
system and even their reasoning is intended to be governed by the constitution. 
These trends allegedly increase homogeneity within law. The claim that these 
trends represent universal tendencies and even universal values adds to the 
legitimacy of the constitution and correspondingly to that of law because it 
indicates that the system meets international standards.5 
Even if one admits the polycentricity of law one ought to take a position 
regarding the place of state law. The constitutional legal system has a dis-
tinguished place among the competing or coexisting normative systems. A 
constitutionally reinforced positive legal system has distinct roles in the shaping 
of the social order. The penetration of constitutional universalia into a legal 
system has contradictory consequences. Constitutional universalism does have a 
potential to homogenize the legal system, e.g. it extends the scope of the rights 
language and juridification. However, at the same time it causes new value 
conflicts and new institutional conflicts. 
A universal value system may be imposed on existing subsystems of social 
action in such a way that this results in new conflicts. This might be aggravated 
by the institutional conflicts within the legal system: legal actors too have 
their own interests which might be jeopardized by universal constitutional 
imperialism. Hence the conflict between constitutional and other courts, hence 
the reluctance of ordinary judges to look at the constitution. 
The constitutionalization of law is inherently a source of conflict both within 
and outside the legal system. At the same time it can be quite successful in 
creating rationally or judicially manageable frameworks for social and political 
conflicts. Constitutionalization may also help to increase the degree of social 
inclusion of certain marginal groups (at least at a symbolic level). But in cases 
where constitutional "resolutions"6 did cause the legal system to be more 
inclusive and thus managed to defuse social conflict, constitutional juridification 
also increased law's social presence. Law exercises a certain mental control vis-
à-vis other normative systems, even if it does not always succeed in determining 
human behavior. Pre- and post-modem social thinking will conflict with the 
universalistic logic of formal law made of general commands. It should be added 
5
 The universalism of recognition and the competition among sources of normative 
recognition is an important dimension of legitimacy and conflict among normative 
systems. See Sajó, A.: Rights in Post-Communism. In: Western Rights? Post-Communist 
Applications (ed.: Sajó, A.). Deventer, 1996. 
6
 The term was used by Timothy Garton Ash to describe the odd combination of 
revolution and reform that characterized the dismantling state-socialism. 
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that the contribution of modern constitutions to modern law is ambiguous. 
Certain values that are part of contemporary constitutionalism in some of its 
forms—namely welfare rights—may undermine the formal qualities of modem 
law to the extent that they enable material justice and (often quite arbitrary) state 
intervention in spheres of private life. 
What is the result of the attempts of competing normative systems to 
minimize the influence of modem law? Do they result in the perpetuation of pre-
modem structures or in a perpetual disorder of mutually exclusive competitive 
orders? Even where community-made or tribal normative systems prevail, or 
where state law is not implemented for one reason or another, new normative 
structures emerge and begin to function without necessarily being in open 
conflict with official law. New social practices are intended to hide non-state 
law from the state, or, alternatively to gain the state's recognition. Self-
regulation as privilege is often conceded and there are many informal guarantees 
that the state will never monitor, take into consideration, or will tum a blind eye 
to whatever is happening behind its back. 
2. The nature of legal pluralism in state-socialist Hungary 
Pre-communist Hungary had few democratic traditions yet it was nonetheless a 
country with considerable official respect for the rule of law. Its legal system 
was under the influence of Germany but it also had considerable peculiarities 
due to its feudal customary law and the institutionalization of a strong 
independent judiciary in the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Given the demographic 
predominance of the peasantry within the society it is not surprising that peasant 
folklore survived as a competing normative system, recognized to a small extent 
even by the courts. Further, it was part of peasant mentality to avoid coming 
into contact with the law and evade it to the fullest extent possible without 
challenging it outright. 
Under the communists the legal system copied Soviet models to a great 
extent. However, the more refined qualities of the pre-socialist legal stmcture 
did not disappear without a trace, although the legal system was rudimentary 
and allowed for nearly unlimited discretion and delegation of authority. Despite 
all of this, there was still a real need for some consistency and predictability, at 
least in order to mn the public bureaucracy, even in a system where important 
decisions were taken at secret communist party meetings. For example, 
beginning with the Sixties the law stated that citizens may receive an exit visa to 
the West once every three years, as long as such visa would not violate the 
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"public interest". The meaning of the term "public interest" was not specified in 
the law and judicial review of these decisions were not available. Nonetheless, 
the law mandated a 60 day deadline for the application to be processed. The 
conditions of applying and those of a refusal were promulgated in a norm 
accessible to the general public, although the source itself was a relatively low 
level administrative decree, which was easy to amend.7 
Legal pluralism existed as part of "socialist cohabitation", a modus vivendi 
of the middle classes that emerged under Communist Party Secretary General 
János Kádár from the late 1960's. The pragmatic party leadership realized, at 
least to some extent, that the officially declared Soviet values and goals, if 
vigorously enforced in private affairs, will run into considerable social 
resistance, which by that time the regime was more keen on trying to avoid. 
So it offered certain informal compromises leading to the tolerance of private 
entrepreneurship—however limited in scope—among others. As part of the 
same attitude of compromise the Hungarian authorities required only a limited 
active endorsement of the regime, although organizational loyalty remained a 
crucial prerequisite of social advancement within the system. 
At the same time, and partly irrespective of this soft attitude of the 
Communist Party, the individual and her few remaining personal communities 
(workplace relations, extended family) tried to develop creative forms and 
networks of cooperation that disregarded the official normative order. Although 
the state tried to penetrate private relations and control them—thereby under-
mining the social grass roots of independent normative orders—it was part of 
the communist strategy of domination that parallel normative orders were able to 
develop, in the shadow of the official yet uncertain law. 
There were two important hurdles to the emergence of these parallel 
normative systems. One, they could not exist in open defiance of the official 
normative system and two, they could not become interrelated at the level of 
social interaction or even at the level of public opinion on a national scale. At 
the shop level in the factories the workers followed their own normative 
expectations with the complicity of the foreman or even the director (as to work 
safety, hourly norm, work intensity, (lack of) productivity, (lack of) efficiency in 
the use of raw materials, distribution of assets, income, changing/altering of 
product line, etc.). However, they always did so by creating sufficient 
paperwork to demonstrate that they observed the official norms and the 
expectations of the command economy. Further, it was crucial that the disguised 
7
 In 1987 the Act on lawmaking was enacted. According to the Act rights and other 
important matters were to be regulated by acts of parliament which then meant mostly 
an act of the Presidium (law-decree). 
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normative order remain hidden from other similarly situated actors. The regime 
would not tolerate the existence of a shared local experience if that attempted to 
emerge as a public phenomenon of some scale. By keeping the local experience 
hidden the authorities were not forced to confront and acknowledge the de facto 
existence of parallel norms. 
Generated by economic scarcity a partially correlated structure of sub-legal 
(and to an extent illegal) local normative ordering, a kind of informal protocol 
of transactions, developed within the sphere of daily life. Scarcity of resources 
and their uneven distribution based on demonstration of loyalty led to the 
development of a system of exchange that included the bartering of anything 
ranging from common goods to administrative favoritism, thereby leading to a 
state of affairs bordering on the notion of systemic corruption. People were 
aware that they were committing an act of bribery in order to get a bed in a 
preferred hospital, or have access to certain consumer goods in short supply, 
or perhaps in the process of obtaining some favors (in ways that were not 
necessarily legally prohibited but certainly questionable by the "moral standards" 
of the state) when dealing with an official of the public administration, but all 
the while they maintained a peculiar sense of schizophrenia which allowed 
these illegalities and immoralities to be understood as "normal".8 So, once again, 
with institutional and even organizational complicity of the authorities, there 
were parallel normative systems, partly in violation of the official law, yet at 
the same time enabling the functioning of the system from the perspective of 
practicality. 
Compared to the legal system of the Soviet Union the primitive legal system 
of Hungary satisfied the requirements of hierarchy and predictability, a formal 
feature which the Slavic and Central Asian Republics located on the former 
Soviet territory could not master until this very day. On the other hand "socialist 
legality" failed to create a legal system which would have punished those who 
abused power to the detriment of their fellow citizens. The legal system also 
failed in establishing its own credibility with regard to the accountability of 
those holding power (including the use of force by the police). The legal system 
was only one of the many components of a society wide system of inter-
dependency which also included many unwritten rules. Instead of recognizing 
legally enforceable rights, those who were loyal received favors. This contributed 
to the gradual emergence of keeping society dependent of the state, including 
the dependence of parallel non-state normative systems on the clemency 
and mercy of the state legal system. For example, state controlled farmers' 
cooperatives increasingly participated in industrial activities, an activity that was 
8
 Sajó, A.: Hungarian victims' reaction to crime. Research Review. 1989. 1. 97-102. 
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not officially fully permitted, but could continue to prosper as long as some 
influential socialist "boss" provided political protection resulting in non-inter-
ference by police and other authorities. 
3. The system emerging after the collapse of state socialism: resources of 
constitutionalism 
In all the post-Soviet countries of Europe the formation of the new non-
communist regimes was carried out in the name of Westernization. It was 
especially the case with the creation of a rule-of-law legal and governmental 
system. The negation of the previous regime was understood—at least in the 
first years of the transition—as the adoption or even return to Western law and 
respective legal institutions. This was a legitimate goal even in the case of 
rampantly nationalist regimes because even these had to demarcate themselves 
from the inherently corrupt previous regime. Nothing seemed more credible 
than the adoption of those forms and institutions of government which were 
vehemently opposed and denounced by the communist regimes. Furthermore, 
in some countries there was a genuine popular discontent with the lawless 
oppression of the past regime. While the early legislation and constitution-
making of the Nineties was essentially a rapid wholesale importation of Western 
laws and legal principles, the process was plagued by many misinterpretations, 
deliberate distortions, and a general lack of systematic implementation. The 
process was inevitably slowed down more and more, partly because of costs 
and social irrelevancy, and partly because of the increased ability to formally 
articulate locally emerging initiatives specific to the unique circumstances of a 
particular country. This genuine development was often formulated in the shape 
of nationalist ideology, erroneously referring to national legal traditions which, 
in reality, were actually often Soviet and bureaucratic traditions in origin. Such 
resistance to change helped to preserve the status quo ante. 
Nevertheless, there were countries like Hungary with markets wide open to 
international investment, as they truly depended on foreign investment and thus 
could not afford economic isolation. As for the political sphere, political groups 
were not dependent on the monopolization of political power. This meant that 
the legal system continued to develop along Western lines (primarily following 
German models and increasingly those of the European Union as well). The 
drive to Westernize the legal system was also fueled by the commonly held 
position pronouncing the importance of entering the camp of the West 
institutionally, by way of joining NATO and the European Union. Western 
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recognition continued to play a major role in legitimating the democratically 
elected or established political power. Perhaps the inferiority complex of the 
new leaders rooted in their lack of sufficient understanding and knowledge of 
the Western world contributed to such needs for legitimacy. These factors might 
also have been supplemented by the actual dependency on foreign investors of 
both the country and the citizens from the very beginning.9 
In a number of areas the current character of the legal system is reminiscent 
of a somewhat simplified, yet relatively modem Western European system, at 
least as far as the law on the books is concerned. Notwithstanding some deliberate 
distortions, today there are effectively functioning institutions safeguarding the 
implementation of an impressive new body of law. Most of the usual guarantees 
of independence are in place. The civil service sector is subject to law, and 
offers a secure long-term professional carrier opportunity. Closely related to this 
phenomenon is the tendency which has seen the number of lawyers on the bar 
increase tenfold and accordingly the number of law students admitted to 
university is almost one magnitude higher than the numbers registered in 1988. 
The Hungarian Constitutional Court initiated a vigorous campaign to protect and 
even to create fundamental rights. The attempts of the Constitutional Court were 
met by the formal acquiescence of the government. Still, even at this moment 
there are more than a dozen constitutional omissions which have not been 
remedied by the legislative branch, notwithstanding the (sometimes repeated) 
condemnation of the Court. Very slowly—and in a most controversial way— 
constitutional values and rules (including the "universalism" of the ECHR) do 
penetrate into the jurisprudence of lower level courts. 
Nevertheless, there is growing discontent with the functioning of the legal 
system, and anecdotal evidence (amplified by the press and "law and order" 
politicians) indicates that the system is malfunctioning or that it is socially 
irrelevant, partly because of the efficiency limiting consequences of the rule of 
law. It is true that law can no longer be used as a cynical tool of monopolistic 
oppression. Nonetheless, it promotes the domination of the political power 
holders, enabling them to gain and protect personal advantages. The formalities 
of the rule of law helped the elite to steal the state and later to keep the booty. 
People believe that there is rampant corruption and that the laws are written in a 
way that favors the powerful, including those members of the nomenclature who 
managed to transform their social networking capital into power and property. 
Tax evasion is wide spread and systematic, and employment is often unreported 
in order to avoid the otherwise excessive social security contributions, and many 
4
 In Hungary even the racist party leaders expect legitimacy from being pictured in 
the company of Le Pen. 
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contracts of sale or services are not formalized at all or are finessed. The law 
offers limited protection against police abuse, neither does it provide safety on 
the streets against crime. The overall performance of law enforcement agencies 
is considered to be poor and the authority of the police is much less respected 
than in most Western European countries. At the same time most people do not 
expect to get meaningful protection of their property and contractual rights 
from courts and public administration. Private enforcement of contracts (debt-
collection, including abusive enforcement) is on the rise. Consumers are less 
protected than ever, at least the consumer protection inspectorate thinks so when 
reporting that in retail trade at least half or as much as 60 per cent of products 
sold are defective or substandard (smaller actual weight, no warranty, poor 
quality, etc.). In particular those in a weaker social position expect no protection 
from the courts and the administrative system. Rather, they continue to perceive 
themselves not as rights-holders but as dependent clients of the state. 
The "rule of law", one of the fixations of the Hungarian Constitutional 
Court and of the emerging political and economic elite, has some perhaps 
unintended consequences. For example, former communists never actually had 
to wake up on a day of reckoning as a result of the insistence on the rule of law 
and personality rights, thus holding responsible former communists and secret 
service agents for their actions in the past has been halted, while personal 
dossiers of these former agents of the regime remained under the exclusive 
management of the government in power until at least 2003. Along the same 
line (i.e. rule of law), questionable privatization contracts with implicit 
advantages to the new owner remain in force, and other privatization and bank 
consolidation deals based on explicit favoritism, corruption, and embezzlement 
remain off limits. 
4. Parallel normative systems 
a) Continued illegal normative systems within the legal system (the "norm-
making" power of scarce resources) 
Under state socialism it was one of the preconditions of social cohabitation that 
no sphere—except for, to a limited extent, family relations—could claim relative 
independence or autonomy from the state. It is in this respect that civil society 
was in any way meaningful to the individual. The desire to be part of civil society 
simply indicated a need for spheres immune f rom aggressively inquisitive 
state oversight. 
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Today, the extent to which social subsystems and various spheres of social 
activity have gained independence from the state and the viability of their 
respective normative orders still remains to be seen. It is clear that in sectors 
where market conditions have prevailed the former scarcity based normative 
systems have also disappeared. Today, trivial as it may sound, no shopper is 
going to have to bribe a salesperson to buy a pair of blue jeans at the store. By 
the same token, the conduct of the salesperson is determined by the ever 
changing rules of the labor market and the rules set by the store management 
itself. However, contrast is most apparent where the state continues to be the 
provider of services without adequate resources, for example, in health care and 
education. There, scarcity prevails. This means that traditional normative 
structures of normalized illegality remain in place unchanged, including the 
necessity (on both the side of the provider and the recipient of services) of 
rampant corruption in exchange for rightful services or illegal favors. In these 
scenarios, obviously, patterns developed earlier are carried over and continue to 
be useful. Consequently, corruption becomes increasingly normalized with the 
unintended effect that it may become a model of operation even in those areas 
that are not affected by the scarcity of resources. 
The schizophrenia of legal consciousness remains a constant, while in the 
meantime a highly problematic solution emerges. Cynicism seems to be the 
universal answer and the way out of this conundrum: it is not even perceived as 
immoral to be on the recipient end of and participate in cultures of corruption. 
This tendency may well end up undermining the legitimacy of the new 
constitutional democracies.10 In a way even the rule of law may contribute 
to shortage and scarcity and hence create new opportunities for corruption. 
The recent history of the land register is a telling example. Land records became 
crucial documents in the privatization process. The workload of the admin-
istrative agencies responsible for maintaining and updating the records increased 
dramatically. The state's monopoly of registration resulted in excessive delays 
which were not acceptable to the participants of the rapid privatization process. 
As a result, lawyers and other actors increasingly performed the role of the 
middleman in greasing the hands of the administrators in order to get expedited 
processing and increasingly even for falsifying the records of the land register. 
Immense administrative delays also lead to the evolution of a new industry 
operating on the currency of small favors and bribery. Volunteer experts would 
offer their services for adequate compensation to process requests at the speed of 
light. 
10
 See Sajó, A.: Corruption, Clintelism, and the Future of the Constitutional State in 
Eastern Europe. 7 East European Constitutional Review 2, 1998. 37. 
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b) Forms of internal pluralism 
There is still enormous dependency on the state, and not only in the economy 
(70-80 per cent of which is privatized) but in all spheres of private and 
communal life as well. Religious exercise, non-govemmental activities, local 
self-governments, pensions and culture all depend on a politicized central 
government. Until recently even broadcasting had been a state monopoly. 
In Hungary such dependency is "constitutionalized" in the sense that both the 
government and the Constitutional Court find the active promotion of con-
stitutional welfare rights the obligation of the state. 
The towering all-encompassing presence of the state, a fact of life inherited 
from state-socialism is, however, over. It seems to have been replaced by mutual 
dependence between civil society and the state, or more specifically between 
a clientele of service recipients and government bureaucracies. In theory, 
codependence of the public and private institutions is likely to lead to some kind 
of domination of either one or the other. Here an entirely new phenomenon 
emerges: the interdependent private spheres try to take over the state (see "state 
capture"11 ) and determine its law. 
In this struggle two predominant strategies seem to have emerged so far: 
(a) increasingly ambitious attempts to lobby the legislature that a private 
ordering of a particular segment of life be blessed as general norm (termination 
of pluralism in favor of particularism), and (b) private and non-govemmental 
stmctures pressure the state to allow their own private ordering to prevail and 
exist "undisturbed" or even receive state sanctioning and enforcement (exclusive 
private ordering).12 
In reality, of course, these are well known developments in neo-corporate 
formations. The surprising development in Hungary is that here relatively weak 
corporate formations are successful. In Hungary about 12 per cent of the 
population is actively practicing religion (many of them follow non-mainstream 
religions), although nominally 70 per cent of the population considers itself of 
"Christian origin". In the past nine years, despite the lack of popular enthusiasm 
or demand for it, the politically compromised (collaborationist) leaderships of 
11
 See for example Hellman, J.-Kaufmann, D.: Confronting the Challenge of State 
Capture in Transition Economies. Finance and Development, September 2001, Vol. 38, 3. 
12 
A classic, non-post-communist example is commercial arbitration. Max Weber 
considered it as a reaction of business interests to the formal, anti-business rationality of state 
law. According to Weber arbitration is a necessity even where the private law of the state 
embodied market rationality, because bureaucracy and judges are unable to understand 
market considerations. 
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the traditional churches have been receiving rather generous financial support 
both from the socialist and the conservative governments. The ownership rights 
of buildings formerly belonging to the traditional ("historic") churches were 
returned even in cases where there were no religious personnel to make use of 
them. Also, there is another tendency in moving public education closer to 
religion in the form of financial support to church operated schools. 
Similar examples of private ordering sanctioned by the state are numerous. A 
weak and barely legitimate trade union movement got control of social security 
funds13 which were de-etatized and transferred to trade union controlled 
self-governments. All sorts of chambers of commerce have been created by 
legislation with public supervisory and disciplinary duties in areas where the 
professionals' interests clearly prevail over consumers' without proper oversight 
(i.e. trade chamber, medical chamber, the bar). Legislation has also been passed 
to create public foundations to perform government tasks (services) with 
(financial) resources transferred from the government, but without continued 
governmental supervision, intervention or personal accountability incorporated 
into the system. The bylaws of such NGOs are not subject to government 
approval since that would go against the ideal of creating a civil society 
independent of the powers that be. Quite often the boards of these public 
foundations are comprised of former civil servants who previously had been in 
charge of the very same functions, but for much lower compensation and under 
stricter conflict of interest rules than what is the norm at these foundations. 
Privatization of the state implies a private ordering that is partly immune to 
the normative expectations of the legal system. In Hungary, the problem is 
fortunately only that of scope, while in Russia, for example, private normative 
orders have been known to undermine central coordination. In Russia not only 
do the various regions and cities tend to follow their own particular legal order,14 
but even larger factories and industrial conglomerates disregard central and 
other legal norms and follow their own normative structures as to workplace 
safety, taxation, salary, contractual relations, etc. 
One does not even have to believe that contemporary law is fundamentally 
post-modern in nature (i.e. inconclusive, not well defined) to recognize that 
modem legal systems may contain competing normative structures, although 
13
 Repealed by the first law passed by the newly elected conservative government in 
1998. 
14
 For example, in some Russian Republics the legislation, by failing to legislate on 
private land ownership, successfully disregarded that the federal constitution expressly 
provides for the right to private property on land. The political leadership in these republics 
continues to manage land and forest as state property. 
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admittedly with relatively settled rules or formulas for resolving possible 
conflicts. It is in this context that the allegedly homogeneous15 constitutional 
system attempts to colonize other spheres of law and it is through these consti-
tutionalized legal branches that it attempts to introduce other institutions and 
interactive structures into a constitutionally devised homogeneous order.16 
c) External legal pluralism 
i) non-inclusion 
The above mentioned interdependencies of the private normative structures and 
law reveal a typical tension. Other normative structures simply disregard or 
challenge state law, and hence in that case there is not even a chance for the rule 
of law and values of legal modernity to prevail. 
First of all, so long as there are non-integrated communities in society there 
will be separate and segregated quasi legal systems. State-socialism intended to 
atomize its subjects and tended to include all members of society in its general 
network of supervision. In part these conscious and systematic attempts of 
atomization were due to a fear of autonomy of any sort, including autonomy 
of communities. Hence—at least in Hungary—very few groups managed to 
maintain their own self-supporting norms. The most significant example of this 
norm protection could be observed in the Romani (Gypsy) community, which 
quickly regained some of its earlier (although distorted) customs after the end of 
state dominance. Such increased reliance on a parallel system of norms is partly 
the result of increased segregation that followed the massive lay-offs after the 
collapse of communism, affecting disproportionately the Roma. Clan-based 
normative systems became vital for survival of the segregated Roma with the 
growing marginalization and prejudice that followed the collapse of state 
socialism turning increasing numbers of Roma into social outcasts. Suddenly, 
thousands of people17 found themselves excluded from state supported social 
" Of course, the constitution itself is a source of institutional (inter-branch) and 
value conflicts. 
16
 These phenomena are known in Germany as third party effect (Drittwirkung). Similar 
trends emerged in New York Times v. Sullivan. 
17
 There are probably 400-600,000 Roma in Hungary, although at least a third of them 
fully integrated into the lower working classes, and another perhaps 20-30 per cent not living 
in segregated communities. The isolation is more visible in Romania, where the Gypsies 
were hardly ever settled and where their number at least a couple of millions. Here, obviously 
the parallel legal system is more visible and widespread, among others because there their 
customs were never corrupted to the extent they were in Hungary due to the partial 
social integration. 
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networks because of segregation. The Roma could not rely on state law as a 
system of protection as this was increasingly denied of them. Other similar 
factors of growing alienation from official law include the application of legal 
rules which were harmful to Roma or were applied in a prejudicial way, such as 
18 
relating to the due process guarantees of criminal procedures. Needless to say 
the functioning of a so-called culturally based legal pluralism is significantly 
more critical in multiethnic societies where ethnicity is also a designator of 
competing cultures. This was the case of Albanians in Yugoslavia and 
Macedonia, and of many Muslim and nomadic communities in Russia. 
There are other examples of differentiated life-forms which tend to disregard 
the state without confronting it. There is of course a known sphere outside or 
above the law. The wealthy can afford to pay (or avoid) all the fines imposed by 
a weak state and conduct a life of their own disregarding the law. The wealthy 
are ready to pay the parking and speeding tickets, if unavoidable, and pay the 
penalties for building villas without a building permit where zoning regulations 
may be in place in order to protect an environmentally sensitive area. Or better, 
they use their enormous resources (financial and social) to delay enforcement, or 
bribe officials if it is cheaper than paying penalties. If pressured, they usually 
find an even weaker state to repatriate to. 
ii) legal orders attempting to take over the state legal order 
(the" criminalization of the state" ) 
The most important normative order competing with, challenging, and in certain 
countries endangering official law is the law of criminal (illegal) organizations. 
Sometimes these are systems of rules generated within large organizations 
which were created by or with complicity of the government, such as oil and 
gas companies. Extraction, refining, and export-import are usually licensed 
monopolies. These activities—often being of a criminal nature themselves— 
generate further criminality as the profits move into other explicitly illegal forms 
of investments (drug and arms). The people involved in these large sectors are 
operating by a set of relatively simple rules which apply to their entire conduct. 
People who get involved in this world usually do so without the possibility of 
opting out at a later time. 
18
 It is not the subject of the present paper to decide whether the Roma-official law 
conflicts are increasing because of the growing Roma-"White" conflict, or the conflict is 
growing because of the cultural differences among the two normative systems. This is a 
multi-cultural conflict which could not manifest itself under socialism as socialism oppressed 
all diversity, and also destroyed Roma culture through superficial integration. 
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A second major area where the government's legal involvement is critical 
in many regards is banking. In this sector, at least in Hungary, the direct in-
volvement of organized crime with the ownership structure (although the oil 
industry does need banks for money transfers, that is, laundering purposes) is 
believed to be marginal. The law used to allow privileges, such as lack of 
stringent regulation of the writing off of bad debt, legalized forms of self-
dealing, etc. In exchange the management of banks which were dependent on 
state bail outs were ready to finance government initiatives. No-interest loans 
were offered to government people. In this example the borderline between 
state law and bank generated (but officially sanctioned) practices that have 
the power to transform the entire national economic landscape becomes 
impossible to locate. The self-regulation of the banking sector partly operates 
as a private regulatory system that is sanctioned by government. Banking laws, 
like in more advanced market economies, are written to a great extent by 
the banking community. Further, the official regulation creates and enables a 
private system which has more practical influence on everyday life than direct 
governmental regulation itself. Banking law, or rather the law of the banks, is 
the result of hidden yet formally completely legalized interaction with state 
law, or at least with official figures in charge. 
In both cases (oil and banks) official law helps to legitimize immoral and by 
ordinary standards very often illegal corporate behavior which then has the 
enormous power to shape the fundamental social and economic stmctures within 
emerging market economies. It is within this interaction, above all, where the 
formal structures of modem law fail to exert the much needed positive impact 
they are designed to bring to society. Ultimately, state law may in fact fail to 
properly shape elementary forms of social interaction based on equality, trust 
and reliance, and perhaps even a sense of justice. 
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 David, R.: Les grands systèmes de droit contemporaines (Droit comparé), Paris, 1964. 
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do not, apart from a few commonplaces, devote much attention to it either. In 
textbooks, Canada is usually characterised—perhaps to even further emphasise 
the peripheric or downright provincial role attributed to it anyway—by some 
simple stereotypes according to which the largest part of the area, once 
developed under British influence, unified later on in a federation, while 
Quebec could retain its French law from 1663 until today. Its geographical 
location neighbouring the United States has all along—and mainly from 
post-World War II-years (first of all in foreign policy and government 
administration, but sensible in the tone of scholarly and journalistic literature as 
well)—served as a motive to emphasise its sovereignty; albeit, for obvious 
reasons, it can scarcely (and increasingly less) withdraw itself from the 
dominant influence of the adjacent superpower in aspects as philosophical 
orientation, artistic taste, legal patterns and other segments of life.2 Nowadays, 
Canada excels in both high living standard and openly professed 
multiculturalism as one of the most self-confident leading powers of the world. 
Its law has indeed developed in a periphery. The English-speaking parts of 
the one-time dominion followed the usual development of a British colonial 
empire until the recent past, in both decision-making tradition and partial 
codification.3 The French-speaking part, Quebec, has retained French law 
irrespective of the fact that France renounced its sovereignty already centuries 
ago. The overall legal continuity was interrupted only by the systematic 
codification achieved by Napoleon in France. This explains why the necessity of 
resuming legal contacts was formulated as the reason for preparing and 
promulgating a Code civil de Québec (1866), 62 years after the issuance of Code 
Napoléon. The preamble reads as follows: "the old laws still in force in Lower 
[University Casebook Series]; Bogdan, M.: Comparative Law. Dewenter, 1994. 245 pp. The 
classical work of Schnitzler, A. F.—Vergleichende Rechtslehre. Basel, 1955. xii + 497—is 
genuinely outstanding in giving at least a rough outline (207-208) of the foundations and 
directions Canada's law has taken throughout history. 
2
 Having stayed in Quebec enjoying the hospitality of Professor Melkevik just at the time 
of the terrorist attack on September 11, 2001, against New York and other US-towns (about to 
leave for Montreal and then for Toronto), I was confronted with the fact that almost all 
important settlements (thus, the residence of the great majority of population) are situated in the 
frontier zone directly bordering on the United States (from West to East, Vancouver, Brandon, 
Fort William, Hamilton, Toronto, Ottawa, Montreal and Quebec, while others, like Calgary, 
Regina and Winnipeg, are not farther from the border than a few hundred kilometres either). 
Canada's population, about the same in size as that of Hungary, can find a living only in this 
extremely narrow zone of the territory ninety times as large as Hungary. At the same time, any 
event and news beyond the strictly local sphere is naturally related to the United States or 
mediated through its channels. 
3
 E.g., Criminal Code (1883). 
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Canada are no longer re-printed or commented upon in France, and it is becoming 
more and more difficult to obtain copies of them, or of the commentaries upon 
them."4 
Of course, trying to give any rough outline involves the risk of covering up 
details-whereas theoretical dilemmas and structural features can mostly be 
understood precisely from these. The most important feature of the legal map of 
the territory and population of Canada is that the Quebec Act (1774)5 maintains 
the French heritage in property and civil rights, while the English tradition is 
followed in constitutional, administrative and criminal law. In addition, 
English testamentary and land law are extended over English settlements 
and settlers. In general, it provides for English law in commercial lawsuits and 
evidence, and it introduces jury in civil cases.6 Altogether, the French law of 
Lower Canada has been mixed from the beginning, in contrast to the English 
law of Upper Canada: "Quebec enjoys »une dualité de droit commun« and even, 
7 • 
more structurally, a »bi-systemic legal system«." It is no mere chance that, 
when having travelled to North America and visited courts in Quebec, Alexis 
de Tocqueville was astonished at the vast variety of languages and traditions 
used in jurisdiction. (In addition, we may add, he found the French language 
used there very old-sounding and outdated as regards both pronunciation and 
4
 Cf., e.g., Baudouin, L.: Les apports du Code civil de Québec. In: Canadian Juris-
prudence. The Civil Law and Common Law in Canada (ed.: McWhinney, E.), Toronto, 1958. 
71-89. 
5
 14 Geo. Ill, chap. 83. 
6
 I do not deal here with the legal status of the Indian aborigines (including their one-time 
customary law and their present claims), which is becoming topical in Canadian political and 
social public speech and also doctrinal and practical jurisprudence. For a few theoretical 
indications, see, from Melkevik, В.: Question identitaire, le droit et la philosophie juridique 
libérale: Réflexion sur le fond du droit autochtone canadien. Cahiers d'études constitutionelles 
et politiques de Montpellier (1995), No. 1, 23-37, The First Nation and Quebec: Identity and 
Law, Self-affirmation and Self-determination at Crossroads. In: Globalization in America. A 
Geographical Approach (dir. Barbosa, J. S.), Québec, 1997, 95-111 and 246, as well as 
Aboriginal Legal Cultures. In: The Philosophy of Law. An Encyclopedia (ed.: Gray, Ch. В.), 
New York-London, 1999. 1-4. [Garland Reference Library and the Humanities 1743], all 
reprinted in Melkevik, В.: Réflexions sur la philosophie du droit. Québec, 2000, part on 
'Identité et Droit', 35-87; and, as practical overviews, also Delgamuukw. The Supreme Court of 
Canada on Aboriginal Title (comm. Persky, S.), Vancouver, British Columbia, 1998. vi + 137 
pp., Isaac, Th.: Aboriginal Law. Cases, Text, Materials and Commentary [1995] 2nd ed., 
Saskatoon, Sask. 1999. xxx + 610 pp. and Macklem, P.: Indigenous Difference and the 
Constitution of Canada. Toronto, 2001. x + 334. 
7
 Glenn, H. P.: Quebec: Mixité and Monism. In: Studies in Legal Systems. Mixed and 
Mixing (ed. Örücii, E.-Attwooll, E.-Coyle, S.), The Hague, 5, the first part-quotation by Pigeon, 
L.-P.: Rédaction et interprétation des lois, Québec, 2nd ed. (1978), 50. 
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intonation.8) Well, it was the co-existence of these two great cultures that 
generated, shortly after World War I, the need for Canada to show its own 
singularity by expressing its independent nationhood in and by the law, thereby 
contributing, at least with a symbolic force, to a French-Canadian identity too.4 
This natural desire for self-determination began to bring its fruits by the 
times around World War II. For instance, in the early 1940s, one reported about 
a growing "prejudice, commencing in the law schools and extending to the 
courtrooms, against the use of American authorities and texts."10 Then, in a 
few decades, the demand emerged towards "Canadian judges developing 
Canadian law to meet Canadian needs".11 This era coincided in francophone 
Canada with the period of ambitions for separation also in law, but reflected 
an overall awakening of Canada in every respect. Genuine professors with 
scholarly attitudes, sometimes distinguished and committed to academic 
career, started to appear in law schools, gradually replacing practising judges 
and lawyers having usually shuttled between their offices and the university. 
They already embody a new style, scholarly methodology and theoretical 
sensitivity, able to bring about magisterial works. This way soon trends and 
schools emerge to compete with each other; an independent doctrine is formed 
as developed from the own legal staff; and, from this time on, no longer only 
law claims to embody the nation but also legal scholarship enters the scene to 
become widely acknowledged as an integral part of Canadian public thought, 
intellectual life and internationally acclaimed performance.12 
The processes-resultants and impacts—are intertwined. What might have 
once seemed to be one of the causes of a peripheral situation, is about to indicate 
today general (further)developmental directions (perspectives and availabilities)— 
perhaps not yet in a way obvious for us, as the entire Central and Eastern 
European region is in a flux of constant forming—of universal (or at least global) 
(world)trends. I mean here a kind of inherent lack of originality as one of the 
8
 de Tocqueville, A.: Oeuvres complètes. Voyages en Sicile et aux États Unis, t. 5, vol. 1, 
2e éd. Mayer, J.-P., Paris, 1957. 212-213. 
9
 "C'est par sa façon d'exprimer le Droit qu'une nation manifeste en partie son 
originalité"—writes Perrault, A. [Pour la défense de nos lois françaises, Montréal, 1919), 8] as 
a programme. 
10
 In: Canadian Bar Review 21 (1943), 57. 
11
 Read, H.: The Judicial Process in Common Law Canada. Canadian Bar Review 37 
(1959), 268. 
12
 As a case study, see, e.g., Normand, S.: Tradition et modernité à la Faculté de droit de 
l'Université Laval de 1945 à 1965. In: Aux frontières du juridique. Études interdisciplinaires sur 
les transformations du droit (dir. Belley, J.-G.-Issalys, P.), Québec, 1993., 137-183. Cf. also 
Melkevik, В.: La philosophie du droit au Québec: développements récents. In: Melkevik, В.: 
Réflexions sur la philosophie du droit. 177-192. 
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features of Canada, deeply rooted in and conditioned by its past. Of course, 
in itself this is but the outcome of historical donnés which—amidst Canada's 
early by-British and by-French development—did not require or promote own 
solutions to be attained. Although those remote Canadian re-formulations of 
English and French technicalities may have been faint replicas in law, in their 
new medium they were exposed to interact in a depth never experienced by the 
proud and legally chauvin isolationisms of 19th to 20th century England and 
France (sharing maybe one single experience in common, their old disdain 
towards the Germans). What I mean here is the mixing and irreversible inter-
mingling of these laws,13 which, due to the latter's co-existence and co-operation 
with the knowledge resulting therefrom, offers unprecedented experience 
entitling Canadian lawyers to develop a well-founded self-confidence 
indeed. For such an added and cumulative knowledge can hardly be gained 
otherwise. Notwithstanding, the pluralism of the parts mixed in themselves 
does not inevitably imply the pluralism of the entire structure.14 Accordingly, 
"mixed jurisdictions may function as monist jurisdictions. The original 
sources of law may be disparate in character, yet monist, state institutions 
may already have largely completed the task of transfiguration into a 
single, national, systemic structure of law."15 
The process of interaction may have also been accelerated by the unpre-
cedentedly enviable fact that the education of both Common Law and Civil Law 
within the same faculties and offering separate degrees began some decades ago, 
and now also common law is taught in French and vice versa.16 Traditions 
mixed appear also in scholarship with an enhanced interest in both intra- and 
extra-Canadian comparison of laws. A development like this is not simply the 
result of some practical decision. Whether we think of the experience (and 
crucial theoretical message) of the mutual (\in)translatability of legal texts 
13
 Cf., e.g., Tancelin, M.: Comment un droit peut-il être mixte? In: Le domaine et l'inte-
prétaton du Code Civil du Bas Canada (dir. Walton, F. P.), Toronto, 1980. 1-32. 
14
 See, first of all, Rouland, N.: Les droits mixtes et les théories du pluralisme juridique. In: 
La formation du droit national dans les pays de droit mixte. Aix-en-Provence, 1989. 41—55, 
especially 42, quoted by Glenn: 'Quebec', 1. 
15
 Ibid. 
16
 At present, parallel degrees in Civil Law and Common Law can be earned at McGill 
University (Montreal) and the University of Ottawa; the Universities of Ottawa and Moncton 
offer common law programmes in French, while McGill University offers civil law in English. 
Other faculties provide a variety of student exchange programmes, and the federal government 
arranges for inter-Canadian comparative legal studies organised every summer. 
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within the European Union17 or of their сommensurability at the intersection of 
18 
diverging legal cultures, evidently both refer to the hermeneutic significance 
of the symptom "I interpret your culture through mine" (symbolised by the 
figurative expression of "missionaries in the boat")19 and, thereby, to the fact 
20 
that, beyond sheer textuality, law is primordially an expression of culture. 
Accordingly, the use of another language is not simply an issue of translation (or 
communication technique) but the choice of another culture, that is, an issue of 
doing interpretation (re-interpretation) in another—inevitably different—medium. 
* 
Developments in present-day Canada are of a special interest for us first of all 
because they, with the interaction of two leading European traditions in law, 
highlight mutual influences with the perspective of convergence (which, in view 
of the unificatory civil law codification decided by the European Union, has 
raised the topicality of rapprochement of Common Law and Civil Law and, 
within it, the need for reconsidering the controversy Savigny and Thibaut had in 
18th-century Germany21), and also outline the potentials of development (or of 
possible deformation) in the light of the Canadian experiment with experiences 
lived through. Here I recall again, as the indication of a kind of belated 
development, the specific feature of the Canadian past which I referred to 
earlier as a mere followance of external patterns under peripheric conditions, 
accompanied by a lack of self-reliance. For around the mid-20th century, this 
state of mind was replaced by self-building and self-determination set as a 
new objective. Unbalancedness, swinging into opposites and neophytism 
may accompany the process. Provincial imitation is replaced by autonomous 
17
 Cf., e.g., de Groot, G. R.: Recht, Rechtssprache und Rechtssystem: Betrachtungen über 
die Problematik der Übersetzung juristischer Texte. Terminologie et traduction 3 (1991), 279-
312 [abridged transi. In: European Legal Cultures (ed.: Gessner, W.-Hoeland, A.-Varga, Cs.), 
Aldershot, Brookfteld USA, Singapore, Sydney, 1996, para 20, 115-120 (Tempus Textbook 
Series on European Law and European Legal Cultures I)]. 
18
 Cf., e.g., from Glenn, H. P.: Commensurabilité et traduisibilité. In: Actes du Colloque 
"Harmonisation et dissonance: Langues et droit au Canada et en Europe (mai 1999)" published as 
a double issue in Revue de la common law 3 (2000) 1-2, 53-66. and Are Legal Traditions 
Incommensurable? The American Journal of Comparative Law XLIX (Winter 2001) 1, 133-146. 
19
 Cf. Cohn, В. S.: Anthropology and History: The State of the Play. Comparative Studies in 
Society and History, 22 (1980), 199. 
20
 Cf., from the author: Lectures on the Paradigms of Legal Thinking. Budapest, 1999. vii + 
279 [Philosophiae Iuris]. 
21
 Cf., e.g., from the author: Codification à l'aune du troisème miéllénaire. In: Mélange 
offert au Professeur Paul Amselek. Strasbourg, 2003. [in press]. 
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construction. At the same time, Canada's economic safety coupled with relative 
political tranquillity and constitutional stability encourages to kinds of 
experimentation which could by far not be available elsewhere (because of 
imperial dimensions or the want of reserves). Moreover, situations brought 
about by chance or provoked by empty slogans may come about due to in-
experience. Needless to say that the final balance will be drawn up by the people 
of Canada. However, for the external observer, all this schemes a path for the 
future. For everything in move in Canada develops in line with dominant ideas 
of our age, mainstream but also self-fulfilling.22 
In this overview, I undertake to analyse (1) the change in the role precedents 
play in judicial process; (2) the transformation of law-application into a 
collective, multicultural and multifactorial search for finding a practical solution, 
assessable by inter-national standards; (3) the practical trends of dissolving the 
law both in common law and civil law jurisprudence; and, finally, (4) the new 
prerogatives acquired by courts for their own procedure, such as a) the unfolding 
of principles from the statutory provisions, themselves taken as mere guide-
marks for the courts, b) the critical filtering of the entire legal system 
according to the Charters' human rights by deducing legal solutions directly 
from the constitution and, in conclusion, c) the courts becoming an ultimate 
ethical forum in debated moral issues as well. 
1. The transformation of the role of precedents 
Our thinking may prove to be ahistorical whether or not we realise it. In average 
cases, we tend to take any event as a preliminary by presuming the present to be 
given with frameworks consolidated, and try to analyse and understand anything 
that merely precedes it, by forcing it into a straitjacket often alien and external to 
it, thereby also distorting it. In our present-day legal thought, we tend to 
consider the body of common law and the entire English legal tradition as a 
normative material differing from continental law mostly in methodological 
elaboration, albeit the substantiation (substantivisation) of the decisional patterns 
of English law, developing mainly from the adaptation of forms of action and 
formulated mostly through procedural forms, is only a product of initiatives 
22
 One of my vital Canadian sources has been the oeuvre of Glenn, H. P.: Legal Traditions 
of the World. Sustainable Diversity in Law, Oxford, 2000. xxiv + 371, a universal overview, 
based upon the generalising re-consideration of his observations built on comparisons focussing 
on Canada. 
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taken in the 19th century and not earlier.23 Moreover, as a result of historical 
reconstruction, we may even declare that practically every feature that had once 
caused the tradition of common law to divert from civil law development has by 
now disappeared from behind the reality of this law over the past one and a half 
centuries. To wit, there are no forms of action in England any more; the 
institution of jury has in the meantime declined; those few ambulant justices 
once wandering all through the kingdom have in the meantime been replaced by 
a judicial moloch with an army of judges; the decisive judicial role of the first 
and last instance declaring what in the case the law is has disappeared from 
this machinery of an enormous hierarchical complexity; the number of cases to 
be heard by a judge has increased sky-high, with litigation having grown to 
massive proportions; the one-time exceptionality of judicial adjudication has 
been degraded into a mere state-provided servicing, and, with the solemnity of 
justice reduced to mere routine, judicature has transformed into case-managing-
adjudication, fulfilled as a task to be administered obligatorily; substantive 
law defining the legal status of behaviours shadows already the once dominant 
procedural approach; and the exclusivity of jurisdiction exercised by a handful 
of elect men is challenged by the inclusion of women and all types of careers 
recruited from fellow-citizens of various colours and cultural backgrounds, 
eligible by mere professional qualification (and 'learned' only in this 
respect).24 Even according to the self-portraying of common law, all this has 
resulted in a change of character so that from now on nothing else can identify 
common law than some vague "habit of thought".25 In the light of our post-
modern and cosmically extended universal expectations of the rule of law's 
service-providing state and law, it may seem almost bizarre to recall in 
historical contrast that even some centuries ago, the judge was not to decide out 
of duty but occasionally at times when he felt he should indeed do so, because 
he found the parties' conflict mature and balanced enough in legal positions that 
he might esteem his decision was needed indeed for the dispute to end. That 
means that, in those earlier times, the parties were expected to co-operate in 
reaching a situation somewhat cleared and balanced.26 
The unification of the judicial system in 19th century England had a series of 
impacts pointing beyond simple institutional rationalisation. In conclusion, also 
23
 Glenn, H. P.: La civilisation de la common law. Revue internationale de Droit comparé, 
45 (1993) 3,559-575. 
24
 Cf., e.g., Glenn, H. P.: The Common Law in Canada. The Canadian Bar Review (June 
1995), 261-292. 
25
 Lord Oliver of Aylmerton: Requiem for the Common Law. The Australian Law Journal 
67 (1993), 686. 
26
 Baker, J. H.: English Law and the Renaissance. Cambridge Law Journal, 44 (1985), 58. 
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the one-time identity of common law was done away with, as precisely the 
rivalling of judicial fora (referring to varying normative sources according to 
differing traditions) had until then defined the identity of English law, across 
more then half a millennium. For the Equity, the Admiralty and the 
ecclesiastical law had equally received and channelled civil law impacts so 
that ideas by Cujas, Pothier and other (mainly French) lawyers could freely 
stream into English law. True, 19th-century England did block this abundant 
source by the said re-organisation of the judiciary. All this notwithstanding, 
common law concepts and institutions could be further fertilised by the English 
interest in German pandectism during the same century.27 
As to the law's structure, Blackstone was of the opinion that "human laws 
are only declaratory of, and act in subordination to (divine law and natural 
law)".28 In fact, the unthinkable dream of a judge making law (i.e., the term 
'judge-made law') was only invented by Jeremy Bentham—in I860.29 Anyway, 
the formal system of precedents with the principle of stare decisis developed 
and solidified around the same time. Judicial law-making has become overtly 
transparent due to the growing resort to the method of distinguishing, while 
courts got accustomed to following earlier and superior decisions. All this 
presumed a renewing approach. For "Cases ( . . . ) could not be rules to be followed 
and were hence examples of the type of reasoning which had thus far prevailed 
(...). Since cases only exemplified arguments, there was no closure of sources".30 
As known, in England in 1966, the House of Lords had absolved itself 
• • • 31 , 
from the compulsory compliance with its own earlier decisions. This soon 
resulted—through the Court of Appeal's seventeen justices proceeding in 
panels—in what we can now call the practical desuetude of earlier decisions. 
(This same change of direction led to similar absolutions with the Supreme 
Court of Canada and, gradually, with all courts of the provincial Courts of 
Appeal.) All this amounts to an inevitable change in the law's overall operation. 
27
 E.g., Glenn: The Common Law..., 278. Both the rich continental collection of classical 
law libraries (especially of the Inns in London or the Bodleian at Oxford) and John Austin's 
recurrent visits to Bonn and Berlin may be remembered here. 
28
 The Sovereignty of the Law Selections from Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws 
of England (ed.: Jones, G.), University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 1973. 51, note 31. 
29
 Evans, J.: Change in the Doctrine of Precedent during the Nineteenth Century. In: 
Precedent in Law (ed.: L. Goldstein), Oxford, 1987. 
30
 Postema, G. J.: Roots of our Notion of Precedent. In: Precedent in Law, 22. In a similar 
sense, see also Lobban, M.: The Common Law and English Jurisprudence 1760-1860. Oxford-
New York, 1991. and Lieberman, D.: The Province of Legislation Determined. Legal Theory in 
Eighteenth-Century Britain Cambridge University Press, Cambridge-New York, 1989. 
31
 'Practice Statement (Judicial Precedent)' Weekly Law Reports 1 (1966), 1234, as well as 
All England Reports 3 (1966), 77. 
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From now on, one has to recognise that decision-making based upon the 
pondering of principles is replaced by a "discretionary dispute resolution 
with a low level of predictability",32 in which no component can be more than 
"relaxed" and "flexible".33 The internal order of common law countries comes 
increasingly close to what we have learned so far about their mutually fertilising 
interconnections, taking over solutions from each other with persuasive force.34 
At the same time, "Citation of single cases has been replaced by search and 
citation methods which batch or group large numbers of cases, as indicating the 
drift of decisional law."35 Accordingly, also syllogisms of law-application 
are substituted by "statistical syllogism".36 
Any theoretical formulation of the doctrine of precedent implies the dual 
chance of an ex post facto arrangement with retroactive effect (as an a posteriori 
manifestation or declaration of the law)37 and—in want of any clear formalisa-
bility, due to which "Judges (...) proceeded on the basis of law they felt they 
could reasonably articulate, through a »careful working out of shared under-
standings of common practices«."38—of social interests being weighed in the 
recourse to distinguishing. Or, the chance of the law and order getting trans-
formed into an open-ending play of social mediation has become actual and 
acute. 
All this results in a new doctrine of case law with the radical renewal of the 
regulation ideal as well. Accordingly, "The announced rule of a precedent 
should be applied and extended to new cases if the rule substantially satisfies the 
39 
standard of social congruence". This way, Talmudic tradition comes back into 
the tradition of common law with its distrust in logic and theoretical generali-
32
 Glenn: The Common Law..., 269-270. 
33
 Curtis, G.: Stare Decisis at Common Law in Canada. University of British Columbia Law 
Review 12 (1978), 8 and, similarly, Friedmann, W.: Stare Decisis at Common Law and under the 
Civil Code of Quebec. Canadian Bar Review 31 (1953), 723 et seq. 
34
 According to Hodgins, J. A.: The Authority of English Decisions. Canadian Bar Review 
1 (1923), 470 et seq., especially 483, borrowing of ideas could always take place in case the 
reasoning was applicable conclusively. K. MacKenzie's formulation—'Back to the Future: The 
Common Law and the Charter' Advocate 51 (1993), 930—is even more laconic on the decline 
of precedent, more rapid in Canada than in England. 
35
 Glenn: The Common Law..., 270. 
36
 Glenn, H. P.: Sur l'impossibilité d'un principe de stare decisis. Revue de la recherche 
juridique / Droit prospectif, XVIII (1993) 4, No. 55. 1073-1081, especially 1081. 
37
 Gray, J. Ch.: The Nature and Sources of the Law [1921] 2nd. ed., New York, 1948. 168 et 
seq. and 174 et seq. For a more detailed exposition, see, from the author: Ex post facto 
regulation. In: The Philosophy of law. An Encyclopedia (ed.: Gray), 274—276. 
38
 Postema: op. cit. 31. 
39
 Eisenberg, M.: The Nature of the Common Law. Cambridge, 1988. 154, note 75. 
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sation for moral choices, by considering both thesis and antithesis suitable to 
embody the word of living God.40 Ultimately, the question 'Is the Common Law 
Law?' arises. For—as the response holds41— 
"Common law rules are a strange breed. They can be modified at the 
moment of application to the case at hand, and their modification depends 
upon the background of social propositions. If ( . . . ) a doctrinal proposition 
should be enforced or extended when and only when it is congruent with 
the relevant social propositions, and a doctrinal proposition should be 
discarded or reformulated when it lacks such congmence, then the 
doctrinal proposition seems to be no more than a rule of thumb." 
2. The transformation of law-application into a collective, multicultural 
and multifactorial search for a practical solution 
The principle of stare decisis has never been accepted in Quebec, although the 
Canadian legal development has always remained open to borrow, especially 
English and French law. This is the reason why it seldom tried to either 
formalise or close down its normative sources. Typically, not even the first 
Quebec Civil Code (1866) did abrogate the previous law and did prohibit 
reference to former decisions as sources of the law. Or, it generously left in 
force from pre-code law anything not in simple repetition of codai wording or 
incompatible with codai provisions, with the effect that "the codification of the 
Quebec laws seems rather like a half-measure, typical of compromise."42 For it 
is to be remembered that demarcation lines between "us" and "them" have 
always been alien to Canadian tradition. Just as no "formal »adoption«" was 
known there, eventual borrowings were not regarded as "radically »foreign« 
laws" either, since, pragmatically, all "they represent living law which may be 
useful in the practical process of dispute resolution."43 
40
 Stone, S. L.: In Pursuit of the Counter-text: The Tum to the Jewish Legal Model in 
Contemporary American Legal Theory. Harvard Law Review 106 (1993), 813 et seq., especially 
828, and, as built into the philosophical understanding of legal argumentation, cf., from the 
author: Lectures ..., 93, note 120. 
41
 Schauer, F.: Is the Common Law Law? California Law Review 77 (1989), 455^*71, 
quotation on 467. 
42
 Code civil de Québec, Art. 2712, and the quotation by Tancelin, M. A.: Introduction. In: 
Walton, F. P.: The Scope and Interpretation of the Civil Code of Lower Canada (new ed. 
Tancelin, M. A.), Toronto, 1980. 27. 
43
 Glenn, H. P.: Persuasive Authority. McGill Law Journal 32 (1987) 2, 289. 
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As if learned f rom the admoni t ions of the Institutions of Ga ius that peoples 
are governed both by law which is particular to them and by l aw which is 
c o m m o n to humanity, 4 4 anyway, the normative bases referred to in judicial 
decisions witness a rather open and international auditorium. A recen t analysis 
of jur isprudence shows the fo l lowing proportion of citations 
at the Supreme Court of Canada*5 
to decision to doctrine 
domestic 367 domestic 63 
British 110 British 29 
American 045 American 24 
Australian-Asian 014 French 09 
French 002 Australian-Asian 07 
other 004 other 02 
foreign 175(32,3%) foreign 71 (53%) 
foreign altogether 36,4 % 
in Quebec46 
to local decision 129 
to French author 117 
to common law decision 079 
to local author 029 
to French decision 025 
to common law author 013 
to foreign decisions altogether 44,64% 
to foreign authors altogether 81,76% 
to foreign sources altogether 234 (59,7%) 
44
 "Omnes populi qui legibus et moribus reguntur partim suo proprio, partim commuai 
omnium hominum iure utuntur" in Inst. Gaius 1.1. 
45
 Supreme Court Reports 1 (1985), 296. According to another survey, the frequency of cita-
tion of foreign decisions or laws at the Supreme Court of Canada amounts to 24,2—32,7% of all the 
references as compared to other Canadian sources, and as compared to foreign ones (typically 
reference to United States sources in public law, to French ones in cases of Quebec and, in other 
cases, mostly to German and Israeli ones), 18,9-21,8% of all the references. Cf. Glenn, H. P.: The 
Use of Comparative Law by Common Law Courts in Canada. In: The Use of Comparative Law by 
Courts (ed.: Drobnig, U.-van Erp, S.), Dordrecht, 1999., 59-78, especially 68. 
46
 Jobin, P.-G.: Les réactions de la doctrine à la création du droit civil québécois par les juges: les 
débuts d'une affaire de famille. Les Cahiers de Droit 21 (1980), 257-275, especially 270. 
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All this means that references to foreign authors are more frequent in all Canada 
and significantly more frequent in Quebec, than to domestic, resp. local ones; 
reference to foreign decisions is made in one third, resp. two fifths of all 
references; altogether, reference to foreign sources is made in one-third, resp. 
three fifths of all references; and finally, in Quebec, the frequency of references 
to foreign decisions is higher by 38,2%, and that to foreign authors by 54,26%, 
than in Canada at large.47 
Well, at the level of call-words, we may encounter globalised mult i-
culturalism perfected. Interestingly enough, something more is also at stake for a 
comparative historical investigation of legal traditions. Repeated experience is 
the case, reminding us that European legal development came about through 
continuous (doctrinal and judicial) re-interpretation of traditions in jus 
commune rather than from oeuvres created in original construction.48 Or, also 
great (English, French, German or American) legal cultures—serving usually as 
standards for us—are in the final analysis nothing but products of trans-national 
learning and mutual borrowing.49 
Common law as a historical accumulation of precedents is process-like by 
definition: "common law is a developing system in the sense that there is a 
continuing process of development and exposition of rules."50 For this very 
reason, 
"the search for law is too important for any potential external source to be 
eliminated a priori. The law is never definitively given; it is always to be 
sought, in the endlessly original process of resolution of individual 
disputes through law."51 
The feeling of insecurity, the renouncement of any search for law, the wish for 
agreement and legitimation from any source at any price add to the above, as 
47
 There is a remarkable contrast here with the United States, asserting itself as open and 
multicultural, where the frequency of citations in one state from another is about 10%, whereas 
from an authority outside the USA is scarcely 1% [Merryman, J.: Toward a Theory of Citations: 
An Empirical Study of the Citation Practice of the California Supreme Court in 1950, 1960, and 
1970. California Law Review 50 (1977), 394-400], or downright unheard of (0%). In its own 
past, however, this ratio was 25,7% in 1850 and 1% in 1950 [Manz, W.: The Citation Practices 
of the New York Court of Appeals, 1850-1993. Buffalo Law Review 43 (1995), 153]. 
48
 Cf. primordially Coing, H.: Handbuch des Quellen und Literatur der neueren 
europäischen Privatrechtsgeschichte I, München, 1973. 
49
 Glenn: Persuasive Authority, 263. 
50
 Jackett, W. R.: Foundations of Canadian Law in History and Theory. In: Contemporary 
Problems of Public Law in Canada (ed.: Lang, O. E.), Toronto, 1968. 29. 
51
 Ibid., 293. 
34 CSABA VARGA 
if inherent scepticism were to be overcome by a rush for substitute to safety. 
After all, the judge "feels much safer if he can rely on foreign jurisprudential 
52 
continuity instead of own sources gained exclusively from the text". 
All in all, new call-words take indeed the lead: diversity, pluralism and 
concurrence—as much in law as in other fields.53 We can be sure that they 
are fulfilled. According to figures, for instance, the safe, foreseeable and 
calculable civil law excels in both client circulation and the queuing for justice 
administered, as well as in mass-scale litigation. Spectacular and frivolous 
lawsuits are more typical in the Anglo-American world—filed out of individual 
rivalry (sometimes represented by gender-, colour- or culture-specific groups), 
of mutual ambition to suppress, to revenge or profit-seeking or business interest 
(e.g., in divorce, for real or alleged discrimination, sexual harassment, medical 
malpractice, or in liability for harms caused by products, etc.)—, albeit all this 
is, due to the complexity of procedure and the costs of lawyer's fees, only 
available to those in middle-class with balanced financial backgrounds. Any-
way, the number of judges per 100 000 inhabitants is54 
in Germany 26 
in France 11 
in Canada 08 
in England 01,9 
The data are not only relevant for employment statistics: they speak of the extent 
of actual workload and institutional significance as well. 
Accordingly, the litigation habit developed in early modem common law 
(with the social exceptionality of a judicial event) is continued. Moreover, from 
the comparative numerical data of the caseload per annum of supreme courts— 
Canada Supreme Court 100-150 cases heard 
France Cour de cassation 28 000 decided cases 
52
 Baudouin, J.-L. : Le Code civil québécois: crise de croissance ou crise de vieillesse. 
Canadian Bar Review 44 (1966), 406. 
53
 Cf., e.g., Villa, V.: La science du droit. Bruxelles-Paris, 1990. 209 pp. (La pensée 
juridique moderne). In Canada, due to inclination towards experiment, differing from the US at 
any price and concentrating in cities, all this can turn into a remarkable driving force. Cf., for 
the symbolic resonance of the concurrence of pluralist diversity in Canadian philosophical life, 
Melillo, R.: Ka-Kanata. Pluralismo filosofico, I—II, S. Michele di Serino. 1990. 165 + 306 pp. 
54
 Glenn, H. P.: La Cour Suprême du Canada et la tradition du droit civil. The Canadian Bar 
Review (March-June 2001), 151-170, especially 161. 
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—, it is revealed that two hundreds to two hundreds and fifty times less cases are 
tried in Canada yearly as against, say, the mass-scale caseload in France.55 
3. Practical trends of dissolving the law 
The possibility of a judge becoming his own master by complementing legal 
considerations with social assessment is inherent in the doctrine of precedent. 
Taking, for instance, the dworkiman approach, the differentiation between 
principles and rules and, thereby, the establishment by principles of the 
relevance of rules56 involve already the mixing of purely legal aspects with 
external axiological and social considerations.57 
This is a complete change in the law's nature, running against the one-time 
justinian creed, according to which judication has to be based upon not the 
58 
example but the law. Now, a conviction according to which it is "closer to the 
truth to regard the law as a continuing process of attempting to solve the 
problems of a changing society, than as a set of rules"59, becomes the deonto-
logical comer-stone of the judging profession. Also a self-reassuring thought 
appears to persuade the sceptics that all this may conform even better with the 
claims of participatory democracy than legal positivism, based upon the alleged 
sovereignty of law. This concept is post-modem, worthy of our brave, new 
world indeed: 
"Law is less precise but more communal and there are more possibilities 
of persuasion and adherence to law, and eventually of eliminating it. 
Decisions are less conclusive, other sources may later prevail, and broader 
forms of agreement become possible, tolerant of differences now seen as 
minor and perhaps transient."60 
55
 Ibid., 154. This comparison does not take account of the mass of unsettled cases, the 
number of which has grown by 200.000 in France in one single decade. Tailhades, E.: La 
modernisation de la justice. Rapport au Premier Ministre, Paris, 1985. 36. 
56
 Dworkin, R. M.: The Model of Rules. University of Chicago Law Review 35 (1967), 14 et 
seq. [reprint: Is Law a System of Rules? In: The Philosophy of Law (ed.: Dworkin, R. M.), 
Oxford, 1977. 38-65]. 
57
 Precisely, 'questions of law' themselves cannot be anything else than products of an 
abstraction taken out of a merely analytical interest. Cf., from the author: Theory of the Judicial 
Process. The Establishment of Facts. Budapest, 1995. vii + 249. 
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 Justinianus (C.7.45.13): "non exemplis sed legibus iudicandum est". 
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 Waddams, S. M.: Introduction to the Study of Law. Toronto, 1979. 5. 
60
 Glenn: Persuasive Authority. 297 and 298. 
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From now on, old patterns of institutional development enter again the scene. 
Once the dam breaks, what used to be merely phenomenal becomes essential 
and what was just symptomatic transforms into a programmatic vision about 
the future, forming in the womb of society now. Anyway, this aspiration is 
descriptively formulated, yet fulfils a justificatory function, leaving behind any 
limiting and disciplining framework as an outdated obstacle. The claim for 
innovation is also formulated as a theoretical claim: 
"Modern societies have been [...] oriented towards the rationalization of 
autonomous fields of social practice, they have raised the problem of the 
unity of social action to the level of a formal, universalizing and abstract 
law, and have understood law as the deduction of an ideal of justice 
characterized by individual freedom. The indeterminate nature of this idea 
of justice, namely the impossibility of deducing some concrete content 
from a principle, has generated a crisis of the power to make law and 
brought about inductive and pragmatic procedures for recognizing the 
rights claimed in social conflicts by various categories of actors."61 
Well, we may freely meditate on the sense of such and similar theses 
reminiscent of the leftist Utopian radicalism of Critical Legal Studies, never-
theless, it is a fact that they are neither exceptional nor unique any longer. What 
they betoken are real alterations in actual practice and factual arrangement. They 
ascertain, for instance, on a theoretical level that 
"Two paths of legal development may be envisioned. One involves 
shifting the centre of the legal system away from legislation towards a 
limited set of fluid principles and concepts. The other implies re-
emphasizing legislation as the centre of the system, while rolling back the 
legislative tide and reactivating the symbolic meaning of legislation— 
especially through the development of new forms of civic involvement in 
the legislative process."62 
Thus, once the dam breaks, a further recognition (mixed with some neophyte 
haste and hypocrisy) is added to it: of course, all this is true, quite to the extent 
61
 Gagné, G.: Les transformations du droit dans la problématique de la transition à la 
postmodernité. Les Cahiers de Droit 33 (septembre 1992) 3, 701-733 and in: Aux frontières du 
juridique. 221-253, abstract, 221. 
62
 Issalys, P.: La loi dans le droit: tradition, critique et transformation. Les Cahiers de Droit 
33 (septembre 1992) 3, 665-699 and in: Aux frontières juridiques. 185-219, abstract, 186. 
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that this has never been otherwise either in civil law63 or in codification.64 One 
may have been wrong in the past but now one is certainly right. 
As the Canadian justice La Forest declared in a recent case, "The legal 
system of every society faces essentially the same problems and solves these 
problems by quite different means, though often with similar results".65 Well, it 
is precisely the diversity of both the paths of procedure and the instruments 
applied, the sources invoked and the kinds of reasoning resorted to, from among 
which the result of the choice actually done today proves to be quite open-
ending, which may signal the advent of a new era. 
Though in theoretical veil, it is now declared with brutal openness that "it is 
no longer the legislator with whom the interpreter conducts a dialogue but the 
authorities; namely, the opinions of other learned justices: judges and especially 
famous justices".66 Actually, hereby, both the subjects and the play, topic, 
purpose and stake of a legal process, as well as the invoked arguments and 
the function of the entire judiciary are changed over. "All the World's a 
Courtroom"—they shout not quite unfoundedly, heralding a new millennium. At 
once a methodology builds upon the apparent description, explaining that 
"The court does not proceed in a purely deductive manner, because the 
available sources or principles are not always clear and complete enough 
to permit deduction. This is wherefrom the dialogical and transnational 
character of civil law arises. The process is not inductive either, because 
no simple multiplication of instances or potential examples is able to lead 
to justification by foundations provided for the resolution of the affair 
before the court. Otherwise, among these extra-frontier sources, the 
court does not cite only judicial decisions. It also has recourse to authors 
expressing opinions and developing principles, just as to laws and codes. 
If this method should be qualified, it can be described as analogical, 
63
 "Law is prior to the law (...) law is not entirely included in the law" Rémy, Ph.: Éloge de 
l'exégese. Revue de la Recherche Juridique / Droit prospectif VII (1982), 261. — "Law is 
variable and diffuse. It is a material to be explored and not to be created." Mouly, C.: La 
doctrine, source d'unification internationale du droit. Revue internationale du Droit comparé 38 
(1986), 364. — "law is prior to legal rule and overflows it everywhere" Varaut, J.-M.: Le droit 
commun de l'Europe. Gazette du Palais (19-20 September 1986), Doct., 9. — "Law is not 
some kind of construction, but a reality to be explored" Atias, Ch.: Une crise de légitimité 
seconde' Droits 4 (1986), 32. — "There is no one today to declare [confirming the words of 
Montesquieu] that the judge is nothing else but »the mouth of the law« [...] the judge sets up his 
own barriers for himself." Rigaux, F.: La loi des juges. Paris, 1997. 65 and 247. 
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 [1977] 2 R.C.S. 67, à la p. 76. 
65
 Rahey v. The Queen [1987] 1 S.C.R. 598, at 319. 
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 Rémy: op. cit. 260. 
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first of all. By means of this method, one searches for links and common 
elements between the problem to be resolved and the model proposed, 
whatever the institutional source of the latter. (...) The legitimacy of the 
court's decision depends on the legitimacy of the decision's sources; 
enlarging these, the range of legitimate decisions is enlarged."67 
Thereby we seem arrive from common law tradition (having once originated in 
Europe) at a peculiar compound of some Anglo-American Europe. A new kind 
of logic is to correspond to this. In its terms, 
"The dialogical principle means that two or more various kinds of 
»logic« are combined into unity in a complex (mutually complementing, 
concurring and antagonistic) manner without duality being lost in this 
unity."68 
One has to note here that duality may have an additional meaning in relation to 
the specific case of Canada, as it is clearly shown in the Canadian charac-
terisation of methodological novelty: "the jurispmdence of Quebec, especially in 
civil affairs, departs from the model of judicial syllogism, in order to practice the 
discursive and descriptive reasoning, characteristic of common law." This is 
what was recently announced in Canada with a simultaneously reconstmctive 
and normative claim, as a legal theory of post-modernism, called legal socio-
70 n - n 
positivism. The scholarly motive of elevating all this into theoretical heights is 
neutral in itself: apparently it results from the merely sociologically inspired 
approach to and specification of the concept of law,71 however, by extending its 
subject, it also turns the entire conception inside out. Namely, law is not a kind 
of normativity any longer but a mere fact or, more precisely, an aggregate of 
67
 Glenn: La Cour Suprême du Canada..., 169. Cf. also Abrahamson, S.-Fischer, M. J.: All 
the World's a Courtroom: Judging in the New Millennium. Hofstra Law Review 26 (1997), 273 
et seq. 
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 Morin, E.: Penser l'Europe. Paris, 1987. 28. Quotation by Glenn, H. P.: Harmonization of 
Private Law Rules between Civil and Common Law Jurisdictions. In: Académie internationale 
de droit comparé: Rapports généraux. XIIIe Congrès International, Montréal, 1990. Cowansville, 
Qué, I.C, 79-95, 89, note 29. 
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 Melkevik, В.: Penser le droit québécois entre culture et positivisme: Quelques 
considérations critiques. In: Transformation de la culture juridique québécoise (dir. Melkevik, 
B.) Québec, 1998. 9-21, especially 15. 
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 Rottleuthner, H.: Le concept sociologique de droit. Revue interdisciplinaire d'Études 
juridiques (1992), No. 29, 67-84. 
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facts regarded as legal.72 Or, law embodies a kind of polycentrism by its "inter-
normativity" that mediates—through its network of many actors—between law 
and the axiologism of extra-legal (social, economic, ethical, etc.) norm-systems 
invokeable.73 Otherwise speaking, it is a duality, a compound of "law as a 
socially constructed fact" and "law as a specifically normative fact".74 As hoped 
for, this is already on the way to dissolve the law's separation, distinction and 
specificity. Its ideologists are about to take sides. Accordingly, 
"We prefer a more integrated approach, one in which law also takes part in 
exercising power and especially state power, and which also allows for the 
constitution and reproduction of social relations and institutions, more-
over, within certain limits, their transformation as well, so that law serves 
as a system of justification in the exercise of power, consequently also as a 
point of reference in the contestation of power (out of which the 
75 
revindication of »rights« may arise)." 
4. Some new prerogatives acquired by courts 
The specific ambition of the Supreme Court of Canada was to unify common 
and civil law in the first half-century of its operation, which it has, however, 
recently renounced, probably for lack of better results than the ones achieved 
until now.76 It has assumed new ones instead, and some of these indicate new 
shades of judicial function with particular prerogatives. In the following, we 
shall pay special attention to them, because they use (or misuse) the authority 
provided by the law when they actually draw from extra-legal sources, the fact 
notwithstanding that they demand indisputable authority for themselves, like the 
one due to decisions taken in law. 
a) Unfolding in principles the statutory provisions. The new Code civil de 
Québec (January 1, 1994), awaited and prepared for long (wasting the masterly, 
72
 Melkevik: ibid. 
73
 See, e.g., Entre droit et technique. Enjeux normatifs et sociaux (dir. Côté, R.-Rocher, G.), 
Montréal, 1994. 
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 Lajoie, A.: Avant-propos. In: Lajoie, A.-Brisson, J. M.-Normand, S.-Bissonnette, A.: Le 
status juridique des peuples autochtones au Québec et le pluralisme. Cowansville, 1996. 
75
 Laperrière, R.: À la recherche de la science juridique. In: Le droit dans tous ses états. La 
question du droit au Québec, 1970-1987. Montréal, 1987. 515-526, quotation on 524. 
76
 Glenn, H. P.: Le droit comparé et la Cour suprême du Canada. In: Mélanges Louis-
Philippe Pigeon. Ottawa, 1989. 197. 
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albeit belated commentary of the old code77 as mere bogus paper), actually 
anticipated the dawn of the new era. Sharply opposed to classical tradition—as 
set forth by the president of the office devoted to the old code's revision78—, 
it was from the very beginning drafted as "temporal, relative, variable, 
consecrating ( . . . ) a certain manner of thought, a certain manner of life, at a 
given time in the history of a people"; moreover—as announced also before the 
code entered into force—, the period for which it was foreseen, might prove 
79 
even surprisingly short. 
Its drafters aimed at the consolidation of jurisprudential developments since 
the earlier code as de lege lata addenda, on the one hand, and its codificational 
integration with newly formulated de lege ferenda doctrinal ideas, on the other. 
At the same time, also some balancing and value- and interest-representing 
function was also assumed. After all, the first internationally acclaimed per-
formance of post-modem codification has halted halfway,80 by codifying without 
making the law rigid. 
Nonetheless, this may perhaps offer a model for the private law codification 
launched by the European Union as well. It seems anyway as if the Canadian 
codifyer were aware of the fact that what was achieved was hardly more than the 
reconstruction of the dilemmas and conditions of mid-18th-century Europe, 
undertaking also tasks normally performed through judicial processes. 
This is why the outstanding Canadian comparatist could proudly declare— 
not denying the need for continuous national legal development either—that, 
back in his time, 
"Savigny may have been right (...) but ( . . . ) codification may not be the 
obstacle to this process that Savigny saw it to be (...: for) contemporary 
codes may not represent the type of code that Savigny and others had in 
mind."81 
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 Quebec Civil Law. An Introducton to Quebec Private Law (ed.: Brierley, J. E. C.-
Macdonald, R. A.) Toronto, 1993. lviii + 728 pp. 
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(1981), 625 et seq., quotation on 626-627. 
79
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b) Constitutionalisation of issues. The way of p rocedure d e v e l o p e d in the 
82 
Uni ted States has already penet ra ted Hungary and the Central and Eastern 
European region as well. In C a n a d a , it was the constitutional review to be 
carr ied out by the Supreme Court to implement the Canadian Char ter of Rights 
and Freedoms (1982) that gave an opportunity to this. The chance was taken by 
the courts with "enthusiasm"; moreover , in the hope of extending the scope of 
civil liberties, they were soon to c o v e r private law cases as well .8 3 However , the 
mere prospect of statutory provis ions being put aside so that ordinary courts can 
direct ly apply principles of charters in their own interpretation, has amounted to 
a change of legal practice as well . "Confl ic ts of interests now tend to be f ramed 
as confl icts of rights, and the Cour t is expected to adjudicate."8 4 
This development encounters bo th criticism and fears of the politicisation of 
judica ture—as the book-title The Charter Revolution and the Court Party may 
85 
i l lustrate this — : af ter all, pract ice has already proven that " the Charter serves 
m e r e l y as a b l ank cheque in t h e hands of the judges" . 8 6 T h e cri t icism is 
reminiscent of the indignation aga ins t the Supreme Court of the United States, 
actual ly re-writing the Constitution with no specific authorisation.8 7 
82
 The subjection of the decisions of state judges (as state-acts) to the Bills of Rights took a 
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Press cuttings are also thought-provoking. One of them, entitled Supreme 
Self-restraint, reads as follows: 
"Canadians have been outraged as the courts have used the Charter to 
tweak or abolish dozens of laws, including the abortion law, the Lord's 
Day Act, restrictions on pornography and voluntary school prayer, and 
laws that kept incompetents from fighting fires".88 
Such and similar examples of criticism are finally followed by remarks from the 
United States, according to which this is but the order of values of some self-
appointed individuals imposed upon the community, without having ever been 
confirmed by any democratic voting procedure. For instance, according to the 
article Out-of-control Judges Threat to Rule of Law, 
"Instead of upholding the law as defined by precedents and legislative 
enactments, judges now routinely change the rules of law to accord with 
their own personal political preferences."89 
Imposing values upon the community by the mere force of judicial authority, 
only supported by a narrow intellectual elite but without any democratic assess-
ment, may easily end in counter-effects. For the politicising of judicature may 
prompt democratic voters with legitimately elected legislative and executive 
institutions to react, by treating the judiciary with its partisan views in a 
genuinely politicised way, as a political institution. The obvious danger of this 
was already formulated by some propheting justices. 
"Only judicial independence will suffer if we continue to push the consti-
tutional envelope as we have over the past 20 years. An overridden public 
will in time, demand, and will earn, direct input into the selection of 
their judges as they do with their legislative representatives. There will 
be renewed calls for a supplementary process wherein their judges' 
felemelő ember? Korunk racionalizmusának dilemmái' [Man, elevating himself? Dilemmas of 
rationalism in our age]. In: Sodródó emberiség [Mankind adrift: on the work of Nándor 
Várkonyi »The Fifth Man«] (ed. Katalin Mezey). Budapest, 2000. 71-76.) 
88
 Supreme Self-restraint. National Post (April 7, 2000), A19. 
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2000). 
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performance, even the continuance of their employment (as it will be 
characterized) can be periodically reviewed."90 
c) The Supreme Court as the nation's supreme moral authority. It has been 
observed during the last decade that the Supreme Court of Canada is not only 
willing to rely on authorial opinions but, besides widely using legal doctrine, it 
also growingly draws from mostly mainstream philosophical considerations as 
normative foundations.91 Thereby it inevitably takes a stand on political and 
moral philosophical issues as a partisan forum, for, in fact, 
"The Supreme Court has, since 1982, taken a one-sidedly praetorian 
position in favour of liberal philosophy and ideology, which is a break 
with formerly prevalent pluralism. What we can see is thus an attachment 
to one single philosophy [of, e.g., John Stuart Mill, Dworkin or Rawls, as 
the author of the quotation adds—Cs. V.], with any other aspect ruled out 
at the same time."92 
Obviously, no one has entitled the Supreme Court to elevate itself to ethical 
93 
heights using nothing but its competence of decision. The circumstance itself 
that in most debated topical questions dividing society (like euthanasia, abortion 
or in vitro fertilisation), it declares itself to be the highest forum of indubitable 
authority,94 implies—despite any short-term effects and actual influences— the 
long run threat for the Supreme Court itself to make its own position sensibly 
undefendable and vulnerable. 
* 
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The scale of globalisation witnessed in Canada, target of the present case study, 
is not at all unfamiliar in the European Union either, especially not after the 
decision was taken a decade ago to prepare a codification of private law, 
common at least in basic principles. In both cases, the main point is to re-
consider the law's normative material in a way somewhat released from 
nationally positivated self-restriction when searching for a kind of trans-national 
cultural community. By gradually eliminating the law's substantivity, legal self-
identity is mostly preserved in a rather procedural sense. Naturally, all this 
involves a change in the concept of, approach to and even traditional techniques 
in law, eventually also leading to a change of character with consequences and 
perspectives utterly unforeseeable in details for the time being. 
Although by far not as a sine qua non, yet globalisation may nevertheless 
issue in "sustainable development" to be accompanied by the preservation of 
some kind of "sustainable diversity", in the form of the increasing reciprocal 
action of all great legal cultures and traditions of the human kind with the 
mutual utilisation of shared sources for inspiration.95 
95
 These trends are traceable already in Glenn: Legal Traditions..., ch. 10: Reconciling 
Legal Traditions: Sustainable Diversity in Law, pp. 318 et seq. as well as in his Vers un droit 
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International law is permeated, perhaps more profoundly than any other 
branch of law, with reciprocity in the sense that rights must be coupled with 
certain obligations in relations between States and that there must be some sort 
of correspondence between rights enjoyed and obligations assumed,1 first of all 
because law is made by equal States, which, in creating law, are well aware 
of the need to assume certain obligations in exchange for their rights, and 
conversely. This thesis in international law holds tme not only for law-making, 
but also for the application and enforcement of law. There is no doubt that the 
principle of reciprocity is most clearly manifested in the law of contracts, 
however, as will be seen in the following discussion, it is also a basic element 
of the system of compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice. 
The International Court of Justice, being the principal judicial organ of the 
United Nations under Article 92 of its Charter, has jurisdiction only with the 
consent of the parties. Dealing with the case of the Minority Schools of Upper 
Pofessor, Director, Institute for Legal Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, 
Budapest, H-1014 Budapest, Országház u. 30., Hungary. 
Fax: (36 1) 3757-858; E-mail: lamm@jog.mta.hu 
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 For more detail, see Virally, M.: Le principe de réciprocité dans le droit inter-
national contemporaire. Recueil des Cours, 1967, Vol. III. 1969. A. W. Sijthoff— 
Ley den, 5-101. 
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Silesia in the interwar period, the Permanent Court of International Justice 
formulated this thesis in the following terms: "The jurisdiction of the Court 
depends on the will of the parties." This same thesis was expressed in the case 
of Eastern Karelia to the effect that no single State can be compelled to submit 
its disputes with other States to mediation or arbitration or any other procedure 
for peaceful settlement unless it has consented thereto.3 Later this principle was 
also reaffirmed by the International Court of Justice in several cases. 
Under Article 36 of the Statute, the parties may express their consent to 
the Court 's jurisdiction, in addition to other means,4 by a declaration of 
submission to or acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction made by reliance on 
the so-called optional clause as referred to in paragraph 2 of Article 36. In 
relations between States that have made unilateral declarations of acceptance 
under the optional clause, a special system comes into effect whereby a State 
party to that system may refer to the International Court of Justice its dispute 
with another State party to that system by filing a unilateral application 
without the prior consent of the opponent State. 
1. Statute provisions on reciprocity 
Reciprocity is covered by Article 36, paragraphs 2 and 3, of the Statute of the 
Court reading: "The States to the present Statute may at any time declare that 
they recognize as compulsory ipso facto and without special agreement, in 
relation to any other State accepting the same obligation, the jurisdiction of 
the Court.. ." (para. 2) and "The declarations referred to above may be made 
unconditionally or on condition of reciprocity on the part of several or certain 
States, or for a certain t ime" (para. 3). At first sight, however clear these 
provisions appear to be, one can detect some confusion5 concerning the 
relationship between paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 36. This is likely due to the 
2
 PCIJ Series A. No. 15.22. 
3
 PCIJ Series, B. No. 5. 27. 
4
 Other means may include the agreement of the parties to submit an already 
existing dispute to the Court, or the so called compromissory clause of an international 
agreement providing that disputes arising between them of the kind envisaged in the 
compromissory clause, shall or may be submitted to the Court. 
In a similar sense, see Thirlway, H. W: A.: The Reciprocity in the Jurisdiction of the 
International Court. Netherlands Yearbook of International Law, 1984, 98; Shabtai, R.: 
The Law and Practice of the International Court. A. W. Sijthoff—Leyden, 1963, 384; 
Shihata, I. F. I.: The Power of the International Court to Determine its Own Juris-
diction. Martinus Nijhoff—The Hague, 1965. 147. 
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fact that while both paragraphs cover reciprocity, they refer to different aspects 
thereof. 
Paragraph 2 of Article 36 is unambiguously clear about what is in reality a 
specificity of the entire regime of the optional clause, namely that it is a network 
of additional obligations and additional rights as between certain groups of 
States party to the Statute. In the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company Case Judge 
McNair described the optional clause as being contracting in rather than 
contracting out in nature.6 This regime operates only in the inter se relations of 
States that have made declarations of acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction, 
and not in respect of all States party to the Statute. Professor Waldock, in his 
study on the optional clause, describes all this as the lack of "some basic 
mutuality" between States having made declarations of acceptance and those 
having made none. The declaring States are continuously liable to be brought 
before the Court at any time,7 however, States not making such declarations 
cannot be sued before the Court unless and until they choose to initiate 
proceedings before the Court as plaintiff and make declaration under the 
optional clause. 
As noted earlier, paragraph 3 of Article 36 refers to reciprocity in connection 
with the content of declarations of acceptance, in which reciprocity may be 
stipulated by States. It is this paragraph of the Statute that forms the legal basis 
of the practice of States to make restrictions or reservations to their 
declarations of acceptance, placing limitations as to persons, subject-matters or 
periods of time on the obligations they have assumed concerning the Court's 
compulsory jurisdiction. 
The explanation for the Statute referring twice to the principle of reciprocity 
is offered by the documents preparatory to the drafting of the Statute, and 
the double reference can, in all likelihood, be attributed to the proposals of 
the Brazilian jurist Fernandez, a member of the 1920 Committee of Jurists. 
Fernandez thought that States were free to accept the Court's jurisdiction on 
condition or unconditionally. He saw one such condition in reciprocity in 
respect of certain States or in respect of a certain number of States, including 
certain denominated States. The Brazilian expert argued that it is impossible 
for a State to accept the Court's compulsory jurisdiction without knowing the 
States with which it is to undertake such an obligation. Regarding Fernandez, 
Thirlway comes to the conclusion that the Brazilian jurist 's draft sought to 
6
 ICJ Reports, 1952. 116. 
7
 At least in principle, as will be discussed later. 
8
 Waldock, C. H. M.: Decline of the Optional Clause. The British Yearbook of 
International Law. 1955-1956. 280. 
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allow States to choose those with which they are able to establish a compul-
sory jurisdiction relationship obligating them to submit their disputes to inter-
national adjudication.9 At any rate, it was under the influence of Fernandez's 
proposals that the section saying that "the declarations referred to above may 
be made unconditionally or on condition of reciprocity on the part of several or 
certain Member States, or for a certain time" was inserted in the Statute of the 
Permanent Court of International Justice. To our knowledge, the possibility for 
the "choice of partners" as originally suggested by Fernandez was used by 
only one State, namely Brazil, which in 1920 included in its declaration of 
acceptance a formula under which the declaration was to be effective "as soon 
as it has likewise been recognized as such by two at least of the Powers 
permanently represented on the Council of the League of Nations". Waldock's 
statement that paragraph 3 of Article 36 refers in fact not to reciprocity is 
essentially in harmony with Fernandez's concept. According to the prominent 
British jurist, what we have here is a provision authorizing States to accept 
compulsory jurisdiction for a definite period of time and on condition that the 
Court's compulsory jurisdiction is also accepted by a certain number of States 
or by specified States. Thus, Waldock argues this is not a real "condition of 
reciprocity", but one that a declaration will not become effective until the 
Court's compulsory jurisdiction has been accepted by a certain number of 
States or by certain specified States.10 
As is provided by paragraph 2 of Article 36., a State recognizes the Court's 
compulsory jurisdiction in respect of States "assuming the same obligation". 
Here it is most likely that the framers of the optional clause had in mind cases 
in which a State accepts the Court 's jurisdiction in respect of only some of 
the four categories of disputes enumerated in paragraph 2.11 However, what 
happened in practice instead, was that States, by attaching reservations to their 
declarations of acceptance, did not exclude categories (a), (b), (c) or (d) of 
disputes, but, by naming precisely or less precisely formulated conditions as to 
9
 Thirlway: op. cit. 103-104. 
10
 Waldock: op. cit. 255. 
" Under para. 2 of Art. 36, States may recognize as compulsory the jurisdiction of 
the Court in all or any of the classes of legal disputes concerning 
"a) the interpretation of a treaty; 
b) any question of international law; 
c) the existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach of an 
international obligation; 
d) the nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the breach of an international 
obligation". 
RECIPROCITY AND THE COMPULSORY JURISDICTION... 49 
time, persons or subject-matters, they limited the scope of the obligations they 
undertook in respect of the Court's compulsory jurisdiction. 
Emmanuel Decaux writes that the original idea was confined to the 
reciprocity of acceptance, namely States making declarations of acceptance, 
and did not imply any sort of full reciprocity comprising reservations and 
12 
conditions. According to the said author, paragraph 2 of Article 36 allows 
for two extreme concepts: minimum reciprocity is satisfied by both parties 
adhering to the system of the optional clause, whereas maximum reciprocity 
requires the parties to make identical declarations of acceptance. Where 
making reservations is not allowed, this distinction would be superfluous as 
States could make identical declarations only.13 
Obviously, neither of these two concepts is acceptable. The minimum 
reciprocity disregards the wide diversity of declarations flowing from the many 
reservations attached to them, while the maximum reciprocity actually rules out 
the application of reciprocity as no two identical declarations of acceptance 
exist.14 Herbert Briggs stresses that any concept to the effect of "accepting the 
same obligation" presupposes that identical declarations or corresponding reser-
vations leads to the nullification of the system of compulsory jurisdiction 
under Article 36 paragraph 2 of the Statute, because States have wide 
discretionary powers to unilaterally determine the conditions for accepting the 
Court's compulsory jurisdiction.15 Taking the passage "accepting the same 
obligation" literally would imply that the system of compulsory jurisdiction 
would only operate in relations between States having made completely 
identical declarations, but would not operate with respect to the other States.16 
Thus, the passage "accepting the same obligation" does not mean that "exactly 
or even broadly the same obligation of compulsory jurisdiction must have been 
accepted by each State," but requires complete reciprocity in the operation 
of compulsory jurisdiction between two States which have accepted the 
obligation in different terms.17 
12
 Decaux, E.: La réciprocité en droit international. Librairie Générale de Droit et de 
Jurisprudence, Paris, 1980. 85. 
13
 Ibid. 87. 
14
 Ibid. 87-88. 
15
 Briggs, H. V.: Reservations to the Acceptance of Compulsory Jurisdiction of the 
International Court of Justice. Recueil des Cours, 1958. 242. 
16
 In a similar sense, see Briggs: op. cit. 242-243. 
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 Waldock: op. cit. 257-258. 
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2. Stipulation of reciprocity in declarations of acceptance 
A closer look at the declarations of acceptance made since the early 1920s 
reveals that stipulation of reciprocity, in most different formulations, can be 
found in most declarations of acceptance. There are declarations which refer to 
Article 36 of the Statute concerning reciprocity, using the phrases: "on condition 
of reciprocity"; "subject to reciprocity"; "subject exclusively to reciprocity"; or, 
"on the basis of absolute reciprocity". Also known is the phrasing that the 
instrument creates an obligation in respect of "States making identical 
declarations" or of "States accepting the same obligation", which is naturally 
equivalent to the aforesaid express stipulations of reciprocity. Declarations are 
frequent which contain the formula "in relation to any other State accepting the 
same obligation, that is to say on condition of reciprocity"; such a formula is 
termed by Briggs as the "double formula of reciprocity".18 On the other hand, 
some declarations of acceptance contain no reference to reciprocity, meaning 
that the declaring States recognized the Court 's compulsory jurisdiction with-
out providing for reciprocity. 
Regarding the inclusion of reciprocity in declarations of acceptance, the 
question automatically arises whether reciprocity applies to all declarations 
of acceptance and to the situation when a State makes no reference to, or 
expressly excludes, reciprocity in its declaration of acceptance.19 This question 
seems proper if only for the reason that, according to some authors, there is 
nothing to prohibit States from accepting the Court's compulsory jurisdiction 
without stipulating reciprocity. The view that distinction can be made between 
declarations of acceptance unconditionally and on condition of reciprocity 
is associated in the pertinent literature with Guiliano Enriques during the inter-
20 
war years and with Hambro among other authors in later times. According 
to Enriques, declarations of acceptance made with the reference to reciprocity 
imply acceptance of obligations of only States having made identical 
declarations, whereas declarations made without refering to reciprocity apply, 
in the absence of a contrary provision, simply to obligations assumed in 
18
 Briggs: op. cit. 238. 
19
 Ibid. 238-239; Thirlway: op. cit. 107. 
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 On the basis of paragraph 3 of Article 36 of the Statute, Hambro deems it 
conceivable for a State to accept the Court's jurisdiction unconditionally, which leads to 
the conclusion that such a State accepts the Court 's jurisdiction without the reciprocity 
clause. He adds, however, that this cannot be supposed to be the case. HAMBRO, E.: 
The Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice. Recueil des Cours, 1950, I. 
184-185. 
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respect of States having ratified the Statute.21 It calls for no further explanation 
that, based on this view, the States having made declarations of the latter 
form would assume rather far-reaching obligations, for they would in fact 
accept the Court 's compulsory jurisdiction in respect of all States party to 
the Statute. In connection with such declarations, Bertrand Maus writes 
that, in the absence of will expressed to that effect, such declarations can-
not be construed to imply an obligation wider that expressed in the clause 
itself.22 
Concerning Enriques's view, Thirlway points out that the author practically 
overlooks the reference to "reciprocity", which is a kind of communis error, 
contained in a declaration referring to paragraph 2 of Article 36, and that the 
possibility of excluding reciprocity is only given in respect of paragraph 3, 
which, however, covers a different sort of reciprocity.23 
The concept that reciprocity is neither a discretionary condition nor a 
reservation, but constitutes the basis of the system following from Article 36 of 
the Statute, can be considered to be the view of the majority in the pertinent 
literature.24 Reciprocity is a fundamental provision of the Statute applicable to 
all declarations of acceptance, including that of a State having unconditionally 
25 rm 
accepted the Court 's compulsory jurisdiction. This is supported by the 
practice of the two Courts, which purports the statement that "reciprocity" 
has always been interpreted as applying to all declarations of acceptance of 
compulsory jurisdiction. For that matter, practice over more than eight 
decades has shown that, as is asserted by Shabtai Rosenne, "(T)he real 
problem which has faced the Court has never been whether or why reciprocity 
exists and within the framework of the compulsory jurisdiction, but how it 
affects the Court's jurisdiction in the concrete case."26 
21
 Enriques, G.: L'acceptation sans réciprocié de la jurisdiction obligatoire de la 
Cour Permamente de Justice. RDILC, 1932. 845. 
22
 Maus, В.: Les réserves dans les déclarations d'acceptation de la jurisdiction 
obligatoire de la Cour International de Justice. Librairie E. Droz, Genève, Librairie 
Minard, Paris, 1959. 100. 
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 Thirlway: op. cit. 107-108. 
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 Decaux: op. cit. 80. 
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3. Limits of reciprocity under the practice of the two Courts 
Practice of the Permanent Court of international Justice 
In the legal practice of the two International Courts, the question of reci-
procity has emerged in a number of cases, with both the parties, the Court and 
the pertinent literature not infrequently offering differing interpretations of 
this principle. The problem concerning the interpretation of reciprocity results 
from the fact that in 1920 the framers of the Statute did not consider how 
reciprocity would really operate with respect to reservations, so the will of the 
lawmakers provides no guidance in this matter.27 It is not accidental that 
Rosenne points to contradictions in the views of both the Permanent Court 
of International Justice and the contemporary literature on the subject of 
28 
reciprocity. 
In the jurisprudence of the Permanent Court of International Justice, the 
case of the Phosphates in Morocco was the first occasion to consider the 
question of reciprocity. In the proceedings initiated by Italy against France, 
which was as a result of measures by Moroccan authorities described by the 
applicant as "the monopolization of Moroccan phosphates", attention 
should be directed to, for the purpose of the present discussion, the French 
preliminary objection invoking the reservation to the French declaration of 
acceptance, which excluded the retroactive effect of the declaration. 
According to the reservation, the Court 's compulsory jurisdiction existed in 
respect of any disputes arising after the ratification of the present declaration, 
(i. e. after 25 April 1931—V. L.) with regard to situations and facts subsequent 
29 
to this ratification. On the basis of reciprocity, France claimed that the 
exclusion of the retroactive effect in relations between the two States— 
albeit the Italian declaration contained no reservation concerning earlier facts 
and situations—was effective as from the date of ratification of the Italian 
Court's jurisdiction to exist in relations between the two States in respect of 
only disputes arising on the basis of facts and situations subsequent to 7 
30 
September 1931. Decaux considers that the said objection of France not only 
involved reciprocity, but actually transplanted the French reservation into 
27
 Thirlway: op. cit.l 12. 
28 
Rosenne: op. ci'r.384. 
29 
In that case the applicant State based the Court's jurisdiction on the declarations 
of acceptance by the two States. 30
 Phosphates of Morocco, in: Hudson, M.: World Court Report. Washington, Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace. Vol. IV. 315. 
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the Italian declaration,31 and that France invoked against Italy a pseudo-
32 
reservation embodied in the Italian declaration. For its part, the Court stated 
that "(T)his (the Italian—V. L.) declaration does not contain the limitation that 
appears in the French declaration concerning the situations or facts with regard 
to which the dispute arose; nevertheless, as a consequence of the condition of 
reciprocity stipulated in paragraph 2 of Article 36 of the Statute of this Court, 
it is recognized that this limitation holds good as between the Parties".33 
However, the Court did not consider the question whether the restriction 
excluding the retroactive effect should operate in that particular case from the 
date of ratification of the Italian or the French declaration, as the Court held 
that "(T)he date preferred by one or other of the Governments would not in 
any way modify the conclusions which the Court has reached. It does not 
therefore feel called upon to express an opinion on that point."34 In reality, 
therefore, the Court recognized the application of reciprocity to the 
reservations to the declarations of acceptance by the two States, but did not 
clarify the consequences ensuing there from. In that case, no special problem 
was caused by this course of the Court, since there was an interval of a few 
months between the dates of the deposit of the two declarations of acceptance. 
However, one can easily imagine a case in which the date accepted by the 
Court could have been of supreme importance. 
Similarly, in the Electricity Company of Sofia Case between Belgium and 
Bulgaria, the Court was confronted with a reservation excluding the retroactive 
effect of the declarations. In that case, it was on the basis of reciprocity 
that Bulgaria—which recognized the Court 's jurisdiction in respect of 
States accepting the same obligation but "unconditionally"—invoked the 
reservation to the declaration of acceptance by the applicant State, Belgium; 
the declaration was ratified on the 10th of March, 1926, and the reservation 
was to the effect that the declaration applied to any disputes arising after 
the ratification of the present declaration with regard to situations or facts 
subsequent to this ratification. The Court stressed that "(A)lthough this 
limitation does not appear in the Bulgarian Government's own declaration, it is 
common ground that, in consequence of the condition of reciprocity laid down 
in paragraph 2 of Article 36 of the Court's Statute and repeated in the Belgian 
declaration, it is applicable as between the Parties".35 
31
 Decaux: op. cit. 90. 
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Dealing with this decision, Alexandrov writes that the Court expressly 
and irrevocably recognized that reciprocity applies to reservations ratione 
temporis. Hence, it was necessary to determine two dates: the date of exclusion 
of the retroactive effect, on the one hand, and the critical date of emergence 
of the dispute, on the other.36 
Despite their apparent similarity, the two cases considered by the Permanent 
Court of International Justice are different. In the Phosphates of Morocco case 
the respondent State actually contested the Court's jurisdiction on the basis of 
the reservation to its own declaration and not on the basis of reciprocity. It was 
a case of genuine reciprocity when that State wanted to have the date of 
exclusion of the retroactive effect counted from the deposit, not of its own 
declaration of acceptance, but that of the applicant State, yet that matter was 
not decided by the Court. On the other hand, in the case of the Electricity 
Company of Sofia, the reservation excluding the retroactive effect was 
contained in the declaration of acceptance of the applicant State, however, it 
was invoked by the respondent State on the basis of reciprocity, but such 
reciprocity was not recognized by the Court. 
Practice of the International Court of Justice 
The question of reciprocity has also been considered by the International Court 
of Justice in several cases. 
Chronologically, mention should be made first of the Anglo-Iranian Oil 
Company Case, which was submitted by the United Kingdom against Iran. In 
that case, the respondent State invoked the reservation contained in its own 
declaration of acceptance and excluded the retroactive effect of the decla-
ration.37 In its judgement on the preliminary objections the Court emphasized 
that "(B)y these Declarations jurisidiction is conferred on the Court only to the 
extent to which the two Declarations coincide in conferring it. As the Iranian 
Declaration is more limited in scope than the United Kingdom Declaration, 
36
 Alexandrov, S. A.: Reservations in Unilateral Declarations Accepting the Compulsory 
Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht 
(Boston) London, 1995. 43. 
37
 By the terms of this reservation, the declaration did not apply to disputes arising 
after its ratification in respect of situations and facts relating directly or indirectly to the 
application of treaties or conventions accepted and ratified by Persia after the ratifi-
cation of that declaration. The dispute between the parties concerned the question of 
whether the reservation was operative in respect of the application only of treaties and 
conventions accepted by Iran after the ratification of the declaration or of treaties and 
conventions accepted by Iran at any time. 
RECIPROCITY AND THE COMPULSORY JURISDICTION... 55 
it is the Iranian Declaration on which the Court must base itself. This is the 
38 
common ground between the Parties". This statement regarding such 
"coincidence" has been repeatedly invoked by the Court, most recently in the 
case of Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria at the 
end of the 1990s.39 In connection with the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company Case, 
Briggs notes that, since the respondent State was invoking the reservation to its 
own declaration as a bar to jurisdiction, there was no need for the reference 
to reciprocity, and it is likely that the Court and its President addressed that 
point "as an elucidation provided by the Court on a question argued at some 
length by the Parties in the pleadings."40 
Perhaps of greatest interest to reciprocity is the Norwegian Loans Case 
between France and Norway, which involved application, on the basis of 
reciprocity, of a subjective reservation of domestic jurisdiction. The declaration 
of acceptance made by France as the applicant State incorporated a reservation 
under which the declaration did not apply to disputes "relating to matters 
which are essentially within the national jurisdiction as understood by the 
Government of the French Republic". The Norwegian declaration of acceptance 
contained no such limitation, but, in its first preliminary objection, Norway 
contended that the International Court did not have jurisdiction in that case 
because by virtue of the declarations accepting the compulsory jurisdiction the 
Court's jurisdiction extended to legal disputes failing within one of the four 
categories enumerated in paragraph 2 of Article 36 of the Statute, while the 
subject-matter of the dispute as stated in the French application related to the 
national law of Norway. In the second part of the objection, Norway relied on 
the principle of reciprocity in referring to the reservation to the French 
declaration of acceptance, under which "(T)his declaration does not apply to 
differences relating to matters, which are essentially within the national 
jurisdiction as understood by the Governments of the French Republic".41 
For its part, the International Court of Justice stated that "in the present 
case the jurisdiction of the Court depends upon the Declarations made by the 
Parties in accordance with article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute on condition 
38
 ICJ Reports, 1952. 103. 
39
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 The second preliminary objection of Norway also referred to reciprocity ratione 
temporis, claiming that the Court was without jurisdiction because, under the French 
declaration of acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction, the Court had jurisdiction in 
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of reciprocity; and that, since two unilateral declarations are involved, such 
jurisdiction is conferred upon the Court only to the extent to which the 
Declarations coincide in conferring it. A comparison between the two 
Declarations shows that the French Declaration accepts the Court 's jurisdiction 
within narrower limits than the Norwegian Declaration; consequently, the 
common will of the Parties, which is the basis of the Court 's jurisdiction, 
exists within these narrower limits indicated by the French reservation".42 
Referring to the statements of its predecessor in the Phosphates of Morocco 
Case and the Electricity Company of Sofia Case, as well as to its own findings 
in the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company Case, the International Court of Justice 
stressed that "(I)n accordance with the condition of reciprocity to which 
acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction is made subject in both Declarations 
and which is provided for in Article 36, paragraph 3, of the Statute, Norway, 
equally with France, is entitled to except from the compulsory jurisdiction of 
the Court disputes understood by Norway to be essentially within its national 
jurisdiction".43 
In the literature on international law, the Court 's judgement rendered in the 
Norwegian Loans Case prompted a large share of criticism, first of all 
because the Court had in fact sidestepped the question of how far subjective 
reservations of domestic jurisdiction were admissible and valid in respect of 
national jurisdiction and, instead of deciding that question, it just stated the 
lack of its jurisdiction on the basis of reciprocity. In its judgement, the Court 
did not deal with the validity of the reservations, and the majority of the judges 
took the position that—since the validity of the reservation was not contested 
by the parties—the Court was faced with a restriction that was deemed by both 
disputants to express their common will regarding the competence of the 
Court, and the Court " . . . gives effect to the reservation as it stands and as the 
parties recognize it".44 
In connection with reciprocity, Decaux writes that it would have been 
possible to consider two concepts of reciprocity in this case. The first is an 
objective one, under which France has no discretionary power by virtue of its 
reservation invoking national jurisdiction, but is bound by good faith. As the 
matters relating to loans do not pertain to the French internal law, they cannot 
be incorporated in the Norwegian internal law on the basis of reciprocity.45 By 
contrast, under the subjective concept, the position of France is less important: 
42ICJ Reports, 1957. 23. 
43ICJ Reports, 1957. 24. 
44
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the law operating between the two parties is constituted not by the content of 
the French reservation, but by the Oslo Government's interpretation thereof in 
terms as if the reservation had been made by Norway. However, the author 
claims that this was not expressed by Norway, but by the Court's judgement 
in its stead.46 Rather than consider the positions of France and Norway on 
international bonds, the Court based itself on the assumption that the 
determination of matters falling within national jurisdiction was subjective 
and that the parties' declarations were sufficient and fell outside the scope of 
consideration by the Court.47 
Thirlway likewise holds that, with respect to the scope of reciprocity, the 
Court went rather far in the Norwegian Loans Case when it had not simply 
"written" into the Norwegian declaration the reservation expressed in the 
French declaration of acceptance, but had also adapted it to its new environment 
in the sense that it had turned the matters understood by the French Government 
to be within national jurisdiction into ones understood by the Norwegian 
Government to fall within national jurisdiction.48 
In connection with the cited passage of the Court 's decision in the 
Norwegian Loans Case, Briggs raises the question why, in relation to the 
condition of reciprocity contained in the declarations, the Court referred to 
paragraph 3, and not to paragraph 2, of Article 36, although the issue 
sometimes emerged that reciprocity was not an absolute condition of Article 
36 of the Statute, because paragraph 3 thereof permits declarations of 
acceptance to be made unconditionally or on condition of reciprocity.49 For 
that matter, in its earlier judgements, the Court argued that Statutory condition 
of reciprocity contained in paragraph 2 of Article 36, as it also appeared from 
the Court's opinion on the Norwegian loans. Therefore, Briggs is of the view 
that the reference to paragraph 3 instead of paragraph 2 is thus probably an 
error.50 On the other hand, Renata Szafarz's conclusion is that the reference 
in this case to paragraph 3 instead of paragraph 2 is to a certain degree 
inconsistent with the Court's earlier decisions, but may also justify the 
inclusion in declarations of the condition of reciprocity regardless of the fact 
that reciprocity is covered by Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute.51 The 
46
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Polish international jurist stresses further that reservation in this case has 
undergone a significant transformation, as the principle of reciprocity 
enabled Norway to invoke the reservation, and invoke it not in its original 
form, notably in its applicability to France, but in a modified form to allow 
its content to be applied to Norway. She adds that the effects of reservations 
in the declarations of acceptance differ essentially in this respect from the 
reservations attached to international treaties and that the effects of the 
principle of reciprocity has much more far-reaching implications for reser-
vations contained in declarations of acceptance.52 
Alexandrov takes a more understanding attitude towards the Court and 
writes that—since in the French view it is not sure that whether the class of 
disputes which could be determined by France belonging to its domestic 
jurisdiction would not necessarily coincide with those understood by another 
State to fall within domestic jurisdiction "(T)he only way to apply reciprocity 
was to allow Norway to exclude the same category of disputes as regards 
Norway."53 
Despite the criticisms the International Court has faced for its decision in 
the Norwegian Loans Case, one should acknowledge that the Court did not 
have much choice in terms of ways to pronounce itself, for if it had decided 
that subjective reservations of domestic jurisdiction were either admissible or 
inconsistent with the Statute, its decision would have been bound to produce 
harmful effects on the system of the Court's compulsory jurisdiction.54 To 
avoid such pernicious consequences, the Court came to a decision by widening 
the scope of the reciprocity principle to an undoubtedly significant measure, 
thus also creating a good opportunity to demonstrate the backlash effect of 
subjective reservations of domestic jurisdiction. 
Shortly after the judgement rendered in the case of Certain Norwegian 
Loans the International Court had to decide again on the question of reciprocity 
in two cases. 
The first, examined by the Court, was the Interhandel Case between 
Switzerland and the United States regarding the restitution by the United States 
of the assets of the Société internationale pour participants industrielles et 
commerciales S.A. (Interhandel). Within the time-limit fixed for the filing of 
52
 Ibid. 45. 
53
 Alexandrov: op. cit. 82. 
54
 On this point see the present author's work: А Сonnally-fenntartás és a Nemzet-
közi Bíróság kötelező joghatósági rendszere (The Conally Reservation and the System 
of the Compulsory Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice). Állam- és Jogtudo-
mány, 1987-88. 449-553. 
RECIPROCITY AND THE COMPULSORY JURISDICTION... 59 
the Counter-Memorial, the United States filed four preliminary objections. Of 
interest to our subject is the second objection, in which the United States 
contested the Court's jurisdiction by contending that the dispute had arisen 
before Switzerland's declaration of acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction 
became binding, i.e. the 28th of July, 1948. Referring to what had been stated 
by the Court in the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company Case, namely that declarations 
should coincide in conferring jurisdiction; the Washington Administration 
argued that since the United States' declaration of acceptance contained a 
clause limiting the Court's jurisdiction to disputes "hereafter arising", while 
the Swiss declaration contained no such clause, but the principle of reciprocity 
required that, between the United States Switzerland, the Court 's jurisdiction 
be limited to disputes arising after the 28th of July, 1948, the date the Swiss 
declaration came into force. The Court rejected that objection and pointed 
out the following: "Reciprocity in the case of declarations accepting the 
compulsory jurisdiction of the Court enables a Party to invoke a reservation to 
that acceptance which it has not expressed in its own declaration but which the 
other Party has expressed in its declaration... Reciprocity enables the State 
which has made the wider acceptance of the jurisdiction of the Court to rely 
upon the reservations to the acceptance laid down by the other Party. There the 
effect of reciprocity ends (my emphasis—V. L.). It cannot justify a State, in 
this instance, the United States, in relying upon a restriction which the other 
Party, Switzerland, has not included in its own declaration".55 
In the Interhandel Case, the United States sought a double application of 
reciprocity, as is pointed out by Briggs.56 Decaux wrote: double application of 
reciprocity, which, as against its single application securing the equality of the 
parties, is virtually conducive to inequality, and here with this case is a Swiss 
(non-existent) reservation excluding the retroactive effect and conferring 
advantage to the United States only.57 However, by rejecting the American 
stand, the Court created a clear situation, defining the limits of reciprocity and 
58 
blocking the way to potential abuse of double reciprocity. 
From the point of view of restrictions laid down in declarations of 
acceptance, the Court, in dealing with the Interhandel Case, faced a similar 
situation to that in the Phosphates of Morocco Case. Unlike its predecessor, 
however, the Court examined the question thoroughly clearly determining the 
aforementioned limitations on the application of reciprocity. 
55
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The question of reciprocity was considered by the International Court of 
Justice in the greatest detail in the Case concerning the Right of Passage over 
Indian Territory. These proceedings were initiated by Portugal against India 
on the g round that the Delhi Government denied passage through Indian 
territory between the Portuguese enclaves. A specific feature of this case is 
that Portugal filed an application against India a few days after the deposit 
of its declaration accepting the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court; the 
Portuguese declaration was dated the 19th of December, 1955, and the Lisbon 
Government submitted its application on the 22nd of December, 1955. In 
response, India filed six preliminary objections, several of which related to the 
question of reciprocity. 
In the f i rs t preliminary objection, India took exception to the third 
condition contained in the Portuguese declaration, under which Portugal has 
the right, by making at any time a notification to the Secretary-General of the 
United Nations to the effect of withdrawing from the compulsory jurisdiction 
any matter. The Indian Government contended that the said clause of the 
Portuguese declaration enabled Lisbon to withdraw, by a simple notification 
made at any time, from the Court's jurisdiction on any matter which has been 
submitted to it prior to such notification. India claimed that the said condition 
was incompatible with the principle and notion of the compulsory jurisdiction 
of the Court as established in Article 36 of the Statute, it introduced an element 
of uncertainty regarding the obligations of the declaring State; and it was 
contrary to the principle of reciprocity. The Court held that the said condition 
caused no uncertainty and did not contradict the basic principle of reciprocity 
underlying the optional clause, since any such reservation, by virtue precisely 
of the principle of reciprocity, was to become automatically operative against 
it in relation to other signatories of the optional clause.59 The Court likened 
reservations concerning the right to mod i fy declarations with immediate 
effect to clauses concerning the right of denunciation by simple notification 
with immediate effect, stating that there is no essential difference between the 
situations created by these clauses, with regard to the degree of certainty, and 
the third condition of the Portuguese declaration which leaves open the 
possibility of a partial denunciation.6 0 In connection with modification of 
declarations, the Court pointed out that "when a case is submitted to the Court, 
it is always possible to ascertain what are, at that moment, the reciprocal 
obligations of the Parties in accordance with their respective declarations".61 
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In its second preliminary objection, the Government of India invoked 
reciprocity, contending that the filing of the Portuguese application violated 
the principle of "equality, mutuality and reciprocity" generally recognized 
in connection with declarations of accepting the compulsory jurisdiction. 
Portugal filed its application as little as three days after its declaration of 
acceptance, leaving insufficient time for the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations, in compliance with Article 36 paragraph 4 of the Statute, to 
transmit copies of the Portuguese declaration, before the filing of the 
application, to the other parties to the Statute, including India among other 
States. The first argument of the Court was that "(T)he principle of reciprocity 
forms part of the system of the optional clause by virtue of the express terms 
both of Article 36 of the Statute and of most declarations of acceptance, 
including that of India. The Court has repeatedly affirmed and applied that 
principle in relation to its own jurisdiction. It did so, in particular, in the case 
of Certain Norwegian Loans (ICJ Reports, 1957, pp. 22—24) where it recalled 
its previous practice on the subject. However, it is clear that the notions of 
reciprocity and equality are not abstract conceptions. They must be related to 
some provision of the Statute or of the declarations".62 The second part of 
the Court's answer was that, in addition to the deposit of declarations of 
acceptance with the Secretary-General, the Statute contained no further 
requirement, such as a certain interval between the deposit of the declaration 
and the filing of the application. At every moment the declaring State is to 
"expect that an Application may be filed against it before the Court by a 
new declaring State on the same day on which that State deposits with the 
Secretary-General its Declaration of Acceptance".63 The Court concluded that 
the filing of the Portuguese application was in no way against Article 36 and 
did not violate any right of India under the Statute or the declaration of 
acceptance.64 
The fourth Indian preliminary objection was closely related to the second. In 
it, the Government of India contended that, since it had had no knowledge of the 
Portuguese declaration before Portugal filed its application, it had been unable 
to avail itself, on the basis of reciprocity, of the third Portuguese condition 
and to exclude from the jurisdiction of the Court the dispute which was the 
subject-matter of the Portuguese application. In connection with the objection 
the Court practically repeated its above finding and stressed that the manner of 
filing the Portuguese application did not, in respect of the third Portuguese 
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condition, violate the rights under Article 36 of the Statute concerning 
reciprocity in such a way as to constitute an abuse of the optional clause.65 
On the basis of the documents presented to the Court and of what the 
representatives of India stated before the Court, the position of India on 
reciprocity can be summarized as this: the Statute covers general and continuous 
reciprocity between two Statutes, and applies to the relations between them from 
the beginning of the relations established under the optional clause up to the date 
of termination of the respective declarations.66 Contrary to this, the Court held 
that "it is not the date of deposit of a new Declaration which constitutes the 
crucial date for purposes of the jurisdictional requirement of reciprocity, but the 
date on which an Application is filed".67 
Dealing with the position of the Court, Decaux states that, in effect, it 
would have been possible to interpret reciprocity in a wider and a narrower 
sense. According to the wider interpretation, maintained by India, reciprocity 
generally applies to all obligations and rights deriving from declarations 
made under the optional clause. On the other hand, according to the narrower 
interpretation appearing in the Court's decision, the determinant factor 
concerning the reciprocal rights and obligations of the parties is the time the 
proceedings are instigated.68 
During the 1980s, new problems emerged concerning the application of 
reciprocity in the Case concerning Military and Paramilitary Actions in and 
against Nicaragua. 
In the case submitted by Nicaragua against the United States, one of the 
most important points of controversy between the parties arose out of the fact 
that three days before Nicaragua filed its application the United States, by a 
Note to the International Court, had modified its declaration of 1946 to exclude 
from the Court 's jurisdiction certain disputes relating to Central America.69 
The United States declaration of acceptance originally fixed six months' notice 
for the termination of the declaration. Nicaragua's declaration contained no 
such restriction. The United States claimed it had modified its declaration of 
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1946 by its 1984 notification, so the Court was without jurisdiction on the 
9th of April, 1984, the date at which Nicaragua filed its application. The 
Washington Administration invoked reciprocity in an effort to render its 1984 
notification immediately effective. That argument sought to ensure that since 
Nicaraguan declaration, being indefinite in duration, is subject to a right of 
immediate termination, without previous notice by Nicaragua, the United 
States declaration could also be terminated with immediate ef fec t by virtue 
of the principle of reciprocity regardless of the six months' notice proviso in 
the United States declaration. The Court refused to accept the American 
argument and emphasized that "(T)he maintenance in force of the United 
States Declaration for six months after notice of termination is a positive 
undertaking, flowing from the time-limit clause, but the Nicaraguan Declaration 
contains no express restriction at all. It is therefore clear that the United States 
is not in a position to invoke reciprocity as basis for its action in making the 
1984 notification which purported to modify the content of the 1946 
Declaration. On the contrary it is Nicaragua that can invoke the six month's 
notice against the United States—not of course on the basis of reciprocity, 
but because it is an undertaking which is an integral part of the instrument 
that contains it."70 The Court explained that "(T)he notion of reciprocity is 
concerned with the scope and substance of the commitments entered into, 
including reservations, and not with the formal conditions of their creation, 
duration or extinction. It appears clearly that reciprocity cannot be invoked in 
order to excuse departure from the terms of a State's own declaration, 
71 
whatever its scope, limitations or conditions." In other words, the Court held 
that the six months' notice formed an integral part of the American declaration 
of acceptance and constituted a condition which must be taken into account 
regardless of whether it related to the termination or the modification of the 
declaration. 
The Nicaraguan case provoked, if for no other reason than its political 
relevance, a great deal of discussion in the pertinent literature. The Court's 
findings about reciprocity and the limits thereof were consistent with the view, 
as expounded in the majority of writings published before the Nicaraguan case, 
that reciprocity cannot be applied to the formal conditions, duration, extinction 
72 
declarations, etc. For the matter, a few members of the Court, including, 
e.g., Sir Robert Jenning, in his separate opinion given in the Nicaraguan 
case, relied precisely on reciprocity, among other things, for criticizing the 
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judgement, observing that the reservations by which one of the parties can 
withdraw or alter a declaration with immediate effect produces an inequality 
73 
and lack of reciprocity between the parties. 
In relation to the Nicaraguan case, mention should be made of Spain's 
declaration of acceptance of 1990, which extended the principle of reciprocity 
to the conditions for termination of the declaration. The Madrid Government, 
most certainly guided by an endeavour to avoid a situation similar to that in 
which the United States found itself, fixed six months' notification of the 
withdrawal of its declaration, "however, in respect of those States which in 
their respective declarations have established a shorter period of time between 
the notification of the withdrawal of their declaration and its becoming 
effective, the withdrawal of the Spanish declaration shall become effective 
after such that shorter period."74 Thus, Spain intended to apply reciprocity to 
the withdrawal of the declaration. U p to now, that condition as laid down in 
the Spanish declaration has not been applied in practice, but, at any rate, it 
would be of interest to know the position of the Court on that condition, as it is 
contrary to what the Court stated in the Nicaraguan case.75 
4. Consequences of reciprocity 
Application of reciprocity to the system of the optional clause and to 
declarations of accepting the compulsory jurisdiction entails various 
consequences, of which one can highlight but a few now. 
a) As noted earlier, the reference to reciprocity in paragraph 3 of Article 36 
was incorporated in the Statute based on the proposal of Fernandez. At the 
time, by the inclusion of reciprocity, Fernandez sought to ensure that States 
knew exactly which were the States, in respect of which, they had assumed 
obligations concerning the compulsory judicial settlement of disputes. Thus, 
by doing so, the Brazilian jurist wanted to eliminate certain elements of 
uncertainty. At that time, however, no one thought that there was another 
implication of reciprocity which, as is pointed out by Rosenne, operates to 
have the extent of jurisdiction crystallized and determined in a concrete case.76 
All this means that so long as a concrete legal dispute is not submitted to 
73
 ICJ Reports, 1984. 548. 
74
 See the last paragraph of the Spanish declaration of acceptance dated the 15th of 
October, 1990. 
75
 Szafarz: op. cit. 46. 
76
 Rosenne: op. cit. 387. 
RECIPROCITY AND THE COMPULSORY JURISDICTION... 65 
the Court, there are specific elements of uncertainty actually accompanying 
the obligations of States under the optional clause and that it is only in 
principle that the Court's jurisdiction exists in respect of disputes covered by 
declarations of acceptance. No State is in a position to know in advance which 
dispute will in practice be actually subject to the Court's jurisdiction and no 
State can be absolutely certain that the Court's jurisdiction will really extend to 
a particular dispute covered by its declaration of acceptance, for, in the last 
analysis, the Court 's jurisdiction always depends on the specific dispute or on 
whether a particular dispute is within the scope of the declaration of the given 
party and that of the opponent State. It could occur that a State has recognized 
the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court in respect of a rather wide range of 
international disputes, but this notwithstanding the Court may in practice deal 
with a much narrower range of international conflicts of the State concerned 
by reason of the fact that the other disputant State has, or States have, accepted 
the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court in respect of a much more limited 
scope of disputes. 
This was expressed by the Court in the Nicaraguan case by saying: "(T)he 
coincidence or interrelation of those obligations thus remain in a state of flux 
until the moment of the filing of an application instituting proceedings, The 
Court has than to ascertain whether, at that moment, the two States accepted 
"the same obligations" in relation to the subject-matter of the proceedings".77 
If the system of obligations established by the optional clause is broken down 
to the bilateral level, one can practically find no two identical scopes of 
reciprocal obligations, and the extent of obligations assumed by each declaring 
State in respect of the other States party to the optional clause system is 
essentially different. 
b) Most authors in the pertinent literature agree that the inclusion of 
reciprocity in the Statute is intended to ensure equality of the parties—the 
78 
elementary requirement of justice—before the Court. In Waldock's view, 
the optional clause ensures exactly the same rights and obligations for all States 
(i. e. those which have made declarations accepting compulsory jurisdiction— 
V. L.). He further argues that equality, mutuality and reciprocity are principles 
underlying the system of the optional clause. In order to ensure the equality 
of the parties to the fullest extent, reciprocity has also been applied to the 
limitations and reservations attached to declarations of acceptance. This has 
gone the length of entitling the States, which have recognized the Court 's 
jurisdiction unconditionally, to avail themselves of the benefits of reservations 
77
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to declarations of acceptance by the adverse party. "The result is that 
application of the condition of reciprocity tends to equalize Declarations made 
with or without reservations."79 In other words, a State making its declaration 
of acceptance without reservations or with some specific reservations 
recognizes the Court's compulsory jurisdiction in all other matters not affected 
by the reservations. This means that it has made an offer to the other States 
party to the optional clause system to the effect that it can be sued before the 
Court in any other matter. If a dispute is brought before the Court, and the 
declaration of acceptance of the applicant State contains reservations, the 
possibility exists for the respondent State to avail itself of the benefits of 
reciprocity and to invoke, if it so wishes, the reservations contained in the 
applicant State's declaration of acceptance. It is precisely the principle of 
equality of the parties that sets a limit of reliance upon the reservation contained 
in the declaration of the adverse party on the basis of reciprocity, and, as is also 
exemplified by the Interhandel Case, the application of double reciprocity was 
rejected by the Court through reliance on the principle of equality. 
c) Considering that a State may, by virtue of reciprocity, invoke the 
reservation to the declaration of the adverse party, reservations tend, in practice, 
to make their effect felt more often than not, precisely against the State or States 
making a reservation, which is to say that this is a two-edged weapon.80 Such 
was the case whenever the Court established the lack of its jurisdiction by 
invoking precisely the reservation or limitations contained in the declaration of 
the applicant State, while the respondent State relied on the reciprocity 
principle for causing the application of the other State to be rejected by the 
Court.81 
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distinction between justification and excuse. By contrast with German and other continental 
criminal law systems, the distinction has not played a significant part in the development of 
criminal law doctrine in common law jurisdictions. Over the past twenty years, however, 
there has been a growing interest in the benefits of this approach to conceptualising criminal 
liability, manifested by the considerable literature on justification and excuse and the frequent 
references to the distinction in judicial decisions and legislative enactments. Although the 
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attempts at a systematic classification of criminal law defences on this basis run up against 
serious difficulties. These difficulties have much to do with the fact that elements of both 
justification and excuse often appear to overlap in the moral basis of a legal defence. It is 
argued that, notwithstanding these difficulties, the theory of justification and excuse offers a 
viable model, which can achieve and maintain coherence among criminal law defences and 
facilitate understanding and acceptance of criminal law and its presuppositions. 
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Just i f i cat ions , e x c u s e s and c r i m i n a l liability 
Cr imina l law doc t r i ne p roceeds f r o m the p r i n c i p l e that a p e r s o n cannot b e 
conv ic t ed of an o f f e n c e unless t w o basic e l e m e n t s are es tab l i shed : the conduc t 
o r state of a f f a i r s which a pa r t i cu la r o f fence prohib i t s (ac tus reus), and t h e 
s ta te of mind w h i c h a person m u s t have at the t i m e of such c o n d u c t or state o f 
a f f a i r s (mens rea). Es tabl i sh ing cr iminal l iabil i ty depends , m o r e o v e r , upon t h e 
absence of a va l id legal d e f e n c e . A dist inct ion is d rawn b e t w e e n two types o f 
de fences : jus t i f i ca t ions and e x c u s e s . A jus t i f i ca t ion-based d e f e n c e chal lenges 
the un lawfu l cha rac te r of an ac t which , on t h e f a c e of it, v i o l a t e s a cr iminal 
prohib i t ion . W h e n such a d e f e n c e is raised the a rgumen t is t ha t , in the c i r cum-
s tances , an act w h i c h would n o r m a l l y cons t i tu te a criminal o f f e n c e should b e 
cons ide red right or, at least, l ega l ly permiss ib le . T h e c i r cums tances of jus t i f i -
ca t ion , in other words , are u n d e r s t o o d to a l ter t he grounds f o r the moral a n d 
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legal assessment of the relevant act. Self-defence and defence of another are 
often referred to as examples of justification-based legal defences. Claims of 
excuse, by contrast, do not deny the wrongfulness and unlawfulness of the act. 
What these defences call in question is the necessary internal relationship bet-
ween a prima facie unlawful act and the actor. An accused who pleads a valid 
excuse cannot be held morally blameworthy and therefore culpable for having 
brought about the external elements of a criminal offence. Examples of this 
type of legal defence include insanity, duress and certain types of necessity. 
Central to the theory of justification and excuse is the distinction between 
primary or prohibitory norms and norms of attribution. The former impose 
general duties of conformity with minimum standards of conduct on members 
of society who are required to guide their conduct accordingly if they are to 
avoid the sanctions provided by the law. These primary or prohibitory norms 
are complemented or modified by the norms of justification, which allow for 
exceptions to the application of the primary norms in prescribed circum-
stances. For example, the primary norm against committing acts of violence is 
complemented or modified by the provision which licenses the doing of such 
acts in self-defence or in defence of another. Justifications operate on the 
assumption that, when done under the prescribed circumstances, the act in 
question, harmful though it may be, should be assessed differently than when 
done under normal circumstances, i.e. under those in which the original pro-
hibitory norm would apply. By contrast with the primary or prohibitory norms, 
the norms of attribution are specifically addressed to judges and juries as these 
norms lay down grounds for legally excusing someone who has violated a 
legal prohibition. Unlike claims of justification, the norms of attribution do not 
modify the primary norms. Their role is not to guide conduct but to allow for 
exceptions in ascribing moral blame as a prerequisite for legal culpability. 
According to Professor Fletcher:1 
"Wrongful conduct may be defined as the violation of the prohibitory norm 
as modified by all defences that create a privileged exception to the norm. 
The analysis of attribution turns our attention to a totally distinct set of norms, 
which do not provide directives for action, but spell out the criteria for 
holding persons accountable for their deeds. The distinction as elaborated 
here corresponds to the more familiar distinction between justification and 
excuse." 
1
 Fletcher, G.: Rethinking Criminal Law. 1978,458. 
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As criminal law is concerned not only with punishing wrongdoers but also 
with highlighting and reinforcing societal values and expectations, it should 
be capable of identifying the moral character of actions and the moral basis for 
exempting certain persons accused of offences from criminal liability and 
punishment.2 In this respect, describing a defence as a justification conveys the 
message that the relevant conduct is approved or, at least, tolerated. On the 
other hand, labelling a defence as an excuse draws attention to the fact that, 
although the actor is free from blame, his conduct remains wrongful and as such 
is to be avoided. A failure to recognise the distinction between justification 
and excuse will result in sending confusing or contradictory messages to the 
3 • • 
community. Besides its great moral significance, the distinction between 
justification and excuse has important practical implications. It is recognised, 
for example, that as the defence of duress operates as an excuse, a person 
who assists another in the commission of an offence should be convicted as 
an accessory even though the principal offender is excused on such grounds. 
By contrast, other things being equal, an alleged accessory would be free from 
criminal liability if the person accused of an offence as a principal successfully 
pleads a justification-based defence. Moreover, legally justified or authorised 
conduct cannot be resisted by force—e.g. one cannot justifiably use force 
to resist a lawful arrest, for this would undermine the greater interest being 
protected, i.e. the enforcement of the law—and third parties are generally 
entitled to assist a person whose action is deemed justified. On the other hand, 
because excuses do not deny the wrongful character of conduct, a person may 
use force to resist an attack by an excusable aggressor.4 Moreover, whether a 
defence is classified as a justification or as an excuse may have important con-
sequences as regards the issue of compensation of those harmed by the 
accused's conduct. If the defence is regarded as an excuse a person harmed 
would have a strong claim for compensation. By contrast, if the defence is 
2
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classified as a justification the victim's claim for compensation would be 
significantly weaker.5 
Commentators agree that, by contrast with German and other Continental 
criminal law systems, the distinction between justification and excuse has not 
been given enough weight in the development of modern criminal law 
doctrine in Common law jurisdictions.6 It is argued that much of the confusion 
surrounding criminal law doctrine today could have been avoided had the 
importance of the distinction been recognised at an earlier stage in the develop-
ment of the law.7 Nevertheless, the increasing literature on justification and 
excuse and the frequent references to the relevant distinction in judicial decisions 
and legislative enactments in recent years manifest a renewed interest in the 
benefits of this approach to conceptualising criminal liability.8 
Justification and excuse in common law jurisprudence 
At early common law the distinction between justification and excuse was 
fully recognised and had important practical implications, particularly in the 
context of the law of homicide. A successful justification-based defence 
resulted in the full acquittal of the accused. On the other hand, an excuse-
based defence resulted in the usual sentence for homicide—death—and the 
forfeiture of the accused's property. The excused person, however, could escape 
execution on the grounds of a royal pardon. The Statute of Gloucester, enacted 
5
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1986. 49 Law and Contemporary Problems 109-122. 
6
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Review (1985), 949; Yeo, S. M. H.: Compulsion in the Criminal Law, 1990, 5. 
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excuse can no longer be ignored by the courts. Its primary contribution is consistency in 
the development of the law, a goal which the courts themselves proclaim as most desirable. 
Without the theory to guide the courts, aspects of the law of self-defence, duress, necessity 
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concedes the wrongfulness of the action but asserts that the circumstances under which it 
was done are such that it ought not to be attributed to the actor." ( S.C.R. 247, C.R. 128). 
WRONGDOING, CULPABILITY AND THE LOGIC OF CRIMINAL LAW DEFENCES 71 
in the thirteenth century,9 p rov ided that k i l l ing another in se l f -preservat ion, 
l ike the ki l l ing of another b y mi sadven tu re o r accident, w a s excusable a n d 
there fore sub jec t to royal p a r d o n . The d i s t inc t ion b e t w e e n jus t i f iable a n d 
excusab le h o m i c i d e was e l abo ra t ed fu r the r b y the c o m m e n t a t o r s of the 17th 
and 18th cen tur ies . In his Commentaries on the Laws of England ( 1 7 6 9 ) , 
Wil l iam Blacks tone dis t inguished be tween justif iable homic ide as it is 
commit ted "e i ther for the advancement of pub l i c justice o r f o r the p reven t ion 
of some atrocious crime",1 0 and excusable homic ide w h i c h could be of t w o 
kinds: "ei ther per infortunium, by misadventure ; or se defendendo, u p o n a 
principle of se l f -preservat ion ." 1 ' Killing in se l f -defence was cons ide red 
excusable when two persons became engaged in a fight in t h e course of w h i c h 
deadly violence was used by one of the par t ies . If the k i l l ing took place in the 
heat of the m o m e n t , it was ca l led "chance -med ley" and the o f fender was gu i l ty 
of the lesser c r ime of manslaughter . If, h o w e v e r , the a c c u s e d had ki l led the 
other af ter he had retreated as fa r as poss ib le , this was excusab le homic ide se 
12 
defendendo. 
9
 6 Edw. I.e.9 (1278). 
10
 Blackstone, W.: Commentaries on the Laws of England (1769), 179. 
" Ibid. 82. 
12
 Francis Bacon was one of the first English writers to comment on the distinction 
between justification and excuse. In discussing what he called "necessity of conservation 
of life" Bacon used as examples the stealing of food by a person to satisfy his present 
hunger and the escaping of prisoners from a jail following an accidental fire. Bacon 
regarded the first of these cases as an example of excusing necessity; however he treated 
the second case as an example of justifying necessity, a view that was to be questioned by 
later writers. Further, Bacon described as justifiable action one's pulling down the wall or 
house of another to prevent a fire from spreading and as excusable the killing of another by 
misfortune. Bacon, F.: The Elements of the Common Laws of England, (1630), 29 ff. And 
see Coke: The Third Part of the Institutes (1660), 50 ff.; Dalton, M.: Countrey Justice, 
(1619) 224 ff. In his Pleas of the Crown, published in 1678, Hale distinguished between 
three kinds of homicide: "(1) Purely voluntary, viz., murder and manslaughter; (2) purely 
involuntary, as that other kind of homicide per infortunium-, (3) mixed, partly voluntary 
and partly involuntary, or in a kind necessary; and this again of two kinds, viz., including a 
forfeiture as se defendendo, or not including a forfeiture as (1) in defence of a man's 
house; (2) in defence of his person against an assault in via regia; (3) in advancement or 
execution of justice." (472) Hale differentiated homicides which were "justifiable, and 
consequently including no forfeiture at all, nor needing pardon", from homicides which 
were "excusable and including a forfeiture." (39—40). William Hawkins, in his Treatise of 
the Pleas of the Crown (1716), explained justifiable homicide as being "either of a publick 
or a private nature. That of a publick nature, is such as is occasioned by the due execution 
or advancement of publick justice. That of a private nature is such as happens in the just 
defence of a man's person, house, or goods." (70). Moreover, he distinguished between 
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East, in his Pleas of the Crown (1803), offered a more elaborate analysis of 
the distinction between justifiable and excusable homicides. Three kinds of 
homicide ex necessitate were identified: (i) homicides in the advancement of 
justice, deemed justifiable by permission of the law, e.g. where a person 
having authority to arrest or imprison another kills the party who resists arrest 
in a fight; (ii) homicides in execution of justice, regarded as justifiable by the 
command of the law, e.g. the lawful execution of a convicted criminal; and 
(iii) homicides "in defence of person or property under certain circumstances 
of necessity" which are "either justifiable by permission of the law, or only 
13 
excusable." In the third category East included: (i) the justifiable killing of 
another "who comes to commit a known felony with force against his person, 
his habitation, or his property"'4; (ii) the excusable killing of another in self-
defence upon a sudden combat, described as homicide se defendendo upon 
chance-medley, and (iii) the killing of a person in circumstances of "dire 
necessity, which is not induced by the fault of either party, where one of two 
innocent men must die for the other's preservation: this has been held by some 
to be justifiable; perhaps it may more properly be considered as excusable: 
justification is founded upon some positive duty; excuse is due to human 
infirmity."15 A further kind of excusable homicide, identified by East, was 
homicide by misadventure, which occurs "when a man doing a lawful act, 
without any intention of bodily harm, and using proper precaution to prevent 
danger, unfortunately happens to kill another person." In East's time it was 
recognised that in this case the "the jury under the direction of the court may 
two kinds of excusable homicide: per infortunium and se defendendo. "[H]omicide per 
infortunium, or by misadventure...is when a man in doing a lawful act, without any intent 
of hurt, unfortunately chances to kill another..." (73). "[Hjomicide se defendendo...seems 
to be where one who has no other possible means of preserving his life from one who 
combats with him on a sudden quarrel, or of defending his person from one who attempts to 
beat him...kills the person by whom he is reduced to such an inevitable necessity." (74—75). 
See also: Foster, M.: Crown Cases (1762), 273; Stephen, J. F.: A History of the Criminal 
Law of England III, (London 1883); Pollock, F. and Maitland, F.: The History of English 
Law. (2nd ed., 1898), 478-481; Green, T. A.: Societal Concepts of Criminal Liability in 
Medieval England. 1972. 47 Speculum 669, 675 ff; "The Jury and the English Law of 
Homicide, 1200-1600" (1976) 74 Michigan Law Review 413, 428; Kaye, J. M.: The Early 
History of Murder and Manslaughter. 1967. 83 Law Quarterly Review 365 and 569. 
13
 220-221. 
14
 221. 
15
 221. 
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acquit the party, without putting him to purchase a pardon under the statute of 
Gloucester, c.9." 16 
Although at first pardons were granted in special occasions, their number 
gradually increased until they came to be granted by the chancellor as a matter 
of course, without the need to consult the monarch. Until the pardon was 
confirmed, the excusable offender remained in jail or, in later years, under bail. 
Besides the pardon, the excused offender was granted a special writ of 
restitution of his goods. Gradually the practice relating to the forfeiture of the 
offender's goods fell into abeyance, until 1828 when forfeiture was formally 
abolished by statute.17 Thus, at the end, both justifications and excuses led to 
the same result, namely the accused's acquittal. As the difference between the 
effects of pleading a justification and an excuse gradually disappeared, the 
significance of the distinction for the common lawyer withered away and its 
possible role in formulating a comprehensive system of criminal law defences 
was subsequently overlooked. The terms justification and excuse have often 
been avoided by common lawyers and, when they have been used by judges and 
commentators, they have often been treated as interchangeable or synony-
18 
mous. The view that came to prevail in English criminal law is that the 
absence of a justification or an excuse constitutes part of the legal definition of 
a criminal offence. According to this approach, when a person acts under a 
valid justification or excuse he cannot commit the offence charged. Some 
authors subsume the absence of such a defence under the requirement of actus 
reus, while others regard it as an independent definitional requirement that 
should be distinguished from the actus reus and mens rea elements of the 
offence.19 Under the latter view, a distinction should be drawn between 
16
 221-222. 
17
 9 Geo. IV c. 1, s. 10 (1828). 
18
 As one commentator remarked: "[T]he distinction between justifiable and excusable 
self-defence was, at one time, one of considerable importance. Moreover, it is still 
occasionally referred to in the cases and the two are still separately classified in the texts. 
However, so far as the present day law is concerned, the distinction is one without a 
difference... The terms are generally used synonymously and interchangeably." Miller, J.: 
Handbook of Criminal Law, 1934, 199. And see Stephen: History of the Criminal Law... 
op. cit. III, 1883, 1. 
19
 Glanville Williams, for example, argues that: "[the] actus reus includes not merely 
the whole objective situation that has to be proved by the prosecution, but also the absence 
of any ground of justification and excuse." Criminal Law: The General Part, 1961, 20. 
And according to Hart, H. L. A.: "[The modem English lawyer] would simply consider 
both [excuse and justification] to be cases where some element, negative or positive, 
required in the full definition [of the offence] was lacking." Hart goes on to point out, 
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excusing conditions negating the actus reus and/or mens rea elements of 
offences (e.g. automatism, mistake), and excusing conditions operating outside 
these elements (for example, duress, necessity). In the latter case the actor 
brings about the actus reus of an offence with the requisite intent, but criminal 
responsibility is precluded or diminished (in the case of a partial excuse) on 
the basis that, in the overwhelming circumstances the actor found himself in, 
his normal capacity to choose the course of his action was vitiated or sub-
stantially impaired. Sometimes the statutory definition of an offence includes 
the phrase "without lawful authority or excuse". It is suggested that the aim of 
this phrase is to serve as a reminder to judges and juries that the application of 
the provision creating the offence is not absolute but always subject to the 
absence of a recognised general defence. On the other hand, the use of the 
phrase "without reasonable excuse" instead of "lawful excuse" in the legal 
definition of an offence implies that, at the court 's discretion, the accused may 
rely on an excuse not formally recognised by the criminal law, provided that 
such an excuse is reasonable.20 
Professor George Fletcher has offered an important lead in re-awakening 
interest in the distinction between justification and excuse in Anglo-American 
criminal jurisprudence. Fletcher traces the decline of the distinction to the 
prevalence of positivistic ideas in the development of modern law. He argues 
that the judges' tendency to abstract the judicial decision from the individual 
case in order to formulate general rules of law resulted in the overlooking of 
the fundamental character of criminal law as "an institution of blame and 
• 21 
punishment". According to Fletcher criminal condemnation and punishment 
presuppose a negative moral judgment of the actor 's character as reflected in 
her voluntary violation of a criminal prohibition. From this viewpoint, excuses 
are seen as introducing exceptions in the application of the rules of positive 
law, for their role is to block the normal inference from a wrongful act that the 
actor's character is morally f lawed. Such moral assessment of the accused's 
however, that "...the distinction between these two different ways in which actions may 
fail to constitute a criminal offence is still of great moral importance". Hart, H. L. A.: 
Prolegomenon to the Principles of Punishment. In.: Punishment and Responsibility, 
1968, 13. 
Smith, J. C.: Justification and Excuse in the Criminal Law: The Hamlyn Lectures, 
1989, 47 ff. 
21
 Fletcher: Rethinking... op. cit. 467. See also his article "The Individualization of 
Excusing Conditions", Southern California Law Review 47, (1974), 1269. 
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character is essential to any theory of criminal liability that connects the 
application of criminal punishment with the principle of just deserts.22 
Fletcher argues, moreover, that the common law's reliance on the concept 
of reasonableness, as providing a single standard for dealing with legal 
disputes, tends to overshadow the distinction between justification and excuse. 
The common law approach is characteristic of what he calls a "f lat" legal 
discourse—a system in which all the criteria pertinent to the resolution of a 
legal problem revolve around the application of a single norm. In Fletcher's 
words:23 
"The reasonable person enables us to blur the line between justification and 
excuse, between wrongfulness and blameworthiness, and thus renders 
impossible any ordering of the dimensions of liability. The standard 'what 
would a reasonable person do under the circumstances?' sweeps within one 
inquiry questions that would otherwise be distinguished as bearing on 
wrongfulness or blameworthiness. Criteria of both justification and excuse 
are amenable to the same question." 
Fletcher contrasts the common law approach with what he terms "struc-
tured" legal discourse, and points to the German law as an example. In this 
context legal disputes are resolved in two stages. The admission of an absolute 
norm, at the first stage of analysis, is followed by the introduction of 
qualifications introducing restrictions to the application of the norm, at the 
second. The distinction between justification and excuse is most at home in a 
system which adopts such a structured approach to defining and tackling legal 
disputes. In such a system, the question of wrongfulness of an act logically 
precedes the question of its attribution to the actor. Questions of justification, 
as pertinent to the issue of wrongdoing, take precedence over questions of 
excuse. This structured approach to criminal liability, Fletcher argues,24 is 
consistent with a theory of criminal responsibility that lays special emphasis 
on retributive punishment and the principle of just deserts. From the viewpoint 
of retributive theory, the question of whether the actor deserves punishment 
cannot be considered before determining the wrongdoing to be punished. As 
22
 Fletcher: Rethinking... op. cit. 800. See also Bayles, M.: Character, Purpose and 
Criminal Responsibility. Law and Philosophy 1, (1982), 5-20. 
23
 Fletcher: The Right and the Reasonable, op. cit. 949, 962-963. 
24
 Fletcher: Rethinking... op. cit. 961. For an interesting account of the role of excuses 
from the viewpoint of retributive theories of punishment see Dressier, J.: Reflections on 
Excusing Wrongdoers: Moral Theory, New Excuses and the Model Penal Code. Rutgers 
Law Journal 19 (1988), 671. 
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related to the requirement of just deserts, claims of excuse become relevant 
following an admission that a wrongful act has been committed. 
By contrast with the general trend in modern common law jurisprudence, 
the distinction between justification and excuse has been instrumental in the 
formation of criminal law doctrine in Germany and other Continental European 
jurisdictions. A general account of the distinction as developed in German 
criminal law theory is offered in the following paragraphs. 
Justification and excuse in German criminal law theory 
In Germany and other Continental European legal systems legal doctrine is 
permeated by the fundamental idea that the normative principles of law are not 
reducible to the body of enacted legal rules, or law in a strict sense (Gesetz). 
According to Kant, the transcendental conception of law, captured in the 
notion of Right (Recht), pertains to the conditions of freedom that allow 
diverse choices in society to harmonise with each other.25 Right, or law in a 
broad sense, derives its binding force from its content; enacted law derives its 
binding force f rom its form-from the fact that its rules have been duly enacted 
by a legislative authority. The principles of the Right are perceived as pre-
existing and transcending the body of enacted rules whose role is merely to lay 
down what is to happen when the former principles are violated. An enacted 
rule, which by definition pertains to a specific type of legal relationship, draws 
on the Right, but cannot be identified with it-it is only a vinculum iuris, a bond 
based on Right. The application of a legal rule is typically strict, for the act or 
dispute is treated under the conditions specified by the letter of the law, 
without taking into account the circumstances of the individual case. By 
contrast, the application of the Right is flexible and as such adaptable to the 
needs of each particular case. Unlawfulness is defined primarily in relation to 
the Right, for an unlawful act is taken to encroach upon the normative 
principles which inform the particular legal provision under which the act is 
subsumed.26 The distinction between Right, or law in a normative sense and 
enacted, posited law is characteristic of continental jurisprudence.27 The 
25
 Kant, I.: The Metaphysical Elements of Justice', and see Fletcher: The Right and the 
Reasonable, op. cit. 965; Fletcher: Rethinking... op. cit. 779 ff. 
26
 See Jescheck: Lehrbuch des Strafrechts, Allgemeiner Teil (2nd ed. 1972), 154. 
27 
Thus the Germans distinguish between Gesetz and Recht, the French between Loi 
and Droit, the Italians between Legge and Dirrito, the Russians between Zakon and 
Pravo, the Greeks between Nomos and Dikaeon. 
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prevalence of positivistic views in Anglo-American jurisprudence precluded a 
similar distinction from being recognised in common law jurisdictions. The 
distinction between Right, or law in a broad normative sense, and enacted law, 
28 
as elaborated by the jurist Karl Binding, allowed German theory to advance a 
conception of unlawfulness that goes beyond the statutory definition of a 
criminal offence. This development was, in turn, essential, to distinguishing 
between unlawfulness and guilt and, subsequently, between justification and 
excuse. 
In German legal thinking the theory of justification and excuse emerged 
from the elaboration of the fundamental distinction between wrongfulness and 
blameworthiness. Although initially expressed in these general moral terms, 
this distinction was brought closer to law through a contrast between unlaw-
29 m i 
fulness (Rechtswidrigkeit) and guilt (Schuld). The latter distinction was first 
recognised in the domain of private law and was subsequently introduced in 
criminal law theory.30 This development is associated with the emergence of 
the so called 'tripartite' system in German criminal law theory. Crime was 
described as an act which a) meets the statutory definition of an offence 
('Tatbestandsmassigkeit), b) is objectively unlawful (Rechtswidrig) and c) can 
31 
be subjectively attributed to the actor (Schuldhaft). From this viewpoint, guilt 
was described as the subjective or internal relationship between the actor and 
the prescribed harm and as such it was distinguished from the objective or 
external unlawfulness of the act. The subjective link between the actor and the 
harm captured in the notion of guilt pertains to the elements of intention, 
recklessness and negligence. This interpretation became known as the 
28
 Binding, K.: 1 Die Normen und ihre Übertretung 135 (1872). Binding's second 
important contribution to the theory of criminal liability was his analysis of guilt in 
terms of intention, recklessness and negligence, an approach that was widely adopted by 
later jurists. 
29
 See Achenbach: Historische und dogmatische Grundlagen der straf rechtssystema-
tischen Schuldlehre (1974) 19 ff.; Jescheck, supra note 26, 153 ff. 
30
 As Jhering, R. first explained, the negation of the subjective blameworthiness of 
the actor does not necessarily preclude the wrongful act from having certain legal 
consequences. Das Schuldmoment im Römischen Privatrecht 4, (1867); for a fuller 
discussion of this matter see Eser, A.: Justification and Excuse. American Journal of 
Comparative Law 24 (1976), 625. 
31
 As proposed first by Beling, E. in his Lehre vom Verbrechen (1906) and elaborated 
by Liszt, V. in his Lehrbuch des Deutschen Strafrechts (1919) 110 ff.; For an interesting 
discussion of this approach to criminal liability see Fletcher, G.: The Right Deed for the 
Wrong Reason: A Reply to Mr Robinson. 23 University of California at Los Angeles Law 
Review (1975) 293, reprinted in Michael Louis Corrado (ed), Justification and Excuse in 
the Criminal Law, 1994, 305. 
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"psychological" theory of guilt.32 In criticising the tripartite system, some 
authors have argued that the satisfaction of the formal requirements of a legal 
provision is but another condition of unlawfulness. These authors have 
proposed, instead, a twofold approach to criminal liability based solely on the 
distinction between unlawfulness and guilt.33 
The clear-cut dichotomy between objective, i.e. pertinent to unlawfulness, 
and subjective, i.e. pertinent to guilt, aspects of crime was finally set aside in 
the light of subsequent developments in German criminal theory. Jurists 
recognised that unlawfulness cannot be adequately canvassed without reference 
to certain subjective requirements. Thus, knowledge on the part of the actor 
that his conduct met the objective conditions of lawfulness was seen as a 
further condition of legal justification. Moreover, it was accepted that the 
notion of guilt hinges not only on subjective but also on objective conside-
rations. The introduction of an objective element in relation to guilt meant that a 
claim denying attribution of an unlawful act to an accused was to be assessed 
also by reference to the question of what could reasonably be expected of a 
normal person when faced with the circumstances of pressure the accused 
found himself in. As a result of this development, the "psychological" theory 
of guilt was abandoned in favour of the so called "normative" theory of guilt.34 
According to the latter theory, the requirements of guilt are not restricted to 
intention, recklessness and negligence, but include, in addition, considerations 
of capacity and control. Lack or substantial impairment of the actor's ability to 
comply with the law would exclude or mitigate guilt, notwithstanding his 
acting intentionally, recklessly or negligently. Nevertheless, the tripartite 
approach to criminal liability, despite the criticisms and further refinements it 
was subjected to, continued to be regarded as the basis of legal doctrine in 
German criminal jurisprudence. 
James Goldschmidt was the first jurist to offer a convincing analysis of justi-
fication and excuse in German criminal jurisprudence. His theory proceeds from 
the fundamental distinction between legal norm (Rechtsnorm) and norm of 
responsibility (Pflichtnorm).35 According to Goldschmidt, a formally expressed 
32
 Eser, A.: op. ci.t. 626-627. 
33
 See e.g. Schmidhausen Strafrecht, Allgemeiner Teil, (2nd ed.), 1975, 141 ff. See 
reference in Eser: op. cit. 627. 
34
 As elaborated by Frank, R. in his Der Aufbau des Schuldbegriffs (1907) and Das 
Strafgesetzbuch fur das Deutsche Reich (18th ed. 1931) 136 ff. and Goldschmidt, J. in 
his "Normativer Schuldbegriff' 1 Festgabe fur R. v. Frank (1930) 428. 
35
 Goldschmidt, J.: Der Notstand, ein Schuldproblem. 4 Osterr. Zeitschrift fur 
Strafrecht (1913), 144 ff. 
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legal norm, i.e. a statutory provision, is tacitly complemented by a norm of 
responsibility requiring one to regulate her internal stance so that his actions 
do not conflict with the legal norm. The distinction between justification and 
excuse is attuned to that between legal norm and norm of responsibility. Claims 
of justification dispute the unlawful character of a prima facie infringement of a 
legal norm; claims of excuse, in contrast, challenge the violation of a norm of 
responsibility, i.e. the required correspondence between internal attitude and 
external conduct according to a legal norm. In cases of justification criminal 
liability is excluded by virtue of what Goldschmidt calls a "greater objective 
interest". In cases of excuse, on the other hand, it is excluded by virtue of an 
"irresistible subjective motivation". The distinction between justification and 
excuse, as articulated by Goldschmidt, was subjected to further theoretical 
elaboration and refinement and is now fully recognised in German criminal 
law. Thus, under the new German Penal Code, enacted in 1975, self-defence is 
regarded as a justification.36 The defence of necessity is treated under two 
separate headings: necessity as a justification,37 and necessity as an excuse.38 
The theory of justification and excuse as a basis for 
the classification of criminal law defences 
The distinction between justification and excuse offers a basic theoretical 
formula for understanding the way criminal law defences operate. One may 
seek to explain, on this basis, the demarcation of different defences as well as 
of different ways in which a legal defence operates or, to put it otherwise, of 
different pleas treated under the same label. From this viewpoint one may 
distinguish, for example, between self-defence as a justification and duress as 
36
 Para 32 (Self-defence) provides: "(1) Whoever commits an act in self-defence 
does not act unlawfully. (2) Self-defence is that defence which is required in order to 
prevent a present unlawful attack on oneself or another." 
37
 Para 34 (Necessity as justification) provides: "Whoever commits an act in order to 
avert an imminent and otherwise unavoidable danger to life, limb, liberty, honor, 
property or other legal interest of himself or of another does not act unlawfully if, taking 
into account all the conflicting interests, especially the legal ones, and the degree of 
danger involved, the interest protected by him significantly outweighs the interest which 
he harms. The rule applies only if the act is an appropriate means to avert the danger." 
38
 Para 35 (Necessity as excuse) provides: "(1) Whoever commits an unlawful act in 
order to avert an imminent and otherwise unavoidable danger to his own life, limb, or 
liberty, or to that of a relative or person close to him, acts without guilt..." 
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39 
an excuse, as well as between justifying and excusing necessity. Although, at 
a theoretical level, the distinction between justification and excuse presents 
few difficulties, attempts at a general classification of the criminal law defences 
along these lines come up against a number of problems. These problems have 
much to do with the fact that, in practice, elements of excuse often appear to 
overlap with elements of justification. According to Greenawalt40 
"The difficulty in distinguishing rests on the conceptual fuzziness of the 
terms 'justification' and 'excuse' in ordinary usage and on the uneasy quality 
of many of the moral judgments that underlie decisions that behavior should 
not be treated as criminal. Beyond these conceptual difficulties, there are 
features of the criminal process, notably the general verdict rendered by lay 
jurors in criminal trials, that would impede implementation in individual 
cases of any system that distinguishes between justification and excuse." 
Greenawalt argues that there is little room for a systematic classification of 
criminal law defences on the basis of the justification-excuse distinction in 
Anglo-American law, although he does not deny the importance of the 
distinction in elucidating problems of moral and criminal responsibility. 
Necessity offers an example of a defence whose rationale may be seen as 
resting upon both justificatory and excusative considerations. Necessity relates 
to situations where a person is forced to commit an offence in order to avoid a 
greater, imminent threat to himself or another. What distinguishes this defence 
from that of duress is that the danger which compels a person to break the law 
arises from the circumstances the person finds himself in, rather than from the 
39
 As Robinson notes, it is possible to recognise "two different categories of defense 
under the same label at the same time and in the same jurisdiction. A jurisdiction may 
properly provide a 'self-defense' justification and a 'self-defense' excuse. Such multiple 
defenses may even occur in the same provision..." He goes on to argue, however, that 
"when this is done, the potential for misunderstanding and confusion increases signifi-
cantly." "Criminal Law Defenses: A Systematic Analysis", 82 Columbia Law Review 
(1982) 199, 240. For a further discussion of this problem see Gur-Ayre, M.: Should the 
Criminal Law Distinguish Between Necessity as a Justification and Necessity as an 
Excuse? Law Quarterly Review 102 (1986), 71. 
40
 "The Perplexing Borders of Justification and Excuse", (1984) 84 Columbia Law 
Review, 1897, 1898. Consider also "Distinguishing Justifications from Excuses" (1986) 
49 Law and Contemporary Problems 89. And see Eric Colvin, Principles of Criminal 
Law, 1991, 204-205. 
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threats of another human being.41 Although, in Anglo-American jurisprudence, 
necessity is traditionally recognised as an excuse,42 questions of justification 
may still arise in so far as the person is still regarded as being capable of 
exercising a degree of choice. Thus, in English law, when an accused pleads 
necessity the jury are directed to consider these two interrelated questions: a) was 
the accused compelled to act as he did because he had a good reason to believe 
that otherwise he or another person would suffer death or grievous bodily harm? 
and b) if so, would a reasonable person, sharing the relevant characteristics of 
the accused, have responded to the situation the way the accused did?43 The first 
of these questions is concerned with the subjective condition of compulsion, 
and as such it pertains to excuse; the second is concerned with the requirement 
of proportionality, or the objective appropriateness of the accused's conduct in 
the circumstances, and as such it relates to justification. The defence may be 
available only if, from an objective standpoint, the accused can be said to have 
acted reasonably and proportionately in order to avoid the forms of harm 
specified, i.e. death and serious bodily injury. A similar position was adopted 
by the Supreme Court of Canada in Perka v. R.44 In that case it was held that 
necessity should be recognised as an excuse, as a concession to human frailty, 
and therefore it implies no vindication of the accused's actions. At the same 
time, however, it was stated that the defence requires a balancing of harms and 
that a plea of necessity should fail unless the harm inflicted was less than the 
harm prevented. According to this interpretation of the necessity defence, the 
success of the proposed compulsion-based excuse depends upon objective or 
justificatory considerations. 
Similarly, the defence of self-defence, which is traditionally treated as a 
justification, may also be conceptualised as an excuse if the emphasis is placed 
on the assumption that a person whose life is under immediate threat is 
incapable of exercising free choice, i.e. acts morally involuntarily.45 This 
41
 Hence the defence of necessity is sometimes referred to as "duress of circum-
stances". 
42
 See e.g. Moore v Hussey (1609) Hob 96. 
43
 R V Conway [1988] 3 All ER 1025; R v Martin [1989] 1 All ER 652. 
44
 Perka v R [1984] 2 S.C.R. 232; 42 C.R. (3d) 112; (1985) 14 C.C.C. (3d) 385. 
45
 For a discussion of the rationale of self-defence see Omichinski, N.: Applying the 
Theories of Justifiable Homicide to Conflicts in the Doctrine of Self-Defence. 1987. 33 
Wayne Law Review 1447; Fletcher, G.: The Right to Life. 1979. 13 Georgia Law Review 
1371; Kadish, S.: Respect for Life and Regard for Rights in the Criminal Law. 1976. 64 
California Law Review 871; Ashworth, A.: Self-Defence and the Right to Life. 1975. 34 
Cambridge Law Journal 282; Dressler, J.: New Thoughts about the Concept of Justification 
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interpretation of the defence may also be adopted in cases where force in self-
defence is used against an excusable aggressor, e.g. an insane person or a child. 
In such cases the aggressor's culpability in starting the fight can no longer be 
said to render the aggressor's rights less worthy of protection. Further, it is 
recognised that when the defence of self-defence is raised, a mistaken belief as 
to the existence or intensity of an attack and/or the psychological pressure an 
accused was experiencing in the circumstances (excuses) are usually taken into 
account in deciding whether his response was reasonable and therefore 
justified.46 What is known as "putative self-defence" offers another example of 
a defence whose rationale involves an overlap of justificatory and excusative 
considerations. In English law, when an accused is charged with an offence 
against the person and pleads self-defence or defence of another, he will be 
judged in the light of the circumstances as he believed them to be. The 
accused's belief need only be honest, not reasonable.47 What this means is that, 
even if the accused's actions were based on a mistaken assessment of the 
situation, his response will be deemed justified if the force used was reasonable 
in the light of that mistaken belief. It is obvious that here an excusing 
condition, i.e. mistake of fact, becomes an element of self-defence as a 
justification-based defence. One may argue, however, that in such cases the 
accused's initial mistake converts the entire defence into an excuse. From this 
viewpoint it may be said that only where the use of force, as well as the 
amount of force used, is objectively warranted one may speak of self-defence 
as a justification.48 On the other hand, it has been argued that, in moral 
discourse, the justification of an action is seen as depending not only on its 
consequences but, more importantly, on the propriety of the reasons for which 
the action is taken. If the emphasis is placed on this letter element, then we 
in the Criminal Law: A Critique of Fletcher's Thinking and Rethinking. University of 
California at Los Angeles Law Review 32 (1984), 61. 
46
 See e.g. Lord Morris' judgment in Palmer v. The Queen [1972] A.C. 814. 
47
 R V Williams [1987] 3 All ER 411 (CA); Beckford v. R. [1988] AC 130. The 
traditional approach has been that for self-defence to be accepted in such cases the 
accused's mistake must be both honest and reasonable. This position was recognised in 
England prior to the decisions in Williams and Beckford and is still accepted in other 
common law jurisdictions. See e.g. the decision of the High Court of Australia in 
Zecevic v. DPP. (1987) 162 C.L.R. 645; Canadian Criminal Code, ss 27, 34, 35, 37; 
New Zealand Crimes Act ss 48^19. 
48
 See e.g. Fletcher: Rethinking... op. cit. 762-769; Robinson: Criminal Law Defenses: 
A Systematic Analysis, supra note 39, 239-240. 
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may speak of a person as acting justifiably irrespective of whether her actions, 
in view of their consequences, are objectively justified or not.49 
Elements of justification and excuse also appear to overlap in some cases 
where a mitigating or partial defence is raised. A plea for mitigation may be at 
issue, for example, where an accused's defence of self-defence has failed on 
the grounds that the amount of force used was unreasonable or excessive. In 
such a case the accused may seek to rely on a partial excuse, claiming that 
under the pressure of the circumstances it was very difficult for him to assess 
correctly the amount of force needed to stifle the attack; or he may seek to rely 
on a partial justification, claiming that the fact that he was defending against 
an unlawful attack is sufficient to diminish the objective wrongfulness of his 
response. A similar overlap of excusative and justificatory elements is apparent 
in relation to the partial defence of provocation. Provocation, when pleaded 
as a partial defence to murder in English law, is not aimed at complete 
exoneration but only at the reduction of homicide from murder to manslaughter. 
Conceptually, the defence is understood to hinge upon two interrelated 
requirements, namely the wrongful act of provocation and impaired volition or 
loss of self-control. If the emphasis is placed on the assumption that the 
accused was acting in response to the victim's wrongdoing, the defence could 
be regarded as a partial justification. If, on the other hand, the emphasis is 
placed on the fact that the accused had lost self-control at the time of the 
killing, the defence would appear to operate as a partial excuse. As J. Dressier 
remarks50 
"Confusion surrounds the provocation defence. On the one hand, the 
defence is a concession to human weakness; the requirement that the 
defendant act in sudden heat of passion finds its roots in excuse theory. On 
the other hand the wrongful conduct requirement may be, and certainly 
some decisions based on that element are, justificatory in character. It is 
likely that some of the confusion surrounding the defence is inherent to the 
situation, but it is also probably true that English and American courts were 
49
 See Colvin, E.: Principles of Criminal Law, 1991, 211; Dressier, J.: New Thoughts 
about the Concept of Justification in the Criminal Law: A Critique of Fletcher's Thinking 
and Rethinking", University of California Law Review, (1984), 92-95; Greenawalt, K.: The 
Perplexing Borders of Justification and Excuse. Columbia Law Review, (1984), 1922— 
1925. 
50
 "Provocation: Partial Justification or Partial Excuse?" Modern Law Review 51 
(1988), 467, 480. See also Dressier: Rethinking Heat of Passion: A Defence in Search of 
a Rationale. 73 Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, (1982), 421, 428. 
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insufficiently concerned about the justification-excuse distinctions while 
the law developed." 
The main obstacle to drawing a clear distinction between justifications and 
excuses is that, in the moral discourse, warranted conduct ranges from that 
which might properly be approved and encouraged through that which might 
only be accepted to what might be tolerated as a regrettable but unavoidable 
consequence of the interplay of human nature and circumstance. Anglo-
American law has attempted to circumvent these problems of moral shading by 
avoiding framing legal defences in terms of justification and excuse, placing the 
emphasis, instead, on the all-embracing requirement of reasonableness. 
Excuse, justification and the reasonable person 
The mythical figure of the "reasonable person" maintains a tenacious hold on 
Anglo-American criminal law doctrine. As Fletcher points out, law's recourse 
to the standard permits a continuous infusion of commonly accepted moral 
values into the law and, as such, constitutes an effort to go beyond the formal 
sources of the criminal law and to reach for "a higher, enduring, normative 
plane".51 This understanding of the "reasonable person" gains support in the 
light of the ever-increasing tendency towards leaving questions of reasonable-
ness to be determined by the jury, the embodiment of community values and 
expectations. Nonetheless, one could not easily account for those moral 
considerations which underpin the "reasonable person" as the basis of a 
generally applicable test, nor could one prescribe the nature of the disputes to 
be resolved on such a basis. According to Fletcher, the law's reliance on the 
"reasonable person" means that heterogeneous criteria of justification and 
excuse, of wrongfulness and blameworthiness, are subsumed under the same 
inquiry and this makes it difficult to demarcate between fundamentally different 
perspectives of liability. 
Nevertheless, the role of the "reasonable person" may be interpreted in 
different ways, depending on the nature of the inquiry within which the relevant 
standard operates. With regard to inquiries of justification, the "reasonable 
person" indicates the course of action that should be re-garded, in the circum-
stances, as legally permissible. In this respect the "reasonable person" embodies 
the moral principles that inform and support judgments of legal justification, 
recognising exceptions to the primary or prohibitory rules of the criminal law. 
" Fletcher: The Right and the Reasonable, op. cit. 980. 
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In this context reasonableness defines the required levels of vigilance, prudence 
and regard for the welfare of others which need to be met for conduct to be 
considered justifiable. Thus, in a situation wherein a conflict of values or 
interests becomes inevitable the actor is called on to act as a reasonable person, 
that is to preserve the value or interest which is considered as being objectively 
superior. From the point of view of the justification theory, such an act, 
harmful though it may be, should nonetheless be considered legally acceptable. 
Further, causing harm in pursuance of a legal right, e.g. the right of self-
defence, would not be legally warranted unless the actor observes certain 
limitations or, one might say, does not act "in abuse" of the right. In this regard 
the "reasonable person" is referred to as relevant to circumscribing the bounds 
within which a legal right is regarded as being properly exercised. 
With regard to inquiries of excuse, on the other hand, the central question 
is whether the actor is fairly expected to stand up to the pressure of the 
circumstances and refrain from acting wrongfully. The "reasonable person" 
provides a yardstick in answering this question. In this context the standard of 
reasonableness is based on a minimalist conception of ethics. What is excluded 
from criminal responsibility is conduct that meets common sense expectations 
as to what degree of pressure ordinary people, concerned for the welfare of 
others, should be able to stand up to, even though such conduct may be 
regrettable from an idealistic viewpoint. In the context of excuse theory, the 
interpretation of the standard is for the most part informed by considerations 
having to do with what is often referred to as the "realities" or "failings" of 
human nature. The slide from the notion of "reasonable" to that of "ordinary" or 
"average" or "normal" person is sometimes suggestive of a shift from 
justification to excuse, as the latter notions seem more apposite to accommodate 
the element of human frailty.52 
Although legal excuses are said to constitute concessions to the failings of 
human nature because it is assumed that these failings are common to all 
people, the combination of factors that occasion a person's surrender to 
pressure, as a manifestation of human frailty, could only be determined by 
reference to the idiosyncrasies of the particular case. Thus it becomes necessary 
to endow the "reasonable person" with certain individual characteristics of the 
accused, i.e. those that are deemed relevant to determining, in an objective 
way, the degree of pressure to which the actor was subjected. Only on such a 
basis may it properly be asked whether the accused should fairly be expected 
to resist the pressure and abstain from breaking the law. Of the characteristics 
that may bear upon the actor's capacity to withstand the compelling situation 
52
 See Greenawalt, K.: The Perplexing Borders... op. cit. 1904-1905. 
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only those for which he cannot be blamed may be taken into account in 
describing the ambit of the applicable test. The singling out of those individual 
characteristics that are material to the assessment of the proposed excuse can 
itself be perceived as a involving an objective moral judgment. In this respect, 
it seems correct to say that incorporating certain personal characteristics of the 
actor into the "reasonable person" standard does not in reality undermine the 
53 
basically objective character of the relevant test. A clear distinction should be 
drawn, however, between individual peculiarities that may be attributed to 
the "reasonable person" and peculiarities whose presence would render the 
standard inapplicable. The latter pertain to conditions which are taken to 
remove the actor from the category of "reasonable" or "normal" people. As was 
indicated before, these conditions provide the basis for a different type of legal 
defence revolving around the notion of abnormality of mind rather than a 
general assumption of human frailty.54 
Concluding note 
At the heart of the theory of justification and excuse lie questions that have 
been the focus of moral philosophy for centuries. And the difficulties in 
categorising legal defences have largely to do with the confusion surrounding 
the choice of the moral theory upon which the role of legal defences is to be 
explained and justified. From the viewpoint of consequentialism, conduct is 
evaluated by reference to its effects. In this respect defences such as necessity 
and duress bear closer to justifications, for the emphasis is on whether the 
harm prevented by the relevant conduct outweighs the harm caused. On the 
other hand, the classification of the same defences as excuses reflects a 
nonconsequentialist, deontological approach which stresses a person's duty to 
abstain from performing certain actions that constitute violations of moral 
standards. For a deontologist, such actions remain wrongful, irrespective of 
their consequences, and the only way for exculpating the actor would be on the 
basis of an excuse. As this suggests, the same defence could be regarded as a 
justification or as an excuse, depending upon the moral viewpoint which one 
adopts. 
53 
For a further discussion of the standard of reasonableness see Allen, H.: One Law 
for All Reasonable Persons? 1988. 16 International Journal of Sociology of Law 419. 54
 In R. v. Ward [1956] 1 Q.B. 351 at 356 the 'reasonable person' was described as 
"a person who cannot set up a plea of insanity". 
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Notwithstanding the apparent difficulties in formulating a comprehensive 
system of defences on the basis of the distinction between justification and 
excuse, the increased emphasis on the distinction in recent years has enabled 
courts and legislatures to achieve a greater measure of consistency in Anglo-
American criminal law.55 The distinction has provided judges with a valuable 
tool in elucidating problems of criminal liability and in interpreting and 
declaring the law in a way that reflects more accurately community values and 
expectations. In the work of codification of the criminal law, legislatures rely 
on the distinction as a useful guide towards achieving and maintaining 
coherence and clarity of definition. The analysis of existing and future defence 
categories in terms of the theory of justification and excuse is important in 
bringing the criminal law closer to the community's moral values and 
expectations and securing a greater degree of comprehension and acceptance 
of the law. The theory offers a viable normative model which can achieve and 
maintain coherence among criminal law defences and secure community 
understanding and acceptance of the presuppositions upon which the criminal 
law system operates. This is because the very focus of the theory is on the 
question of Tightness or wrongness of actions and society's expectations in 
dealing with the authors of such actions. Attention to the theory of justification 
and excuse will warrant the legitimacy and institutional efficacy of the 
criminal law system as a system which derives its aims and guiding purposes 
from the society which it serves. 
55
 For a reply to the critics of the theory of justification and excuse see Dressier, J.: 
Justifications and Excuses: A Brief Review of the Concepts and the Literature. 1987. 33 
Wayne Law Review 1155, 1168-1169. And see Yeo, S. M. H.: Compulsion in the 
Criminal Law, 1990, 5 ff. 
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1. The place and role of coercive conduct in criminal procedures 
In constitutional democracies, rules of prosecution are set down in writing, 
both accessible and applicable to all citizens and are implemented in the process 
of prosecution. These are designated to ensure the lawfulness and fairness of 
legal procedures, by which crimes are investigated and the penal code is 
brought to bear against the perpetrators of criminal activities. Procedural rules 
by their mere existence as directives imply, or at any rate are supposed to 
imply, a symbolic threat and their role equals that of "the cane on the primary 
school wall" of old days.1 In the classroom, the cane occasionally had to be put 
to actual use, which might also be necessary in the process of prosecution. 
We cannot claim that coercive conduct is a fundamental prerequisite to all 
prosecution, but it nevertheless looms in the background and thereby ensures 
voluntary compliance and peaceful behaviour on the part of the parties 
Lecturer, University of Pécs, Faculty of Law, H-7622 Pécs, 48-as tér 1, Hungary. 
E-mail: tatar@ajk.pte.hu 
1
 See, Farkas, Á.: A falra helyezett nádpálca (Cane Hanged on the Wall), Budapest, 
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concerned against, which, as a potential threat averts the need of taking the 
cane off the wall in the first place. 
Both theoretical and practical research have shown that those, who have 
committed a crime, either as a consequence of the drive of human nature or 
in response to their own instincts, will try to avoid the potential of being held 
accountable for their actions as well as to obstruct the authorities in their 
attempts to ascertain the facts of the case through comprehensive investi-
gation, to precisely reconstruct preceding events, furnish either damning and 
aggravating, or, occasionally, exonerating or extenuating evidence and reveal 
the circumstances linked directly to the act of crime. Such behaviour in a 
way substantiates the employment of coercion on the part of the authorities. 
It is no exaggeration to assert that if the threat of coercion and other means 
of force were eliminated, the implementation of rules of prosecution and law 
enforcement would not be effective and it would be impossible to guarantee 
law and order in society. 
A further fundamental pillar that substantiates the employment of coercion 
is the predominance of a high-level interest, namely a criminal-political 
interest, by which all members of society can demand that efficient law 
enforcement and enforcement of criminal law be categorically upheld. The 
force of that belief is so strong that it sufficiently substantiates the employment 
of otherwise undesirable state-implemented coercion, which can also prevail 
in constitutional democracies, insofar as it is enforced in full compliance with 
constitutionally guaranteed rights and within specified limitations.2 
2
 As Ákos Farkas clearly states, "an efficient judicial system must have effective 
instruments so as to facilitate criminal investigation and punishment as well as the 
elimination of obstacles in its path, even without the involvement of the defendant, in 
order to administer punishment as stipulated by the state. However, the authorities 
involved in the above system are each led by different objectives, i.e., the police aims to 
improve crime-fighting statistics, the prosecution aims to win as many cases as possible, 
the courts aim to conclude as many cases as possible with a minimum level of successful 
appeals, whereas the penitentiary system aims to guarantee that the period of penal 
servitude expires with as few problems as possible. 
These objectives often clash not only with one another, but also with law. In the 
interest of achieving their own objectives, the authorities find several ways to interfere 
with the rights of the individual. 
On the other hand, the defendant demands a fair trial and besides the observation of 
the rules of prosecution, also protection of his rights and a constitutionally valid 
investigation. Finding the right balance is extremely difficult, a challenge in itself for a 
court of constitution." Farkas, Á.: Alkotmányosság és büntetőeljárás (Constitutionalism 
and Criminal Procedure). In: Kriminológiai és kriminalisztikai tanulmányok (Essays on 
Criminology), Vol. 30, 1993. 45. 
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2. Differentiation between necessary—legal and unnecessary—illegal 
coercive conduct 
In the followings, we will differentiate between legal and illegal (lawful and 
unlawful or legitimate and forbidden) coercive conduct within the criminal 
procedure. Legitimate coercive conduct is specified and permitted primarily 
under the Constitution, furthermore under Act I. of 1973 on Criminal Procedure 
and other related regulations, such as those governing the police, the border 
guards, the domestic revenue and customs prosecution authorities as pursuant 
to Act V. of 1972 on Prosecution, etc. The legal basis of coercion does not in 
itself justify employment in each case, since that would constitute a serious 
violation of human rights. Law-enforcement authorities may resort to 
coercive conduct exclusively with respect to the strictly specified standards 
of necessity and proportionality.3 Necessity occurs in the event of inevitability 
and absolute necessity in a situation, which is otherwise unworkable. 
Whereas proportionality requires that the principle of a minimum level be 
followed, that is to say, the lightest coercive conduct or form of coercion shall 
be applied in the given situation. The violation of either of the criteria under 
necessity and proportionality is a serious breach of both the norms specified 
by the rules of prosecution and the rights of the individual guaranteed by the 
constitution. 
The Act on Prosecution (hereinafter: AP) in Hungary provides that "in a 
criminal procedure the right of privacy and other rights of the citizen shall be 
respected, and these can only be limited in cases and in ways as specified 
herein. In the course of the prosecution the authorities shall ensure that any 
recourse to force shall not impinge on the rights of the citizen."(Paras. 1—2 of 
Art. 4.) 
Which, in negative terms, implies that any form of coercive conduct, which 
does not correspond with the criteria above, shall be forbidden. In positive 
terms, however, it is in compliance with the definition of unlawful coercion 
as set forth under Para. 8 of Art. 76 of the Police and Criminal Evidence 
Act of 1984 in the UK. Accordingly, oppression includes torture, inhuman 
or degrading treatment, as well as the threat of torture or coercion without 
torture. 
3
 These criteria, in view of the fact that coercion features in both, share similarities 
with the requirements of justified defence, where both the theoretical literature and law 
enforcement specify necessity, proportionality, directness, direct attack and inevitability as 
requirements. 
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3. Features of coercion in the four main stages of the criminal procedure 
—investigation, confinement under remand, hearing, penalty 
enforcement 
The Act on Prosecution stipulates the task of investigative authorities as 
follows: "The investigative authorities shall conduct a fast and thorough 
investigation of crimes and take the necessary steps to call those responsible 
for crimes to account for their actions." (Para. 1 of Art . 16. of AP) The 
elements of speed and thoroughness as requirements are also included in the 
sections of the Act on Criminal Procedure, which deal with the criminological 
aspects of investigation strategies in practical terms. The so-called erster 
Angriff "first strike"4 is an extremely important element with respect to the 
efficiency of the entire criminal procedure. Let us consider, for example, what 
happens when someone is caught in the act of a crime. Then, the perpetrator is 
apprehended and brought forth, which is followed by the primary collection of 
facts and immediate investigative activity such as search of the surroundings, 
house and body search, arrest and taking into custody. Practically, each phase 
contains a violation of human rights, and, in cases where resistance occurs, 
coercion on the part of the authorities and limitation of rights shall be incurred. 
In the phases mentioned above, the process of apprehension is of special 
significance, so far as the public and individuals are guaranteed the right to use 
force in order to apprehend the perpetrator of a crime. In this respect the 
criteria of necessity and proportionality shall be respected and the right to 
resort to legitimate coercion shall not be abused, whereas the authorities shall 
be informed immediately, so that the apprehended perpetrator can be handed 
over. In practice, that results in numerous conflicts. People, confronted with 
someone who is emotionally overloaded, generally offended and behaving 
threateningly towards them, their family, or other people or assets, very often 
take the law into their own hands and act like judge, jury and prosecutor, and 
thereby abuse the perpetrator unnecessarily and employ excessive coercion 
without sufficient cause. 
The law-enforcement authorities themselves have also been noted to 
occasionally resort to excessive coercive conduct. Despite the two-century-old 
principle that an individual is innocent until proven guilty, some are subjected 
to unjustified and illegitimate coercive conduct on the grounds of "presumed 
4
 Tremmel, F.-Fenyvesi, Cs.: Kriminalisztika tankönyv és atlasz (Manual and Atlas of 
Criminology). Budapest-Pécs, 1998. 242. 
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concea lment of guilt",5 because of a "pas s ion for the hun t " , even in o rde r to 
create a dis torted statist ical profile of eff ic iency. C o e r c i v e conduct c a n take 
physical o r psychological form, or a combina t ion of t h e two. It a p p e a r s in its 
most var ied forms at the beginning of the procedure, i.e., threatening with 
arrest, threa ts with respec t to the ch i ld ren , the family o r the workplace of the 
individual concerned, physica l assault, t o list just a f e w examples . 
In v i e w of the fact that the inves t igat ion is conf iden t ia l by n a tu r e , and 
therefore secluded f r o m the public d o m a i n , the ins t ruments of coe rc ion and 
instances of multiple l imitat ions on r igh t s may all subs tant ia te serious ca se s of 
human r i g h t s v io la t ions , i .e. c o n d i t i o n s of de ten t ion , 6 cus tody, 7 t e m p o r a r y 
enforced displacement , which demons t r a t e both the extent to w h i c h law 
enforcers are able and wi l l ing to abuse t h e law and that they are in a pos i t i on to 
do so. In a survey of t h e Hunga r i an f i l e s on i l l - t r e a t m e n t dur ing o f f i c i a l 
procedures , we see that in nearly e v e r y case such an i l l - t reatment occur red 
either in the phase immedia te ly p reced ing the criminal procedure or d u r i n g the 
initial inves t iga t ive p h a s e , f requent ly d u r i n g inves t iga t ions by the p o l i c e . In 
5
 See Farkas, Á. -Pap, G.: Alkotmányosság és büntetőeljárás (Constitutionalism and 
Criminal Procedure). In: Kriminológiai és kriminalisztikai Évkönyv (Yearbook of 
Criminology). Budapest, 1993, 45.; Skolnick, J.: Justice Without Trial, New York, 1994. 
112; Szikinger, I.: Az ártatlanság vélelme — alkotmányos alapelv (The Presumption of 
Innocence—A Constitutional Principle), Belügyi Szemle, 1989/3. 8. 
6
 The European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment implemented inspections in Hungary in 1992 and 1994. According to the 
report of November 1994, the danger of abuse in custody shall be reduced if it is 
stipulated under a provision that those taken into custody may notify relatives and 
request a doctor or lawyer immediately after taken into custody... The Report of the 
Committee stressed that individuals shall be entitled to the above rights from the very 
moment of the outset of custody at a police station, and that, in any case, where a 
limitation of these rights occurs, the authorities shall justify the necessity of such 
limitation in writing. It is also deemed necessary that such measure shall be authorised 
by a lawyer or judge, who would also be responsible for the stipulation of the precise 
duration of the limitation." For further details, see the report, Összefoglaló tájékoztatás 
az Európa Tanács Kínzás Ellenes Bizottsága (CPT) [Information on the European 
Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment of the Council of Europe (CPT)], Kriminológiai Közlemények, 1996/53. 50. 
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 For further details on the anomalies, see, Herke, Csongor, A letartóztatás (Arrest), 
Budapest-Pécs, 2002. 1-366, and, Róth, E.: Emberi Jogok kontra fogvatartás a büntető 
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other words, the authorities employ illegitimate coercion8 in the expectation 
of greater criminological and procedural efficiency and attempt to reveal facts 
of the case at a time when no counsel for the defence is present. 
Instances of unlawful coercive conduct against the perpetrator are un-
common in the second phase of the criminal procedure, i.e. during confinement 
under remand, when it is the public prosecutor, who decides what direction the 
process will take and in the preliminary phase of the trial, when documents are 
examined by the court. In that phase, contact both with the parties concerned 
in the trial and the defendant occurs only in exceptional cases.9 
In the third phase of the criminal procedure, that of the court trial of the 
first and second instance and the remedial phase, both the judiciary and the 
principal judge have the right to command the use of force, take a person into 
custody, have a person expelled in the time of hearings or removed from the 
building, etc. Instances of illegitimate coercive conduct might include cases 
when the trial judge hears the witnesses in an excessively authoritarian style 
reminiscent of the mode of interrogation. Which, as a conduct, is expressly 
coercive, excessively constraining, we could say, violent behaviour on the part 
of the judge, who, faced with a situation where the defendant refuses to offer 
evidence, launches an interrogation about the underlying reasons for this 
stance and bombards the defendant with questions concerning the merits of the 
case. Defendants, who refuse to offer evidence, must not be asked questions, 
since that equals coercion to of fer evidence. Any intent on the part of the 
judge to do so, either implicitly or explicitly, constitutes illegitimate coercion, 
which further exacerbates the case of the already "enormously disadvantaged 
defendant".10 
The fourth phase of the criminal procedure, separately regulated, is that of 
punishment. The defendant now has the legal status of a convict, and as such, 
8
 On the subject of coercive conduct against the perpetrator under remand in the 
investigative phase, we note that in the United States "the Miranda verdict established a 
practically unshakeable presumption, when it deemed the interrogation of the person in 
custody to be ab ovo coercive conduct, against which the defendant is entitled to protection 
by law." Grano, J. D.: Miranda's Constitutional Difficulties: A Reply to Professor 
Schulhofe. The University of Law Review, 1988/Jan. 174-178, quoted in: Szikinger, I.: 
Miranda-iigy (Case Miranda), Belügyi Szemle, 1990/3. 111-119. 
During the phase of the confinement under remand, the public prosecutor is liable 
to interrogate the accused held in custody, therefore contact can only occur on that 
occasion, but in that respect, I haven' t encountered instances of illegitimate coercive 
conduct either in legal literature or my survey. 
'"Tremmel, F., Magyar büntetőeljárás (Hungarian Criminal Procedure), Budapest-
Pécs, 2001.95. 
COERCIVE CONDUCT IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURES 95 
is even more unprotected and vulnerable. In the confined and strictly ordered 
prison environment, the convict can only maintain sporadic contact with a 
lawyer, provided that he/she has one, whence the assumption of innocence 
until proven guilty is no longer valid, since a verdict has been brought under 
full force of the law. The potential for reversal on appeal is slight and the trial 
judge does not allow for the principle of contradictorium. The "guardian" of 
the rights of the convict is the public prosecutor, who has afflicted the status of 
the convict by seeking a verdict of guilty, now acts as a guardian of justice. An 
institution, in which external regulation practically hardly ever interferes, the 
defendant can suffer legitimate and illegitimate coercion in countless ways." 
4. The recipients of secondary victimisation in the criminal procedure 
In the four distinct phases of the criminal procedure, the defendant is not the 
only one who can suffer legal and illegal coercion. As the terms themselves 
suggest, both the victim of the crime and the witness can appear on the 
receiving end of coercive conduct within an investigation. Special attention 
needs to be given to the situation of the victim, who has to undergo voluntarily 
the tribulations of the whole procedure, besides having suffered unlawful 
violent attacks against his or her person, rights or property. Coercion can inflict 
injuries in several ways and cause different forms of damage, be it emotional, 
physical, financial, enduring, etc. Therefore, different forms of coercion have 
sweeping effects and combined with the indiscretion, insensitivity and the 
humiliation involved in the serial interrogations by the incompetent and rough 
police officers (or other authorities), who are often biased and prone to treat 
victims and witnesses, as if they were suspects themselves, their situation is 
12 • 
merely exacerbated. The severity of occasional medical examinations, the 
tension caused by the ever-present procedural bureaucracy and the depressing 
impact of force only adds to the above. In that respect, young people and 
children as those with vulnerable or damaged emotional development, who 
are particularly exposed to victimisation at the hands of the seeming 
" The prevalence of human rights violations in the punishment phase is 
demonstrated by the fact that the European Court of Human Rights received 40% of the 
complaints from those held in custody. Vókó, Gy.: Az elítéltek jogi helyzetéről, mint 
reszocializálásuk kiinduló pontjáról (The Legal Status of Convicts as a Starting—Point 
of their Reintegration into Society), Jogtudományi Közlöny, 1989/12. 626. 
12
 This observation is supported by the fact that police interrogation rooms are 
frequently papered with photographs of naked women, often pictured in bizarre poses or 
with men, and female victims of sexual assaults may also be interviewed in such a room. 
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omnipotence of the grown-up authority deserve special consideration. In such 
cases, in view of the age of those concerned, the authorities shall ensure that it 
is not the standard interrogation procedure that shall be applied.13 
Usually five to seven witnesses are called in the course of a trial, and they, 
too, can become victims of both kinds of coercive conduct. They can be forced 
to attend the trial, be subject to various investigations and confined to a 
particular place, etc.14 Simultaneously, they can become the victims of 
illegitimate threats and coercive conduct, in view of the fact that effective law 
does not allow them to engage a counsel.15 
Others who may also endure coercive conduct are victims of confiscation, 
who themselves are neither defendants nor witnesses to an act of crime. Here, 
we could refer to the shocked owner of a second—hand car, who discovers that 
it is just being forcibly confiscated by the authorities due to its former 
involvement in an act of crime (theft, smuggling, etc.). 
5. Victimisation catalysts and their functions 
The harmful effects of coercive conduct, be it legitimate or illegitimate, 
employed by the authorities can be mitigated both by authorities within the 
institution of the Hungarian Prosecution Service and by independent 
individuals and organisations. These, in my view, include the agents of 
law enforcement (the head of the investigation, the prosecuting attorney, the 
judge), the defence counsel, and individuals and organisations, such as the 
Constitutional Court, the ombudsman, and various organisations for the 
protection of the rights of individuals, such as the Helsinki Convention. All 
these parties, especially the prosecuting attorney, who is designated to a special 
status, are obligated to safeguard against coercive conduct and secondary 
victimisation by the authorities. In the former case, they are in a position to 
influence the way of proceedings, however, in the latter case they cannot be of 
13
 Such a case is both distressing and, from a criminal-strategic point of view, 
abhorrent as a model, when a child or a juvenile is forced to furnish evidence as a 
witness against a close relation, for example, the father, who sexually abused them, but 
denies that. 
14
 According to Para. 3 of Art. 4. of the Act on Criminal Procedure "the authorities 
shall be liable to inform the parties involved in the procedure of their rights and remind 
them of their legal obligations." Witnesses often get the impression that the latter is 
overemphasised. 
15
 This is due to be amended as of July 1st, 2003, when the new Act on Criminal 
Procedure will guarantee the witness the right to engage a counsel. 
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assistance, since victimisation usually occurs close to the act of crime in terms 
of time and place, which implies that the authority is not present. Since the role 
of the defence counsel in the investigation is restricted, in that respect s/he is 
insignificant. Furthermore, empirical studies dating back several decades have 
shown that barely a third of defendants receive the formal protection of an 
attorney, and that two-thirds of these attorneys are publicly appointed. Thus, 
a mere ten per cent of all defendants receive a form of "effective" defence as 
stipulated under the European Convention and Court of Human Rights.16 
The struggle of independent organisations to safeguard against coercive 
conduct can become effective only after the respective incident occurred and 
shall only affect the situation of victims and perpetrators after a series of stages. 
Therefore, it is less effective than the implementation of internal "catalysts" in 
the investigation process itself. 
6. Potential ways of the reduction of cases of coercive conduct in criminal 
procedures and of secondary victimisation 
Since in my view both the distortion of legitimate coercive conduct and 
unlawful coercive conduct have the same origins, they can be redressed in 
the same way, not only by the removal of those who employ coercion, among 
them detectives and investigators, but also of those in the field of penalty 
enforcement. It is precisely the preparedness and competence, experience and 
self-confidence of the officers concerned that needs to be established, built up 
and relied on. 
The requirements above can be met on condition that a particularly 
competitive admission system is established, in which through the examination 
of personality traits, candidates and employees with an aggressive disposition 
and a lack of self-control shall be rejected or dismissed. Successful candidates 
would also need to demonstrate advanced knowledge of legal texts and an 
ability to enforce them, as for the management of police documents and 
16
 For further details, see Nagy-Szabó, Th.: A vétségi nyomozás a gyakorlatban 
(Investigation of Crimes in Practice), Belügyi Szemle, 1983/10. 28.; Tóth, M.: Nyomozás 
és védelem (Investigation and Defence), Magyar Jog, 1989/4. 350; Kiss, A.: A védő 
szerepe a büntetőeljárásban (The Position of the Attorney in the Criminal Procedure), 
Kriminológiai és Kriminalisztikai tanulmányok XXVIII. Budapest, 1991. 177.; Fenyvesi, 
Cs.: A védői jogállás empirikus vizsgálat tükrében (The Legal Status of the Attorney for 
Defence in View of Empirical Study), Belügyi Szemle, 2001/2. 37. and, A kirendelt védői 
intézmény problematikája (The Problematic of the Institution of the Appointed Attorney 
for Defence), Jogelméleti Szemle, 2001/4. 
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criminal procedures, as well as knowledge of criminology, i.e., strategies and 
techniques as contained by criminal methodology, psychology, i.e., the psychic 
implications of criminal imprisonment, furthermore, conflict resolution. 
Within the scheme of criminal procedure, it is a major imperative that the 
role, presence and significance of the "catalysts", especially of the authorities 
in charge, i.e. the defence and prosecution attorneys, be highlighted both f rom 
a theoretical and a procedural standpoint. 
Summary 
Finally, we wish to add a few closing remarks as a conclusion. 
The practice of criminal procedure shows that the legislative threat ("cane 
on the wall") is in itself ineffective in terms of the desirable objectives of law 
enforcement and crime prevention. Therefore, legitimate coercion and measures 
of force (the use of the cane) are admissible. The criminal procedure in itself is 
a repository of force, pressure and constraint, so "velvety" prosecution as such 
is inconceivable, at best, it is considerate. The truth of this statement is most 
conspicuous in cases of organised crime, where the parties involved are not 
reputed for being overly scrupulous in their choice of methods and instru-
ments, yet, the constitutional and legal limitations must not be transgressed. 
Coercive conduct cannot be high-handed, autocratic, excessive or dispro-
portionate, either in degree or in time, legislators and law-enforcement 
authorities must maintain a delicate balance between permissible coercive 
conduct and the due respect of human rights of the defendant and other parties 
concerned in the case. 
As we've pointed out in our study, it is not only the defendant who, as a 
"main character", is forced to suffer and endure legitimate coercion in the 
course of the criminal procedure. Other parties also undergo similar treatment, 
whilst also, unfortunately, may be subjected to contingent illegitimate coercive 
conduct. Ill-treatment by the authorities can at times have such a great impact 
that it by far exceeds the disadvantages suffered by the already injured person 
as a consequence of an act of crime. Which is both highly damaging and 
constitutes persecution. Secondary victimisation is a real phenomenon in 
Hungarian prosecution and its prevention should be both a priority and an 
imperative for all legislators and law enforcement agents, as well as for official 
and non-official "victimisation catalysts." 
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Article in question in order to ensure effective judicial protection. The Court 
of First Instance (CFI) followed another line of argument concentrating on a 
possible change in judicial attitude towards the notion of individual concern 
in order to establish effective judicial protection. The clear contradiction in 
case law is shadowed, however, by the latter decisions of the CFI, in which it 
followed the position of the Court. Nevertheless, it has been shown that other 
solutions can be admissible in case law. 
Under the rule of law, Community law must establish a system of review 
of Community measures. The subjects-at-law are entitled to initiate an action 
for annulment of a Community measure, which invests rights or imposes 
obligations on them. During the action for annulment the validity of a Community 
measure is under scrutiny on the following grounds: lack of competence, 
infringement of an essential procedural requirement, infringement of the 
Treaty or of any rule of law relating to its application, misuse of powers. 
Article 230 EC on the action for annulment distinguishes among the subjects-
at-law of Community law on the basis of the scope of their right to initiate an 
action for review. Privileged applicants, such as the Member States, the 
Council, the Commission, and for the purpose of protecting their prerogatives, 
the European Parliament, the Court of Auditors and the European Central Bank 
are entitled to bring an action for annulment of regulations, decisions, 
directives, and the regulations, decisions concerning the European Central 
Bank in the European Court of Justice. The acts of the European Parliament can 
be brought under review, if they are intended to produce legal effects vis-à-vis 
third parties. In the application for annulment brought by privileged applicants, 
the Treaty does not require the proof of existence of conditions of admissibility, 
contrary to the applications lodged by non-privileged applicants, i.e. natural or 
legal persons. 
If natural or legal persons wish to attain the direct review of a Community 
measure under Article 230 (4) EC, they must provide proof of the existence of 
serious conditions of admissibility. The Treaty contains three conditions of 
admissibility. Firstly, the nature of the Community measure under scrutiny; 
secondly, the individual concern, and finally, the direct concern. Regarding the 
point of view of the cases analysed below, only the first two conditions are 
significant, rendering the examination of the third condition negligible in this 
case. The Treaty allows non-privileged applicants to bring an action for 
annulment of a Community measure, if the measure is: a decision addressed to 
the applicant; a decision addressed to another party, but the applicant is of 
individual and direct concern to the measure; and, a decision in the form of 
a regulation when the applicant is of individual and direct concern to the 
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measure. It is evident from the rules mentioned above, that non-privileged 
applicants can ask for the review of a measure of specific application 
addressed to them without proving the existence of the other conditions of 
admissibility. The Treaty, however, requires the proof of other conditions of 
admissibility if the applicant asks for the review of a Community measure of 
specific application not addressed to the applicant, or if the Community 
measure in form is of general application, but in substance is of specif ic 
application. It can be concluded that the Treaty offers the right to initiate an 
action for annulment of a Community measure for non-privileged applicants in 
case the measure is a decision and is addressed to the applicant, or the applicant 
is of individual and direct concern to the decision.2 
In the case law of the European Court of Justice the examination of whether 
the measure under review was a regulation or a decision, and whether the 
applicant was of individual and direct concern to the measure has been separated 
for a long time. The question of "regulation-decision" was decided under 
Article 249 EC on the basis of being of general or of specific application. If the 
Court thought that the measure under review qualified as a regulation, it could 
declare the action inadmissible without examining whether the applicant was of 
individual and direct concern to the measure. It appeared in case law, however, 
that the applicant was of individual concern to some valid regulations, therefore 
the necessity of the application of the "regulation-decision" test was questioned. 
The Court in Codorniu3 stated that a Community measure of general application 
may be brought under review by a non-privileged applicant, if the applicant was 
of individual concern to the measure. Since Codorniu, individual concern has 
been the thoroughly examined condition of admissibility. The Court defined the 
notion of individual concern in the Plaumann case.4 According to the Court, 
natural or legal persons shall be regarded as individually concerned by a 
measure not addressed to them, if it affects their position by reason of certain 
attributes peculiar to them, or by reason of circumstances which differentiate 
them from all other persons, and distinguishes them individually in the same 
way as the addressee. This means that the applicant must be distinguishable 
from all others by reason of some of his peculiarities, or by reason of a factual 
situation. It can be asserted that both the European Court of Justice and the 
Court of First Instance have applied the Plaumann-test rather strictly. The 
2
 See also: Hartley, T. C.: The Foundations of European Community Law. 4 ,h ed. 
Oxford, 1998. 327-376. 
3
 Codorniu SA v. Council C-309/89 [1994] ECR 1-1853. 
4
 Plaumann & Co. v. Commission C-25/62 [1963] ECR 95, 107. 
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European Courts interpreted individual concern in such way that very few 
actions by natural or legal persons have been found admissible on this basis.5 
If the European Courts reject the application for annulment on grounds of 
inadmissibility, the only other way of the review of Community law is through 
the preliminary ruling procedure.6 In this procedure the national judge asks the 
Court in the form of judicial questions to decide on the validity of the 
Community measure applied in the proceedings in the national court. This 
procedure, however, does not guarantee access to the European Court of Justice. 
The preliminary ruling procedure requires a procedure in a national court, and 
the posing of a question on validity by the national judge, because the assertion 
[by the party] of the invalidity of the measure does not bind the national judge to 
tum to the European Court of Justice. The preliminary ruling procedure, in our 
view, is not an adequate alternative for Article 230 EC action.7 
Article 235 EC and Article 288 (2) EC jointly establish a Community remedy 
for individuals against Community violations of law. These dispositions rule 
on the procedure of non-contractual liability of the Community. This procedure, 
nevertheless, is not aimed at the annulment of the Community measure, rather, 
it focuses on the compensation for damages. It can be concluded from the facts 
mentioned above, that the Treaty does not provide complete and effective judicial 
protection for individuals who have rights and obligations derived f rom the 
Treaty against unlawful Community measures. Since the European Community 
is based on the rule of law, it must ensure that the right to effective judicial 
protection is enforced. This obligation of the Community was recalled under 
the Union de Pequenos Agricultores,8 and subsequently the European Courts 
were asked to revise their standpoint concerning the admissibility of Article 
230 EC action. 
The argument above is supported by precedents. In ASOCARNE,9 the 
applicant referred to the disadvantages of the review via the preliminary ruling 
procedure, being fully aware of the delay factors in the functioning of the 
5
 See also: Neuwahl, N.: Article 173 Paragraph 4 EC: Past, Present and Possible 
Future, 1996 21 EL Rev. 17—31.; Ward, A.: Amsterdam and Amendment to Article 230 
EC: an opportunity lost or simply deferred? In.: The Future of the Judicial System of the 
European Union (ed.: Dashwood, A.-Johnston, A.), 2001. Oxford and Portland, Oregon. 
37-10. 
6
 Article 234 EC. 
7
 See also: Ward, A.: Judicial Review and the Rights of Private Parties in EC Law, 
2000. Oxford, 202-287.; Arnull, A.: The European Union and its Court of Justice. 
Oxford, 1999. 21-69. 
8
 Jégo-Quéré et Cie SA v. Commission..., op. cit. par. 28. 
9
 ASOCARNE v. Council C-10/95 P [1994] ECR 11-871. 
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Spanish judicature, in order to establish the admissibility of action. The Court, 
however, decided that it can only proceed within the framework of the Treaty 
and shall not depart from the conditions of admissibility as set forth under the 
Treaty on the basis that the other judicial channel of review does not provide 
adequate judicial protection. The Court of First Instance in Salamander10  
rejected the argument in which the applicant stated that in case of rejection of its 
application, it would not receive effective judicial protection in the national 
court, because the preliminary ruling procedure is less effective than the 
procedure under Article 230 EC. The court argued that even in case of 
ineffective judicial protection, it cannot amend the Treaty in order to change the 
system of remedies. The features of Article 234 EC action do not establish the 
admissibility of application under Article 230 EC action. In Pescadores," the 
Court repeated this standpoint, in spite of the fact that the applicant relied on 
Article 6 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) on adequate court procedures. The standing of 
the case law shows that by applying such arguments one cannot efficiently rely 
on the right to effective judicial protection in order to declare an action 
admissible. The question is whether there is another line of argument serving as 
a basis for the European Courts to accept the reference to the right to effective 
judicial protection in annulment cases? In the case examined, first the applicant, 
then the Advocate General tried to convince the European Courts that effective 
judicial protection is not completely accomplished in the Community. 
Reaffirming judicial attitude towards annulment actions: the UPA case 
The application for annulment of Regulation 1638/98/EC12 by the Union de 
Pequenos Agricultores was lodged at the Registry of the Court of First 
Instance on 20 October 1998. The Regulation in question amended Regulation 
13 
136/66/EEC on the establishment of a common organisation of the market in 
10
 Salamander AG and Others v. Parliament and Council T-172/98, 175-177/98 [2000] 
ECR 11-2487. 
'
1
 Federacion de Cofraidas de Pescadores de Guipuzcoa and Others v. Council C-
300/00 P(R) [2000] ECR 1-8797, par. 84. 
12
 Council Regulation (EC) No. 1638/98 of 20 July 1998 amending Regulation No. 
136/66/EEC on the establishment of a common organisation of the market in oils and fats, 
OJ L 210, 28/07/1998. 32-37. 
13
 Regulation No. 136/66/EEC of the Council of 22 September 1966 on the establish-
ment of a common organisation of the market in oils and fats, OJ, English Special Edition 
1965-1966, 221. 
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oils and fats, in particular the common organisation of markets in olive oil. 
Fundamentally, the Regulation amended the subvention system of olive oil 
production. The applicant is a trade association, who represents and acts in 
the interests of small Spanish agricultural businesses and is considered a legal 
personality under Spanish law. The Council raised an objection of inadmissibility 
on 23 December 1998. The CF1 upheld the objection of inadmissibility and 
dismissed the application as inadmissible. 
According to settled case law, the CFI examined the nature of the challenged 
provision and decided that it was of general application and was legislative in 
character that it did not substantiate a decision according to Article 249 EC. 
Pursuant to settled case law, the court went on to examine whether the contested 
measure of general application may be of individual concern to the applicant 
that it affects the applicant in a way that he can be differentiated f rom others 
either by reason of certain attributes which are peculiar to them or by reason of 
circumstances. The CFI pointed out that applications from associations were 
found admissible, when the challenged Community act guaranteed procedural 
powers to them, or they represented undertakings, which would [them-
selves] be entitled to bring actions, or when the contested measure affects 
their interests as associations.14 
When applying the criteria mentioned above, the CFI decided that the 
applicant had not proved that its members could be differentiated from others 
by reason of certain attributes, which are peculiar to them or by reason of 
circumstances. It argued that in spite of the fact that some members of the 
applicant operated in the given market and that some of them were forced to 
give up operation in the market, they could not be differentiated from others 
because their market position is comparable on objective grounds with the 
market position of others even in the present, or in the future. In addition, the 
CFI concluded that the applicant could not prove the existence of any specific 
interest that would imply he was individually concerned. Furthermore, it stated 
that the applicant could not prove the admissibility of his actions under the 
case law concerning associations. 
The last argument of the applicant focused on the fact that a denial of 
admissibility under Article 230 EC would deprive him from effective judicial 
protection. In his view, there was no legal mechanism in the applicable national 
law that would guarantee the review of Community law via preliminary 
ruling. The CFI declined the argument stating that according to the principle of 
equality, the success of review of Community law must not depend on the 
different conditions stipulated by applicable national law. According to the 
14
 Union de Pequenos Agricultores v. Council... op. cit. par. 45. 
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principle of sincere co-operation as laid down under Article 10 EC, the 
Member States must establish a complete system of remedies in order to 
ensure the review of Community law. On these grounds it is not exclusively 
the court's task to guarantee the right to effective judicial protection, but it is 
the obligation of the Member States. The CFI may not depart from the law to 
guarantee this right. The argument of the applicant that the preliminary ruling 
proceedings would last long under effective rules must not substantiate an 
exemption from the requirements as pursuant to Article 230 (4) EC. 
In its appeal the UPA presented the following arguments. He stated that 
when the CFI declared the application inadmissible, it violated UPA's right 
to effective judicial protection guaranteed by Community law. According to 
the appellant, Community law did not provide an alternative remedy to the one 
prescribed under Article 230 EC, because in the given case the procedure 
for preliminary ruling was excluded. Firstly, there was no related national 
regulation, secondly, it was not possible to infringe the provisions of the 
Regulations by virtue of their content that the appellant could institute 
proceedings. The appellant concluded that the CFI must examine in each 
case whether another remedy was at disposal. 
The Council and the Commission in their intervention rejected the 
arguments of the applicant. According to their views, the conditions for 
actions for annulment were set forth under Article 230 (4) EC, in which the 
right to effective judicial protection was not included. They pointed out that 
the appeal was not aimed at the substantial part of the judgement, in particular 
at individual concern, but it replied to the content of the judgement in the 
light of effective judicial protection. The Council and the Commission stated 
that the Treaty had established a complete system of remedies. When the Member 
States entailed difficulties in the functioning of the system by obstructing the 
course of preliminary ruling proceedings, they violated their obligation of 
sincere co-operation laid down under Article 10 EC. Pursuant to this, the 
proceedings under Article 226 EC shall be instituted against the Member State. 
The Commission rejected the criticism of the improper functioning of 
the system of remedies as pursuant to the Treaty in the following way. 
When an application is lodged, the relevant national authorities must 
commence proceedings under a directly applicable regulation. If the national 
authority does not commence proceedings in due course or its decision is 
contrary to the interests of the citizen, the national judicial remedies will be at 
disposal and then it is possible to rely on the preliminary ruling procedure. 
The Court affirmed the conclusions of the Court of First Instance with 
respect to case law concerning Article 230 (4) EC and it recorded the well-
known conditions of action for annulment by non-privileged applicants. After 
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concluding that the appeal basically focused on the guarantee of the right 
of effective judicial protection, the Court went on as follows. Whence, the 
European Community is based on the rule of law, it shall ensure that the law 
created by its institutions is reviewed. Pursuant to this, individuals are entitled 
to effective judicial protection of their rights guaranteed by Community law. 
This entitlement stems from the common constitutional traditions of the 
Member States and is protected by the European Convention on Human Rights. 
The Treaty of Rome has established the complete system of review under 
Community law, which functions via European court actions and national 
court remedies. Inasmuch as the Community has fulfilled this obligation laid 
down in the Treaty, it is the obligation of the Member States to supplement the 
system of effective judicial protection. The courts in the Member States must 
interpret the rules of national law in such a way that the review of Community 
law is possible. Furthermore, it is neither the duty, nor the competence of the 
European Courts to examine the national rules of procedure or national 
substantial law when they decide on admissibility or to decide whether direct 
action under Article 230 EC is required in order to guarantee the right to 
effective judicial protection. The European Courts cannot depart f rom the 
condition of individual concern in order to declare actions admissible on the 
grounds of the right of effective judicial protection, because the Treaty 
requires them to apply it. If the Member States view the system of remedies 
established by the Treaty inadequate, it is their responsibility to initiate the 
amendment of the Treaty under Article 48 TEU.15 The Court decided that 
the CFI did not err when it declared the action inadmissible without the 
examination of whether another remedy existed. Therefore, the Court rejected 
the appeal. 
In its judgement the European Court of Justice had to follow two ways of 
reasoning, one concerning Article 230 (4) action and one concerning the right 
to effective judicial protection. If the reasoning on the action for annulment is 
examined, it can be concluded that the Court followed a well-known path. Its 
reasoning is consistent and well-grounded, it pinned down [again] the 
conditions of Article 230 (4) action as prescribed under the Treaty and in case 
law. The Court's reasoning on individual concern was the usual, it must be 
proved that the applicant belongs to a closed category by reason of certain 
attributes peculiar to him or by reason of circumstances in which the applicant 
can be distinguished f rom others. 
It is noteworthy that the Court of First Instance, besides applying the 
classical Plaumann-test, decided upon admissibility by examining case law on 
15
 Treaty on European Union. 
THE RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE JUDICIAL PROTECTION... 107 
the admissibility of applications lodged by associations. This means that the 
analysis of the European Courts concentrates on finding a common element in 
the case in front of them and in a previous case, where individual concern was 
established under Plaumann based on the fact in question. The question of 
individual concern is decided by comparing specific facts determined in 
previous cases and not by applying the general concept of individual 
concern as in Plaumann. This means, that according to case law there is a 
separate set of conditions established on the grounds of Plaumann concerning 
the admissibility of applications lodged by associations.16 The use of special 
categories crystallised from the general concept in Plaumann appears not only 
in this specific area, but in such territories, where the decision on individual 
_ 17 
concern is based on peculiarities and circumstances returning case-by-case. 
This method may facilitate the application of law, however, it may result in a 
stiffening of the applied law. This may exclude a wider domain of inter-
pretation provided under the general concept of individual concern by not 
permitting deflection from the specific conditions of admissibility. 
Concerning the right to effective judicial protection the Court recognises 
the right and its obligation to guarantee such right. The sole purpose of its 
argumentation, however, is to point out the limits of its powers, which exclude 
the fulfilment of this obligation. Viewing the question from a formal point of 
view, it can be asserted that the Court shall not overreach the facilities provided 
by the Treaty. From the Court's point of view, the system of judicial protection 
is complete, because it may manoeuvre within the limits of the Treaty and 
the Court takes advantage of its elbow-room. The Member States, however, 
under Article 10 EC must create such rules of procedures and the national 
court must interpret and apply these rules in such a way, that the right to 
effective judicial protection prevails in the Community. Moreover, it is the 
obligation of the Member States as objects of international law that by the 
amendment of the Treaty this right is enforced. Consequently, the Court can do 
nothing else but burden those obligated by law with the obligation to establish 
a complete and effective system of judicial protection. That is why, the 
16
 Expressly granted procedural powers, members of which are entitled to bring action 
for annulment, own interests, Union de Pequenos Agricultores v. Council... op. cit. par. 47. 
17
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enforcement of the right to effective judicial protection is in the competencies 
of the Member States. 
The Court pays less attention to the problems concerning the preliminary 
ruling procedure than the Commission, because the Court understands that the 
difficulties of the preliminary ruling procedure lay rather in Community law, 
than in the law of the Member States. Among the dispositions under the 
Treaty, it is not the provisions concerning the preliminary ruling procedure that 
impede the effective review of Community law, since the preliminary ruling 
proceeding is regulated with the intention that it may be initiated when a 
national judge decides so in a dispute in front of him. Moreover, its objective 
was to ensure the uniform interpretation and application of Community law by 
the national courts. The dispositions of judicial review in Community law 
rather obstruct effective review. The Court, however, may not decide against 
the Treaty, hence it is the task of the Member States to alter the provisions in 
the Treaty. 
The message of the Court seems quite clear. It declines to overreach the 
boundaries of the Treaty, because it is the role of the Member States. 
Certainly, this also means that the Court does not undertake initiating such 
direct action for annulment, through which substantial protection of rights can 
be achieved, without worrying to prove individual concern according to case 
law. The Court camouflages his resistance to change its position concerning 
the admissibility of actions for annulment by non-privileged applicants with 
adequate legal reasoning. Change must be reached through amendment of the 
Treaty. This passivity contradicts [to some extentj the former practice of the 
Court pursued in this area of law, when it often contra legem extended its 
powers under Article 230 EC.18 
When the Court refers to the amendment of the Treaty, it does not specify 
which provisions of the Treaty it wishes to modify. It must be considered that 
according to Arnull,19 case law of the Court on individual concern reflects a 
judicial intention that non-privileged applicants rather attain the annulment of 
a Community measure via preliminary ruling procedure. Knowing this, it may 
18
 Parti Ecologiste Les Verts v. European Parliament C-294/83 [1986] ECR 1339, 
European Parliament v. Council C-70/88 [1990] ECR 1-2041, Commission v. Council C-
22/70 [1971] ECR 263, Codorniu SA v. Council... op. cit., Extramet Industrie v. Council... 
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de Burca, G.: EU Law. 2nd ed., Oxford, 1998. 86-95. 
19 
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not be asserted that under amendment of the Treaty the Court understands 
solely the modification of Article 230 EC, but it is assumable that the 
judicial will is also aimed at the amendment of Article 234 EC. It must be 
stated, however, that these procedures serve different purposes and it is 
necessary that the Court is aware of this when it refers to the amendment of the 
Treaty. 
The European Court of Justice explicitly answered the criticism of its 
decision in such fashion that in a formalistic sense it leaves no room for 
objection. On solid grounds it declined the responsibility to establish the 
complete and effective Community system of judicial protection by judicial 
means. In its answer it appointed the responsible party and it seems that it 
made its role clear. Notwithstanding, it should be asked whether the European 
Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance have done everything by their 
own means in order to enforce the right to effective judicial protection and to 
operate a complete and effective system of judicial protection founded by the 
Treaty. 
However, in a substantial point of view, the activity of the European Courts 
cannot be viewed as adequate. It is true that the courts shall not overreach the 
scope of formal law, nevertheless, when they interpret and apply the law, they 
have room for assigning substance to the units of formal law. Article 230 (4) 
contains the notions of direct and individual concern, which limit the European 
Courts in finding applications for annulment of Community measures 
admissible. The European Court of Justice through the interpretation of 
Community law defined the notion of individual concern in Plaumann. 
According to this, the applicant is individually concerned if the given 
Community measure affects him in a way that the applicant can be 
distinguished from others by reason of certain attributes peculiar to him and 
by reason of circumstances. The substance of this notion was revealed via 
case-by-case application, because the notion contains elements, the meanings 
of which can be explored when they are assigned to the facts in the cases. 
When the Plaumann-test is scrutinised, it can be asserted that it is not 
conclusively determined whom the applicant shall be distinguished from by 
reason of certain attributes and by reason of circumstances established by the 
Community measure in question. Nothing orders the European Courts where 
and how to set up that category in which those individuals belong and from 
whom the applicant shall differ. The Plaumann-test does not require the 
courts to distinguish the applicants from its present or potential competitors. 
It is not set forth that on others than the workers of the same sector, the 
inhabitants of the same geographical area must be understood. Nothing 
prevents the European Courts from setting up different closed categories case-
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by-case, on the grounds of which the applicant shall be distinguished from 
others. Such analysis of the text of the Plaumann-test indicates that the 
European Courts have and had a wide domain of interpretation when defining 
the meaning of the notion of individual concern. Which demonstrates that such 
interpretation is possible when the right to effective judicial protection is 
enforced in the present system of judicial protection of the Treaty. 
The above reading of judicial practices of the European Courts is based on 
an interpretation according to which the courts first select a closed category 
that is empty; then they appoint that group of individuals which they think 
belongs to the closed category by reason of attributes peculiar to them or by 
reason of circumstances. In the course of such interpretation, however, when 
the closed category already contains a group of individuals, the membership 
of the closed category is decided by comparing the individuals included in 
the closed category with the ones excluded from it. The comparison is also 
pursued according to the conditions of individual concern in the Plaumann-
test, however, selection is restricted, because a reference group is used. Never-
theless, taking into consideration that the members of the reference group are 
also selected by the courts according to the Plaumann-test, the restriction 
created by the comparison remains virtual, therefore the courts decide on the 
question on the basis of a discrepancy from those they see fit. The first 
interpretation of closed category is based on cases when individual concern 
could not be determined, because besides the applicant, an indefinable number 
of individuals would have been individually concerned.20 The latter reading 
is based on cases in which only a small group of individuals had individual 
concern, and the courts found the applicant not individually concerned by the 
contested measure, because it could not be distinguished from others within 
the group. This interpretation is supported by those arguments by the courts, 
according to which, despite the existence of a small group of individually 
concerned individuals, the individual concern of the applicant was not well-
founded due to the fact that the number of individuals in the group would have 
risen by reason of the appearance of new operators in the market.21 
What kind of new interpretation shall be given, then? The basis of the 
following approach is that the European Courts shall not interpret the notion 
of individual concern in a way that anyone would have the right to start an 
action for annulment, because it is contrary to the Treaty. Hence such 
20
 Stichting Greenpeace Council v. Commission C-321/95 P [1998] ECR 1-1651, 
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minimum condition should be found that ensures that the requirement of 
individual concern predominates. If the applicant is able to name his right, the 
violation of which he supposes, the applicant fulfils the requirement of 
individual concern. This also purports that the action of annulment would not 
be open for anybody, because it may be rather difficult to name a violated 
right. Secondly, this new condition will be sufficient to distinguish the 
applicant from others in the meaning of Plaumann, if this is still a requirement, 
because the applicant differs from those, who cannot name such a right. Such 
adjudication of admissibility would not affect questions of substance, so it 
does not qualify as prejudicatio. While the opinion of the Advocate General in 
UP A22 suggests another new interpretation of individual concern, the model 
above will be scrutinised below, together with the approach of the Advocate 
General. It should be noted that the sole purpose of the above mentioned model 
is to prove that European Courts have not reached the limits of judge-made 
law in order to enforce the right to effective judicial protection. European 
Courts, within the structure of the Treaty, have the power to establish the 
complete system of effective judicial protection. The conclusion of the Court is 
incorrect when it asserts that only the Member States are able and obliged to 
act in order to enforce this right. Because, through interpretation, the European 
Courts are also able to create a scope for Article 230 (4) EC so that remedy can 
be given when the rights of individuals are violated. 
It must be observed, however, slightly contradicting the above, that the 
applicant never argued on the basis of individual concern under the regulation 
in question. The appeal was based solely on the right to effective judicial 
protection. What the applicant demanded was not an adjustment to the notion 
of individual concern, but it asked the Court left the wording of the Treaty in 
order to ensure effective judicial protection. From this point of view, the 
judgement of the Court seems adequate, because the Court declined to 
overreach the boundaries of Article 230 (4) EC. If the Court had been asked to 
reconsider the notion of individual concern in the light of the right to effective 
judicial protection, the Court would have answered in a different way. In spite of 
the fact that the applicant's argument evidently lacked certain aspects, the Court 
should have tackled the question in its entirety. 
Does the current system of judicial review comply with fundamental 
rights—the dictum of the Advocate General?23 
It is often useful to analyse the opinion of the Advocate General parallel 
with the judgement of the Court. In this case, however, it is less reasonable, 
22
 Opinion of Mr. Advocate General Jacobs on 21 March 2002, [2002] ECR 1-6681. 
23Ibid. 
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because Mr. Jacobs is opposed to the opinion of the applicant, the Council, the 
Commission and the European Court of Justice. This is not contradicted by the 
fact that the Court under paragraph 43 of its judgement refers in consent to 
some points of the opinion of the Advocate General, because in this part of its 
opinion the Advocate General confuted the argument of the applicant, instead 
of orienting the Court in the direction of the interpretation he suggested. 
The opinion of the Advocate General is one of the most comprehensive 
criticism of the case law of the European Courts concerning Article 230 (4) 
EC. Mr. Jacobs not only opposes the interpretation of the article, but he is up 
against the formalist legal arguments presented by the CFI and later by the 
ECJ. It rejects the solutions proposed in the interventions and refuses to 
agree with the applicant. The Advocate General points out the weaknesses of 
the present system of judicial protection and suggests a solution within the 
framework of the Treaty in order to ensure proper functioning. 
The review of Community law by non-privileged applicants is pursued via 
two means, one through direct action by Article 230 (4) EC, the other through 
the preliminary ruling procedure under Article 234 EC. The Advocate General 
concluded that according to the case law of the European Court of Justice, the 
primary procedure of review of secondary Community law of general 
application is the preliminary ruling procedure. According to the courts, the 
preliminary ruling procedure makes the system of judicial protection complete 
in the framework of the Treaty, because this procedure is open for those who 
are not able or who were not able to apply for annulment under Article 230 
EC. The Advocate General asserted, however, that the system of judicial 
protection completed by the preliminary ruling procedure is not sufficient to 
enforce the right to effective judicial protection, because of the peculiarities 
of the preliminary ruling procedure. 
The Advocate General pointed out the following peculiarities. Firstly, he 
asserted that the preliminary ruling procedure cannot be initiated without a 
procedure in a national court or tribunal. This may be impossible when no 
national measure or no damage exists, or the applicant has to initiate a 
procedure against itself. It costs money and time to reach a court of last 
resort in the procedure in the national courts, where it is obligatory to 
request a preliminary ruling. It is not the right of the parties, but the right of 
the judge in a proceeding in a national court to ask for a preliminary ruling. 
This also means that the national judge decides which questions to ask and 
which Community measure it asks to annul. The procedure in the ECJ means 
further delay and costs. The application of an interim measure is also a 
problem, because the order on an interim measure requested in different 
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Member States depends on the discretion of the national courts and different 
orders endanger the uniform application of Community law. The interim measure 
pursuant to Article 230 EC action is valid in all Member States, which 
ensure uniform application. The Community institution, which ordered the 
Community measure in question, is not a party in the preliminary ruling 
procedure contrary to Article 230 EC action. In the action for annulment the 
courts may deal with all questions related to annulment under Article 234 
action, however, the Court is only entitled to answer the judicial questions. 
The application for action for annulment is published in the Official Journal, 
meaning that intervention may occur on a wider scale. The two-month deadline 
in the Article 230 EC procedure ensures that the review of Community law 
takes place as soon as possible, thus enhancing legal certainty opposed to the 
preliminary ruling procedure, which may last for years.24 
The Advocate General may have missed one important momentum when 
he examined review via Article 234 EC action. Mr. Jacobs asserted that the 
national court is not entitled to declare a Community measure invalid, and 
that it may ask for review in case of grounded suspicion of invalidity. The 
Advocate General nevertheless forgot to deal with the possibility that the 
national judge does not doubt the validity of the Community measure, even if 
it has been referred to by the parties during the procedure. The national 
court is not obliged to ask for preliminary ruling every time suspicion is raised 
on the validity of a Community measure, because by declaring the Community 
provision valid, the question of validity does not appear any more in the 
national court. This momentum may bar out the possibility that the preliminary 
ruling procedure adequately supplements the action for review under Article 
230 EC in order to enforce the right to effective judicial protection in the 
framework of the Treaty. 
The opinion of the Advocate General points out, however, that the limits of 
this right do not reside exclusively in the peculiarities of the preliminary ruling 
procedure. Mr. Jacobs submitted that the review of Community measures must 
be realised in the framework of Article 230 EC. He stated that the limits of the 
vindication of the right of effective judicial protection lies not in the provisions 
of the Treaty, but in the substance attached by the courts to the provisions of 
the Treaty. The European Courts must create a new meaning of individual 
concern in a way that the review of Community law would be possible without 
violating the right to effective judicial protection. The Advocate General thought 
that the complete and effective system of judicial protection has not been 
established within the framework of the Treaty. The Advocate General did not 
24
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settle for this call, but proposed a new meaning of individual concern. In his 
view, a person is "individually concerned by a Community measure where, 
by reason of his particular circumstances, the measure has or is liable to have, a 
substantial adverse effect on his interests".25 
It is obvious that Mr. Jacobs in his opinion did not request the trans-
formation of Article 230 (4) EC into an actio popularis, but he wanted to keep 
the locus standi provided by the article. One may argue for such 
transformation, nevertheless the opinion focused on the reconstruction of the 
locus standi, so it will be discussed below. 
It must be premised that the centrepiece of the solution suggested by Mr. 
Jacobs is the dereliction of the main element in Plaumann, the condition that 
the applicant shall be distinguished from others. The interpretation of individual 
concern by the courts limited the admissibility of applications to a large extent, 
because the above mentioned condition of Plaumann allowed the courts to value 
the applicant's uniqueness as an absolute category. In our view, it is not only 
uniqueness that establishes individual concern, but individual concern is 
founded when the applicant can be distinguished from others, together with 
others. Individual concern is not equal to being the addressee of a measure. 
The determination of individual concern shall not be refused on grounds that 
others are similar or they have the potential to be similar to the applicant. The 
requirement of individual concern must work in a way that it excludes those 
who are not concerned, but includes those who are not unique but concerned. 
Beyond the fact that the Advocate General rejected the requirement of being 
distinguishable from others, the new interpretation of individual concern 
raises different problems. 
It is difficult to value the notion of interest in legal terms, because there are 
interests that are outside the scope of law, and there are others that have legal 
relevance. In my view, an interest gains legal relevance not when it is referred 
to in a procedure in a court, but when a court in a procedure values it as 
legally relevant. On this basis it is difficult to specify the interest that shall 
have legal relevance and get legal protection. When we speak of rights and 
obligations, however, their relevance and protection by law is obvious. 
The notion of adverse effect is also difficult to interpret, because it is not 
easy to define when an adverse effect would be perceptible. The palpability of 
adverse effect is a matter of proof in a procedure. When it does not appear 
in the outside world as a fact, it will be impossible to refer to in a procedure. 
Adverse effects may appear near at hand as abuse or in the distance as 
endangering and they may be actual or potential. At which point does it bear 
25
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relevance? When is it perceptible? The notion of substantial tries to answer to 
these questions, but its meaning still allows such a wide domain for 
interpretation that uncertainty around the meaning of individual concern still 
lingers. 
The ambiguities in the interpretation of the approach suggested by Mr. Jacobs 
are increased further by the fact that by reason of the particular circumstances 
the measure has or it is liable to have a substantial adverse effect on his 
interest. This can be interpreted in a way that it corresponds to the notions of 
certain peculiar attributes and circumstances known from Plaumann, because 
in some contexts they are the particular circumstances of the applicant. The 
rights and obligations of the applicant may also belong to the notion of 
particular circumstances. This notion, which can be interpreted in different 
ways, still offers a chance for the European Courts to adopt an interpretation of 
individual concern that does not allow for the enforcement of the right to 
effective judicial protection. 
According to my suggestion for the reduction of uncertainties of inter-
pretation of individual concern, it is sufficient for the applicant to prove 
individual concern to indicate the right or obligation, the protection of which it 
asked for in his application. When determining rights and obligations, well-
established legal categories can be relied upon. Furthermore, it is unnecessary 
to prove effect and substantiality. Being distinguishable is not a condition, 
because the indication of rights and obligations does not require the 
specification of exclusive rights and obligation. An action under Article 230 
(4) EC would not be an actio popularis, since the condition of individual 
concern could not be fulfilled by everybody, since the rights and obligations in 
Community law are often specific. This means that there are individuals, who 
have rights or obligations under a specific measure of Community law and 
there are others who do not. In case of general measures containing rights and 
obligations for all concerned subjects-at-law, exclusion from judicial 
protection is not justifiable. 
The Advocate General protected his position with different arguments, 
which support both new interpretations. They suppose that the interpretation of 
individual concern by the European Courts is unacceptable, and by reaching a 
new interpretation the European Courts facilitate the establishment of a complete 
and effective system of judicial protection in the framework of the Treaty. By 
applying a new interpretation, the denial of justice (déni de justice) can be 
excluded, and the development of judicial protection could be ensured. If the 
European Courts applied a new interpretation of individual concern, the 
controversies in case law could be resolved. Furthermore, the paradox 
situation implying that the more individuals are affected, the less chance they 
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have to prove that they are individually concerned, would cease to exist. This 
situation is supported by the approach, according to which the more general 
the interest of the review of a Community measure is, the more the institutions 
and the Member States shall be obligated to initiate an action for review. It 
may be submitted, however, that the lack of such action shall not deny access 
to justice for individuals. According to Mr. Jacobs, this would allow the 
European Courts to rule more on the merits, and less jurisdiction in matters of 
admissibility. This does not mean that the Advocate General proposed no 
examination of admissibility in the proceedings, or that the European Courts 
should decide on merits when they consider admissibility. Whence, he neither 
acknowledged that Article 230 (4) EC action was actio populáris, nor argued 
for jurisdiction against legal principles. Mr. Jacobs stated that a more 
permissive interpretation of individual concern would fit in the more liberal 
stance of preceding case law, since the Court often ruled contra legem on the 
grounds of principles of law (the rule of law).26 
It must be seen, however, that in these cases the European Court of Justice 
served its own purpose expanding its jurisdiction. The less strict approach of 
Article 230 (4) EC action, however, may be contrary to the interest of the 
European Courts, because a relaxed locus standi means a larger number of cases, 
and this increase in workload is not compensated by the increase of judicial 
competence in the Community courts.27 A dangerous increase of workload 
may make the functioning of the European judicature impossible. 
The Advocate General asserted that the objection against a new inter-
pretation of individual concern cannot be well-grounded. Article 230 EC does 
not exclude the opportunity for a new interpretation. The political, procedural 
difficulties of legislation and its length do not justify that a Community 
measure violating Community law evades review. In addition, the democratic 
deficit of the legislative procedure emphasises the necessity of review. Finally, 
the two-month deadline, the condition of direct concern and the future judicial 
reform make the reference to immense workload as opposed to a relaxed 
28 
interpretation of individual concern senseless. 
One argument against a new interpretation of individual concern was that 
case law on individual concern was settled. 
26
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Whereas Mr. Jacobs stated that case law is not settled regarding all aspects 
because in several cases the limits of admissibility were indistinct.29 The liberal 
jurisdiction of the national courts and the establishment of the Court of First 
Instance also supports the departure from case law. According to the Advocate 
General, the Court applies an interpretation of the principle of effective 
judicial protection regarding the national courts that it is hard to support the 
strict interpretation on individual concern applied by the European Courts.30 
The Advocate General not only expounded his point of view, but he 
examined the arguments put forward in the procedure by others. The core of 
the applicant's argument was that in case the application of Article 230 EC 
action was declined, it would not be granted effective judicial protection.31 Mr. 
Jacobs rejected the argument by stating that the Treaty exactly specifies the 
locus standi conditions of Article 230 (4) EC action. Furthermore, the 
European Courts lack the jurisdiction to interpret or annul national laws. An 
examination of national law by the European Courts concerning the possibility 
of a review of Community law may be contrary to the former rule. After all, 
such analysis would establish that admissibility under Article 230 (4) EC 
would be determined by the laws of the Member States.32 
The standpoint of the Advocate General differs from the point of view of 
the applicant only in that it construes the right to effective judicial protection 
in another context. He asserted that the enforcement of the right resides in the 
alteration of the interpretation of individual concern. The applicant, however, 
stated that if any judicial channel is open for his claim then the right is 
enforced. This argument can be rejected on the grounds that the operation 
of judicial channels shall not depend on each other. Each one is situated in a 
specific environment, their functioning serves specific aims and they require 
particular conditions when initiated. The individual seeking judicial protection 
shall choose the one that is more effective. 
The Advocate General rejects the submission of the Council and the 
Commission on the functioning of a complete system of judicial protection in 
the Community, and states that Article 234 EC action would not be a right 
even if national rules were changed, because a court-case cannot be created by 
29
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amending the mles of procedure. On the other hand, if a review through 
preliminary ruling was made more accessible, it would not help the problem of 
Article 230 (4) EC action.33 
When analysing the decisions of the European Courts it must be taken into 
consideration that they are the units of a process. They represent a standpoint 
of the law, at the same time they open up new chances for further development 
in the law. That is why, it must be examined which parts of the judgement 
define the future evolution of law. 
In its judgement the Court rejected its further obligation concerning the 
enforcement of the right to effective judicial protection on formalist grounds. It 
positioned this obligation on the Member States. Now, there is no amendment of 
the Treaty in prospect that would directly concern Article 230 (4) EC. The 
judicial reform in the Treaty of Nice34 may indirectly have such effect, that the 
European Courts would ease the conditions of admissibility. This statement is 
based on the assumption that the cause of judicial conservatism shown during 
the interpretation of the conditions of admissibility is that with strict conditions 
of admissibility the workload of European judicature can be lessened. After the 
Treaty of Nice entering into force, if not the number of applications, but the 
workload on the European Courts will decrease by the distribution of case. 
Therefore, it would be possible to declare more applications admissible. The 
decrease of workload can be influenced by the number of judicial panels, their 
competence and by the number of final judgements in first instance. 
The CFI departs from settled case law: the Jégo-Quéré judgement 
In this procedure the case law on the individual concern of non-privileged 
applicants had a particular turn. The events just heightened the obtuseness 
with the activity of the European Courts in this field. The Advocate General 
presented his opinion on the UP A case on 22 March 2002. The Court of First 
Instance decided in Jégo-Quéré on the 5th of May. The European Court of 
Justice brought its judgement on 25 July 2002. The succession of events 
requires us to assert that in spite of new elements in case law, the legal 
situation has not changed. The analysis of the judgement in Jégo-Quéré shall 
not be ignored, because the decision contains such new judicial approach that, 
in our view, must be followed and the examination of the judgement can point 
out the weaknesses of the new approach. 
33
 Ibid. par. 56-58. 
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The applicant French enterprise asked for the annulment of certain 
provisions of Regulation 1162/2001 EC35 from the Court of First Instance 
under Article 230 (4) EC. The Regulation applying to certain fishing vessels 
and its provisions set the minimum mesh sizes used by the vessels. The 
Commission raised an objection of inadmissibility and asked the court to reject 
the application. 
The argument of the applicant can be divided into two. First, it deals with 
the nature of the given Community measure and with its being of individual 
concern to it. Second, the core of its argument concerns the enforcement of 
the right to effective judicial protection. It asserted that the Regulation is rather 
a bundle of decisions, than a measure of general application. The Regulation 
concerned it individually, because it was distinguishable from others on the 
basis that it was the only French undertaking fishing in the Celtic Sea. In the 
course of legislation the Commission was obliged to observe the fact that the 
applicant fishes for fish that are smaller than hake, therefore, the increase of 
mesh sizes deprives it from its catch. 
The applicant concluded that besides Article 230 EC action, no other 
means of judicial protection were available and asked the court to adopt a 
relaxed interpretation of Article 230 EC in the light of Article 6 of the ECHR. 
The argument of the Commission also followed two directions. First, it 
denied the individual concern of the applicant. Furthermore, it stated that the 
applicant was not denied of other means of judicial protection. When it 
examined individual concern, it analysed first the nature of the measure in 
question and asserted that according to case law, even tough it was a measure 
of general application, the applicant may be of individual concern to it.36 
According to the Commission, however, individual concern was not proven 
in this case, because the scope of the Regulation was set by objective criteria. 
The Regulation applies to all fishing vessels equally within its scope. There 
was no higher rule of law that obliged the Commission to take account of the 
situation of the applicant in the course of legislation. The Commission stated 
that alternative means of judicial protection are Articles 235 and 288 (2) EC, 
which regulate the action for non-contractual liability of the Community. 
35
 Commission Regulation (EC) No. 1162/2001 of 14 June 2001 establishing 
measures for the recovery of the stock of hake in ICES sub-areas III, IV, V, VI and 
VII and ICES divisions VIII a, b, d, e and associated conditions for the control of 
activities of fishing vessels, OJ L 159, 15/06/2001. 4 -9 . 
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The Court of First Instance, lead by the president of the court, proceeded in 
an extended composition chamber and asserted that the Community measure 
under scrutiny is of general application, because it applies to undefined classes 
of persons and to objectively determined situations. According to settled case 
law,37 measures of general application can be of individual and direct concern 
to some economic operators. The condition of direct concern is fulfilled because 
the application of the Regulation does not depend on the discretion of a third 
person. The examination of individual concern was done by applying the 
general concept of Plaumann, and by applying case law crystallised categories, 
in which individual concern was always established. The court did not accept 
individual concern as proven by the applicant under the notion in Plaumann, 
because the Regulation affects the applicant as a fishing undertaking, and 
as such, it cannot be distinguished f rom other fishing undertakings. In case 
law, individual concern was established many times, and the legislator was 
obligated to take into account the applicant when making the Community 
measure, however, this time it was not the case. Under Community law, the 
applicant had no procedural rights or guarantees, so these specific cases do not 
establish individual concern of the applicant. The court asserted that the 
applicant was not in a special position, nor had special rights in order to be 
distinguishable from others.38 
However, the argument of the Court of First Instance took a turn. The 
court ascertained that the Community is based on the rule of law and that 
Community law established a complete system of legal remedies in order to 
facilitate a system of review of Community law.39 The obligation of effective 
judicial protection is based on the constitutional traditions common to the 
Member States and on Articles 6 and 13 of the ECHR. Under Article 47 of 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union proclaimed at 
Nice on 7 December 2000,40 the European Courts shall give remedy to the 
party whose rights and freedoms are guaranteed under the law of the Union. 
Fully aware of this obligation, the Court of First Instance stated that the 
inadmissibility of an action for annulment, where a non-privileged applicant 
37
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requests the annulment of a measure of general application, would mean that 
the applicant shall be deprived of the right to effective judicial protection. 
According to the court, the review via preliminary ruling is not an adequate 
means of judicial protection, because the enforcement of the right to effective 
judicial protection shall not force an individual to violate the law. The action 
for non-contractual liability of the Community is not an alternative judicial 
remedy, because in this procedure the annulment of Community law does not 
take place. The question of admissibility and the questions on the merits are 
often examined together, as it is excluded in Article 230 EC action. In this 
procedure, the analysis of lawfulness does not reach the same level as in the 
action for annulment. 
The Court of First Instance asserted that under the ECHR and the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, the Community system of 
remedies cannot provide effective judicial protection in a case, when such 
Community measure of general application is under review, directly affecting 
the legal position of the applicant. This situation, however, does not entitle the 
Community judicature to depart from the provisions of the Treaty. The only 
possible solution is the new, relaxed interpretation of individual concern 
within the framework of Article 230 EC. 
The Court of First Instance gave the following interpretation to the notion 
of individual concern. "In order to ensure effective judicial protection for 
individuals, a natural or legal person is to be regarded as individually concerned 
by a Community measure of general application that concerns him directly, 
if the measure in question affects his legal position, in a manner which is both 
definite and immediate,41 by restricting his rights or by imposing obligations 
on him. The number and position of other persons, who are likewise affected 
by the measure, or who may be so, are of no relevance to that regard."42 
By applying the new test, the Court found the applicant individually 
concerned, because the Regulation imposed obligations on Jégo-Quéré. The 
application, therefore, was found admissible. 
The approach of the Court of First Instance is radical, since it recalls those 
times, when the Court declared actions for annulment of regulations lodged 
by non-privileged applicants admissible.43 This is a judicial approach, which 
had been demanded by the critics and with which, in our view, the European 
Courts had owed for a long time, if they acknowledge that Community law is 
based on the rule of law. The new judicial attitude is welcomed without 
41
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reservation, if it is expressed in the decision on merits. This means that the 
new interpretation of individual concern shall establish such locus standi, 
which creates the conditions of effective judicial protection within the 
framework of the Treaty. 
The argument of the court in one section runs parallel with the argument 
applied in UPA. The starting point is the rule of law and the obligation derived 
from it, so that a complete and effective Community system of remedies must 
be established at the disposal of Community subjects-at-law. The court sees 
the effective judicial protection not only as an obligation, but as a right, which 
can be deduced from the common constitutional traditions of the Member 
States, f rom the ECHR and from the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union. In spite of the fact that reference to the latter is questionable 
due to its legal nature, it is acceptable on similar grounds as the reference to 
the ECHR. The Court of First Instance sees in that way that the present system 
of judicial remedies is not complete and effective with respect to the right and 
the obligation mentioned above. 
At this point the arguments depart. While in UPA the obligation of the 
Member States comes into focus, in this case the court examines the obligation 
of the European Courts regarding the complete and effective system of judicial 
protection. 
According to the court, in order to enforce the right to effective judicial 
protection, a new interpretation of individual concern is required. The court 
creates the new notion of individual concern from the following elements: 
measure of general application that concerns the legal position of the applicant 
directly; definitely and immediately, by restricting his rights or by imposing 
obligations on him, and the number of persons affected is not relevant. 
According to the judgement of the Court of First Instance, the court wants 
to apply the new conditions of individual concern only in actions for 
annulment of measures of general application, i.e. regulations. The text of the 
judgement refers to measures of general application, which means that in case 
of a decision addressed to another person or in case of a decision in the form of 
regulation, the applicant in an action for annulment must prove individual 
concern by applying the interpretation in Plaumann. It appears that the Court 
of First Instance does not intend to treat the right to review of non-privileged 
applicants equally in respect of regulations and other Community measures 
mentioned in the Treaty. If the wording of the new interpretation was intended, 
it must be stated that this distinction cannot be justified on the grounds of 
general or individual nature of Community measures. The obligation to 
establish a complete and effective system of remedies requires the court to 
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extend the new interpretation of individual concern to decisions addressed to 
another person and to decisions in the form of regulation. 
In connection with the nature of the Community measures under review it 
requires an explanation, why it was important in the argument of the parties 
that the Community measure in question was of general application or it was a 
bundle of decisions? Amull stated that in UPA a similar argument was made 
by the Court, when it stated that the applicant would be of individual concern 
to the regulation in question, because the regulation had the nature of a decision 
in that regard.44 After Codorniu this argument is incomprehensive, however, it 
can be asserted that the examination of the nature of the Community measure 
is a common element in the arguments of judgements of the European Courts.45 
In our view, this is only applied to create a complete line of argument, because 
the courts every time assert that the review of measures of general application 
is possible when individual concern of non-privileged applicants is proven. 
The complete line of argument is needed, because case law somewhat deflects 
from the wording of the Treaty, according to which, the action for annulment 
of regulation is the right of the Institutions, the ECB and the Member States. 
The courts shall reinforce the legal basis of the review case-by-case, which is 
contrary to the Treaty, in order to avoid the questioning of jurisdiction that is 
in compliance with the Treaty. 
The court inserted the requirement of direct concern into the new concept 
of individual concern. This suggests that the court ensures that both conditions 
in Article 230 (4) EC are fulfilled by the applicant.46 
According to the judgement in Jégo-Quéré, in order to establish individual 
concern the applicant must prove that the Community measure in question 
affects his legal position in a manner which is both definite and immediate, 
so it restricts his rights or imposes obligation on him. If the notions of 
restriction of rights and imposition of obligations imply the meaning of the 
notion of definite and immediate effect on the legal position, it is questionable 
whether it is necessary to include both the result of interpretation and the 
notion under interpretation in the new concept of individual concern. If the 
expressions can substitute each other, in our view, it is sufficient to indicate 
only the restrictions of rights and the imposition of obligations, because 
these notions restrict the European Courts in their discretion when deciding 
44
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on admissibility. Legal certainty requires such legal provisions that make 
legal actions predictable. 
When the expressions are not substitutable, it is difficult to define the notion 
of effect on legal position. Although, the application of the categories of 
"definite" and "immediate" can narrow the domain of interpretation defined by 
"restriction of rights and imposition of obligations". Case-by-case the 
content of the new interpretation of individual concern could be defined, if the 
premises applied in the enforcement of the right to effective judicial protection 
are derived from the rule of law. 
The Court of First Instance undoubtedly indicated that it wanted to 
relinquish the application of the method in Plaumann, which required the 
courts to distinguish the applicant from all others. It undertook to concentrate 
solely on the position of the applicant irrespective of others surrounding him. 
This is the only part of the new conditions of individual concern that is 
worth welcoming, because the above mentioned critical remarks show the 
shortcomings of the new method of examining individual concern suggested 
by the court. This means that in spite of the fact that the court stopped applying 
the method of closed category, it rejected to restrict its operations within the 
frame of well-definable notions. 
The purpose of examining uncertainty is not to prove that a concept of 
individual concern that has absolute meaning is necessary, rather it is to point 
out the advantages of the method suggested by us against the suggestions of the 
Advocate General and the court. We think that the new concept of individual 
concern should bear the highest degree of certainty without the exclusion of 
individuals from the review of Community measures. 
At this point, it is necessary to compare the core solutions of the three 
suggested methods in order to choose the most adequate. The Advocate 
General gave the widest domain to individual concern, when he required the 
proof of substantial adverse effect on the applicant's interest. Our suggestion 
of the indication of rights and obligations defines a narrower scope, because 
rights and obligations represent a narrower domain than interests. The 
restriction of rights and imposition of obligations suggested by the Court of 
First Instance is the narrowest interpretation, because that requires activated 
rights and obligations. Parallel to this, it can be stated that by narrowing the 
domain of interpretation the definability of the concepts increased. While 
the notion of interest applied in the first solution is definable with difficulty, 
the content of r ights and obligations, restriction of rights and imposition 
of obligation can be determined easier. In our view, the limitation of the 
concept to restriction of rights and imposition of obligations is unjustified, 
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because remedies shall not be provided only for those whose right has been 
restricted or who has been obligated. Rather, those shall also have a share 
in judicial protection, whose right would be restricted or whom obligation 
would be imposed upon. The Community measure under review does not 
always cause immediate violation of law, but it often carries this 
potential.47 If a Community measure violates Community law, it does not 
mean that it also violates the rights of an individual, because the grounds of 
illegality in Article 230 EC only means the violation of Community law and 
not the rights of an individual. That is why it is necessary to establish such 
concept of individual concern that provides that individuals, whose rights can 
potentially be violated by a Community measure, may ask for the review of that 
Community measure. It is not justified to leave the action for review of the 
Community measure in case of indefinite and not immediate violation of law 
to privileged applicants, because without being affected they will not perceive 
that the Community measure does indeed violate Community law. The affected 
individuals have no such mechanism at their disposal through which they 
could enforce any privileged applicant to launch an action for annulment. The 
most effective way to enforce the right to effective judicial protection is to 
ensure that the affected persons have the right to initiate such proceedings. 
In the course of analysis other factors outside the scope of law must be 
considered. The publication of the opinion of the Advocate General a few weeks 
ago must have had a great effect on the development of the judicial approach. In 
spite of the fact that the applied interpretations on individual concern differed, the 
starting point of their approach was the same: the need for a new interpretation 
in order to establish effective judicial protection in the Community. 
In this case a regulation of the Common Fisheries Policy was under review. 
This sector is in deep crisis, because the amount of fish in the seas has 
decreased significantly as a consequence of excessive fishing activity. The 
reforms suggested and implemented by the Commission sensitively affect the 
undertakings in the sector, because their means of earning a living is in danger. 
The reception of the measures of the Commission often degenerates into 
violent acts by these people. Every week, during protests against the new rules, 
the fresh catch is dumped in front of the buildings of fishing authorities. When 
courts apply the law, they shall not leave the social circumstances [behind 
the law] out of consideration. 
47
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Closing remarks 
The new radical concepts emerging in case law and in the opinion of the 
Advocate General have grounds to call the constructive judicial activity of the 
Court, which has defined Community law in its basis, on account. It is 
questionable that the European Court of Justice rejects the two reform concepts 
on purely formalist ic legal grounds. That Court , which have created the 
missing elements of the Communi ty system of judicial protection of 
individuals in its case law, cannot back out f rom the obligation of further 
perfection of the Community system of remedies. 
The significance of Jégo-Quéré is that the Court of First Instance rejected 
the condition of being distinguishable from others, as the core element of 
the concept of individual concern. According to this, the applicant has to 
concentrate on his position in the proceeding. In our view, however, under the 
criteria set in the case, the group of individuals, who may qualify as individually 
concerned, is set narrow without reason. Only in case of real violation of law, 
i.e. restriction of rights or imposition of obligations, would their actions be 
admissible. Judicial interpretation would preclude individuals whose rights are 
not violated directly at the effective date of the Community measure and allow 
action for them later, when the result aimed by the Community measure ensues. 
Nobody shall be excluded from the review of a Community measure violating 
Community law, if the right of that person would be violated by the later effect 
of the unlawful measure. 
In the light of the UP A judgement it must be stated that according to case 
law individual concern must be interpreted as in Plaumann.48 According to the 
argument of the applicant in UP A, it had locus standi under Article 230 EC 
action because Article 234 EC action was not open for his application, 
therefore, in order to enforce the right to effective judicial protection, the direct 
action for review shall stand for its disposal. The Court rejected the argument 
by stating that it had no jurisdiction to examine national laws whether they 
serve Article 234 EC action appropriately. The Court of First Instance rejected 
the same argument on the same basis in case SLIM Sicilia only a month after 
the judgement in Jégo-Quéré 49 Three months after the decision in Jégo-Quéré, 
the President of the CFI repeated the UPA judgement stating that the lack of 
48
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other means of judicial protection does not require the court to depart from the 
conditions of admissibility set in Article 230 (4) EC.50 
In view of the functioning of the European Courts, the Jégo-Quéré judge-
ment is not the result of a communication failure. The European Court of 
Justice does not want to alter the present set of conditions. It must be seen, 
however, that the judgement in Jégo-Quéré is the part of Community law, and 
it has not been reversed yet by the European Court of Justice in an appeal 
procedure. The judgement of the Court of First Instance can be relied upon and 
it will be relied upon. Furthermore, the proceedings in Jégo-Quéré are still 
underway, only the question of admissibility was decided. The decision on 
merits will follow the possible appeal, the opinion of the Advocate General 
will come later, and finally, the judgement of the European Court of Justice 
will hopefully clarify the situation. The process is not over yet and it is still 
possible that the interpretation of individual concern will change in the 
forthcoming months.51 
50
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Konstitutsionnye proekty v Rossii, 18-nachalo 20 v. 
otv. redaktory S. Bertolissi, A. N. Sakharov (Moskva: IRI RAN, 2000) 
[Draft constitutions in Russia, 18th to early 20th century, 
S. Bertolissi-A. N. Sakharov, eds. (Moscow: IRI RAN, 2000)] 
In 2000 the Institute of History of the Russian Academy of Sciences and the 
Oriental Institute of the University of Naples, in a joint publication, released a 
book of great importance on the history of Russian constitutionalism. The subject 
of Russian constitutionalism is today of exceptional interest and importance. 
The continuing global significance of Russia's role in political, military and 
cultural affairs means that the development of Russian constitutionalism will be 
watched with great interest from outside Russia's own borders, just as it had 
been in the previous era. The book is in a class of its own, endeavoring a full 
and thorough introduction to the origins of Russian constitutionalism. It aims to 
present Russian constitutionalism in its entirety, understanding constitutionalism 
in the narrower sense of the term. The volume contains documents, which were 
drafted to limit tsarist autocracy. The collection begins with various 
constitutional plans discovered in connection with the ascendance of tsarina 
Anna Ivanovna in 1730, and covers projects up to the Constitutional Convention 
of 1917. 
The book offers a truly exceptional presentation of unique historical 
documents. The largest part of this more than 800-page-volume is devoted to 
the development of Russian constitutional thought, in which 50 documents, 
covering the main stages of constitutional development, are presented. Extensive 
introductory essays by A. N. Sakharov, S. Bertolissi and A. N. Medushevsky 
open the presentation of these documents. The three introductory essays, written 
from three different perspectives, as well as the detailed references in the work 
of A. N. Medushevskij, comprehensively illuminate the historical context of the 
documents' origins. This apparatus also makes the historical documents 
accessible to those not that familiar with the intricate details of Russian 
politics, law, and institutional and social history. Indeed, the need to outline 
the legal and institutional historical context is of great significance given that, 
as the title suggests, the book contains only those draft constitutions that 
were (actually) intended to be realised. These drafts can only be properly 
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analysed with an understanding of their legal and institutional context. By 
placing these documents one after the other, it becomes possible to reconstruct 
and analyze in its entirety the nearly three centuries of Russian constitutional 
thought, which began following the reign of Peter I. 
The massive amount of historical material offers useful insights not only 
to those specialising in Russian history. Foreign scholars of European and 
North American comparative law and constitutionalism who are less familiar 
with Russian history and constitutional developments may also make exciting 
discoveries. Analysing the development of Russian constitutional thought 
through concepts, institutions and solutions that emerged during the centuries-
old evolution of constitutionalism in Europe and North America, reveals 
aspects of this development, which would otherwise have remained hidden. 
(Although, to a certain extent, such an outsider approach might seem rigidly 
analytical and overly unhistorical.) 
Sakharov approaches Russian constitutionalism primarily from its historical, 
cultural and civilizational aspects. Full of ideas and inspiration for further 
thought, Sakharov's essay touches upon a few major episodes in the develop-
ment of the Russian political system before the reign of Peter I, which had the 
potential to direct Russian history in a completely different direction. A central 
concept in his essay is the emphasis on the non-determinate, alternating nature 
of Russian history. Although following the rule of Peter I, the "constitutional" 
or "liberal" alternative was clearly more apparent, with a slight exaggeration, it 
was already noticeable before his reign. It is in this light that Sakharov 
evaluates, admittedly only tangentially and in a careful fashion, the boyar 
opposition to Ivan IV ("the Terrible"), the Russian elite's renewed attempts 
to limit the tsar 's power in the time of Boris Godunov and Prince Vasily 
Shuysky, and—with much greater emphasis—Prince Kurbsky's opposition to 
the 'terrible ruler ' . In relation to Kurbsky, Sakharov speaks directly of "his 
draft constitution to limit autocracy". The author places much significance 
on Kurbsky's endeavors to reform the "Chosen Council" and to include rep-
resentative elements in local councils. In Sakharov's view, had these reforms 
been realised, they would have brought into being a completely different, 
alternative model of Russian political development in the second half of the 
sixteenth century which would have been "on the level of East-European and 
Swedish civilizational experience". In Sakharov's evaluation, Kurbsky's 
stance against Ivan IV "was the first forceful and dramatic attempt in the on-
going struggle for an alternative Russian development to end in failure". 
Worthy of note is Sakharov's "cultural" and "civilizational" approach, 
which can be traced on more than one occasion both within and outside 
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Russia, admittedly imbued with differing value content. In the end, he connects 
the autocracy—constitutionalism duality back to the Russia—Europe 
duality. Furthermore, perhaps exactly due to the systematic application of 
this "cultural" outlook, the reign of False Dimitry I is presented in a funda-
mentally different manner than is commonly accepted in historiography. 
False Dimitry I came to power during the so-called Time of Troubles, the 
time of the fatal blow to Russian statehood, and he is commonly held to have 
represented Catholic and Polish interests. At the same time, Sakharov's 
interpretation of False Dimitry I 's reign presents a perspective which fits 
well into the "autocracy" v. "liberalism / constitutionalism" dualism of Russian 
history. From this perspective, the measures adopted by False Dimitry I 
point exactly in the "liberalism/constitutionalism" direction. False Dimitry I 
permitted Russian people to freely travel abroad, he announced freedom of 
religion, he eased the situation of the peasants and kholoptsvo, and planned 
to convene the elected representatives of the serving nobles to familiarise 
himself with their demands. According to Sakharov, the origins of the 
conspiracy to overthrow and assassinate False Dimitry I can basically be 
explained by the above measures of the usurper tsar. In Sakharov's conception 
(which is at notable variance with standard historiography) the reign of 
False Dimitry I was of great significance as it presents the focal point of a 
potential for an alternative Russian history that could have stepped off the 
path of autocracy. 
Sakharov's evaluation of the character of Peter I similarly differs f rom 
common historiography. In his description it is Peter I who represents the 
ever-dominant autocratic-authoritarian pole in Russian history. This is opposed 
to Regent Sophia and Prince Vasily V. Golytsin, a key figure under the 
Regent's reign and the head of the 'posolsky prikaz', i.e. the minister of 
foreign of affairs (in the words of Sakharov the "enlightened chancellor") 
who represented the failed non-autocratic/authoritarian alternative. (Their reign 
ended in 1689 by the coup d'etat of the Naryshkin clan, thereby assuring the 
reign of Peter I.) Peter I did not continue any of the important aspects of 
Sophia's and Golytsin's reform measures and carried on the previous 
autocratic traditions of Moscow Russia, his own superficial reforms changing 
nothing. Thereupon, it is not surprising that Sakharov presents twelve 
documents in relation to the attempts to limit the powers of the Supreme Privy 
Council in the 1730's. At the time the eight-member oligarchic Supreme Privy 
Council attempted to limit the power of the ascending tsar, Anna Ivanovna 
in a legal document, setting certain "conditions", thereby also highlighting the 
constitutionalist alternative. 
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Besides the above document prepared by the autocrats of the Supreme 
Privy Council (of which the book presents numerous versions), a good number 
of other plans were produced in the circles of the nobility which also sought to 
limit the power of the autocratic ruler. These attempts were supplemented by 
countless highly articulate open political initiatives undertaken by Russian 
nobility up to 1905. These events point beyond themselves and are truly 
worthy of further examination. 
Having read the assorted documents on Russian constitutional thought 
after Peter I, Sakharov's central argument concerning the alternating nature 
of Russian history seems very fertile and inspiring, yet it still bears a number 
of paradoxes. Indeed, it is arresting that constitutional plans which sought 
to limit autocratic power were often fatally aborted at the last minute, 
sometimes being thrown out by the ruler herself right after royal concession 
(Anna Ivanovna, Catherine II, the Great). Alexander II, who accepted the 
plan for constitutional reform (the consultative involvement of the 'zemstvo' - s 
and municipal representatives in the legislative process), was assassinated 
two weeks after he affixed his signature on the resolution, which made the 
reforms executable. His heir, Alexander III had no intention in continuing 
his father 's work, and in the first weeks of his rule issued the famous 
manifesto on the reinforcement and inviolability of autocracy—a departure 
from the logic of constitutional reform presented. 
In this respect, the rule of Alexander I is extremely interesting, as a 
number of constitutional plans were commissioned and prepared during this 
period, which occupy a significant place in the present book. Most notable 
among these include 'The most gracious charter to the Russian people' from 
the Unofficial Committee (Neglasny Komitet) (1801), Speransky's plan entitled 
'An introduction to the code of state laws' (1809), and Nikolai Novosiltsev's 
'The charter of Russia's state organisation' (1820). Had any of these draft 
constitutions been adopted, they would have affected Russian history in a 
manner, which would be felt even today. According to the original plan, the 
proclamation of the 'The most gracious charter' was to be introduced on the 
occasion of Alexander I ' s coronation in September 1801. Speransky enjoyed 
the full confidence of the tsar between 1807 and 1811 and was almost as 
powerful as the almighty favourites of the 18th century, who actually decided 
on all state affairs. In the light of the magnitude of his influence, his quick 
fall is even more striking (Alexander I having expelled him). 
As if observing the cruel play of destiny, the choreography of key aspects, 
the pattern of events is strikingly similar. In an autocratic environment, 
documents that have the capacity to bring about substantial changes (those 
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containing the minimum of civil rights) are prepared in the highest circles of 
the government, sometimes even with the encouragement and assent of the 
czar, and seem to have every chance of being realised. Yet, hardly any of 
these documents, some of which were lengthy and thoroughly elaborate, 
such as Speransky's, were put into effect, or they were realised with their 
most important elements being left out. Out of Speransky's plan, components 
of a bureaucratic machinery such as the institution of ministries and the 
Council of State were preserved. An exploration of the historical context of 
the constitutional documents presented in the volume tends to suggest that 
there should be some deeper reason standing in the way of the realisation of 
these constitutional projects. Curiously, the failure of these constitutional 
projects, which were so close to being realised, often contains a tragic 
element, given that these schemes could have lead to a totally different path 
for Russian constitutional development and Russian history in general. 
Studying all the draft constitutions presented in the book, one is inclined 
to agree with many considerations that Medushevsky makes in his essay. On 
the one hand, Russian constitutionalism, just as its counterparts in Western 
Europe, was bom from a conflict between state and society. Thus, the stages 
and the principles of Russian constitutionalism are akin to those found in 
Western Europe. However, there are a number of significant, possibly 
structural, differences. For instance, in Russia a social class or group that 
could carry the idea of constitutionalism was always absent, or at least very 
small and isolated. All draft constitutions or legislative reforms emanated 
from the highest circles of government or from groups in the political elite, 
and at times it was even the ruler who inspired or commissioned such 
proposals (i.e. the Instruction of Catherine II, the Great). For this reason, 
until 1905 and 1917, constitutional reforms were not representative of the 
political forces of the society, which, through the political process could 
have been capable of reforming the absolutist-autocratic state. (The events 
of 1730 might be an exception to this). In Russia, reform was a purely 
philosophical or ideological phenomenon, where reform of the method of 
exercising power was sought for the sake of principles and the implementation 
of the reform was expected from the state itself. The all-encompassing 
rationale behind the reform initiatives was to make the state rational and 
more efficient, to make the administration more professional through reforms, 
which are conducted from above. In Russia, the primary force of consti-
tutionalism is the autocratic state itself. This is the underlying paradox and 
self-contradiction of Russian constitutionalism, and it is this feature which 
makes Russian constitutionalism essentially different from its Western 
European counterparts. This also explains the differences in the emphasis of 
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themes that exists between various Russian projects and Western European 
solutions. 
This further sheds light on the fact that despite the radical declaration of 
basic rights in the various reform schemes, the government could never 
commit itself to the final step on the most crucial issue, that of full popular 
representation, which could have substantially limited autocracy. In this 
respect, Medushevsky rightly quotes one of the interpreters of "The most 
gracious charter" of 1801, who explored the Western European sources of 
this document (the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679 and the declarations of the 
rights men and citizen found in three French Constitutions): "on the soil of 
Russian peasants, these formulas were similar to those tropical plants, which 
have been planted in frozen soil". 
The autocratic Russian state has never committed itself to limiting and 
thus weakening its own power. Many thought that self-restraint would have 
put an end to Russian statehood. Among others, this position was shared by 
Nikolay M. Karamzin in his famous work, Memoir on Ancient and Modern 
Russia [Zapiska о drevnei i novoi Rossii (1811)], who criticised the views 
of Speransky. Karamzin's words are well known and widely quoted: 
"Autocracy has founded and resuscitated Russia. Any change in her political 
constitution has led in the past and must lead in the future to her perdition, 
for she consists of very many and very different parts, each of which has its 
special civic needs; what save unlimited monarchy can produce in such a 
machine the required unity of action? If Alexander [I] inspired by generous 
hatred for the abuses of autocracy, should lift a pen and prescribe himself 
laws other than the laws of God and of his conscience, then the true, virtuous 
citizen of Russia would presume to stop his hand and to say: 'Sire! you 
exceed the limits of your authority. Russia, taught by long disasters, vested 
before the holy altar the power of autocracy in your ancestors, asking him 
that he rule her supremely, indivisibly. This covenant is the foundation of 
your authority, you have no other. You may do everything, but you may not 
limit your authority by law!' " ' 
The extent to which the delineation of competencies and the clarification 
of the relationships between the various planned bodies are absent from even 
the most progressive reform schemes is striking for the non-Russian consti-
tutional lawyer. It may be said that such practical considerations were lost in 
the intellectual and institutional vacuum in which such schemes came into 
being, given that it was not a question of arranging the relationship between 
' Translation in: Richard Pipes: Karamzin's Memoir on Ancient and Modern Russia, 
A Translation and Analysis, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1959, 139. 
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real and existing bodies. It may have been that the clarification or the precise 
description of legal competencies could have made the tsar of the day 
suspicious, since even those tsars who would otherwise flirt with limiting 
autocratic rule do not particularly like to see their own power actually 
restrained. What is for sure, however, is that the various constitutional schemes 
contain hardly anything as for practical matters. The concept of a legislative 
act is similarly underdeveloped. Some of the constitutional schemes had the 
modernisation of the legislative procedure as their primary purpose, but did 
not aim to alter the established governmental structure. This may be in line 
with the enlightened absolutist model of the 17th century, but it does not 
answer the question as to whose will the rationalised legislative process is 
ultimately supposed to represent. For the non-Russian constitutional lawyer 
it appears that a certain tradition of thought is emerging, in which 'zakor i 
[legislative act] and other norms are mixed. And since the constitutional 
schemes (again with an eye on autocracy) do not differentiate between 
legislators, no legal hierarchy, which is the basis of the rule of law, emerges. 
The present volume contributes significantly to the study of Russian 
constitutionalism. The analysis of the never realised draft constitutions 
prepared in Russia before 1917, and the illustration of their destinies, may 
help contemporary Russia in finding the path to modern constitutionalism. 
András Sajó and Gábor Sisák 
MIKLÓS LÉVA Y (ed.): Essays for Professor Emeritus Tibor Horváth's 
75th Birthday (Tanulmányok Horváth Tibor Professor Emeritus 75. 
születésnapjára). Miskolci Egyetem, Bíbor Kiadó, Miskolc, 2002 
The 3rd Serial of the Bulletin of Criminal Scientific Section, a brochure of 
the Department of Criminal Sciences at the University of Miskolc, has been 
released in May 2002. The volume features essays of current concern f rom 
the field of national and international criminal law, edited by Professor 
Miklós Lévay, head of the Department of Criminal Sciences, Dean of Faculty 
of Law. The recently published omnibus edition, Volume III, is collated on 
the occasion of Professor Emeritus Tibor Horváth's 75th birthday, a great 
authority at the University of Miskolc. This book allows space for the essayists 
and the editors to express to their gratitude to Tibor Horváth, who is also the 
founder of the Miskolc workshop of criminal sciences. The writers them-
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selves studied and graduated at the Faculty of Law, University of Miskolc, 
so they were all educated by the honoured professor and they are former or 
present participants of the department project of "Evolution Tendencies in 
Criminal Sciences" directed by Tibor Horváth, embraced by the doctoral 
program (Ph.D.) of the Faculty. The papers widely explore and review inter-
national legal literature, so the rich notation helps those interested get informed 
in the field of criminal sciences. 
Márta Ábrahám's essay offers insight into The Reformulation of the 
Austrian Criminal Procedure. As the author asserts, the amendment of the 
Penal Procedure Code was necessitated by the Janus-faced situation that, 
although, the legislator's intention was to guarantee a leading role to the 
judge in the investigation process, instead, the police department controls it 
de facto. According to the Code in force, the principle of letting the judge 
control and monitor police investigation, is not admissible. Urgent measures 
cannot be formerly authorised by the prosecutor, nor can be monitored by 
the judge, since the police is liable to make the first step and the prosecutor's 
role is mainly reduced to laying an indictment. The paper provides a detailed 
analysis of the draft act, which is focused on the „restraints and outweighs". 
The hinge of the draft is the empowerment of the position of the offended 
party, as well as the abolishment of immediate trial investigation. Ábrahám, 
while analyses the channels of collaboration among the police, the 
prosecution and the court, also draws the attention to the anomalies of the 
amended draft. 
Edit Fogarassy, while starts her analysis in her work titled About the 
Criminal Acts Ex Post Facto from the underlying principles of „ nullum crimen 
sine lege" and „nulla poena sine lege", construes the interdiction of a stricter 
penal stance adopted as retrospective, as a concept enacted after World War II. 
In her paper, she studies the emergence, the evolution as well as the re-
inforcement of the standard above, its theoretical and historical background, 
as well as its role in international law. The essay relies on Pál Angyal's unique 
monography published in 1916, which surveyed the emergence of the 
retrospective effect of substantive penal law. 
According to the study by József Gula, the economic, social and judicial 
changes of recent years faithfully reflect the transformation of economic 
crimes. The paper, dealing with Jurisdiction and Legislation Problems in the 
Field of Economic Crime, emphasises the role of penal law as „ultima ratio". 
The effect of penal law must be dramatically limited in respect of 
economic movements. At the same time, there is a contrary demand for the 
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protection of the new market-economic legal institutions, which, following 
the European legal harmonisation process, puts pressure on legislation. However, 
the writer enumerates the advantages of lawmaker's frame disposition on 
economic crimes and attaches importance to the relative stability of detailed 
regulations as a fundamental prerequisite of lawful conduct. The writer offers 
a stunning presentation of the transformation of the field of economic crimes 
and of the way, in turn, they have transformed frame provisions. 
According to his analysis, organised crime and money laundering is a 
severe illness of our society, which, finally, creates a vicious circle, since 
„clean" money originating in money laundering ensures that racketeering 
rolls onward. Therefore, the legislators' most important mission is to penalise 
hiding or concealing possession arising from crimes on both the national and 
transnational level. In the volume, we find two excellent papers that discuss 
the problem of legislation on money laundering. 
Judit Jacsó provides a survey of The Provisions of the Austrian Penal Code 
for Money Laundering and Confiscation of Property. Both international 
collaboration against and the national demand for criminal prosecution of 
organised crime (the Austrian method) indicate that a war should be declared 
on money laundering and confiscation of property by efficient legislation. 
The Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and 
Confiscation of the Proceedings from Crime (Strasbourg, 8 November 1990), 
which unified regulations on confiscation of property, was ratified by 
Austria in 1997. However, the legal preconditions of the confiscation of 
property arising from acts of crime have been formulated under the Amend-
ment of 1996 of the Penal Code in consistence with the EU directive. The 
study reviews the ways of confiscation of illegally obtained money and 
presents the up-to-date Austrian regulation. 
The paper by Ferenc Sántha focuses on Money Launder within the 
Monetary Sector and the European Convention on Laundering (see above) 
and in connection with that The Legal Regulations of EU Member States. 
Harmonisation and strict coordination of legal regulations by the states are 
highlighted as primary imperatives of the treaty. EU Member States apply 
different regulations within the framework set by the standard, which are 
eventually in accordance with the acquisTherefore, potential offenders can 
concentrate their actions on countries that sustain the most favourable 
conditions for crime. 
1
 Acquis-, an umbrella term for European Union legal norms, which is supposed to 
be followed by acceding states. 
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Katinka Kígyóssy, based on the studies of French legal scientists Mireille 
Delmas-Marty and Christine Lazerges, provides an introduction to the 
models of criminal policy. The scope of antisocial activities covers not only 
crimes, but also actions, which are dangerous for society and potentially 
interfere with public order. She claims that criminal political considerations 
are not restricted to the fields of substantive penal law, penal procedure law 
and criminology, but instead, tend to establish a global plan, an embracing 
strategy. By studying responses from different segments of society, such as 
family, school, professional circles and other communities, the essayist 
proposes social action plans as proper methods of criminal-policy against 
crimes and deviant behaviour. 
László Miskolci examines The Way Police Provoked Crimes are Judged 
in Different Systems of Common Law. According to his argument, the 
evolution of criminal methods should be tracked both by substantive and 
procedural law, as well as by way of according adjustment of the objectives 
of prevention, the scope of criminology and the investigation process. To 
reveal crimes that remain unreported requires special agents. The revealing 
method of „invisible", unreported crimes is employed in secret police actions, 
such as decoy or lure operations, manna from heaven operations, honey-pot 
operations, "sting", etc. The study outlines different views on entrapment, 
which is the most controversial form of "proactive" police operations and 
examines this practice in various systems of common law, in terms of the 
related legal regulations and debates on the admissibility of punishment in 
that case. 
Péter M. Nyitrai reviews an array of Pros and Cons of the Extradition of 
the Home Object. Whereas in continental law extradition of the home object 
was substantially prohibited, it was a practice from the 19th century onward. 
Which was contrary to the principle effective in common law countries, 
where even home objects were liable to extradition to the state on petition 
(the petitor state) in order to prevent probation difficulties. While the writer 
analyses the arguments and counter-arguments in a realistic manner, presents 
the European institution of the warrant of arrest and the related new 
extradition procedure due to come into force. 
Ildikó Soós analyses The Effect of Positivist Criminology on Hungarian 
Legislation in Relation to the Amendment of 1908 Penal Law. Soós sut >»eys 
penal judiciary letters and theories since the end of the 19th century to the 
first third of the 20th century. She provides a cross-sectional overview on 
the trends of the age from Lombroso's criminal-anthropology to Tarde's 
criminal-sociology, from the offender-focused school up to the intermediary 
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school. She also reviews the work of the most noted Hungarian legal scientists, 
whose activity is attached to the radical transformation of the classic 
definition of guilt. She studies the basic notions and trends that mark the age 
of fierce legal debates. Some of them, like penal sanctions against juveniles, 
the methods of enforcing penalties, the problems of „patronage", death penalty 
and f ines and the advisability of suspended sentence still need serious 
consideration. 
Nóra Széles surveys The Development of Derivational Crime and 
summarises The Amendment of Substantive Penal Law as well as Criminal 
Conspiracy and Criminal Organisation in her study. The definitions of 
criminal conspiracy and criminal organisation as amended are in compliance 
with EU norms and in accordance with the objectives of legal attempts at 
struggle against organised crime, which becomes more and more important 
nowadays. The study points out the new components of definitions in a 
critical manner and compares them to EU protocols and conventions. The 
question that arises here is if it makes sense to interpret those definitions of 
Hungarian law that are incommensurable with EU legislation in terms of the 
EU regulations, and amend penal regulations, non-compliant with European 
Union legislation, for geopolitical considerations. 
The edition presents us with an opulent perspective on legal trends and 
legal history, while it does not lack critical censure or theories useful for 
legislators. This is an extensive collection of miscellaneous studies. Not only 
as former students, but also as candidates, the essayists are all obliged to 
Professor Horváth for embedding a veneration of values of Hungarian criminal 
cogitation, a sensibility for the exploration and analysis of newly arising 
problems and thoroughness in work.2 The writer of this review, who also 
graduated at the Faculty of Law of the University of Miskolc, wishes to 
contribute to the essayists ' gesture of paying tribute to Professor Horváth in 
the belief that the community of professionals in law has been enriched due 
to the publication of that valuable and noteworthy volume. 
Katalin Parti 
2
 For further details on Tibor Horváth's teaching and research, see, Annual Essays, 
vol. II. for Professor Tibor Horváth's 70th Birthday. Bíbor Kiadó, Miskolc, 1997, ed, I. 
Görgényi-Á. Farkas-M. Lévay. 
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IMRE VÖRÖS* 
The Legal Doctrine and Legal Policy Aspects of the 
EU-Accession 
Abstract. The author deals with an important question of the Hungarian constitutional law, 
which question plays a relevant role during the accession process of a state of the European 
Union (EU). It means that the question of legal haromization always arises, when a state is 
going to join the EUZ. The author focuses on the question, whether the international l a w — 
namely the law of the EU—or the national law should be privileged in given cases. The 
author introduces the possible conflicts between international law and domestic law with the 
help of several examples. The author refers to the numerous solutions of member-states of 
the EU and also mentions the situation of some would-be member-states, too. The author 
analyses the practice of the European Court, as wee by underlining some important cases, 
inter alia, the famous case of Van Gend en Loos. The author highlights the point of view that 
the Community law precedes the constitutions of the member-states. As a result of this the 
Hungarian constitution has to be modified in order to meet the requirements of the legal 
harmonization process, which will emerge with the access of Hungary to the EU. 
Keywords: constitutional law, constitution. EU-law, legal harmonization 
I. The problem: A conflict between international law and domestic law 
1. De lege lata relationship between international law and domestic law 
1.1. In the first approach, the accession of Hungary to the European Union 
(EU) presupposes that the relationship between international law and domestic 
law is constitutionally settled. 
In this respect, Hungary is not in an advantageous position. According to 
Para. 1 of Article 7 of the Constitution: "The legal system of the Republic of 
Hungary accepts the generally recognised principles of international law and 
shall harmonise the country's domestic law with the obligations assumed under 
international law." This article of the Constitution should be the governing one 
for the jurisdiction in case a conflict between domestic law and international 
law occurs, i.e., if international law, that is, an international agreement or inter-
* Professor of Law, Institute for Legal Studies of the Hungarian Academy of 
Sciences, H-1014 Budapest, Országház u. 30. 
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national customary law contains contradicting provisions to these of domestic 
law. 
1.2. The emergence of this conflict has become more likely in a broader 
scope as a result of the process of integration of Hungary into international co-
operation with higher intensity since the transition in 1990. Hungary as a 
member state of the international community and the UN, and a signatory state 
or a contracting party to several international conventions in human rights or 
international economic relations obviously shall not dispose of such free scope 
of legislation, as it used to before accession to these international treaties. 
Becoming a member state to these treaties also implies that Hungary cannot 
create domestic law, which contradicts their content, whereas, with respect to 
effective domestic statutes, we are posed with the question concerning what way 
the lawmaker can resolve a potential conflict. 
Some examples'. The accession of Hungary to two human rights treaties (the 
UN Charter and the European Convention on Human Rights) excludes the 
codification of capital punishment, while our accession to the W T O 
Convention excludes the possibility of the imposition of e.g. discriminative 
customs fees. Furthermore, since our accession to the Washington Convention 
on the protection of foreign investments, the codification of such important 
fields, which would not guarantee immediate, unconditional and just indem-
nification and due process of law, is inadmissible. So long as the Republic of 
Hungary codified domestic law that is contrary to the international treaty, 
Hungary would be abjudicated and obligated to correct domestic law, either by 
the Strasbourg Court, which is competent in the area of human rights, or by 
the proceeding panel of arbitrators in the scope of the Washington Convention, 
or by the competent dispute settlement council in the scope of the WTO. If 
Hungary failed to comply, its liability under international law for the breach of 
an international treaty would obtain and ultimately it would be faced with the 
option of the "uphold of its membership" in the respective international treaty 
or the withdrawal. The uphold of "domestic law" however that is contrary to 
international treaties is not tolerated on a long-term basis by the dispute 
settlement mechanism of the these treaties. 
In the scope of the European Agreement, the European Community-Hungary 
Association Council was established between the European Community and 
the Republic of Hungary, furthermore, the implementation of the Agreement 
was transferred to its competence. Accordingly, the Council promotes the 
implementation of the Agreement gradually by adopting adequate decisions 
framed in legally binding government decrees. 
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1.3. The majority of international treaties, however, does not allow legal 
dispute settlement mechanisms: the requirement of the harmony between 
international law and domestic law, therefore, needs to be secured in general 
under domestic law, and in particular constitutionally, with respect to the fact 
that a fundamental problem of the functioning of the legal system arises. 
Therefore, the harmony needs to be guaranteed under the Constitution, since 
Para. 1 of Article 2 of the Constitution binds the Hungarian organs of juris-
diction, that is, courts and other authorities, to enforce the Hungarian legal 
system: ("The Republic of Hungary is an independent, democratic state under 
the rule of law."). This principle and the deduced requirement of security in 
law, which prevails in the general practice of the Constitutional Court, 
positively imply the requirement above, disregarding the fact that the judges, 
government officials and civil servants, by taking an oath on the Constitution, 
take an oath that they shall comply with constitutional rules as well as assure 
that they are observed. 
Therefore, an exemption from the constitutional liability to implement 
Hungarian domestic law also needs to be guaranteed under the Constitution 
itself and its instrument is that the Constitution positively and clearly takes a 
stand point concerning the relationship between international law and domestic law. 
However, Para. 1 of Article 7 of the Constitution quoted above is not adequate 
to achieve this goal. 
1.4. Concerning the relationship of international law and domestic law, the 
following three issues shall be considered: 
— the monist-dualist conceptions, 
— a division between the technique of transformation/adoption codification, 
and in this context, 
— the issue of the self-executing and non-self-executing character of inter-
national treaties. 
The core of these well-known, fundamental issues of international law—on a 
simplified way—is as follows:1 
a) According to the dualist conception, international law and domestic law 
are two separate legal systems in terms of substantive law. According to the 
monist conception they are not, therefore, international law as framed by 
several national legislators shall be applied by the domestic jurisdiction con-
1
 For a summary, see, Bodnár, L.: A nemzetközi jog jogrendszerbeli helyének alkot-
mányos szabályozásáról [On the Constitutional Regulation of the Placement of Inter-
national Law in the Legal System], In: Alkotmány és jogtudomány [The Constitution and 
Legal Science], Acta Universitatis Szegediensis de Attila József Nominatae, Tomus XLVII, 
Fasciculus 1-18, Szeged, 1996, 22. and the following pages. 
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cemed, and so shall domestic law framed by the domestic lawmaker. According 
to the monist conception, the difference is merely formal: the former was made 
by several lawmakers, while the latter was made by a single one." 
b) The codification-technical consequences of the two conceptions, i.e., 
how international law becomes an integral part of domestic law, is deduced by 
the transformation-adoption model. According to the previous one, which 
echoes the dualist conception, separate domestic legislation, incorporation is 
deemed as necessary following the ratification, while according to the latter 
one, which "reflects" the monist conception, such incorporation procedure is 
unnecessary, since international treaties are incorporated into domestic law on 
their ratification and promulgation. 
c) Finally, the conception, which attributes self-executing character to 
international treaties, is consistent with the monist-adoption conception. 
Accordingly, international treaties are to be implemented directly by the 
national courts and no separate rule of implementation is necessary to be 
enacted. 
In the modern globalising world economy and world politics, with respect 
to the contemporary intensity of international relations and the increasing 
significance of regional integration, it is the monist-adoption, self-executing 
model, which can be considered as up-to-date. The problem, however, is that 
Para. 1 of Article 7 of the Hungarian Constitution quoted above shall not 
support either of these conceptions, since this provision is not positive, but 
ambiguous,3 meaningless and eclectic.4 
1.5. It is no wonder that the Constitutional Court, when it applied Para. 1 
of Article 7, encountered significant difficulties. 
1.5.1. AB Decision of 53/1993 (X.13.) (ABH 1993. 327) postulated or more 
correctly, "interpreted" a tripartite hierarchy in the Constitution, which is un-
justified or unformulated under Para. 1 of Article 7. Accordingly, the Constitution 
dominates the hierarchy, and international law is subordinated to it, whereas 
domestic law prevails at the bottom, neither of which may not contradict the 
levels above. 
Vörös, I.: Az Európai Megállapodás alkalmazása a magyar jogrendszerben [The 
Implementation of the European Treaty in the Hungarian Legal System], Jogtudományi 
Közlöny, 1997, no. 5., 229-239. 
1
 Bragyova, A.: Igazságtétel és nemzetközi jog [Retroactive Justice and International 
Law], Glossza az Alkotmánybíróság határozatához [Commentary on the Decision of the 
Constitutional Court], in: Állam- és Jogtudomány, 1993. nos. 34, 217-218., 220. 
4
 Bodnár: op. cit., 21-22. 
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Besides, the decision adopted the conception of German constitutional legal 
science and the idea of the German Federal Constitutional Court concerning 
Article 25 of the Grundgesetz,5 according to which the necessary transformation 
has already been implemented in principle and in general as pursuant to Para. 1 
of Article 7 of the Constitution with an effect to the future, therefore, no 
separate transformation is necessary. 
The attempt for the "introduction" of the monist conception however, 
against the best intentions, was a failure. Since the Hungarian Constitutional 
Court, either as a result of its incompetence or simply of its insensitivity, 
disregarded a fact, which was also misconstrued by the "constructors" of the 
revised Constitution in 1989, namely, that Article 25 of the Grundgesetz 
pertained exclusively to international customary law, i.e., the general principles 
of international law, whereas a separate article, i.e., Article 59 based on the 
dualist-transformation model pertained to the international law of treaties.6 
Para. 1 of Article 7, which was definitely framed under the influence of the 
Grundgesetz, testifies both an awareness of Article 25 of the Grundgesetz and 
the fact that the legislators were not aware of the existence of Article 59. 
Consequently, it is understandable that Para. 1 of Article 7 of the Hungarian 
Constitution specifies as a constitutional requirement merely the harmony of 
international customary law and domestic law, whereas, it does not take a 
stand on a harmony with international treaty law. Furthermore, it neglects the 
clarification of the hierarchical relationship between international law and 
domestic law. 
The requirement of "harmony" in itself is both meaningless and ambiguous, 
since it can imply both 
— the necessity to adjust domestic law to international law, and also its 
contrary: 
— that international law is hierarchically subordinated to domestic law. 
This interpretation obviously excludes any participation in international 
relations, since in case of conflict, domestic statutes would have priority in 
jurisdiction. The mere possibility of such interpretation should be categorically 
excluded under the text of the Constitution itself. 
1.5.2. The defective provision in the Constitution "transplanted" incompletely 
from the Grundgesetz, consequently, did not facilitate that the Constitutional 
Court, while it was framing AB Decision of 53/1993 (X. 13), which is other-
Hesse, K.: Grundzüge des Verfassungsrechts der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 
16th edition, 1988, n. 103; BVerfGE 15, 25 (34). 
6
 Grundgesetz- Kommentar, (hrsg.: von Horst Dreier), Mohr, Siebeck, 1998. Bd. 2, 
1118, and the following pages. Hesse, К.: op. cit., 101-104. 
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wise loaded with a number of mistakes and technical deficiencies of inter-
national law, clarified the relationship between international law and domestic 
law in a reassuring manner.7 Hungarian special literature on international law 
has exposed the statements of the decision concerning international law to 
strong criticism (e.g. the original English technical term of adoption was 
misconstrued and translated as „adaptation "),8 and reached the conclusion 
that „the Constitutional Court... drafted the decision irrespective of the doctrinal 
grounds of international law.4 
Nevertheless, it can be definitely inferred on the grounds of the positive 
analysis of the Hungarian legal system,10 (not on the grounds of the analysis of 
the Constitution) i.e., of the provisions of Act XXXII of 1989 (Abtv) on the 
Constitutional Court concerning competence and procedural law. One has to 
take into consideration especially its Point c) of Article 1, Para. 3 of Article 21 
and Articles 44—46 that the Hungarian legal system is constituted on the basis 
of the dualist conception, the transformation technique and on the recognition of 
the non-self-executing character of international treaties. 
The "settlement" of the issue in such a ruling is, of course, an absurdity in 
constitutional law. 
1.5.3. The Constitutional Court in its AB Decision of 4/1977 (/. 22.) (ABH 
1997. 41.) reaffirmed its former standpoint and corrected some of its mistakes, 
which, however, did not modify the fact that the body in itself as a "legislator" 
did not manage to readjust the Hungarian legal system from the dualist-
transformation, non-self-executing model to the monist-adoption, self-executing 
model." 
1.5.4. To sum it up, we can assert that the Hungarian Constitution does not 
contain a judicially governing provision either on the status of international 
law in the hierarchy of the sources of law, or on the admissibility or constitu-
tionality of the direct application of the norms of international law by the 
Hungarian courts. 
7
 Bragyova: op. cit., 218. 
8
 Bragyova: op. cit., 218. 
9
 Bodnár: op. cit., 22. 
10
 Vörös: Az Európai Megállapodás... op. cit., see, especially, the explications in 
part IV. 
11
 See, my dissenting opinion attached to the decision (ABH 1997, 53-54.); see also. 
Vörös, I.: Dixi et salvavi, Különvélemények, párhuzamos indokolások (Dissenting 
Opinions and Parallel Motivations), Budapest, 2000, 107. 
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2. Some foreign examples: 
This is not the case in a number of foreign legal systems. Article 28 of the Greek 
Constitution and Article 15 of the Russian Constitution positively sets forth 
— the priority of international law versus domestic law and 
— the doctrine of the obligation that national courts and other authorities 
directly enforced international law. Surprising as it may seem, Article 122 
of the Albanian Constitution also contains a very high-standard provision.12 
In the Czech Republic, the Constitution was amended on 18 October, 2001 
expressly in the framework of the preparation for the EU-Accession. In that 
framework, the relationship between international law and domestic law was 
also settled. Article 10 of the Constitution accordingly specifies: "Those 
promulgated international treaties, the ratification of which the parliament 
consented to and which bind the Czech Republic, shall be part of its legal 
system. If such an international treaty provides otherwise than domestic law, 
the provisions of the international treaty shall be applied." 
II. Legal doctrinal bases 
1. Three fundamental problems: 
The clarification of the legal doctrinal bases necessitates the analysis of three 
legal doctrinal issues: 
— the relationship between international law and domestic law, 
— the transfer of sovereign rights, and as a special sub-category of this 
second scope of issues, 
— the problem of the potential transfer of sovereign rights specifically to the EU. 
1.1. The unsettled character of the relationship between international law 
and domestic law 
a) Since the relationship between international law and domestic law in the 
Hungarian Constitution can be construed as an open question, the relationship 
between the Hungarian legal system and the law of the European Community 
is also unsettled. 
b) That is not a simple issue even in the relationship between the legal 
system of the member states and Community law, since both the Italian13 
l2Czuczai, J.: The Legal Alignment Process with the Constantly Evolving Consti-
tutional acquis of the EU in Central and Eastern Europe, Európa, 2002, 1 March 2001. no. 
1., 3. sqq. 
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and the German Constitutional Courts'4 have expressed their reservations 
concerning the absolute interpretation of the priority of Community law, 
according to which the latter prevails over not only a significant part of 
constitutional rules and other domestic statutes, but also over the national-
member state constitutions. 
In its Frontini-Decision, the Italian Constitutional Court set forth the limits 
of the doctrine of the priority of Community law (the issue of which we revert 
to later) as laid down and proclaimed by the European Court of Justice, which 
emphasised that although Community law could actually overrule the Italian 
Constitution, however, it shall certainly not overrule either inalienable rights 
guaranteed to persons under the Constitution or the fundamental principles as 
pursuant to the Constitution. Although, Article 11 of the Italian Constitution 
provides for the admissibility of the transfer and, consequently, the limitation 
of sovereignty, nevertheless, the fundamental principles and rights above are the 
"counter-balances" and "controlimitF of this constitutionally guaranteed option. 
In its Fragd-Decision of April 21st of 1989, the Constitutional Court reserved 
the right to review the issue whether the respective regulations of Community 
law and the articles of the Italian Constitution concerning the protection of 
human rights are in accordance.15 
The German Federal Constitutional Court equally held that Community law 
shall not have absolute priority over the protection of fundamental rights as 
guaranteed under the German Grundgesetz, until Community law provides 
similar protection: the constitutionality of Community law in this respect shall 
be constitutionally measured against the norms of the Grundgesetz. 
с) These statements, according to the interpretation of de Witte, imply that 
the thesis of the relative priority of Community law prevails concerning the 
13
 On the priority of Community law, see, Várnay, E.—Papp, M.: Az Európai Unió 
joga (The Law of the European Union), Budapest, 2002. 235, and the following pages. On 
the decisions of the Italian Constitutional Court, see, de Witte, В.: Constitutional Aspects of 
European Union Membership in the Original Six Member States: Model Solutions for 
the Applicant Countries? In: EU Enlargement. The Constitutional Impact at EU and 
National Level (ed.: A. Kellermann, J. W. de Zwaan, J. Czuczai), The Hague, 2001. 74. 
S C J 4
' i 4 The Maastricht-Judgement, BVerfGE 89, 155, The "Solange"-Judgements, e.g., 
BverfGE 73, 339, the argumentation of which was recently affirmed by the Federal 
Constitutional Court in its ruling of 7 June 2000, BverfG, 2 BvL 1/97, Europäisches 
Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht, 2000. 702. 
15Gaja, G.: New Developments in a Continuing Story: The Relationship between 
EEC Law and Italian Law, Common Market Law Revue, 1990. 83. 
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relationship between the constitutions of the member states and Community 
law, thereby, they refute the doctrine of absolute priority.16 
d) The relevance of the problem is adequately demonstrated by the confusion, 
which occurred when the Hungarian Constitutional Court dealt with the 
motion related to the unconstitutionality of Article 62 of the European 
Agreement on the Establishment of an Association between the Republic of 
Hungary and the European Communities and their Member States ratified under 
Act I of 1994. In my print of view, the Constitutional Court does not have 
competence to deal with the subsequent norm control of an international treaty 
17 
even if it was ratified in compliance with the transformation conception, since 
the constitutionality of an international treaty can only and exclusively be 
examined in the scope of a preliminary norm control (Point a) of Article 1 of 
Abtv.). 
da) The Constitutional Court disregarded this minor "triviality" of procedural 
law, examined the motion on its merits and in its AB Decision of30/1998 (VI. 25) 
(ABH 1998, 220.) it arrived at the conclusion that Para. 2 of Article 62 of the 
European Agreement, which specified competition law prohibitions, is not 
expressly unconstitutional, nevertheless, the Court stipulated constitutional 
18 
criteria for its implementation. According to the decision, the constitutional 
criterion is that Hungarian courts and judges authorities may not directly 
implement the application criteria as pursuant to Para. 2 of Article 62, which 
refer to and are contained in Community law. 
Whereas, the Constitutional Court held that two provisions of the European 
Community-Hungary Association Council included in the Supplement of 
Government Decree no. 2320/1996 (XII. 26.) are unconstitutional and thereby 
annulled them, whereas, they were purported to implement the provisions of 
Article 62. 
db) The decision (ABH 1998, 226-227), which was adopted not only in the 
absence of competence and sufficient knowledge of European law and in 
several technical respects wrongly, contested the immediate effect and direct 
applicability of Article 62 of the European Agreement, while it misinterpreted 
the content of the second notion above as established in the science of 
16
 de Witte: ibid. 
17
 See, note 11. 
18
 The Constitutional Court is not competent to determine the "constitutional 
criteria", since no Hungarian statute authorises it to apply such legal consequences. The 
body applies this legal consequence prescribed by itself contra legem, and what is an 
even graver mistake, contra Constitutionen!. See, Dissenting Opinion of Constitutional 
Court Justice, Vörös, I.: Dixi et salvavi (note 11.) 71, 92, 110. 
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international law.14 Relying on that, the decision in a self-contradicting manner 
concluded that in commercial relations between the member states and 
Hungary respective Hungarian law, i.e., Competition Act (No. LVII of 1996 on 
the Prohibition of Unfair and Restrictive Market Practices) shall be applicable 
with respect to the criteria specified under Community law. 
The standpoint above is defective on the grounds that if there are inter-
national elements in relations of civil law, family law or labour law, the rules 
on international collision of private law prevail, since these norms define 
which law should be applied.20 Article 62 shows familiarity primarily with 
civil law, since it pertains to the market conduct and competition conduct of 
companies—competition restrictions or abuse of economic superiority. In view 
of the fact that it is a competition law rule, those rules, which fundamentally 
bear the character of private law obtain together with those norms, which bear 
the character of public law and codify state intervention. Hence, such scope of 
legal norms as a typical instance of omnibus law shall not fall either under 
"private law" or "public law", but they are part of business law, which combines 
the elements of both branches of law. 
At the end of the 20th century, we cannot set out from a conception of the 
dualism of "public law" and "private law", unless we admit our legal technical 
ignorance, and especially, we cannot base a constitutional court decision on 
that doctrine. As it is known, the dualism based on this structure disintegrated 
in the second half of the 19th century.21 
The Decision of the Constitutional Court, framed in the absence of the 
knowledge of the content and legal relevance of the interstate commerce clause, 
is misconstrued not only with respect to the fact that in such cases it is 
Hungarian law that shall be applied, but also when it considers competition 
law as part of "public law" (ABH 1998, 230): the application of Article 62 
„shall incur that relations under public law are effective". By accumulating 
these misconceptions, the Constitutional Court concluded that since the criteria 
19
 According to my view, Article 62 has direct effect and needs to be implemented 
directly. See, Vörös, I.: Az Európai Megállapodás... op. cit. Point 3.3., Part IV. 
20 ., 
Burian, L.—Kecskés, L.—Vörös, I.: Magyar nemzetközi kollíziós magánjog [Hungarian 
International Collision Private Law], 4th edition, Budapest, 2001, 70-75. 21
 Rittner, F.: Wirtschaftsrecht, 2nd edition, 1987, 10-23., Eörsi, Gy.: Jog—gazdaság— 
jogrendszer-tagozódás [Law, Economy, the Structure of the Legal System], Budapest, 
1977. 65., 73., 79., 110. Here, Eörsi develops the arguments adduced in his previous 
work: Összehasonlító polgári jog [Comparative Civil Law], Budapest, 1975, 85, and the 
following pages, and Chapter VI., on the basis of the conclusions drawn from the law 
of Western market economies, at the same time, challenges the relations of planned 
economy. 
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under Community law entail the mandatory application of criteria pertaining to 
relations under public law by the Hungarian jurisdiction, and that is exactly 
what the rule of implementation provides for. Consequently, the rule violates 
the constitutional requirement that a democratic state under the rule of law 
(Para. 1 of Art. 2) prevails, and therefore, it is unconstitutional. According to 
the Constitutional Court, the violation consists in the fact that these criteria are 
not promulgated under a domestic statute (ABH 1998, 233). 
dc) The complicated nature and the intricate technical legal difficulties of 
the argument reveals that the Constitutional Court—with its reference to 
53/1993 (X. 13.) ABH and 4/1997 (I. 22) ABH—made a renewed attempt 
without avail to clarify the relationship between domestic law and international 
law. The case could have exposed a specifically problematic aspect of the 
relationship between Community law and domestic law (n.b. not the domestic 
law of a member state), if the Decision of the Constitutional Court had 
recognised it at all. 
dd) The solution reached finally, i.e., the enumeration of the sources of 
Community law that contain the Community law criteria to be applied under 
Act X of 2002, is in accordance with a casual phrase of the decision (... 
"without the respective criteria following from ... a domestic source of law"). 
This phrase, however, contradicts the overall purpose of the decision, since, if 
the application of foreign law in relations under "public law" is inadmissible as 
pursuant Para. 1 of Article 2 of the Constitution, then this, in principle, is 
inadmissible even if these criteria are specified under a separate statute. 
Namely, the Constitution does not a contain a provision, which stipulates the 
conditions of the transfer of sovereign rights. Therefore, the transfer of 
sovereign rights or of the exercise of powers, which in the present case hides 
in the background of the issue of the domestic application of statutes adopted 
by foreign legislation, is deemed as inadmissible. 
The doctrine that Hungary shall be a democratic state under the rule of law 
as pursuant to Para. 1 of Article 2 does not entail that if the criteria of the 
application of foreign "public law" is proclaimed under a domestic statute 
(ABH 1998, 223), then the application of a foreign "public law" rule is 
constitutional, since this provision does not constitute such possibility for 
exemption or an exception. Para. 1 of Article 2 is a categorical requirement, 
which allows no exception, therefore it cannot substantiate the reference by 
the Constitutional Court to domestic promulgation in order to qualify the 
application of foreign "public law" as constitutional. 
As a result of this, Act X of 2002 on the grounds of 30/1998 (VI.25) ABH 
would probably fail to pass the test of constitutionality. 
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de) Law-Decree Act 13 of 1979 on international private law would also fail 
to pass such a test, since the argument the decision follows fails to offer an 
explanation why a constitutionally bianco authorisation for the application of a 
constantly changing foreign legal system can be granted under the norms of 
"private law". This is not substantiated or expounded either sufficiently or 
doctrinally in view of the fact that here "public law" norms and legal relations 
with ambiguous content and legal constitution are constructed in an isolated 
manner, detached from the legal system. 
df) The basic problem is not if the European Agreement pertains to "public 
law" relations and norms, but whether that international agreement has priority 
over domestic law or not. The decision does not adequately respond to the 
expressly specific question in terms of Community law. 
1.2. The unsettled character of the transfer of sovereign rights 
a) As the argument of 30/1998 (XI. 25.) ABH also pointed out, a further 
doctrinal problem lies in the background. The decision admits that the 
problem delineates in that direction so far as the limitation of sovereignty, 
transfer of sovereign rights and of exercise of powers are concerned (ABH 
1998, 232), however, it deals with these aspects only in the general context of an 
"independent, democratic state under the rule of law". We have to admit that it 
cannot do otherwise, since the Constitution does not take a stand point concerning 
the transfer of sovereign rights to an international organisation, either. 
b) The content-based aspect as simplified is that the prerequisite of 
international co-operation is the establishment of an open state, which, how-
ever, in a given case facilitates the limitation or transfer of sovereignty. The 
openness that is indispensable in times of economic and political globalisation 
positively entails that norms prescribed by a transnational organisation may 
enter the Hungarian legal system, which are not necessarily substantiated by 
Paras. 1 and 2 of Article 2 of the Constitution. Therefore the sovereignty of the 
Hungarian people will not legitimise them. 
The modern conception of sovereignty, which designates the people as the 
depositary of sovereignty, may make easing to solve the doctrinal problem. 
The conception of the state as opened by the constitutions in the direction of 
international co-operation, which is adequately determined as "kooperativer 
22 
Verfassungsstaat" by Haberle," as a matter of fact resolves the problem of the 
democratic "deficit" related to the transfer of sovereign rights, since in such 
cases it is the constitution of the respective state, which frames the conditions 
of the transfer and of constitutionality. 
2
" Häberle, P.: Kooperativer Verfassungsstaat, in: Verfassung als öffentlicher Prozess, 
2nd edition, 1996, 407. 
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c) The formal requirement following from the conception of the sovereignty 
of the people is that it is exclusively the people that can transfer sovereign 
rights, therefore, the transfer shall be prescribed in the scope of an act by the 
institution of the representation of the people. 
According to that conception, it is the people that constitutes the inter-
national (interstate) organisation and also endows it with adequate competence 
to comply with its obligations according to the discretion of the representation 
of the people. When applicable, the transfer will impair the scope of sovereign 
rights of the representation of the people, while that scope of the international 
(interstate) organisation shall be constituted, or it increases under a subsequent 
amendment of an agreement. This, as long as the consequences are concerned, 
may modify the constitutional status of the citizens of the respective state, 
hence, its settlement is inevitable under an act. 
1.3. A special instance of the transfer of sovereign rights; the transfer of 
sovereign rights to the European Union 
The transfer of sovereign rights to the EU construed as the content and the 
essential element of the accession process cannot be identified with the general 
transfer of sovereign rights to an international organisation. The EU postulates 
the sovereignty of the member states, since it is not a federation of states and 
as a consequence of its constantly evolving, developing structure, its frame-
work cannot be determined with legal exactness even on a short-term run. The 
European Union is constituted on the European peoples, not on an abstracted 
notion of a single, non-existent people, in which the sovereign rights derive 
from the peoples of the member states with the mediation of the member states: 
the EU develops on an intergovernmental basis. The legal definition of 
Europe, which forms the European Union, is a difficult task even for German 
legal science reputed for its conceptual thought, its Begriffshimmel.24 
As a consequence of the uncertainty of the conceptual definition, the 
doctrinal challenge is the issue of the priority of Community law, which 
challenges the rights of the member states and has been a conditio sine qua 
non of the European Community, which today is the EU. As we noted, 
(Il.l .l .b), the problem is highlighted in the relationship to the Constitutions. 
The problem can be approached via the doctrine of absolute priority in legal 
relations and legal branches, however, in the area of the relation to the 
23
 Rittner, F.: Az Európai Unió űtja a szövetségi állam felé (The Progress of the 
European Union in the Direction of a Federal State), Jogtudományi Közlöny (1995) no. 6., 
286. 
24
 Häberle, P.: Európa mint formálódó alkotmányos közösség (Europe as a Constitutional 
Community in the Process of Formation), Jogtudományi Közlöny (2001) no. 10, 432. 
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constitutions, the priority has been relativised in the legal practice of the 
Constitutional Courts. In this context, i.e., in a segment of the relations under 
constitutional law, in which the determinant, the "strong core" is the protection 
of fundamental rights by the constitutions of the member states, the doctrine of 
the absolute priority does not obtain. 
With respect to these, the transfer of sovereign rights to an interstate 
organisation, which is vaguely qualified and outlined under international law 
and vindicates, by all means, absolute or relative a priority for its constantly 
evolving legal system, can be posited as a special doctrinal issue. 
The specific explication of that problem as a third issue distinct from the 
previous two ones is deemed as inevitable. 
III. Legal political basis 
From the analyses above, around the three issues dealt further legal political 
consequences emerge, and consequently, the following constitutional problems 
arise. 
1. On the relationship of international law and domestic jurisdiction 
1.1. The lawmaker needs to make a positive legal political decision concerning 
that on the grounds of which conception the Hungarian legal system "shall be 
arranged". In our view, with respect to doctrinal considerations, it cannot be 
doubted that Hungarian law in the future should follow a scheme, which is 
based on the monist conception with the application of the adoption-codification 
technique and the recognition of the self-executing character of international 
treaties. 
1.2. Which necessitates that the Constitution, instead of the present Para. 1 
of Article 7, prescribes that 
— the ratified and promulgated international treaties shall be part of the 
Hungarian legal system, 
— in the event of a collision between these international conventions and 
domestic Hungarian statutes, the provisions of international treaties shall 
prevail. In such cases, in case doubt is arisen, the court and other 
authorities shall enforce the international treaty, which implies that the 
jurisdiction is entitled to take a decision whether a harmony between all 
other statutes, except for the Constitution, and the respective international 
treaty prevails, 
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— the international treaty incurs a direct obligation for the jurisdiction, which 
implies that the adoption of a further rule of implementation shall not be 
necessary. 
1.3. The amendment of the Constitution shall obviously not supersede the 
streamlining of the law on international treaties, since the currently effective 
Act XXVII of 1982 is completely out-of-date and inapplicable. 
1.4. Without the amendment of the Constitution and framing a new statute 
on international treaties, not only the relationship between international law 
and domestic law remains unsettled, but we can' t take a reassuring stand on 
the issue of domestic law and Community law in a reassuring manner, either. 
The two issues are closely related. The issue of the relationship to Community 
law is preceded by urgency of the constitutional settlement of transfer of 
sovereign rights with respect to the fact that in that relationship on the one 
hand the issue of the transfer of sovereign rights, on the other hand, the issue 
of the priority of Community law are inseparably intertwined. 
2. The transfer of sovereign rights to an international, interstate organisation 
2.1. The Hungarian constitution does not take an stand on the transfer of 
sovereign rights. 
a) Para. 2 of Article 6 prescribes the endeavour to co-operate with all people 
and states of the world, which obviously does not entail that in a given case any 
kind of transfer of sovereign rights and exercise of powers is not uncons-
titutional with special respect to Para. 1 of Article 2 of the Constitution. The 
constitutional fate of Article 62 of the European Agreement and the concerning 
decision passed by the Constitutional Court analysed above is sufficiently 
indicative. Para. 1 of Article 2 shall have to be supplemented by a provision in 
the Constitution, which—under certain circumstances— exceptionally facilitates 
the transfer of sovereign rights and of exercise of powers. 
b) The participation of the Republic of Hungary in an international co-
operation and international organisations (e.g. NATO) is de lege lata vaguely 
substantiated constitutionally. It is not accidental that e.g. the German Grund-
gesetz addresses the problem in a separate article (Article 24), and so do the 
French (Article 15 of the Preamble), the Italian (Article 11), the Norwegian (Article 
93) and the Spanish constitutions (Article 93). These articles are incorporated 
into these constitutions irrespectively of separate provisions concerning 
international treaties. The reason for this duality is that the conclusion of an 
international treaty does not necessarily incur either the transfer of sovereign 
rights and of exercise of powers, or the limitation of sovereignty. 
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с) The urgency of the settlement under the Constitution gains special 
relevance since the issue of the constitutionality of the transfer always arises 
with respect to concrete sovereign rights or powers, which is primarily not a par 
excellence issue of constitutional law, but an issue that is related to another 
branch of law, behind which, however, the constitutionality of the transfer is 
posited as a preliminary question. 
From this viewpoint, the frequently quoted Kehlrinne-Decisïon of the 
German Supreme Court, the Bundesgerichtshof (hereinafter: BGH) (BGHZ 
102, 118, GRUR 1988. 4. 290-Decision of 3rd of November, 1987) can be 
construed as an instructive instance. 
ca) According to the facts of the case, the defendant is the proprietor of a 
European patent, which the European Patent Office (hereinafter: EPO) granted 
in 1977 with an effect to the German Federal Republic. The patent description 
was submitted in English, whereas, the patent claims were submitted in 
German, too. 
According to the plaintiff, the patent in the German Federal Republic could 
not have a legal effect, since the patent description was not submitted in 
German, besides, only the English version had a binding force. According to 
Article 65 of the European Patent Convention (hereinafter: EPC) any member 
state has carte blanche whether it prescribes in a domestic statute the 
obligation of the submission of the patent description translated into its official 
language to the national patent office. The German Federal Republic did not 
stipulate that as an obligation and the legal status quo arisen thereby (which 
consists in the negligence of the prescription of the obligation to submit the 
patent description in German language by the GFR) contradicts several 
provisions of the Grundgesetz, especially Article 24 concerning the transfer of 
public authority, furthermore, also pertains to (restricts) the essential content of 
fundamental rights as guaranteed under Articles 2, 3, 12 and Para. 2 of Article 
103 (the free development of personality, the right to the free choice of 
profession, the prohibition of discrimination), and finally, it violates the 
criteria of security in law originating in the rule of law. The competent court 
thereby rejected the claim, which was remitted to the BGH by reason of the 
appeal by the plaintiff. 
In its appeal, the plaintiff requested the nullification of the patent, partly, 
because the respective statute, i.e., Article 65 of the EPC, which substantiates 
it on legal grounds, is unconstitutional in the absence of the German domestic 
regulation on the subject. Hence, the plaintiff requested the suspension of the 
procedure and submitted a request of reviewing the case to the German Federal 
Constitutional Court. 
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cb) As the BGH established, the patent was submitted and published in 
English language with the application of Paras. 1, 3 and 7 of Article 14 of the 
EPC, and it was supplemented with the German translation of the patent claim. 
Consequently, since the EPO proceeded according to the provisions of the EPC, 
and since the EPO is not a German institution, it does not exercise either 
German sovereign rights or German public authority, therefore, a violation of 
the German statutes cannot obtain in that case. The EPO, when it grants European 
patents and exercises transnational sovereign rights, proceeds as pursuant to 
the EPC relying on the scope of competence transferred to it by the Contracting 
States. 
Nevertheless, the BGH has to examine as a preliminary question, which 
emerges in the context of constitutional law, if patent law as the object of legal 
dispute can be considered as validly constituted in the German Federal Republic. 
Hence, the BGH has powers to decide on the constitutional problem whether 
those European patents can be generally considered as validly constituted in 
the German Federal Republic, which are not published in their full text and are 
inaccessible in German language. 
The BGH departed from the fact that concerning the language criteria of 
European patents in the German Federal Republic, Articles 14 and 70 of the 
EPC shall be deemed as applicable and governing. With reference to that, the 
Court did not agree with the plaintiff that the standpoint of the German law-
maker incurred an unconstitutional situation (negligence), when it did not 
proceed in compliance with the authorisation under Article 65. 
cc) According to the BGH, when the German Federal Republic acceded to 
the EPC, it transferred its sovereign rights in terms of granting European 
patents to the European Patent Organisation, and within that scope to the 
EPO, in full compliance with Article 24 of the Grundgesetz. It is the Grund-
gesetz itself that defines the limits of openness in the direction of interstate co-
operation, which, according to the BGH are the following: the transfer of 
sovereign rights in the scope of an international convention shall not affect the 
foundations of the German constitutional order and the basic structures 
constituted by that shall not be renounced or emptied out for the sake of 
international co-operation. The essential content of fundamental rights attached 
to the bases of the constitutional order as constituted as pursuant to the 
Grundgesetz shall not be affected or made relative by the transfer of sovereign 
rights ( "nicht relativiert... werden "). 
Therefore, the BGH did not deem that it was unconstitutional to construct 
the patent as the object of legal dispute on such a legislative basis and in such a 
legislative setting, in which the German lawmaker did not take the opportunity 
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for restrictive language regulation as pursuant to Article 65 of EPC. Therefore, 
a case of unconstitutional negligence did not obtain. 
For Hungary, that decision is extraordinarily important, since our country 
has been invited to join the Contracting Members of the EPC. Our accession 
to the NATO constitutes also a transfer the exercise of powers to an other major 
international organisation, which has a broader scope of membership than 
the EU. 
2.2. The settlement of the issue on the level of the Hungarian constitution is 
furthermore deemed as necessary, because that is the only instrument available 
for the codification of a doctrinal claim for the establishment of an "open 
state", a "kooperativer Verfassungsstaat" towards international co-operation. 
2.3. It is obvious that a constitutional transfer of sovereign rights cannot be 
implemented to international organisations in general, but within that scope 
exclusively to interstate organisations—however, both non-interstate organi-
sations and NGOs are excluded from that scope. To make the problem simple, 
we can assert that the transfer can exclusively be implemented via an inter-
national treaty, so that the established organisation is the subject of international 
law. In that case, the founding forces of international organisations are the 
states, which are themselves the subjects of international law. 
2.4. The transfer, however, is constitutional, since it is the Constitution 
itself that frames its criteria, i.e. its limits in a restrictive sense. These limits, on 
the grounds of the doctrinal considerations above, would be the following: 
— The fundamental limit of the transfer is the principle of subsidiarity, which 
implies that the transfer can be implemented exclusively if 
— it is necessary by the efficient administration of quasi-public duties, 
— it is deemed as inevitably necessary by reason of the occurrence of a 
problem, which transgresses borders and has an international dimension. 
— The transfer may not affect the fundamental set of values of the consti-
tutional order, i.e., the structure of the Hungarian Constitution. 
— Following the transfer of sovereign rights, the protection of fundamental 
rights guaranteed under the Constitution of the Republic of Hungary and 
international human rights treaties, constitutive elements of the Hungarian 
legal system shall be secured on the grounds of the constitutional order. 
2.5. The amendment of the Constitution would not imply the annulment of 
the currently effective Para. 2 of the Article 6, but the new regulation would 
align as an adjunct to this provision. 
2.6. It needs to be noted that Article 10a) of the Czech Constitutional 
Amendment as of 18 October 2001 quoted above grants express authorisation— 
"Certain powers of the organs of the Czech Republic may be transferred to inter-
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national organisations or institutions in the scope of international agreements"— 
with a simultaneous specification of its conditions. 
3. A special sub-category of the transfer of sovereign rights and exercise of 
powers: Accession to the European Union 
3.1. The accession of Hungary to the EU necessitates the analysis of three 
issues following from the doctrinal questions as explicated above: 
a) What is the legal character of the EU? 
b) What is the legal character of Community-law (Union law)? 
c) Consequently, we are posed with the question whether the requirement 
of the incorporation of a special rule into the Constitution obtains, and if so, 
what does that requirement consist in. In other words: can the EU-accession be 
resolved by the settlement of the duality of the relationship between inter-
national law and domestic law and of the transfer of sovereign rights, or a 
separate third provision is deemed as necessary. 
3.2. Concerning the legal character of the EU as an organisation three 
25 
viewpoints have developed." 
a) According to one of these viewpoints, the EU is postulated as a federal 
state, while, according to the other it is classified as a special international 
organisation among the subjects of international law. Whereas, according to 
the third viewpoint, a so-called autonomous conception, it is a sui generis 
formation, which cannot be categorised as either of the above. 
b) The third conception can be construed as a majority viewpoint. Its specific 
emergence is related to the introduction of the term of the „association of 
states" (Staatenverbund) in the Maastricht-Judgement of the German Federal 
Constitutional Court. The Maastricht-Judgement denied both that the EU could 
be posited as a state or as a federal state—the unique situation, according to 
the Federal Constitutional Court, is reflected in the moment of the introduction 
of the specific term itself (see, Opinion of Court, С II).26 
25
 Schweitzer, M.—Hummer, W.: Europarecht, 5th Edition, Berlin, 1996. 83-88. 
26
 The term of the "association of states" is a novelty only in legal practice, however, 
besides the terms of the federal state and confederation, it has been established in new 
German technical literature for a long time. Jellinek, G.: Allgemeine Staatslehre, 1917, 
738., quoted in: Rittner, F.: Az Európai Unió útja a szövetségi állam felé (The Develop-
ment of the European Union in the Direction of a Federal State), Jogtudományi Közlöny, 
6. (1995) 286., note 14., which, in an interesting manner, draws a parallel with the 
Austrian-Hungarian Empire following the enactment of the Pragmatica Sanctio. 
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With respect to these, the EU is an unique international institution, an 
interstate organisation, which is constantly evolving and is in the process of 
incessant integration, and, to which certain sovereign rights have been trans-
ferred by the German Federal Republic. 
3.3. Concerning the legal character of Community law, there is a debate 
between traditionalists and autonomists, the latter of whom constitute a 
27 
majority. 
a) Traditionalists postulate that Community law falls under the scope of 
international law. 
b) According to autonomists, although, primary law has been framed via 
international treaties, this ontological feature shall by no means prejudge 
the legal character of the legal system. Autonomists emphasise the dual 
character of Community law."8 Which implies that in its framework the 
international legal characteristics are supplemented by the pecularities of 
constitutional law, since the EU is constituted on an international treaty. The 
specificity is contained in the fact that this nature of constitutional law is not 
linked to a state, but to a specific (sui generis) international, interstate 
organisation. 
ba) The European Court developed this conception in its Van Gend en Loos-
29 
Decision, which is considered as a leading case, then somewhat modified it 
in its Costa/ENEL-Decision.w While the Van Gend en Loos-Decision was 
based on an emphasis on the character of international law, the impressively 
pathetic phrasing of the opinion of the court in the Costa/ENEL-Decision was 
positively framed in compliance with the doctrine of a sui generis legal system 
and its revoke is not admissible by subsequent unilateral national jurisdiction 
of the member states. 
bb) Secondary law shares in the fate of the legal character of primary 
norms. According to the autonomists, it is neither international, nor national 
law, since it originates in an autonomous source of law: it is constituted partly 
on primary law, partly on Community law as a new public authority. 
~
7
 Schweitzer—Hummer: op. cit., 75-82. 
28 
See, Grundgesetz. Kommentar, note 6., 360 and 366. See, in note 278, the conception 
of Walter Hallstein and Manfred Zuleeg, according to which, although the founding 
treaty of the European Economic Community "was framed in the scope of an inter-
national agreement, it qualifies as a constitutional document of a community of rights 
( Verfassungsu rkunde )". 
Varnay—Papp: Az Európai Unió joga (The Law of the European Union), (note 
13), 202. 
30
 Vörös, I. Az európai versenyjogok kézikönyve (The Handbook of European 
Competition Law), Budapest, 1996, 375. 
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be) As a conclusion, we can state that Community law precedes the consti-
tutions of the member states. Therefore, Community law cannot be measured 
against the norms of the constitutions of the member states, so, conceptually, it 
cannot be "unconstitutional". The limits of the autonomist conception are 
ultimately defined (and made relative with respect to fundamental rights) by 
the legal practice of the constitutional courts of the member states as analysed 
above (Il . l . l .b). 
bd) It needs to be noted that Article 51 of the EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights has recently introduced the notion of "Union law", without determining 
its positive content and meaning. As a matter of fact, it is clear that the scope 
of that notion is broader than that of Community law (law of the EU). 
3.4. With respect to the above and to the system of requirements as set 
rr 31 
forth by Jenő Czuczai, we assume the following legal political consequences: 
3.4.1. The issue of the EU-Accession cannot be discussed merely in the 
scope of the relationship between international law and domestic law, since 
Community law cannot be construed as exclusively a legal material of inter-
national law, the issue of the EU-Accession cannot be discussed merely in the 
scope of the transfer of sovereign rights or of exercise of powers. The exercise 
of sovereign rights opens up the way to the inflow of the norms of a such a legal 
system, which cannot be measured against the norms of national constitutions 
(disregarding the terrain of fundamental rights, the relevance of which cannot be 
underestimated), so that legal system is superior to the constitutions of the 
member states. 
3.4.2. So long as the tripartite hierarchy in the relationship between inter-
national law and domestic law is dominated by the national constitution, to 
which international law is subordinated, whereas domestic statutes are positioned 
at the bottom of the hierarchy, the EU as an international organisation and its 
legal system, i.e., Community law (Union law) demonstrate such features, 
which incur dual consequences. 
— On the one hand, these features exclude its classification as an inter-
national organisation or international law, as a consequence of which a potential 
constitutional provision pertaining to the relationship between international law 
and domestic law is inapplicable and senseless. 
— On the other hand, in this case the hierarchy turns upside-down: 
Community law is positioned at the top of the hierarchy, whereas the constitution 
of the member state (except for fundamental rights) is positioned in the middle, 
while other domestic statutes are subordinated to these. 
11
 Czuczai: The Legal Alignment... op. cit., 33. sqq. 
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3.5. Following from the above, a third scope of issues has to be analysed. 
Namely, framing a special constitutional provision, a specific "Europe Clause" 
has become inevitable in legal-political terms, as well. 
With respect to the EU-Accession, we need to address all of the three 
issues as analysed above, since the Europe Clause cannot be framed without the 
constitutional settlement of both the relationship between international law and 
domestic law, and of the problem of the transfer of the exercise of powers. This 
clause can exclusively be constructed on the grounds of the analysis of the 
former two problems, although the settlement of these separately, or of the 
other two combined cannot supersede the settlement of the third one. 
It is not accidental that a so-called Europe Clause, related to the adoption 
of the Maastricht Treaty, was incorporated into the Grundgesetz in 1992. 
Since, on the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty it became obvious that Article 
24, in itself, providing on the transfer of sovereign rights cannot sufficiently 
justify an economic and political integration with such depth and character on 
constitutional grounds. Article 23 designates participation in the advancement of 
the European Union as a state objective. This has been defined as the consti-
tutional obligation of all state organs: it is an obligation that can be demanded 
by the Federal Constitutional Court. It is a further issue that the limits of that 
obligation with respect to the German Grundgesetz and the fundamental rights 
guaranteed under its provisions were determined by the Federal Constitutional 
Court under its Maastricht- and Solange-Judgements. 
3.6. In our point of new, framing the Europe Clause will postulate the 
following legal-political requirements: 
— It needs to be asserted that participation in the European economic-
political integration is a constitutional objective of the state, which needs to be 
framed in general phrasing first in the Preamble, then also in particular in the 
Europe Clause by setting forth the conditions. Such conditions, in accordance 
with Para. 1 of Article 2 of the Constitution, can be, e.g., that the European 
Union is based on the democratic rule of law, on a commitment to social values 
as well as on the respect of fundamental constitutional values and the traditions 
of the member states. 
— With respect to the protection of fundamental rights, it needs to be 
asserted that Community (Union) law shall not have priority until a European 
Constitution has been adopted, which as a minimum standard meets the 
protection level framed under the European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. 
— It needs to be asserted that certain powers exercised by the Republic of 
Hungary may be transferred to the Union in the process of the continuous 
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advancement of the EU integration. Of course, the word "certain" has ultimate 
relevance here, to which the Constitutional Court shall render adequate content. 
Such a provision can only be framed with bianco-content. This phrase could 
guarantee that the constantly evolving and vaguely outlined framework of the 
integration and its legal system shall not "absorb" the state-formation and the 
legal system of the Republic of Hungary. 
IV.Conclusion 
1. The relationship between the Constitution and the EU-Accession is a 
complicated issue, in which three problems so far highly disregarded by the 
Hungarian Constitution are linked. In our view, a "tripod", closely and 
inseparably related regulation, which needs to be codified simultaneously, is an 
essential precondition of the accession. Its settlement—or at least its „full 
preparation"—cannot be further postponed. 
2. The proposed amendment of the constitution, however, opens up „a 
new chapter" in the history of Hungarian constitutionalism and Hungarian 
constitutional law and of the constitutional structure of the Republic of Hungary. 
The amendments would facilitate that the Constitution constituted a public 
authority beyond its scope. By this ,,opening-up", the Constitution would have 
significance beyond itself, because thereby, it would crosscut and make 
relative the traditional conception of the nation-state monopoly of the exercise 
of public authority. Therefore, the currently effective Para. 1 of Article 2 of the 
Constitution would remain in force, but its content and scope, along with the 
inner structure of the Hungarian Constitution would radically change in the 
spirit of a 21st century Europeanism. 
It is regrettable that the amendment of the constitution as pursuant to Act 
LXI of 2002 fails address the questions above, besides, the relationship 
between the constitution and the EU is made even more ambiguous by the 
incorporation of the amended Article 2/A. Hence, we assume that a further and 
broad amendment of the Constitution is inevitable. 
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I. Recent efforts regarding unification (harmonization) of the private 
law in the Member States of the European Union 
Resolution of the European Parliament (EC OJ 1989, С 158.400), adopted on 
May 26, 1989, requires that Member States make steps toward the codification 
of European private law (both civil and commercial law).1 Accordingly, the 
European Communities, pursuant to this resolution, established a Commission 
charged with developing the framework for the codification of European 
Professor of Law, Head of the Department of Roman Law, Eötvös Loránd University, 
H-1053 Budapest, Egyetem tér 1-3. 
Fax: (36 1)411-6515; E-mail: gabor.hamza@ajk.elte.hu 
1
 With regards to the harmonization in the field of private law and the background of 
harmonization in classical antiquity, see, Maroi, F.: Tenderize antiche e recenti verso 
I'unificazone internazionale del diritto privato. Roma, 1933. 7 sq. and 15. With regard 
to the importance Theophrastos' Peri nomon, which, in essence, also serves the objectives 
of law harmonization, see, Hamza, G.: Jogösszehasonlítás és az antik jogrendszerek 
[Comparative Law and Legal Systems of Antiquity], Budapest, 1998. 17 sqq. 
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2 
contracts law." In 1994, another resolution of the European Parliament (EC 
OJ С 205.518, April 27, 1994), once again called on the Member States to 
harmonize certain sections of their private law to provide for a uniform 
internal market." At its conference, held on 15-16 October, 1999 in Tampere, 
the European Council discussed the question once again. Article 39 of the 
declaration accepted by the European Council emphasizes the necessity of the 
harmonization of certain areas of the Member States' private law.4 Resolution 
of the European Parliament (EC OJ 2001, С 327.255), adopted on November 
15, 2001, reaffirmed the necessity of the approximation of the civil and 
commercial law of the Member States. 
In 1980, almost ten years prior to the adaptation of the 1989 Resolution, a 
working group, led by Professor Ole Lando of Copenhagen and called the 
Commission on European Contract Law, was formed, which, sponsored by the 
European Communities, has undertaken the task of developing the principles 
of European contract law." The Academy of European Private Lawyers 
(Académie des Privâtistes Européens, Accademia dei Giusprivatisti Europei) 
with the seat in Pavia and consisting of mostly Roman law experts (including 
among others professors Peter Stein of Cambridge, who is the Vice President 
of the Academy, Theo Mayer-Maly of Salzburg, Fritz Sturm of Lausanne, Dieter 
Medicus of Munich, and Roger Vigneron of Liège), was founded in October 
1990. Within this Academy, comprising European civilists and Roman law 
scholars, enjoying great international reputation and working on the creation of 
a common European private law system, exists the Group d'étude pour le droit 
européen commun (GEDEC) which is currently drafting the a Code of European 
Contracts Law (Code Européen des Contrats).6 The proposed Code is modeled 
af ter the fourth book (regulating obligations) of the Italian Codice civile of 
See, Großfeld, В.—Bilda, К.: Europäische Rechtsangleichung, Zeitschrift für Rechts-
vergleichung Internationales Privatrecht und Europarecht 33 (1992), 426. 
3
 See, Staudenmayer, D.: Perspektiven des Europäischen Vertragsrechts. In: Die Schuld-
rechtsreform vor dem Hintergrund des Gemeinschaftsrechts (hrsg. von R. Schulze und H. 
Schulte-Nölke), Tübingen, 2001. 419. 
4
 See, Sonnenberger, H. J.: Privatrecht und Internationales Privatrecht im künftigen 
Europa: Fragen und Perspektiven. Recht der Internationalen Wirtschaft 48 (2002), 489. 
5
 See, Lando, O.: Principles of European Contract Law. Rabeis Zeitschrift für 
ausländisches und internationales Privatrecht 56 ( 1992), 261 sqq. 
6
 Gandolfi provides an overview of the activities and achievements of the Academy of 
Pavia and the working group. G. Gandolfi: Pour un code européen des contrats. Revue 
trimestrielle de droit civil, 1992. 707 sqq. Compare with, Gaggero, P. G.: Il progetto di un 
codice europeo dei contratti: l'attività del gruppo di lavoro pavese. Rivista di diritto civile 
43 (1997), 113-120. 
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1942 (which incorporates many aspects of the tradition of the French Code civil 
and the of German Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch) and the Contract Code1 drafted in 
the 1960s and 1970s by Harvey McGregor from Oxford for the English Law 
g 
Commission. Professor Giuseppe Gandolfi of Pavia, whose achievements in 
the field of Roman law research are also significant, has played a major role in 
establishing the Academy.4 
Harmonization efforts, of course, are not without opposition. Professor 
Peter Ulmer of Heidelberg, for example, is quite skeptical regarding to the 
question of urging harmonization (unification) of law among the EU Member 
States.10 Jean Carbonnier, who doubts the urgency and even the necessity of 
harmonization, expresses similar views with relation to France. It seems that 
we are witnessing the codification debate between Anton Friedriech Justus 
Thibaut (1772-1840) and Friedrich Carl von Savigny (1779-1871)—though, 
under historical conditions substantially different f rom the social and legal 
realities of the 1810s. 
Although, it is, certainly, undecided whether Europe, at present, needs a 
unified legal system at all, it is obvious that harmonization in the field of civil 
(private) legislation—even if not to the same extent in every aspect of private 
law—is unavoidable. However, the way to realization of legal harmonization is 
uncertain. It could take the form of regulation or policy, and also could be 
realized via coordinated national legislation." The failure of England and 
Scotland in 1970 to adopt the unified Law of Contracts that would have been 
binding in both countries does not contradict the tendency toward efforts of 
7
 See, McGregor, H.: Contract Code drawn up on behalf of the English Law 
Commission. Milano-London, 1993. 
8
 Until now, the debates of the Academy and working group of Pavia were published 
in two volumes. Incontro di studio sul future codice europeo dei contratti (Pavia, 20-21 
ottobre 1990). A cura di P. Stein (Milano, 1993) and Atti accademici (1992-1994), A cura 
di P. Stein (Milano, 1996). 
4
 The preliminary project plan of the Code Européen des Contrats (Avant-projet) was 
published in the edition of Professor Gandolfi. See, Code Européen des Contrats-Avant-
projet (ed.: Gandolfi, G.), Milano, 2001. Compare with, Gandolfi, G.: Der Vorentwurf eines 
Europäischen Vertragsgesetzbuches, Zeitschrift für Europäisches Privatrecht 10 (2002), 1^1. 
1
 See, Ulmer, P.: Vom deutschen zum europäischen Privatrecht. Juristen Zeitung, AI 
(1992), 1 sqq. 
" See, Remien, O.: Rechtseinheit ohne Einheitsgesetze? Rabeis Zeitschrift für 
ausländisches und internationales Privatrecht 56 (1992), 30. and Illusion und Realität eines 
europäischen Privatrechts. Juristen Zeitung 47 (1992), 277 sqq. Compare with, Herber, R.: 
Deutsche Zivilrechtskodifikation und internationale Rechtsvereinheitlichtigung. Rechts-
dogmatik und Rechtspolitik (hrsg. von K. Schmidt), Berlin, 1990. 269. 
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European legal harmonization.12 Roman law (ius Romanum), which constitutes 
the historical foundation of the unity of European law, might have a crucial 
role in this undeniably long-term process, which could require perhaps decades 
of hard work.13 One circumstance ensuring that Roman law prevails is the 
application of the legal principles of private autonomy and freedom of contract, 
among other things, in European relations.14 Doubtless, however, these legal 
principles, stemming from Roman law, could become relatively important and 
materialized in certain areas. This is the situation, for example, in the field of 
consumer protection. The more emphasized and better founded legal protection 
of the consumer, who is the more disadvantaged participant in civil legal 
commerce, doubtlessly materializes in private-autonomy and the legal principle 
of freedom of contract within a given private law system. That is, the droit 
communautaire, without doubt, indicate certain tendencies that seem to 
jeopardize the freedom of contract. 
In our view, Roman law may play an important role in the standardized, or 
at least in a tendency toward standardization, of European jurisprudence, and, 
more precisely, in the development thereof. Throughout Europe, in the age of 
ius commune, a uniform "legal working method," the so-called stilus curiae 
predominated precisely through Roman law, which was considered the lingua 
franca of lawyers. The uniform stilus curiae following the "nationalization" of 
legal systems became part of the past. The training of legal professionals, 
which is becoming international once again, may eventually result in a 
harmonization similar to the stilus curiae,b 
II. Roman law traditions and unity of private law in Europe in a historical 
context 
Roman law played a significant role in both the secular and ecclesiastical 
sectors of medieval societies. It served as a foundation for the 16th century 
legal humanism and as a wellspring for the rationalist Natural Law doctrines. 
j 2 
" See, Tilman, W.: Kodifikation des Privatrechts in der Gemeinschaft. In: Für Recht 
und Staat, Festschrift für H. Helmrich zum 60. Geburtstag, München, 1994. 441. 
13
 Knütel, R.: Rechtseinheit in Europa und römisches Recht. Zeitschrift für Europäisches 
Privatrecht 2 (1994), 244 sqq. 
14
 See, Hommelhoff, P.: „Europarechtliche Bezüge" im Zivilrecht, Überlegungen zur 
Gestaltung des akademischen Unterrichts. In: Für Recht und Staat. Festschrift für H. 
Helmrich zum 60. Geburtstag, München, 1994. 340. 
15
 Ranieri, F.: Der europäische Jurist. Rechtshistorisches Forschungsthema und rechts-
politische Aufgabe, lus Commune 17 (1990), 10 sqq. 
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In the 19th century, Roman law was molded in the sprit of scientific positivism 
primarily through Pandektistik (Pandektenwissenschaft), and, finally, was also 
an eminent material source of the great private law codices. The role of Roman 
law in the 20th century political sphere is not negligible, the most conspicuous 
sign of which is Article 19 of the party platform of NSDAP (National-
sozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei, the German National Socialist Labor 
Party) adopted on February 24, 1920 and supported by the interpretation of 
Alfred Rosenberg which may be viewed as an "interpretatio simplex". The 
reception of Roman law, characterized—or rather, stigmatized—as foreign by 
the German people, and also seen as individualistic, cosmopolitan, materialistic, 
liberal, and advocating solely private interests, appeared as a national 
catastrophe ("nationales Unglück") and tragic event ("Tragik") in the legal 
literature of the 1930s' Germany. It is worth mentioning that Carl Schmitt, in 
his study entitled „Aufgabe und Notwendigkeit des deutschen Rechtsstandes" 
(Deutsches Recht 6/1936/), labels Article 19 of the 1920 NSDAP party platform 
as something that demands the overshadowing of neglected Roman law through 
the initiation of "deutsches Gemeinrecht", as „verfassungsrechtliche Bestimmung 
ersten Ranges" (sic! G. H.). Carl Schmitt, however, fails to support his rather 
peculiar view with legal arguments. Reading the literature of the era in 
question, it might seem that, quoting the ironic lines of Rusztem Vambéry 
regarding the NSDAP's proposed legislative reform, "the influence of Roman 
law had infected the puritan intellect of Teutons sipping Meth (honey-beer) 
sitting on bear hides in caverns of lost times." 
The trend of "antike Rechtsgeschichte" completely ignores the afterlife of 
both the jurisprudential and political aspects of Roman law. The advocates of 
the trend of "antike Techtsgeschichte," hallmarked by the name of Leopold 
Wenger, fail to consider the fact that for centuries, Roman law has had a major 
influence on the evolution of European law and jurisprudence. In the case of 
Roman law, which can be rightly viewed as the "ius commune Europaeum", 
the followers of this school, still represented by a few existing advocates today, 
completely disregard the role that Roman law plays, as a consequence of 
interpretatio multiplex, in the development of European law, and more 
precisely, in the legal systems and jurisprudence of European nations. In 
essence, this view narrows the possibility of comparison of legal systems of 
states or peoples on the same socio-economic level, but reaches similar 
conclusions. The undeniable advantage of this approach is, however, the sound 
foundation of the background of its synoptic view. On the other hand, this 
concept limits the possibility of comparison in such a degree that it nearly 
reaches the outermost boundaries of rationality. The frustration with this view 
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is manifested especially clearly in the works of Ernst Schönbauer, who 
restricted the possibility of comparison to the rather narrow territory of 
comparing the legal systems of ancient peoples that were on the same level of 
civilization or were ethnically related. This view relates in many aspects to the 
schools of thought according to which certain institutions of Roman law are 
incomparable with certain institutions of modern legal systems, because the 
former is the legal system of a slave-holding socio-economic formation. The 
followers of this school tend to forget about continuity, which plays an 
especially important role in the sphere of legal phenomena. 
In the last quarter of the 20th century, Professor Uwe Wesel of Berlin 
polemicizes in his writing titled Aufklärungen über Recht, published in 1981, 
about the notion of legal structures reappearing f rom time-to-time—Theo 
Mayer-Maly writes aptly about "Wiederkehr von Rechtsfiguren". This view-
point, concurring with the possibility of accepting reoccurring legal structures, 
is, naturally, not so radical as to deny the existence of legal structures 
exclusively linked to a single given socio-economic formation, such as, for 
example, feudal relationships, which, in itself excludes accepting Roman law 
as a timeless ratio scripta. Of course, it is the sign of déformation professionelle 
when lawyers overstate the facts, according to which legal transactions—the 
expression, legal transaction (negotium juridicum), is attributed to Johannes 
Althusius (1557/63-1683)—, or at least a fairly substantial fraction of these 
transactions could be performed by applying the same legal constructions 
regardless of the time factor. Fundamentally, however, this does not change the 
fact that the legislation and jurisprudence of recent years, in many countries 
within and outside Europe, returned more than once, even in concrete forms, to 
the constructions as well as the institutions of Roman law. 
The fact of the expanding influence of tradition should not excuse the 
scholar from the requirement of analyzing the substantive differences and the 
prevailing economic functions. This is true, for example, although it might 
seem extreme at first sight, with respect to the examination of the regulations 
pertaining to cartels and monopolies or trusts. Roman cartel and monopoly or 
trust regulation, which is densely woven with the elements of ius publicum, 
obviously differs, for example, from modern cartel law, yet, the socio-economic 
forces working in the background—independently from the socio-economic 
system—doubtlessly intersect at certain points. 
The expression 'reception', as it relates to Roman law, the meaning of 
which, if interpreted correctly, is not some sort of "cultural occupation", but, at 
least in Germany, more like a notion that is equivalent to some kind of a 
"scientification" (Verwissenschaftlichung) of law. Reception cannot be connected 
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neither to the Reichskammergerichtsordnung, adopted in 1495, or to the 
mythical decree of emperor Lothar III, fading in the dimness of legends. The 
reception of Roman law means an intellectual tradition built on Roman legal 
foundations that only marginally relates to a well-defined positive legal 
system, ius positivum. Reception, defined in this manner, can be traced back 
centuries, with a good example being the conveyance of German lawyers who 
studied law at the universities of Northern Italy. 
The signs of reception, i.e., the subsidiary prevalence of Roman law, 
associated with positive law, appeared fairly early, in the 11th century. And, in 
the 13th century, elements of Roman law can be found especially in the practice 
of ecclesiastical courts that often litigated disputes having the nature of private 
law. According to our view, the influence of the Commentators appears in the 
latter area, while Roman law, defined as "legal literature," has already been 
accepted in Germany as made evident by the conveyance of the Glossators. 
Naturally, the division of the influence of Roman law into these two categories 
does not mean the denial of the importance of the Commentators' work, that is, 
the acceptance of Savigny's concept of viewing them merely as post-Glossators. 
Reception, however, was not limited to Roman law material but also extended 
to the acceptance of canon law and feudal law of the Langobards (or Lombards) 
as well. That is how the ius commune = gemeines Recht evolved, as a body of 
law pertaining to both Common law and private law, but divergent from, and 
competing with, the Landesrecht. The harmonization of the ius commune with 
local legal systems, or, in other words, the task of adapting the ius commune to 
local conditions was resolved by the so-called Practicals. 
The readiness for the reception of Roman law, in the function of objective 
conditions, substantially differs in individual European countries. The level of 
sophistication of a given country's (region's) jurisprudence and political system 
is crucial with regard to reception. In significant parts of the Iberian peninsula, 
for example, the conditions in the 13th century were such that Roman law 
could become the subject of reception in the seven-volume codex, the Siete 
Partidas, of Alfonso X (the Wise). In Switzerland, in contrast, for reasons that 
could be attributed primarily to unique political conditions, reception of 
Roman law in its entirety (reception in globo) was out of the question. There is 
a close connection between Roman law and the so-called imperial law, ius 
caesareum, or Kaiserrecht. Roman law serves as the ideological foundation of 
renovatio imperii, which attains extraordinary importance during the reign of 
the dynasty of Hohenstaufen. Roman law, more precisely the ius publicum 
Romanum, is the instrument of the legitimacy of "Weltkaisertum". The work 
best representing the Cameralist school both in its title and substance is 
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Samuel Stryk's "Usus modernus pandectarum" from the turn of the 17th and 
18th centuries. 
Although, on the one hand, a characteristic feature of the school of Practicals 
is that they put special emphasis on German legal practice—which results in a 
distancing from the original Roman sources—; on the other hand, another 
characteristics is the casuistic analytical methodology, nonetheless, we can talk 
about the "science of the Pandects", for the first time, in connection with the 
Cameralists. Connecting the expression "science of the Pandects" to this 
school is conect in spite of the fact that the school itself—especially, because 
of the increasing prevalence of particularity in its views—is not capable for 
progress. Only Natural Law, unfolding in the 17th century, would be fit to 
further improve the unproductive "science of the Pandects" implemented by 
the Practicals. 
We have to emphasize that Roman law plays an important role in the 
development of natural law doctrines. The evolution of non-antique, "modern" 
Natural Law, aptly described by Max Weber as "Entzauberung der Welt", is 
inseparable from the concept of "ius naturale" of the Romans.16 The aspiration 
of Roman law scholars to trace ius civile back to ius naturale is a basic feature 
of the Natural Law of the 16th and 17th centuries. The influence of Roman law 
also can be found in the Christian-scholastic Natural Law. In the case of Hugo 
Grotius, who may be counted as a follower of the rationalist Natural Law 
jurisprudence, the "auctoritas" of Roman law is associated with the ius 
Romanian as "impérium rationis". Roman law plays a cardinal role in the 
work of Samuel Pufendorf, the author of the highly influential De iure naturae 
et gentium libri octo (1672), who may be regarded as a follower of another 
secularized school of Natural Law. The fusion of "science of the Pandects" and 
Natural Law had not taken place, which could be explained, on the one hand, 
by the Common law-like approach of Natural Law, and, on the other hand, by 
the philosophical, in other words, non-legal, interests of Natural Law 
professors, a fact that demonstrated with the example of Christian Wolff 
(1679-1754), the only disciple of Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, whose studies 
focused primarily on moral philosophy. 
16
 Regarding the Romans concept of ius naturale, see, Hamza, G.: A természetjog 
értelmezésének problémái: Cicero és a ius naturale [The Problems of the Interpretation of 
Natural Law: Cicero and the lus Naturale], Jogtudományi Közlöny 50 (1995), 523-529. 
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III. Historical school of jurisprudence (Pandektistik) and its role in the 
development of the European private law 
The fundamental conflict between Usus modernus pandectarum and Natural 
Law could have been only resolved by the Pandektistik developed in the work 
of the followers of the school of historical jurisprudence. The characteristics of 
Pandektistik, the intention of which was the creation of "the philosophy of 
positive law" (Wieacker), include the historical point of view, building on the 
original, Justinianus' sources, the desire for systematization, the development 
of legal theories, and, finally—as a hoped-for result of all the aforementioned— 
the partition from particularism. In the light of the aforementioned, the pandect 
law of the 19th century, "heutiges römisches Recht", should be sharply 
separated from Usus modernus pandectarum, which was dominated by the 
elements of particularism. 
The pandectist law of the 19th century,17 which after the work of Georg 
Friedrich Puchta (1798-1846), "Pandecten", published in 1838, is also called 
"Pandects" (Pandekten), as phrased by the German legal scholar, is the general 
theory of German private law based on Roman law principles, the function and 
importance of which is the development and expansion of the bases of the 
private law system. 
Despite the fact that it was developed on German soil, it is not practical to 
talk about German Pandektistik exclusively, because this school i.e. trend is 
not equivalent only to the "doctrine of gemeines Recht" (Koschaker), but from 
the beginning of its development, it gained significant influence outside the 
borders of Germany. 
In this respect, it is sufficient to consider the influence of Pandektistik in 
England. John Austin (1790-1859), who adopted Jeremy Bentham's legal 
theories, in the analysis of legal terminology, follows the German Pandektistik. 
Characteristically, he regards Savigny's Das Recht des Besitzes as a masterpiece 
and as the most perfect among all legal works ever written. Thibaut's work, the 
first edition of which was published in 1803, titled System des Pandektenrechts 
also had a great influence on him. This work of Thibaut, of which eight editions 
were published between 1803 and 1834, influenced English legal scholarship 
17
 Regarding the Pandektistik, see, Hamza, G.: Az európai magánjog fejlődése. A modern 
magánjogi rendszerek kialakulása a római jogi hagyományok alapján [Trends in the Develop-
ment of Private Law in Europe. The role of the civilian tradition in the shaping of modern 
systems of private law], Budapest, 2002. 99 sqq. and idem: Die Entwicklung des Privatrechts 
auf römischrechtlicher Grundlage unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Rechtsentwicklung 
in Deutschland, Österreich, der Schweiz und Ungarn. Budapest, 2002. 85 sqq. 
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tremendously. Nathaniel Lindley's book titled Introduction to the Study of Juris-
prudence, published in 1845, is the translation of the general part of Thibaut's 
aforementioned work. We further refer to the fact that in Sir Henry Maine's 
18 
Ancient Law, published in 1861, the influence of Pandektistik also seen. 
The members of the Academy of Pavia, among whom we can find experts 
of Roman law, Common law, and modem (codified) private law, in their 
efforts to codify the European law of contracts, view as their mission the 
creation of a compromise between the Roman law-based continental private 
law, and the contract constructions of Common law. 
It is a fact that similarities may be found among numerous institutions and 
constructions of Roman law and English law. It is without doubt, at the same 
time, that essential differences appear between the views of Roman law and 
English law, which are the result of unique historical conditions. One of the 
attributes of Roman law is that it is jurisprudential law, so-called diritto 
giurisprudenziale1 ' that generally is not associated with the binding authority 
of preceding juridical decisions (sentences). The interpretation of jurisprudential 
law, however, could differ depending on what scientific discipline the inter-
preting scholar follows. According to Friedrich Carl von Savigny, the unique 
notion of Juristenrecht is systematization, or more precisely, a tendency-like 
aspiration for systematization. This view is especially clearly expressed in his 
work titled System des heutigen römischen Rechts. Rudolph von Jhering 
(1818-1892), who is a declared opponent of legal positivism, examines this 
problem from a very different angle. According to Jhering—primarily in his 
book titled Geist des römischen Rechts auf den verschiedenen Stufen seiner 
Entwicklung—Roman law, viewed as basically jurisprudential law, has an 
contemporary significance with regard to methodology and ideology. 
The jurisprudential law-quality of ius Romanian was given particular 
emphasis by Koschaker in his work titled Europa und das römische Recht. In 
Roman law, Koschaker sees an effective category of counter-ideal to legal 
positivism "elevated to absolute heights." Koschaker, viewing Roman law as 
Juristenrecht, stresses its sharp opposition to English law. English law, clearly, 
is judge made law, which makes the difference between the two legal systems 
obvious. lus Romanum could never be viewed—in any of the phases of its 
evolution—as precedent law. In the literature, this is pointed out—mentioning 
only a few examples—by Buckland, McNair, Schiller, Dawson, Van Caenegem, 
Pringsheim, and Peter. 
I g 
See, Lombardi, L.: Saggio sul diritto giurisprudenziale. Milano, 1967. 
14
 See, Hamza, G.: Sir Henry Maine és az összehasonlító jog [Sir Henry Maine and the 
Comparative Law], Jogállam, 1998-1999. 326. sqq. 
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IV. The historical background of the convergence of Roman (civil) law 
and Common law 
The jurisprudential quality of Roman law can be demonstrated in every phase 
of the development of this legal system.20 The basis for this, among other 
things, is that there is an obvious continuity between the pontifical law or juris-
prudence and the lay jurisprudence. Examining its judge-made or Common 
law-like attributes, we have to point to the unique historical development, and 
not the least, to the unique ideological characteristics of this legal system. With 
relation to the doctrine of stare decisis, we may refer to some characteristics of 
the English ius consuetudinarium. It deserves emphasis that in English law (see, 
e.g., leg. Henr. IX. 9.), the interpretation of statutes takes place in a fairly 
elastic manner. The judge is less bound by the statutes, or more precisely, by 
the texts thereof, than by previous judicial decisions. Bracton, the author of De 
legibus et consuetudinibus Angliae, is in effect the first—although previously 
there are signs of this view at Glanvill—to provide the theoretical support of 
the vigor of binding precedent. This is shown studiously in the doctrine of 
"...Si tamen similia evenerint, per simile iudicentur, dum bona est occasio a 
similibus procedere ac similia " (De leg. f. 1 b). 
An important difference between Roman law and English law is the Roman 
iurisperiti's so called ars distinguendi, expressed in some responsa of them as 
the "art" that is capable of distinguishing between the relevant, the legally 
relevant, and the irrelevant. As the result of this ars distinguendi, the high level 
abstraction capability of Roman iurisperiti (iurisconsulti), which was always 
separated from Roman law by the communis opinio, is clearly demonstrable. 
Here, we wish to refer to the fact that, oddly, even Fritz Schulz writes about 
the Romans' aversion to abstraction. 
In some of the responsa, indeed, only the legally valuable elements 
submerge, which is in diametric contrast to the relation of ratio decidendi and 
obiter dicta that melt together and are practically inseparable in the decisions of 
Anglo-Saxon courts. The "ars abstrahendi," already affecting legal scholars 
working in the last centuries of the pre-classical era, constitutes the real 
demarcation line between the mentality of Romans and the legal thinking of 
Anglo-Saxons. We have to point out that in some relations, —it is especially 
valid for "stare decisis," arising in relation to the ius respondendi, that is a clearly 
20
 Regarding the jurisprudence of Roman law, see, Földi, A.—Hamza, G.: A római jog 
története és insitúciói [The History and Institutions of Roman Law]. 8th, revised and 
extended edition, Budapest, 2003. 84 sqq. 
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mutatis mutandis characteristic of Roman law—even within Roman law, there 
are certain signs of the guiding authority of precedent legal-scholarly opinions. 
In the domain of Roman law, the question of judicial precedents is 
significant in the field of its comparison with English law. We may examine the 
significance of precedents based on both legal and non-legal sources. The law 
of inheritance—besides the law of gift21—, is extremely important in this 
relation, and what is more, it has explicit paradigmatic significance. In the law 
of inheritance, the weight of previous decisions can especially be ascertained 
in connection with querela inofficiosi testamenti. In the domain of contract law 
we may mention compensatio, in which the responsa originated in earlier 
times are given greater weight. This weight, naturally, is expressed through the 
recognition of the normative authority of certain legal principles. Furthermore, 
the problem of ius singulare is also important with regards to the examination 
of precedents. Namely, in the case of ius singulare—for example, in relation 
with a privilege—in aliis similibus can be interpreted, cautiously, obviously, in 
light of previous cases. 
Stare decisis plays a prominent role in the development of modern English 
law. Naturally, in modern judicature, there is a sharp distinction between ratio 
decidendi and obiter dicta, that frequently allots a difficult task to those 
applying the law, which fact is often referred to in the legal literature of for 
example, Montrose, Simpson, Derham, Allen, Cross, and Paton. Stare decisis, 
after all, is attributable to the fact that the most essential element of English 
law is the decision-making activity of the judge, whom Dawson rightly calls, 
in this respect, the "oracle of law." 
V. Concluding remarks 
In the development of European private law, convergence plays an increasing 
role. In the new legal literature, many authors, for example, James Gordley22 
9 3 
and Paolo Gallo," writes about the materialization of the differences between 
Common law and civil law (Roman law), and, what is more, about the 
disappearance of differences in the sphere of many legal institutions. In the 
See, Dawson, J. P.: Gifts and Promises, Continental and American Law Compared. 
New Haven-London, 1980. 
" See, Gordley, J.: «Common law» v. «civil law» Una distinzione che va 
scomparendo? In: Scritti in onore di R. Sacco I. Milano, 1994. 559. 
"
3
 See, Gallo, P.: La recezione dei modelli continentali nel diritto inglese delle 
obbligazioni. In: Scritti in onore di R. Sacco 1. Milano, 1994. 473-494. 
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field of contract law, many institutions and constructions of continental law are 
subject to reception in English law. It deserves attention that with regards to 
terminology, certain English authors, in connection with English private law, 
explicitly refer to the role of Roman law tradition.24 
The private law of European countries, no doubt, to a different extent and 
building on different historical traditions, is connected to Roman law. This is 
more and more obvious in a period of decreasing or even disappearing 
differences, often motivated by political interests, between certain "legal fields" 
and "legal families." Not even differing traditions of culture and civilization 
constitute obstacles to the differing extent of the reception of Roman law. It 
follows from the foregoing that it is justifiable to consider the significant role of 
Roman law in the efforts to unify the private law in Europe. 
24
 See, English Private Law. I—II. (ed.: P. Birks), Oxford, 2000. 
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A Conception of a New Act on Insolvency 
Abstract . The author—being a well-known expert of the field of law of bankruptcy and 
liquidation—gives a critical analysis of the present status of the Hungarian bankruptcy law. 
It is a commonplace to say that this field of the law is in very tight connection with the 
economy. Therefore the changes and the changing trends of the economy may have huge 
influence on the law of liquidation and bankruptcy, as well. 
As it is known the effective act on bankruptcy, liqudation and voluntary dissolution was 
adopted in 1991 in Hungary. Nevertheless there have been modifications on this act since 
then, the new economic conditions require a more appropriate regulation of this field. 
The author presents a thorough summary on the critical points of the valid regulation. 
The author applies a comparative method by referring to the legal solutions of different 
European countries concerning this branch of law. The author underlines that there are even 
significant terminological differences between the Hungarian regulation and e.g. the regulation 
of the EU-countries. This circumstance itself would demand modification of the law of 
bankruptcy in Hungary with respect to the join of Hungary to the European Union. 
The author mentions examples of the everyday practice of bankruptcy and liquidation, 
which can also prove the necessity of creating a new act on this issue. The author puts high 
emphasis on the role and activity of the liquidator (trustee in bankruptcy). Finally the author 
attempts to outline those essential elements of this branch of law, which should be taken into 
consideration during the codification of the new act on bankruptcy, liquidation and insolvency. 
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I. On the ncessity of ceating a new act 
During the process of legal harmonisation, the reconciliation of norms governing 
specific areas of Hungarian law with the legal materials of the European Union 
has become an established practice. This, in a certain cases may imply the 
adoption of a new act, while in other cases, some sort of adjustment is sufficient. 
Directive no. 1346/2000, which created the international bankruptcy law on 
the level of the European Union was promulgated in Hungary on 15th May, 
2002 and shall be effective law on the accession of Hungary to the EU. By 
reason of the content of the directive, this implies the possibility of subjecting 
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the debtor's assets scattered on the territory of several EU member states to 
one main procedure, permitting that supplementary procedures on the territory 
of one member state are pursued according to the substantive law of the specific 
country. Therefore, the fundamental amendment of bankruptcy law is not 
necessary since only procedural issues are concerned. 
As opposed to the above, it is obvious that the common system of procedural 
law shall lead to the advance of the rules of substantive law and it can be 
assumed that substantive bankruptcy law, even if no measures were taken, 
would be adjusted to the norms followed and established by the majority of 
the member states within 4 or 5 years after accession of Hungary to the EU. 
This circumstance, in our point of view, according to our view, evokes the 
reformation of our bankruptcy law, which has been a practical problem since 
the bankruptcy act of 1991 came into effect. 
It is nearly a cliché that bankruptcy law is a major instrument of the actual 
economic policy, which the legislators actually resorted to as it is marked by 
several minor amendments besides two amendments to supplementary law, 
which are equally designed to ameliorate the respective law. At this moment, we 
cannot endeavour to assess the impact of these amendments, which, has 
already been manifested both in legal practice and in expert literature. In this 
respect we should mention that legal practice even today has to deal with four 
different groups of legal materials, which significantly differ from one another. 
This obviously imposes disproportionate and unnecessary workload on the 
actors and encumbers the completion of the procedures. 
It is fortunate that Hungarian legal codification has already employed a new 
legislative method (competition act, act on business associations) of framing 
formally new and unified law instead of greater amendments and thereby 
facilitated jurisdiction and made the Hungarian legal system more transparent. 
The facts outlined above justify our proposal for drafting a new bankruptcy 
law, instead of the mere amendment of the old one. 
II. Conceptual definitions 
As it is widely known, the terminology of our effective law is in compliance 
neither with domestic legal traditions nor international practice. This, in itself 
would not pose a problem since the basic content-ased criterion of the 
applicability of a term is that it should define the respective legal institution 
markedly and distinctly. At the same time, safeguarding that content-ased 
aspect when translating the term into other languages should be observed. 
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The present phrasing, however, does not meet any of these requirements. In 
1986, the use of the term of "bankruptcy" was impossible for political reasons, 
therefore we assigned the term of liquidation to the law-ecree in a quite 
adverse way. Unfortunately, this terminology following the transition period 
prevailed, hence, the strange situation has occurred that we use such widely 
known notions, which are juxtaposed to our historical traditions with different 
implications, which create a different impression in the non-ungarian reader 
and may result in a greater problem. 
Let's illustrate the case above with an example: what we denominate as 
liquidation proceedings is termed bankruptcy proceedings in Austrian law, 
whereas Hungarian bankruptcy proceedings is designated as prejudicial action 
or reorganisation procedure in Austrian terminology, while full settlement is 
designated as liquidation proceedings in the legal terminology of our Western 
neighbours. As a result, the Austrian reader will find something quite different 
from what would be expectable under the term of Konkurs in the German 
translation of a Hungarian text. 
Therefore it is obvious that the terminology, also on the grounds of the inter-
national directive for bankruptcy law as referred to above, has to be rendered 
approximately the same content. 
Our recommendation for terminology is as follows: 
In the title of the act we propose the application of the term of insolvency. The 
underlying reason is that the German insolvency act, which came into effect at 
the 1st January, 1999 made a significant impact in the sphere of influence of 
German doctrines, thereby also in Hungary, both on account of its broad scope 
and its extraordinarily thorough, 20-ear-ong preparation period, furthermore, by 
reason of the fact that it was adopted and promulgated already in 1994. We can 
safely state that insolvency law has become an established term in the course 
of the recent 5 - 6 years. 
We propose to replace the present term of liquidation proceedings for bank-
ruptcy proceedings. It is undeniable that the German insolvency act referred 
to above does not use this term any longer, while other German-speaking 
countries, i.e., Austria and Switzerland do, and the term of bankruptcy 
proceedings has also integrated into the established legal terminology in other 
countries of the Union. By means of this modification, we could join the sweeping 
majority. 
We propose however, to maintain the term of full settlement. On the one 
hand, it has become fully established in Hungarian legal terminology, on the 
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other hand, doctrinally, it does not fall under the competence of insolvency 
law. Hence our worries concerning the terms of bankruptcy and liquidation do 
not pertain to the term of full settlement. From a strict doctrinal point of view, 
it should not be included in this act, nevertheless, since we propose radical 
changes in the regulation area of this procedure, it can be retained under the 
scope of the act on the grounds of the principle that "we should not incur 
unnecessary trouble". 
III. The objectives of the act 
In a significant segment of domestic jurisdiction we grave deficiencies occur 
from the economic point of view. That's why the new act needs to be relatively 
simple, which has to be matched by expeditiousness, transparency and account-
ability. In a given case, the automatism of procedures also has to be taken into 
consideration. 
In the present Hungarian economic situation, in our view, the major 
emphasis needs to be put on the priority of creditors' interests. This, f rom a 
theoretical point of view, means that it is obvious that bankruptcy law crosscuts 
normal liability relations, which shall be replaced by specific procedural 
rules in the moment of the adjudication of bankruptcy. It is natural in itself, 
therefore, we cannot forget that a special legal relation obtains here, since the 
debtor does not deny that the legal title of debt or the amount are valid, there-
fore, the creditors' claim is valid and it is merely the debtor's incapability of 
compliance with his liabilities that underlies the fact of non-payment. 
It is an undeniable fact that upon the considerations of the interest of national 
economy, the legal development of the recent 100-150 years has shifted in the 
direction of solutions protecting the debtor, which, understandably, could only 
be accomplished at the damage of creditors. However, the systematic overs-
hadowing of creditors, on the one hand, does not correspond to the fundamental 
principles of the legal system, on the other hand, it may cause disturbances in 
the functioning of the economy under normal liability relations. Economic 
analyses also to support the fact that the new Hungarian act has to be funda-
mentally creditor-friendly, whereas the creditor's interest needs to be construed 
in a broad scope. This not only implies that the creditor should be capable of 
obtaining the greatest possible share of the demand, but also that the creditor 
could achieve this purpose, it also has to play an active role in the reorgani-
sation of the debtor if possible and necessary. 
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IV. Conceptual modifications 
1. The pragmatic analyses positively support the fact that extraordinarily many 
liquidation proceedings are initiated. In several cases, the creditors resort to this 
legal institution only as a psychic threat, and thereby produce unnecessary work-
load for the courts as well as undermine the credit of the legal institution. Hence 
in the future the statutory encumbering of the conditions of the commencement 
of bankruptcy proceedings seems to be expedient. The amendment, which came 
into force as of 1st September, 2001 was framed in this spirit, since, with the 
termination of the right of the prenotation of dues, the commencement of the 
proceedings shall cost 40.000.- HUF in each case. 
Proceeding with this line of argument, we propose on the one hand, that in 
some cases a mandatory procedure is initiated by the debtor, on the other hand, 
that the limit of the claimed amount for the creditors is prescribed. 
2. The present effective solution fundamentally undermines the role of 
securities protected with ius in rem, which leads to an imbalance of the economy. 
With respect to the fact that a hinge of our conception is the protection of 
creditors' interests, we propose the division of the assets of the debtor into two 
parts. The items of property secured under ius in rem for the creditor shall be 
indemnified directly. (Separate right of indemnification.) Supposing the sale of 
the security covers the claim, the creditor status entailing a separate right of 
indemnification shall be terminated and the potential residue shall be added to 
the other segment of bankruptcy assets. In an opposite case, the creditor with 
an unsatisfied claim shall be determined as a normal bankruptcy creditor and 
shall be included in the creditors' indemnification sequence. 
3. In a number of cases, due payment of the employees causes a grave 
problem. Even if there is adequate coverage available for that purpose, the 
claims of secured creditors cannot be fully satisfied. In case our recommen-
dations are accepted, the settlement of employees' lawful claims will be even 
more endangered, since it may well be the case that a more substantial part of 
the debtor's assets would be fused into funds for separate indemnification. In 
order to secure that both employees get their due emolument and the primacy of 
creditors' interests is not curbed, we recommend that a monetary fund is set 
up. This monetary fund could be managed by the Hungarian Treasury, and its 
resources would spring from the payment of a certain percentage of the wages 
paid. In the event of the provisional exhaustion of the fund, additional 
resources could be arranged for by means of the provisional redistribution of 
the state budget with the prescription of a refund liability. 
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Of course, this would further put up the price of labour, whereas, since 
claims with security coverage are essentially guaranteed in the system, what can 
be expected is either a greater tendency for the provision of loans on the part of 
banks or the decrease of credit interest rates. In this later case, the extra costs 
that burden the employer would return. 
4. According to our effective law, the liquidator shall be designated ex 
officio by the court. The scope of those to be liquidated shall be determined in 
a government decree. The government shall invite tenders for entering the 
liquidators on the rolls. The government decree on liquidators does not require 
special amendments. The method however, by which the liquidators or the 
trustees in bankruptcy are appointed should be definitely changed in the future. 
The courts shall have to consider only one circumstance when appointing the 
liquidators, namely, that the liquidator to be appointed is included in the list 
of those registered to proceed as such. At the moment this list encompasses 
120 or 130 liquidators. 
According to IM-Directive no. 123/1983 on the rules of judicial procedure, 
the appointment of the liquidator (assets supervisor) shall be administered by a 
computer program in the event of the adjudication of liquidation (bankruptcy 
proceedings). The computer program shall offer a list of liquidators registered 
and operating in the competency area of the court for appointment with special 
respect to the order of importance as specified in the liquidation registry and the 
work pressure on the respective liquidator. 
The directive on the rules of judicial procedure raises several problems 
concerning the appointment of the liquidators, since the referred code of 
practice pertains to the liquidator registered in the competency area of the 
court, which as a legal term is not positive or distinct under any circum-
stances. According to the referred government decree, any liquidator included 
in the supplement may be appointed by any court in Hungary, therefore, such 
a nomenclature as liquidators registered in specific areas of competence does 
not prevail in any statute. Such statutory authorisation does not exist. 
In practice, what happens is that the courts in charge of liquidation shall 
register 10 or 30 companies arbitrarily out of more than 100 liquidators in the 
competency area of the court and further liquidators shall not be concerned in 
the course of the proceedings. A number of methods are available for the 
appointment of liquidators at courts. One of these is the so-called automatism, 
which in practice means that the liquidators shall be appointed in a specific 
order but in a contingent manner. In this case, the experience and the expertise 
of the liquidator shall not be taken into consideration. As a consequence of such 
automatic appointment, the factors of expert knowledge, the work pressure and 
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the potential special professional skills of the liquidators shall be disregarded, 
since the computer system appoints the liquidators on a schematic and linear 
basis. In this framework, we can' t assume that the court or the liquidating 
judge, after due consideration of all circumstances of a specific case, shall 
appoint the liquidator with the greatest expertise and professional skills. 
Another option is that the court, considering all circumstances of the 
case, including the particular circumstances of the business association and 
the preparedness of the liquidator, endeavours to appoint the most adequate 
liquidator in the given case. Unfortunately, this system also has its disadvan-
tages, so far as we tend to encounter the ungrounded charges that the courts 
give preference to certain liquidators in the liquidation proceedings. 
Therefore, on the appointment of the liquidator (trustee in bankruptcy), 
even the appearance that the court in the course of the appointment procedure 
would favour certain liquidators (tmstees in bankruptcy) should be avoided, 
hence, in the future, instead of the application of the automatic system or the 
systematic appointment by the court, a new and adequate system should be 
developed in all respects. 
In practice, the option that the debtor requests the appointment of a specific 
liquidator (trustee in bankruptcy) that it deems as favourable has also occurred. 
This fact, however, does not seem a proper solution, since in some cases the 
debtor is interested in the withdrawal of further stakes from the residue of the 
assets. So far as the debtor recommends and decides on the entity of the trustee 
in bankruptcy, we might face the threat that the debtor and the trustee in 
bankruptcy appear to collaborate in the procedure. 
In our viewpoint, the following pattern of the appointment of the trustee in 
bankruptcy would be the most adequate and objective solution. 
With respect to the confidentiality of the matter, either the creditor or the 
creditors' board should be put in charge of the appointment of the trustee in 
bankruptcy, implying that the trustee in bankruptcy would be appointed by the 
creditor or the creditors' board and the only agency of the court in its ruling that 
affirms the case of insolvency would be to appoint the entities of the trustees in 
bankruptcy as designated by the creditor or the board. 
We also mention as a viable option that the creditor or the board could 
make a recommendation for the entity of the trustee in bankruptcy with the 
consent or the approval of the National Association of Liquidators. 
So far as this construction seems reasonable, the potential ways of the 
implementation of the recall of the liquidator in the course of the procedure 
also need to be considered. According to the present regulation, the liquidator 
cannot be recalled unless the procedure has finished. 
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In case the legislator's intention in the course of the potential amendment 
of the statute is to allow for a broader scope for the creditors' board, a decision 
needs to be reached whether to facilitate for the creditors or the creditors' 
board to recall the liquidator under definite and strict conditions, in case the 
reasons as specified in the act obtain. 
5. In our viewpoint the most neuralgic points or terms of the present 
liquidation proceedings are the following: the determination of the insolvency 
of the debtor by the court, the appointment of the liquidator and subsequently, 
the appeal for a review of the ruling of the court by the debtor. The sweeping 
majority of appeals for review, according to some surveys a rate of up to 90 p.c., 
are formal. By filing such an appeal, the debtor's intention is to gain time and 
within this time, with special respect to the exceptions, the debtor will make an 
attempt to withdraw the remaining assets of the association. Such procedures 
seriously violate the creditors' interests and the jurisdiction is unable to handle 
this problem according to the present practice. 
The analysis of cases appealed so demonstrates that on an average it takes 
one or one and a half years for the Supreme Court to reach a firm decision, which, 
in practice means that a crucial majority, i.e., 90 per cent of the appealed rulings 
shall be affirmed. Whereas, in that term of one or one and a half years or in an 
even longer period the unscrupulous proprietors or the officials of the debtor's 
association may incur grave damages to the creditors, who stand by helplessly. 
As we see it the emergence of this adverse situation may be prevented by 
the introduction of a single new institution of law, i.e., the designation of a 
provisional guardian ad litem ex officio by the court immediately after liquidation 
proceedings have commenced. 
The task of the provisional guardian ad litem, without aiming at 
completeness in its agency, would be the protection of the creditors' interests 
and monitoring the economic activities of the debtor until the court appoints the 
ultimate trustee in bankruptcy on the basis of the creditors' request. The task of 
the provisional guardian ad litem would be to survey the debtor's assets, which 
implies an overall inspection of the debtor's financial situation, including the 
inspection of bookkeeping and of the cashier's book, as well as of the 
securities and the goods stock, contracts and bank accounts. The provisional 
guardian ad litem could request information from the leading officials of the 
business association, about which the creditors and the creditors' board shall 
be continuously provided information. 
In our assumption, it is reasonable that the provisional guardian ad litem 
affirms the pecuniary covenants of the debtor that emerge after the commence-
ment of the bankruptcy proceedings. 
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The debtor would actually not suffer damages by reason of the appointment 
of the provisional guardian ad litem and consequently, would not be more 
disadvantaged. So far as the bankruptcy proceedings are instituted by the 
debtor or the Court of Registration, the limitation of the rights of the debtor as 
outlined above would obviously not be hindered. So far as it is the creditor 
that initiates the bankruptcy proceedings, the theoretical possibility arises 
that it is exactly the market rival, which initiates the proceedings against the 
debtor so as to incur an awkward market situation, since the provisional guardian 
ad litem necessarily impedes the operation of been determined as insolvent, the 
creditor, who initiated the bankruptcy the debtor. In that case, our recommen-
dation is that if the bankruptcy proceedings were not instituted by the court, 
since the debtor has not proceedings, shall be obligated to indemnify the debtor. 
The provisional guardian ad litem would by all means proceed with its activity 
until the appointment of the ultimate trustee in bankruptcy, and thereby, the 
unjustified marking time and the appeals that are designated to play for time 
would be eliminated. 
6. The present regulation of the activity of the creditors' board can't 
secure that the objective the legislator intends to attain is accomplished. In the 
majority of cases, the creditors' boards are not operative or they are not estab-
lished, while in other cases the established boards are designated to implement 
merely formal tasks. According to our standpoint, the establishment of the 
boards in the future should be mandatory under the new regulation. So far as 
the number of creditors does not reach the minimum limit of three, each 
creditor shall automatically become a member of the creditors' board. In our 
view, the trustee in bankruptcy should be appointed by the creditors' board or 
the creditors under specific conditions, but the dismissal of the trustee in 
bankruptcy should also be permissible. The role of the creditors' board in the 
procedure should be definitely reinforced. Hence, the introduction of the Anglo-
axon practice would be reasonable, according to which, it is the creditors' board 
that assigns the task of the sale of the assets to the creditors. In that case, the 
role of the trustee in bankruptcy would be restricted to an assessment, adequate 
sequencing and categorisation of the creditors' claims. So far as the re-
organisation of the debtor is deemed necessary, the trustee in bankruptcy shall 
ensure that the tasks the reorganisation entails are fully complied with and the 
collection of outstanding debts is accomplished. All functions however, related 
to the sale of assets would be transferred to the powers of the creditors or the 
creditors' board. Of course, it is not impeded legally that the creditors' board 
instructs the liquidator or any other party to sell the assets. Our proposed 
solution, in our conviction, would facilitate that the procedures related to the 
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sale of the assets become more simple, expeditious and efficient. Thereby, 
the rumours and assumptions implying that liquidators tend to spin out the 
procedures or obtain undesirable financial advantage would be refutable. 
Hence the inadequate practice, which the liquidators resort to almost without 
exception could also be ended, namely, that the majority of liquidators 
systematically makes use of the debtor's physical assets, primarily, the vehicles 
under liquidation without financial compensation, and thereby, causes 
considerable damage to the creditors. By the regulation, the creditors or the 
creditors' board should be granted substantially more entitlements in the course 
of the entire procedure, while the liquidator (or the trustee in bankruptcy) 
would be perpetually obligated to report to the creditors on the specific stages 
of the bankruptcy proceedings according to a certain scheme. 
7. In our present practice, several problems arise from the fact that the 
debtor's assets prove to be so insufficient after the commencement of the liqui-
dation proceedings that they shall not even cover the costs of the procedure. 
This means, that thereby we impose not only superfluous workload on the 
courts, but also incur groundless or non-or slowly remunerative, basically 
unnecessary costs for the liquidators. Therefore, we propose that the well-
known solution as pursuant to Act XLIX of 1991 on Bankruptcy Proceedings, 
Liquidation Proceedings and Voluntary Dissolution is employed, which, in the 
light of contemporary practice, has proved suitable, namely, that the 
insufficiency or deficiency of assets should be determined as an impeding 
factor of the commencement of the procedure. In that case, we would save the 
actors from doing ... a lot of superfluous work, whereas, the possibility, that 
the debtor withdraws the assets in the last minute, can be impeded by the 
establishment of the institution of the provisional guardian ad litem. 
8. As it is known, the definition of pledge as specified under Article 266 
of the Civil Code was re-codified under Act CXXXVII of 2000, which intro-
duced a new concept of pledge on real property. The core of that legal 
institution is defined as follows: "The creation of a pledge on real property is 
permissible on the entire assets or part of the assets (operated as a self-
contained economic unit without the determination of its constituents, rights 
and liabilities, i.e., real property) of a legal entity or a business association 
without a legal entity via a pledge contract, which shall be documented in front 
of a notary public and this pledge shall be recorded in the pledge property 
register. The pledge on real property, after the conclusion of the pledge contract, 
shall pertain to the real property that shall be included in the obligee's assets 
when the obligee obtains the concerning right of disposal, however, shall be 
terminated when the real property is removed from the obligee's assets." 
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In the event of the introduction of a separate indemnification law, it is 
logical that the creditor who holds a pledge on real property stands basically 
alone, since it shall seize hold of the assets obtainable until the claim is 
satisfied. So far as the bankruptcy proceedings are commenced by one creditor, 
the procedural rules modelled primarily on several creditors would lose 
their relevance. Therefore, we propose that in such a case no bankruptcy 
proceedings are instituted, but only and exclusively a reorganisation procedure 
according to the decision of the creditor. Whereas, the creditor can be expected 
to take additional care to monitor the activity of the debtor, which can possibly 
entail a financial benefit consisting in the accomplishment of the financial 
reorganisation and consolidation of the company. In that case, of course, the 
facilitation of the creditor's actual influence on the debtor's usual economic 
activities must be reinforced, possibly in other cases of reorganisation, too. 
In that case, the ranking of the creditor in the indemnification sequence also 
has to be addressed. If the obligee of the lien on real property is preceded by 
one or several creditors in the sequence, they can't be disadvantaged, so the 
obligee of the pledge on real property shall be obligated to ensure that the 
indemnification of the creditors preceding in the sequence is accomplished. 
This is implemented by redemption from the assets of the debtor in the 
reorganisation procedure, but we think that it is also doctrinally feasible that 
the obligee of the pledge on real property reaches an agreement with the 
creditors preceding in the sequence via the instruments of civil law. 
9. As already mentioned under the point above, bying to our view, 
granting more management entitlements in the reorganisation procedure to the 
creditor would be expedient. In this respect, we may choose between two 
conceptual options, i.e., on the one hand, the contemporary system, which 
works based on the joint management by the debtor and the asset supervisor, 
on the other hand, the creditors become entitled to appoint the reorganisation-
trustee, who shall be responsible for the implementation or effecting the 
implementation of the reorganisation. 
10. The provisions of Act IV of 1997 on Business Associations have 
principally transgressed the institution of limited liability with respect to 
bankruptcy cases. Whereas, in case of associations with legal entities, it was 
not only the factor of inflation that evoked the determination of higher nominal 
capital and authorised capital, but also the more powerful enforcement of the 
protection of creditors. On that basis, as far as bankruptcy proceedings are 
concerned, in our view, when the nominal capital or the authorised capital are 
not actually available and the company shall not initiate proceedings against 
itself, its limited liability should be terminated. 
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11. With respect to full settlement, it can be definitely asserted that at the 
moment the proceedings are unnecessarily complicated, so that the proprietors 
of an association with minor capital shall be advised to reconsider their 
concerning decision. Contrary to the established legal regulation and Hungarian 
jurisdiction, we can state that on the one hand, full settlement in the European 
Union member states does not fall under the competence of bankruptcy law, 
which is doctrinally justifiable, on the other hand, it is essentially covered 
under financial and company law and shall be handled accordingly without a 
special procedure. As for our view, the adoption of that practice is by all 
means reasonable. Therefore, in our draft the regulations of substantive law 
concerning the decision on full settlement would be sustained, whereas both 
the practice of the appointment of the trustee in full settlement and the 
mandatorily prescribed order of procedures would be terminated. Accordingly, 
the decision on full settlement shall be announced to the Registry Court by the 
management, which shall request its publication in the Company Gazette. 
Subsequently, the daily balance sheet and the recommendation for the division 
of assets shall be prepared within the term as defined by the proprietors 
without any formal procedures, which shall be filed to the Registry Court by 
the management in line with a request for the liquidation of the company. As a 
result, the entitlements for full settlement would be terminated, which are 
subject to our effective law. This standpoint is tenable since full settlement is 
a sovereign proprietor's decision in itself, which does not concern the public. 
On that basis however it can be concluded that an intervention into normal 
liability relations with the instruments of law cannot be substantiated. To shed 
light on the issue from another viewpoint, that implies that full settlement 
in the future can only and exclusively be realised if, on the one hand, the case 
of insolvency or its threat does not obtain, or on the other hand, the company 
can settle all its liabilities deriving from contract law with the instruments of 
civil law. 
Of course, it cannot be excluded either, that such a claim arises, which the 
company managers have not been aware of in spite of their greatest care. These 
extreme cases also have to be taken into consideration. Therefore, in our 
recommendation, the proprietors of the company cancelled under the legal title 
of full settlement shall bear one year 's liability for such claims, which have an 
effect on the distributed assets for one year after cancellation. This, however, 
is a forfeiting deadline. In an opposite case, the principle of the security of 
circulation would be damaged. 
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V. The structure of the law 
The objectives that the legislator sets have to be framed in the introduction 
of all significant codes, i.e., in the preamble. In this respect, we propose the 
extension of the preamble with a definition of the basic principles to be 
followed in both procedures, according to their substance, content and 
objectives, with reference to the fact what attitude the parties are obligated to 
demonstrate in the course of the procedures. The relevance of this extended 
preamble would be that both procedures allow for grave financial abuse and 
even the strictest legal regulations cannot offer protection against these. There-
fore, it is uncertain if the general notions of the Civil Code are satisfactory in 
terms of the notion of liability, since it is obvious that in these cases the parties 
have to comply with the norm of increased care. 
1. The definition of the concept and norms of substantive law 
Similarly to our effective law, the new act initially provides a definition of the 
concept or basically, the norms of substantive law. 
a) The effect of the act 
With respect to the effect, a recurrent pragmatic problem is that, on the one 
hand, bankruptcy law uses the terminus technicus of economic organisations, on 
the other hand, it separately enumerates the entities that qualify as economic 
organisations. This, in case of all formations that the lawmaker intends to include 
under the effect of the law, entails that a direct amendment of the act is 
necessary. With respect to the circumstance that it already crystallised in the 
course of the codification of the Civil Code that the term of economic organi-
sation was deemed to be exiled from Hungarian law, we propose that this notion 
was revoked under the act of insolvency. As a consequence of which, since 
bankruptcy law regulates business activities, we could apply the definition 
below: the effect of the law pertains to legal and non-legal entities engaged in 
business activities. One can highlight, this notional definition seems to be 
adequate to include all those associations under the effect of the law, which are 
engaged in business activities only as a supplementary activity. Primarily societies 
and foundations need to be mentioned. The administration of the bankruptcy 
situation of these associations poses a recurrent problem for Hungarian law-
making, however, the acceptance of our draft could solve this problem. Of course, 
adequate amendments shall be necessary in the relevant statutes, and a res-
ponsibility regulation has to be integrated in the Civil Code, which prescribes 
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the full and unlimited liability of those legal entities that have been in the 
position to make decisions in those foundations and societies, in which as a 
consequence of its business activity, a bankruptcy situation occurred. The term 
of "business activity" has to be rendered an economic content as an auxiliary rule. 
b) Debtor 
The debtor as a term with all its legal implications is applicable in the bank-
ruptcy proceedings or the reorganisation procedure. Therefore, the uphold of 
the contemporary effective regulation also seems adequate, according to which 
the debtor is the entity that was not able to, or presumably will not be able to 
settle its debt (debts) on the due date. 
c) Creditor 
The creditor is the party, who has money or property claims expressed in 
monetary terms against the debtor and has been registered so by the liquidator 
in the bankruptcy proceedings. 
The creditor, who has security protected with ius in rem against the debtor, 
is entitled to separate indemnification. 
d) Assets 
All property that the debtor's proprietary rights obtain for as pursuant to the 
Civil Code. Both the right of lease, which is effective for more than ten years 
or an indefinite term and the usage rights attached to a particular item of 
property are applicable under the definition. 
e) The Bankrupt's estate 
The bankrupt's estate is that part of the debtor's assets, which is not burdened 
with securities protected with ius in rem. 
2. Bankruptcy proceedings 
a) The commencement of the proceedings 
In accordance with our effective law, the proceedings can be commenced upon 
the initiation of the debtors or the creditors. The difference however, consists 
in when and on what conditions this is conceivable. 
We recommend that the debtor is obliged to commence the proceedings if it 
is a legal entity, and if, on an average of the previous financial year, the 
nominal or the authorised capital was not at the debtor's disposal, or if the 
debtor's public liabilities approximate the amount of the debtor's capital. In 
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that case the basis of reference versus the АРЕН (Hungarian Financial and Tax 
Administration Authorities) would be the balance of the annual current 
account including those "hiding" nominal liabilities not shown on the current 
account balance of the АРЕН (Hungarian Financial and Tax Administration 
Authorities). Furthermore, those cases can be also applied, when the given 
firm has not settled the payment of the due general sales tax or the personal 
income tax. The non-payment of the personal income tax by the debtor's 
association could also be considered as a case subject to criminal law, since 
under private law, the amount of the personal income tax is a legal due of the 
employee, i.e., a third party, and its non-payment on the part of the company 
can be considered as fraud. 
The debtor can apply the commencement of the bankruptcy proceedings in 
a case when, according to its discretion, it shall presumably not be able to meet 
its foreseen liabilities. The creditor is entitled to commence the proceedings, 
if the due claim expired and the conditions of the debtor's insolvency obtain 
and the amount of the claim reaches... HUF. 
b) Insolvency 
Classical bankruptcy law in this respect provides significant scope for judicial 
discretion, since the initial supposition was that such economic-tructural 
problems underline the fact of pecuniary non-ayment, which cannot be remedied. 
At the same time, it was publicly known that bankruptcy proceedings implied a 
basically drastic intervention into economy and it was a long and expensive 
process, therefore, its avoidance was by all means expedient and reasonable. 
It would be very easy to assume that a return to this principle would be 
favourable and the judges should be granted discretionary powers. This, how-
ever, by reason of the current workload on the courts, would obviously not be 
an advantageous decision. Whereas, the three currently regulated cases in bank-
ruptcy law seem to adequately and relatively normatively secure the reassuring 
solution of the case, as this is justified by practice. Therefore, we recommend 
the uphold of the a)-b)-v) framework of conditions as pursuant to Para. 2 of 
Article 27 of Act XLIX of 1991 on Bankruptcy Proceedings, Liquidation 
Proceedings and Voluntary Dissolution with the relevant amendment of 
terminology that the debtor did not comply with the agreement as framed in 
the reorganisation procedure. 
c) The proceedings of the provisional guardian ad litem 
The immediate appointment allows that the provisional guardian ad litem offers 
a general insight into the financial situation of the debtor before its office 
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expires. In this respect, it shall make a declaration if the transactions within a 
year preceding the commencement of the proceedings can be challenged and 
in the event of their challenge what rate of return can be expected. So far as 
the provisional guardian ad litem is capable of implementing this activity 
efficiently, upon the appointment the ultimate liquidator, the proceedings can 
enter into a more active phase, since the ultimate trustee in bankruptcy shall start 
the activity in possession of such preliminary information, the determination of 
which has to be devoted more time. 
d) The activity of the liquidator (trustee in bankruptcy) 
In compliance with classical law and contemporary international legal practice, 
the trustee in bankruptcy receives direct entitlement to manage and dispose of 
the bankrupt's estate or the creditor is entitled to separate indemnification. On 
the one hand, the trustee in bankruptcy controls the actual property that was 
sold, therefore, shall be entitled to challenge and stop the process. 
One neuralgic point of our present act is that neither the creditors, nor the 
proprietors of the debtor's association are supplied with continuous information 
on the present status of the liquidation, since the liquidator is obligated to do 
this on request. We think that in the future a system of the provision of 
constant information should be established as a consequence of which both the 
creditors and the creditors' board, and the proprietors can receive meritorious 
information on the actual financial situation. Therefore, the prescription of a 
15-day-deadline is expedient. 
The registration of the creditors' claims would follow the present system so 
far as the liability of the creditors to pay registration fees would be sustained. 
Although this solution can be strongly debated doctrinally, we still propose its 
sustenance, since there are no other liquid resources available, from which the 
activity of the liquidator could be remunerated. Whereas, it is a basic market 
principle that any economic activity is due its equivalent. 
This is the period, when it is actually decided whether the liquidation 
proceedings continue or do not, since the ultimate liquidator has been appointed, 
the financial situation has been clarified, the scope of the creditors securing 
substantive additional obligation has been shaped. Disregarding the activity of 
the liquidator, we propose that the act stipulates that the creditors' board shall 
be summoned within 30 days of the commencement of the bankruptcy 
proceedings, which later will have a major role. 
According to one view, the creditors' board should include the creditors 
with the three most outstanding claims, while in another view this circle should 
also involve the representative of the financial institution that keeps the account 
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of the debtor. The creditors' board, after it has been set up on a mandatory 
basis, would supervise the activity of the liquidator. The liquidator would be 
obliged to provide information to the creditors' board on the continuation or 
cessation of sub-ransactions and on the actual sale of assets, and would be 
permitted to administer any asset flow, which equals or exceeds 10 per cent 
of the bankrupt's estate, exclusively if the consent of the creditors' board has 
been guaranteed. Of course, the scope of the competence of the creditors' 
board also encompasses the supervision of the economic activity of those 
creditors entitled to separate indemnification. 
So far as the creditors' board is unsatisfied with the activity of the liquidator, 
the creditors would be entitled to replace him, but the normative conditions for 
that measure shall have to be set forth. This implies that it has to be outlined in 
what cases and after what warning the board shall be entitled to resort to this 
measure. The replaced liquidator would be entitled to the equivalent of its 
activity, except when the creditors' board can prove that the liquidator did not 
proceed according to the requirement of increased care and breached that. 
After the closure of its economic procedures, the liquidator shall prepare a 
general balance sheet and a recommendation for the division of assets. Until 
that time the creditors' board can initiate the conclusion of the bankruptcy 
agreement with the purpose that the completion of the bankruptcy proceedings, 
that is, the actual liquidation of the debtor can be avoided. As for the present 
situation, at that point the creditors' board on behalf of the creditors is entitled 
to negotiate with the debtor's representative. In that case however, it is 
advisable, whereas this is contrary to the present practice, to consult the 
experts of the liquidator, since that is the legal entity that managed the debtor's 
association up to that date. 
A classical task of the bankrupt's trustee is the classification of the creditors 
of the estate. In our framework, the method of classification would undergo 
significant changes, therefore, it deserves explanation in a separate sub-section. 
So far as the court accepts the general balance sheet or the recommendation for 
the division of assets, the liquidator (trustee in bankruptcy) shall be absolved 
from responsibility, and it shall provide for its due payment. 
e) Indemnification sequence 
In our framework, the indemnification sequence would undergo basic changes, 
since secured creditors' claims have been transferred to a different branch of 
indemnification, therefore, they do not burden the estate any longer. With 
respect to this factor, and on the grounds of the sustenance of basic principles of 
bankruptcy law, i.e., no creditors shall receive indemnification unless full satis-
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faction of the creditors ranked as preceding in the sequence have been fully 
indemnified, our proposed indemnification sequence can be outlined as follows: 
1. Cost: this category includes all costs of the judicial procedure and the 
overall fees of the liquidator, 
2. Mass liabilities: a continuous and well-established institution of bank-
ruptcy law. All payments, practically without a legal title, are covered by this 
term, which have arisen on the grounds of the provision of the trustee of 
bankruptcy, in which the mass was involved either in the position of the 
obligee or of the obligor. Since it is easy to understand that in a given case the 
suppliers are exclusively willing to make external tools, which are necessary 
for the completion of semi-manufactures, available on condition that they are 
paid the equivalent and do not become the bankrupt's creditors. As a result of 
this category, these payments shall be made in the course of the proceeding, 
therefore, these payments shall already be settled in the moment of the judicial 
proceedings. 
3. Claims made upon the warranty or guarantee: according to contemporary 
notions these are claims, which arise from the non-economic activities of the 
individual person. Classically, we distinguish between two categories, which are 
obviously applicable with respect to debtors engaged in such activities, whereas, 
the classification of the obligees into the creditors' first group seems expedient 
by reason of the relevance of the interest to be protected. In this case, which 
special regard to the type of payments, the liquidator shall determine a separate 
amount, which shall presumably cover these liabilities until the expiration of 
warranty. So far as the separated fund is not exhausted, the indemnification basis 
of other creditors shall be extended. 
4. A share of public liabilities calculated with capital—and transaction 
interest: as it is known, in terms of public liabilities, several types of fines or 
interest surcharges may be charged. It however is not unusual that the obligors 
because of the contingent discrepancies of data—flow only subsequently receive 
the concerning information. It would be contrary to the objective of the bank-
ruptcy proceedings that other creditors bear the costs of the extraordinarily great 
interest surcharges and fines that have to be paid on certain outstandingly 
enormous public liabilities, which sometimes exceed the total of the capital 
claim itself. Therefore, the mere calculation of the normal transaction interest 
seems logical in the event of indemnification of the creditor on a privileged 
ranking. 
5. The capital claim calculated with normal transaction interest of the 
creditors qualifying as small or micro-ventures: The subsidising of small and 
micro-ventures is an objective of economic policy, which is relevantly 
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manifested as pursuant to Act XCV of 1999 on small and medium-size enter-
prises and on the subsidy of their development adopted in this scope. This act 
provides a brilliant notional definition of small and micro-ventures, according 
to which a venture, in which the total of employees does not reach 50 and the 
annual net revenue does not exceed HUF 700 million, or the balance-sheet 
total does not exceed HUF 500 million and the stake held by the state and 
the self-government jointly or separately does not exceed a rate of 25% in the 
proprietors' group, shall qualify as a small venture. A micro-venture is a 
venture, which employs less than 10 employees and the annual net revenue or 
the balance sheet total does not reach the upper limit as specified for small 
ventures. 
6. Other capital claims. 
7. Interest fines and bonuses. 
Obviously, the overall calculation of the transaction interest may be 
accomplished before the proceedings are commenced. 
f ) The court, after the acceptance of the general balance sheet and a recom-
mendation for the division of the assets, as we already noted, shall recall the 
liquidator and transfer the power to manage the existing assets to the creditors' 
board. Subsequently, the creditors' board shall be entitled to sell the assets on 
the market and since it is basically and definitely interested in obtaining the 
highest possible price for the assets, the present complicated regulation of the 
sale of the assets is deemed necessary. 
g) The regulation of the bankruptcy proceedings as outlined above entails the 
overall reconsideration of the charge of liquidation and liquidation costs. With 
respect to the fact that it is not the liquidator that shall sell the assets at the 
closure of the proceedings, the basis for the calculation of the charge won't 
equal the amount of the sold assets. We think, however, that the level of the 
consultation market price as developed recently adequately facilitates the 
determination of the real price by the court, in the course of which it shall take 
the opinion of the creditors' board into consideration. The principle of the 
formation of the charge as well as the itemised enumeration of the type of 
costs that can be utilised by the liquidator needs to be established in a decree 
issued by the Ministry of Finance, since in that case the legislator could take 
into consideration the price changes in Hungary more effectively than today. 
Of course, as a basic principle we have to assert that the activity of liquidation 
is a business venture like any other venture, therefore, a decent profit needs to 
be secured for that specific activity. 
198 GÁBOR TÖRÖK 
3. The reorganisation procedure 
The commencement of the procedure may be requested without limitation by the 
debtor or the creditor, who holds a pledge on real property on the debtor's assets 
under Article 266 of the Civil Code and any other creditor, the worth of whose 
assets secured under right in rem equals half of the property the debtor disposes of. 
The procedure shall be commenced by registration at the court. The court 
may only investigate the personal particulars, and if the procedure is instituted 
by the creditor, it may examine the legitimacy of the claim, and consequently, 
provide for the commencement of the reorganisation procedure in its ruling. 
This also entails that the debtor shall be entitled to three months' moratorium 
on payment, in the course of which the claims put forward shall bear normal 
"transaction" rates without late payment surcharges and fines. If the procedure 
was instituted by the debtor, it shall be obligated to recommend a binding 
reorganisation program within two months of the institution of the proceedings, 
to which it should request the consent of the creditor in the course of the 
conciliation. As an alternative to securing a valid approval, reverting to the 
solution effective between the period of 1991-1993 is conceivable, when the 
consent of all the creditors present was necessary for the adoption of the 
reorganisation scheme, or the solution of a legal settlement technique, which 
has been basically non-operative since 1993, could also be followed. 
So far as the creditors initiated the bankruptcy proceedings, it is subject 
to their decision whether they appoint a reorganisation-trustee with full 
competence to manage the debtor's association. 
In case an agreement is concluded, the debtor shall be obligated to proceed 
in full compliance with the reorganisation agreement and any essential deviation 
f rom the scheme (what qualifies as essential deviation shall be determined in 
the agreement) would entail the entitlement to an automatic commencement of 
the bankruptcy proceedings. Therefore, the debtor is sufficiently encouraged to 
implement the scheme developed or approved of jointly with the creditors. The 
accomplishment of the scheme can take a maximum period of 3 years and after 
the expiration of the period, the court must stay the procedure or proceed with 
it in the scope of bankruptcy proceedings. 
So far as no agreement is reached and otherwise the conditions of insolvency 
obtain, the reorganisation procedure should be remitted to bankruptcy pro-
ceedings, which is not necessary in every case, since the commencement of 
the reorganisation procedure, according to special literature in economics, is 
advisable in case insolvency is merely a remote threat. Therefore, it may well be 
likely that the debtor is still solvent in the moment of an unfruitful agreement. 
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I . 
T h e prohibi t ion of the use of fo rce has been a f u n d a m e n t a l p r inc ip le of 
in ternat ional law since the end of the Second World W a r . The pr inciple forbids 
the use or threat of a r m e d force with peremptory c h a r a c t e r for all sub jec t s of 
in ternat ional law. T o the prohibi t ion f r a m e d under Ar t i c l e 2, pa rag raph 4, of 
the Char t e r of the Uni ted Nat ions ( U N ) ' — w h i c h ex is t s with a s imi la r content 
in cus tomary l aw 2 —only two except ions prevail.3 T h e r e f o r e , the use of force in 
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1
 Article 2, paragraph 4, of the UN Charter: "All members shall refrain in their inter-
national relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political 
independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the 
United Nations." 
Cf., Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua 
(Nicaragua v. United States of America), Merits, Judgement of 27 June 1986,1.C.J. Reports 
1986, para. 188, at 99. 
3
 A former third exception, the "enemy state" clause under Article 107 of the Charter 
has since become entirely and perpetually inapplicable. 
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our age is lawful exclusively in two cases: if the UN Security Council gives a 
pr ior and express authorisation under Chapter VII thereto, or if it is employed 
in exercise of the inherent r ight to individual or collective self-defence.4 
Evidently, the emergence of the prohibition of the use of force resulted in 
decisive changes in the direct legal environment of humanitarian intervention, 
one of the most ancient institutions of international law, as wel l . Owing to a 
l ack of positive legal sources in this field, it is extremely difficult to define 
this phenomenon of international relations, and its description can hardly claim 
general recognition. In my view, the definition of humanitarian intervention 
valid under contemporary international law can be summarised—on the basis of 
the relevant literature—within the framework of the following set of criteria: 
The subject of humanitarian intervention is one or more "willing" state or 
international organisation. Other actors—for example, non-govemmental organi-
sations—cannot carry out such actions. The intervener acts in a relatively 
disinterested and unbiased manner. The target of intervention can only be a 
state, which does not request or consent to the intervention. The beneficiaries 
of the action are, f rom the viewpoint of the intervener, foreigners, as they are 
a lways nationals of the target state. The ground for intervention is a grave and 
widespread violation of the most fundamental, first generation human rights of 
non-political character, or guarantees of international humanitarian law 
applicable to non-international armed conflicts. Unfortunately, a fairly large 
number of victims of atrocities or of imperilled persons are also indispensable 
fo r the credibility of humanitarian intervention. The target state might be guilty 
of such violations either as a resul t of an active or a passive behaviour, but 
it may also come about that the intervention is necessitated by a state of 
anarchy developing in the wake of the collapse of state power. Furthermore, 
humanitarian intervention is of an ultima ratio nature, restricted in its goals, 
and proportional to the violations constituting its ground both with regard to 
its means and its duration. The relevant norms of international humanitarian 
law—that is, the norms relat ive to armed confl icts of an international 
character—have to be rigorously observed during the action. Last, but not 
least, the internal right to self-determination of the people of the target state has 
to be respected in the course of intervention, which—in my opinion—does not 
automatically rule out the possibility of an overthrow of the oppressive regime. 
It can be observed that the definition as outlined above does not contain the 
legality of the initiation of humanitarian intervention. I think that the legality of 
commencement cannot constitute a conceptual element, since both the renowned 
representatives of the science of international law and states consider—besides 
4
 See, Articles 42 and 51 of the UN Charter. 
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the lawful instances—several conducts of rather questionable legality or of 
manifest unlawfulness as humanitarian interventions. In other words, an unlaw-
fully launched armed action may also be humanitarian in nature, provided that 
the essential, conjunctive conditions required for such qualification exist. It 
might be misleading that—even though the legality of commencement, and 
therefore the overall lawfulness of the intervention is not an element of the 
concept—some of the criteria mentioned in connection with the definition of 
humanitarian intervention valid in the present era of international law bear a 
legal character and presuppose a law-abiding behaviour. Such elements are, for 
example, the obligation to respect norms of humanitarian law governing 
international armed conflicts or the internal right to self-determination of the 
people of the target state. The existence of these legal conceptual elements, 
however, does not legalise an unlawfully instigated humanitarian intervention. 
These are merely preconditions for the qualification of an action as huma-
nitarian, and as such, are eligible to establish maximum its legitimacy. As the 
quality of humanitarian intervention is per se not a legal title, a self-contained 
analysis of its legality, which, however, does not concern the exact content of 
this category, appears to be sufficiently justified. 
In line with the explanation above, it is obvious that a humanitarian 
intervention is lawful, if it is commenced in possession of a prior and express 
authorisation by the Security Council.3 The pattern of adoption of these 
authorisations is basically the same as the general scheme of adoption of other 
resolutions authorising the use of force, albeit the process carries a few special 
features at some points. The most important among these is probably that an 
authorisation to humanitarian intervention—owing to the nature of the ground 
of the action—is imaginable solely in case of a threat to international peace 
and security, the existence of which has to be, at least implicitly, by a 
reference to Chapter VII, determined by the Security Council under Article 39. 
Since humanitarian intervention is necessitated by events taking place within a 
state, the two further categories under Article 39—that is, a breach of the peace 
or acts of aggression—are irrelevant in this regard, in view of the fact that 
these imply forms of conduct arching over borders of states.7 States and 
5
 On the lawfulness of authorisation, see, Blokker, N.: Is the Authorization 
Authorized? Powers and Practice of the UN Security Council to Authorize the Use of 
Force by "Coalitions of the Able and Willing." European Journal of International Law, 
Vol. 11. No. 3. (September 2000), 541-568. 
7
 Since the Charter does not define any of these notions, the Security Council has an 
extraordinarily broad discretion in the determination of the existence of a threat to the 
peace, a breach of the peace, or an act of aggression. (Although the definition of aggression 
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international organisations may likewise be recipients of an authorisation, 
however they are not obliged to carry it out. Furthermore, the authorisation can 
assume the form neither of a recommendation, nor of a provisional measure, 
even though these types of action, along with non-forcible enforcement 
measures under Article 41, may be able to establish the ultima ratio character 
of humanitarian intervention. Consequently, the direct grounds, on which 
humanitarian intervention is considered lawful, are Articles 39 and 42 of the 
Charter. These may be supplemented by a reference to Chapter VIII, in the 
event of an authorisation to regional arrangements or organisations. 
Nonetheless, the Security Council is, by reason of the lack of unanimity of 
its permanent members, often incapable of taking action for the protection of 
an oppressed population in a timely and efficient manner. Since humanitarian 
intervention, which involves the offensive use of force, cannot be classified as 
self-defence, the chance for lawful action on the part of the states willing to 
intervene is thereby extinguished. Such states face the alternative of either 
contemplating the atrocities in inertia or intervening, in knowledge of the fact 
that, in spite of their noble intentions, they will violate international law. It is 
therefore not at all surprising that a recurrent question of international law is, 
whether a so-called unilateral or unauthorised humanitarian intervention can 
nevertheless be justified, and if so, by what legal arguments. In the following, I 
shall make an attempt to provide an exhaustive answer to this question. 
At first sight, it seems to be possible to derive the legality of unauthorised 
humanitarian intervention from a recommendation by the General Assembly 
on the use of force, though it must be noted that this issue, in fact, raises a 
number of serious legal concerns. Two methods are available for the purpose 
of justifying that the General Assembly—even if it bypasses the Security 
Council—can lawfully make a recommendation to states on the use of force, 
including armed humanitarian intervention. One of these theories is based on 
is available in the form of a General Assembly resolution, its content does not bind the 
Council.) This may be the reason why, according to some views, humanitarian intervention 
is admissible in the case of a breach of the peace, as well. See, Hilpold, P.: Sezession und 
humanitäre Intervention — völkerrechtliche Instrumente zur Bewältigung innerstaatlicher 
Konflikte? Zeitschrift für Öffentliches Recht, Band 54. Heft 4. (1999), 591.; Simma, В.— 
Verdross, A.: Universelles Völkerrecht. Theorie und Praxis. Berlin, 1976. 584. 
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the Charter itself, whereas the other rests upon the procedure envisaged by the 
controversial "Uniting for Peace" Resolution. 
The General Assembly is the most representative principal organ of the 
UN, given that that all member states of the Organisation are represented in it.9 
Simultaneously, it is also the organ with the largest scope of powers, although 
its activity is primarily deliberative and critical.10 The general description of 
the powers and functions of the General Assembly is set forth in Article 10 of 
the Charter." As the provision reflects, there is practically no segment of 
international relations, which the General Assembly is not competent to deal 
with. It should be added that the powers guaranteed under this article—as a 
consequence of Article 2, paragraph 6—exist also with respect to non-members. 
In this regard, the sole substantial limitation is specified under Article 2, 
paragraph 7, concerning the prohibition of intervention. Therefore, the General 
Assembly is not competent in issues, "which are essentially within the domestic 
jurisdiction of any state". As it is known, neither human rights, nor fundamental 
guarantees of international humanitarian law qualify as matters being within 
the scope of domestic jurisdiction, thus the attending to these matters does not 
manifest itself as an intervention by the Organisation. The demonstration of 
the legality of humanitarian intervention based upon a recommendation by the 
General Assembly is, therefore, "half-accomplished". However, the verifi-
cation of the remaining "ha l f ' is much more difficult, as it needs to be proven 
that the General Assembly can lawfully make recommendations on the use of 
force, despite that the Charter attributes the power regarding such enforcement 
measures to the Security Council in an apparently exclusionary manner.12 
Article 10 mentions the scope of the Charter, which incorporates such 
purposes as the maintenance of international peace and security and the 
taking of "effective collective measures" to that end, as well as the promotion 
and encouragement of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms for 
all.13 Furthermore, according to the same article, the General Assembly may 
9
 Cf., Article 9, paragraph 1, of the UN Charter. 
10
 Cf., Kelsen, H.: The Law of the United Nations. A Critical Analysis of Its Funda-
mental Problems. London, 1950. 199-200. 
" Article 10 of the UN Charter: "The General Assembly may discuss any questions or 
any matters within the scope of the present Charter or relating to the powers and functions 
of any organs provided for in the present Charter, and, except as provided in Article 12, 
may make recommendations to the Members of the United Nations or to the Security 
Council or to both on any such questions or matters." 
12
 Cf., ibid.: Article 24, paragraph 2. (The second sentence of this paragraph expressis 
verbis refers to Chapter VII.) 
13
 See, ibid.: Article 1, paragraphs 1 and 3. 
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not only "discuss any questions or any matters within the scope of the present 
Charter or relating to the powers and functions of any organs provided for in 
the present Charter", but may also make recommendations on any such 
questions or matters. The provision contains merely one restriction, which is 
described under Article 12: "While the Security Council is exercising in respect 
of any dispute or situation the functions assigned to it in the present Charter, 
the General Assembly shall not make any recommendation with regard to that 
dispute or situation unless the Security Council so requests."14 
One may easily conclude f rom the wording of Article 10, that the General 
Assembly can indeed make a recommendation on humanitarian intervention 
directly to the members. (Obviously, a recommendation can also be addressed to 
the Security Council and in the event of its acceptance, the Council will 
authorise the use of force in a binding resolution.) Merely on the basis of 
Article 10, it looks as if the General Assembly has to refrain from the making 
of such a recommendation, only if the Security Council is simultaneously 
dealing with the same matter. Moreover, the adoption of a recommendation is 
permitted as a sub-exception even in this case, provided that the Council 
requests the General Assembly to proceed accordingly. 
At this point, the question pertaining to the interpretation of the phrase 
"exercising ... the functions assigned to it" as contained by Article 12, paragraph 
1, arises, since the duration of this activity indicates the beginning and the end 
of the prohibition for the General Assembly to make recommendations. In the 
beginning, the exercise of functions by the Council was deemed equivalent to 
having a specific matter on the agenda, therefore, it is probably not accidental 
that the last sentence of each substantive resolution usually reads as follows: 
"Decides to remain seized of the matter". On the other hand, the view that 
exercising functions entails "simultaneous, actual, and active consideration" on 
the part of the Council has gradually gained ground, which, as an interpretation, 
seems to be justified by the practice of the General Assembly, as well.15 
Consequently, Article 12 contains a provisional procedural limitation that is 
immediately terminated if the Security Council so requests in a resolution, or 
convokes a special or an emergency special session of the General Assembly, 
or ceases or adjourns to deal with the matter.16 
14
 Ibid., Article 12, paragraph 1. 
15
 See, Hailbronner, K.—Klein, E.: Article 12, in: The Charter of the United Nations: A 
Commentary (ed.: Simma, В.). Oxford, 1995. 256. Concerning Article 12, paragraph 1, see 
also, Blum, Y. Z.: Eroding the United Nations Charter. Dordrecht-Boston-London, 1993. 
103-132. 
16
 See, Hailbronner—Klein: Article 12, 259-261. 
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However, by making a preliminary conclusion from the interpretation of 
the text of Article 10, we have not found the ultimate answer to the question 
whether or not the General Assembly can recommend enforcement measures, 
including the use of force, under the Charter. Even though the answer is prima 
facie in the affirmative, it does not follow that other provisions of the Charter, 
or other sources of interpretation support it. Our preliminary conclusion 
seems to be contrary to Article 11, paragraph 2, which specifies the text of 
Article 10.17 
The well-known second clause of this paragraph leaves no room for doubt 
18 
that "action", that is, the taking of enforcement measures, is admissible 
exclusively by the Security Council; consequently, the General Assembly cannot 
make such a recommendation. Furthermore, the submission of a dispute or a 
recommendation to the Council does by no means oblige it to actually take the 
action deemed necessary by the General Assembly.14 Nevertheless, Article 11, 
paragraph 2, is related to Article 10 as the specific to the general. This is 
indicated by the fact that while Article 10 contains only one limitation (Article 
12), Article 11, paragraph 2, specifies not less than three restrictions: the 
requirement of an adequate request, as a result of which the General Assembly 
cannot proceed on its own motive under this paragraph; Article 12; and in case 
action is necessary, the obligation to refer the dispute to the Security Council. 
But pursuant to Article 11, paragraph 4, "the powers of the General Assembly 
set forth in this Article shall not limit the general scope of Article 10". This 
provision can be interpreted in several ways. One of the interpretations implies 
that the General Assembly is not bound by the limitations under Article 11, so 
20 
far as it proceeds and makes a recommendation under Article 10." But a 
contrary interpretation is also acceptable, considering that paragraph 4 refers to 
17
 Article 11, paragraph 2, of the UN Charter: "The General Assembly may discuss any 
questions relating to the maintenance of international peace and security brought before it 
by any Member of the United Nations, or by the Security Council, or by a state which is 
not a Member of the United Nations in accordance with Article 35, paragraph 2, and, 
except as provided under Article 12, may make recommendations with regard to any such 
questions to the state or states concerned or to the Security Council or to both. Any such 
question on which action is necessary shall be referred to the Security Council by the 
General Assembly either before or after discussion. " (Emphasis added.) 
18
 See, Kelsen: op. cit. 204. 
See, Hailbronner, K.—Klein, E.: Article 11, in Simma: The Charter of the United 
Nations, op. cit. 250. 
20
 See, Kelsen: op. cit. 204, 207. 
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powers defined under Article 11, whereas the obligation to refer the dispute to 
the Council does not constitute a power, but rather is a procedural norm.21 
As a further counter-argument, one could mention that the debates in the 
course of the wording of the Charter likewise reveal that the General Assembly 
cannot recommend the taking of enforcement measures. This argument cor-
responds to the position of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) expressed in 
its famous advisory opinion of July 20, 1962." Nevertheless, according to a 
remarkable point of view, this advisory opinion does not make it absolutely 
clear whether or not the General Assembly can make such a recommendation. 
According to this view, the meaning of the second clause of Article 11, 
paragraph 2, is determined by the term "enforcement", since the word 
"action"—as confirmed by the ICJ—refers to enforcement measures. In line 
with the formal definition of this phrase, "the existence of an 'enforcement 
action' is not determined by the character of the action itself but by the binding 
nature of the measure taken". Hence, the clause under deliberation limits the 
power of the General Assembly to make recommendations exclusively in case, 
if it considers that a resolution on mandatory enforcement measures has to be 
adopted by the Security Council for the settlement of a situation. Upon these 
premises one can easily draw the conclusion, supported to some extent by the 
practice of the General Assembly, that: "Therefore a non-binding recommen-
dation is not to be considered as 'action', so that the GA is not prevented by 
Art. 11(2) cl. 2 from recommending coercive measures. This norm only recalls 
the fact that the GA shall not take any enforcement measures binding on all 
member states." In a certain way, even the ICJ affirmed this position, when it 
stated that the responsibility conferred upon the Security Council was 
"primary, not exclusive", thus, the General Assembly was also to be concerned 
with international peace and security, what is more, its functions and powers 
were not merely hortatory.24 
21
 See, Hailbronner—Klein: Article 11, 252. 
" "The word "action" must mean such action as is solely within the province of the 
Security Council. [. . .] The "action" which is solely within the province of the Security 
Council is that which is indicated by the title of Chapter VII of the Charter, namely 
"Action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression." 
Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter), Advisory 
Opinion of 20 July 1962, I.C.J. Reports 1962, 165. 
"
3
 For the theory and the cited opinion, see, Hailbronner, K.—Klein, E.: Article 10, in 
Simrna: The Charter of the United Nations, op. cit. 233. For a summary of the relevant 
practice of the General Assembly, see, ibid., 234. 
"
4
 See, Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, paragraph 2, of the 
Charter), Advisory Opinion of 20 July 1962, I.C.J. Reports 1962, 163. 
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Pursuing this train of thought, one arrives at the conclusion that, even 
though the Security Council bears primary responsibility in the field of the 
maintenance of international peace and security, as illustrated by Article 12, 
nothing in the Charter prohibits the General Assembly to recommend the use of 
force, including the commencement of a humanitarian intervention, in exercise 
of its "secondary" or "supplementary" responsibility.25 (It is worth noting, how-
ever, that according to all indications, not even the Council is entitled to make 
a recommendation on the use of force, since the authorisation must assume the 
form of a binding resolution.26) At the same time, it also follows f rom the 
relevant provisions of the Charter that recommendations under Article 10 can be 
made directly to the member states, whereas recommendations under Article 
11, paragraph 2, are addressed to the states "concerned", that is, both members 
and non-members. The General Assembly can make a recommendation to 
international organisations only indirectly, via states. 
The derivation of the legality of humanitarian intervention from the "Uniting 
for Peace" Resolution is a solution with an equally controversial outcome. 
According to the central provision of the resolution, the General Assembly: 
"Resolves that if the Security Council, because of lack of unanimity of the 
permanent members, fails to exercise its primary responsibility for the 
maintenance of international peace and security in any case where there 
appears to be a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression, 
the General Assembly shall consider the matter immediately with a view to 
making appropriate recommendations to Members for collective measures, 
including in the case of a breach of the peace or act of aggression the use of 
armed force when necessary, to maintain or restore international peace and 
security. If not in session at the time, the General Assembly may meet in 
emergency special session within twenty-four hours of the request therefor. 
Such emergency special session shall be called if requested by the Security 
Council on the vote of any seven members, or by a majority of the Members 
of the United Nations."27 
25
 On residual powers, see, e.g. Prandler, Á.: Az ENSZ Biztonsági Tanácsa. [The UN 
Security Council] Budapest, 1974. 298-300. 
26
 Cf., Frowein, J. A.: Article 42, in Simma: The Charter of the United Nations, op. cit. 
614-615. 
27
 Uniting for Peace. G.A. Res. 377A, 302nd plen. mtg., 3 November 1950, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/377A (V), para. A. 1. Since the number of the members of the Security Council has 
been raised to fifteen, at present nine votes are necessary for the convocation of an 
emergency special session of the General Assembly. 
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At first sight, t h e "Uniting fo r Peace" Reso lu t ion seems to b e an appropr ia te 
g round of the lawfulness of a humanitar ian intervention, and it is f r equen t ly 
28 
ref lected by t h e relevant l i terature." T w o factors , however , contradict the 
uncondi t ional applicabili ty of th i s resolution. O n the one hand , its legality a n d 
conformi ty w i th the Charter is at least d u b i o u s , so its adop t ion has t r iggered 
extremely f i e r ce debates both in practice and in scientific c i rc les . Although the 
charges brought up against the resolution w e r e to a large ex ten t attributable to 
the international context of the Cold War, s u c h an extension of the powers of 
the General Assembly seems somewhat pe r i lous even f r o m a clearly legal 
po in t of v iew. Without p rov id ing a detailed presentat ion of the arguments and 
coun te r -a rgumen t s raised in the course of t h e s e disputes,24 it c a n be stated that 
the "Uniting f o r Peace" Resolut ion can be t aken into considerat ion with respect 
to the jus t i f ica t ion of humani tar ian intervention, only if it qua l i f i e s as a l a w f u l 
instrument. T o put it briefly, its legality c a n only be demonst ra ted , if o n e 
p roves that the General A s s e m b l y is enti t led to recommend the use of f o r c e 
"
8
 See, e.g. Abiew, F. K.: The Evolution of the Doctrine and Practice of Humanitarian 
Intervention. The Hague-London-Boston, 1999. 100. (Footnote 106); Advisory Council of 
International Affairs—Advisory Committee on Issues of Public International Law: 
Humanitarian Intervention. No. 13. The Hague, 2000. 26.; Arias, I.: Humanitarian Inter-
vention: Could the Security Council Kill the United Nations? Fordham International Law 
Journal, Vol. 23. No. 4. (April 2000), 1026.; Independent International Commission on 
Kosovo: The Kosovo Report. New York, 2000. 166, 174.; Nagy, В.: Hadban állunk? [Are 
We at War?] Élet és Irodalom, Vol. XLIII. No. 15. (16 April 1999), 3.; Pellet, A.: Brief 
Remarks on the Unilateral Use of Force. European Journal of International Law, Vol. 11. 
No. 2. (2000), 390.; Reisman, W. M.: Humanitarian Intervention to Protect the Ibos. (With 
the collaboration of McDougal, M. S.), in Humanitarian Intervention and the United 
Nations (ed.: Lillich, R. B. ). Charlottesville, 1973. 175, 190. For an opposing view, see, 
Gowlland-Debbas, V.: The Limits of Unilateral Enforcement of Community Objectives in 
the Framework of UN Peace Maintenance. European Journal of International Law, Vol. 
11. No. 2. (2000), 374.; Valki, L.: A koszovói válság és a humanitárius intervenció. [The 
Kosovo Crisis and Humanitarian Intervention] Acta Humana, No. 46-47. (2002), 157-158. 
For an intermediary view, according to which it is questionable if the unilateralism 
manifested in the "Uniting for Peace" Resolution is a legitimate substitute for collective 
measures, see, Dupuy, P.-M.: The Place and Role of Unilateralism in Contemporary 
International Law. European Journal of International Law, Vol. 11. No. 1. (2000), 27. 
~
4
 On this issue, see, Andrassy, J.: Uniting for Peace. American Journal of International 
Law, Vol. 50. No. 3. (July 1956), 563-582.; Kelsen, H.: Recent Trends in the Law of the 
United Nations. A Supplement to the "The Law of the United Nations". London, 1951. 
953-990.; Prandler: op. cit., 271-276.; Woolsey, L. H.: The "Uniting for Peace" Resolution 
of the United Nations. American Journal of International Law, Vol. 45. No. 1. (January 
1951), 129-137. 
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even beyond the scope of this resolution, that is, on the basis of the Charter. 
Otherwise, the document qualifies as an unlawful amendment to the Charter,30 
and its adoption is to be considered an ultra vires act. As it follows from the 
previous part, the Charter allows for both interpretations in the context of such 
recommendations by the General Assembly, nevertheless, if the permissive 
interpretation had been absolutely correct, the adoption of the "Uniting for 
Peace" Resolution probably would not have been necessary. At the same time, 
one cannot fail to observe that the once so fierce debates have almost entirely 
diminished, and despite the concerns regarding lawfulness, the resolution has 
been integrated into the practice of the UN. Although, the instrument had been 
used to confront an aggression during the Korean War, afterwards it has rather 
served the purposes of peace-keeping or the convocation of emergency special 
sessions.31 Notwithstanding, it can reasonably be assumed that in case the 
resolution was applied for the justification of the use of force, the debates 
would flare up again. 
The applicability of the "Uniting for Peace" Resolution for the justification 
of humanitarian intervention is also undermined by the following phrase of the 
cited provision: "including in the case of a breach of the peace or act of 
aggression the use of armed force when necessary". A recommendation on the 
use of force is, consequently, permissible exclusively in the gravest situations, in 
case of a breach of the peace or acts of aggression, whereas in the event of a 
threat to the peace, which embraces the violations of human rights or 
32 
humanitarian law necessitating humanitarian intervention, it is inadmissible. " In 
view of this conclusion, the "Uniting for Peace" Resolution, regardless of the 
issue of its legality, seems to be entirely inapplicable. One "escape route" is, 
nevertheless, conceivable: if the emergency special session is convoked at a 
time, when the Security Council, due to the lack of the unanimity of its 
permanent members, is not even able to adopt a resolution on the determination 
of a situation under Article 39. Owing to the fact that the Security Council has 
exclusive power to determine the existence of a threat to the peace, a breach of 
the peace, or an act of aggression in an authentic and binding manner, a decision 
30
 Cf., Articles 108 and 109 of the UN Charter. 
31
 See, Hailbronner—Klein: Article 10, 235-236.; Higgins, R.: The Development of 
International Law Through the Political Organs of the United Nations. London-New 
York-Toronto, 1963. 227-228. 
32
 For a similar position, see, Danish Institute of International Affairs: Humanitarian 
Intervention: Legal and Political Aspects. Copenhagen, 1999. 61.; Murphy, S. D.: 
Humanitarian Intervention. The United Nations in an Evolving World Order. Philadelphia, 
1996. 300. 
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of similar effect cannot be adopted by any other principal organ, not even the 
General Assembly. In absence of a determination under Article 39, it is after all 
irrelevant how the Council would qualify the given situation, therefore, the 
General Assembly can recommend the use of force in the event of a violation of 
human rights or fundamental guarantees of international humanitarian law. 
However, if the Council has previously qualified the atrocities as a threat to the 
peace, the "Uniting for Peace" Resolution cannot establish the legality of 
humanitarian intervention. It has to be emphasised that this "escape route" is 
presumably contrary to the requirement of bona fide exercise of rights; 
nevertheless, state practice does not completely refrain from solutions of such 
nature. Still I believe that if the states willing to intervene cannot obtain the 
indispensable authorisation from the Security Council, they should resort to the 
"Uniting for Peace" Resolution before they launch the attack. Despite that a 
recommendation adopted by a two-thirds majority of the members of the 
General Assembly will not necessarily secure legality, it would guarantee a great 
deal of legitimacy for the use of force. 
I I I . 
As I already mentioned above, the condition of the lawfulness of use of force 
is a prior and express authorisation by the Security Council under Chapter VII 
of the Charter. However, at the end of the 20th century, as a quasi abstraction 
of state practice, the idea according to which the authorisation does not have to 
be prior and express, but it can also appear in an implicit or an ex post facto 
form, gained ever increasing ground in the relevant literature. It is not 
astonishing that these "two variants" of Council authorisation not contained by 
the Charter have acquired great significance in connection with the legality of 
humanitarian intervention, as well. 
Implicit authorisation, as the phrase itself indicates, does not assume an 
express form and is not issued in a separate resolution, but it does not imply 
total silence on the part of the Security Council either—its existence can be 
deduced from certain conclusive facts. But which facts attest that such an 
authorisation has been granted? First of all, one can infer from the text of 
earlier resolutions adopted with respect to the crisis concerned that this principal 
organ has implicitly authorised the use of force. An extremely important 
precondition is that the crisis, as expressly determined by the Council under 
Article 39, qualifies as a threat to international peace and security. Without 
such determination, furnishing evidence for an implicit authorisation is an 
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attempt committed to failure, since the bottom line for the adoption of measures 
under Chapter VII is the existence of a threat to the peace. Thus, despite 
the fact that on the basis of the theory of implicit authorisation, the "real" 
authorisation for the use of force is tacit, the determination under Article 39 
has to be explicit. 
The determination of a threat to the peace by itself obviously constitutes an 
insufficient basis for proving that the Security Council has implicitly authorised 
the use of force. The chance of a successful argumentation is, consequently, 
greater in case the Council—following the determination—has taken provisional 
measures or non-forcible enforcement measures, as well. If recourse to Article 
41 has been inadequate, one may reasonably assume that the next logical step 
to be taken by the Council would be the application of Article 42. Sometimes 
even the Council itself stresses that it will consider "additional measures", if 
non-forcible actions turn out to be inefficient.33 There is rational ground to 
believe that these "additional measures" refer to action pursuant to Article 42, 
although it cannot be excluded either, that by this phrase the Council speaks of 
other, more intensive coercive measures under Article 41, which—of course— 
do not involve the use of force. 
It can be seen that the resolutions of the Council leave room for divergent 
interpretations in this respect. For this reason, it can be useful to support the 
argument concerning the existence of an implicit authorisation with other 
sources, such as the statements of leading politicians of great powers, and acts 
of other organs of the UN, including the statements of the Secretary-General. 
As such, the demonstration of an implicit authorisation implies the enumeration 
and systématisation of a complex network of arguments. As a consequence, the 
argumentation can easily diverge into "arbitrary interpretation" and the 
construction of far-fetched theories. It needs to be admitted that the theory of 
implicit authorisation cannot be considered as being particularly persuasive, 
and accordingly, it receives little theoretical and practical support.34 
The theory of ex post facto authorisation, according to which the authori-
sation by the Security Council to use force is not secured prior, but rather 
subsequent to the commencement of the military action, seems to be more 
13
 For instance, regarding the Kosovo crisis, see, S.C. Res. 1199, 3930th mtg., 23 
September 1998, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1199 (1998), para. 16. 
34
 For a rejecting view, see, Chinkin, C. M.: Kosovo: A "Good" or "Bad" War? 
American Journal of International Law, Vol. 93. No. 4. (1999), 842-843.; Gray, C.: After 
the Ceasefire: Iraq, the Security Council and the Use of Force. British Yearbook of 
International Law (1994), 149.; Independent International Commission on Kosovo, op. cit., 
173. 
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plausible. It must be noted that an alleged ex post facto authorisation also takes 
an implicit form, as if it were express, it would be considered as a "standard" 
authorisation. (As a result, these two "forms" of authorisation are sometimes 
treated in the literature as closely correlated," although, in my view, they can be 
distinguished theoretically on a temporal basis.) An ex post facto authorisation 
does not imply absolute idleness either; just as in the case of an implicit 
authorisation, its existence can be derived from conclusive facts or circum-
stances. Such facts are, for example, the absence of a resolution by the Council 
condemning the unauthorised use of force,3'1 possibly its express acceptance,37 
38 
or the recognition of a situation arising in the wake of the use of force." 
The last one might be the most significant argument, as it is endowed with 
special authority by a fundamental norm of international law, according to 
which no territorial acquisition or special advantage resulting from aggression 
is or shall be recognised as lawful.34 Therefore, it cannot be disregarded if the 
Security Council—the sole organ capable of authentically determining that an 
act of aggression occurred—in a way recognises a situation created by an 
unauthorised use of force, that is, a prima facie act of aggression as lawful. 
This is closely related to the following provision of the General Assembly 
resolution on the Definition of Aggression: 
"The first use of armed force by a State in contravention of the Charter 
shall constitute prima facie evidence of an act of aggression although the 
Security Council may, in conformity with the Charter, conclude that a 
determination that an act of aggression has been committed would not be 
35
 Cf., Simma, В.: NATO, the UN and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects. European 
Journal of International Law. Vol. 10. No. 1. (1999), 10.; Wedgwood, R.: NATO's 
Campaign in Yugoslavia. American Journal of International Law, Vol. 93. No. 4. (October 
1999), 832. 
36
 See, e.g. Security Council: Belarus, India and the Russian Federation: Draft 
Resolution, 26 March 1999, U.N. Doc. S/1999/328. The draft resolution condemning the 
NATO intervention in Kosovo was dismissed by the Security Council by a 12:3 majority. 
37
 Concerning Liberia, see, e.g. Note by the President of the Security Council, 22 
January 1991, U.N. Doc. S/22133 (1991); Note by the President of the Security Council, 7 
May 1992, U.N. Doc. S/23886; S.C. Res. 788, 3138th mtg., 19 November 1992, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/788 (1992), preamble. 
38
 Concerning Kosovo, see, S.C. Res. 1244, 4011th mtg., 10 June 1999, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/1244 (1999). 
39 
Cf., Definition of Aggression. G.A. Res. 3314, 2319th plen. mtg., 14 December 
1974, U.N. Doc. A/RES/3314 (XXIX), Annex, Article 5(3). 
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justified in the light of other relevant circumstances, including the fact that 
the acts concerned or their consequences are not of sufficient gravity."40 
In other words, the Security Council may qualify a unilateral humanitarian inter-
vention both as an act of aggression and as its opposite. Since the Definition of 
Aggression does not specify what form this determination should take, one 
might as well conclude that it could be implicit and ex post facto. It should be 
borne in mind that it is only the determination of the existence of an act of 
aggression that Article 39 of the Charter binds to the form of a resolution, 
whereas it does not provide for the determination of the absence thereof. 
Framing the absence of an act of aggression in a separate resolution is not only 
an unnecessary, but also a hazardous step. Hazardous, since the adoption of 
such resolution—in view of the fact that it is a substantive resolution— 
presupposes the unanimity of the five permanent members. It is easy to predict 
what would happen, if a permanent member vetoed—or at least nine members 
of the Council, including the permanent members did not approve of—the 
draft resolution concerned. Such result could easily be interpreted in a way that 
the rejection of the draft resolution equals the determination of an act of 
aggression, although this distorted interpretation would scarcely be in 
compliance with the content of Article 27, paragraph 3, or with Article 39. 
The determination of the absence of an act of aggression by the Council 
probably implies "constructive" silence, or recognition of the situation thus 
arisen in a resolution. It does not imply, however, that the unilateral use of 
force was lawful. The Security Council may also qualify lawful actions as 
threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, or acts of aggression, therefore, its 
position does not necessarily reflect—albeit strongly indicates—the unlaw-
fulness of a conduct. Reversing this statement, one arrives at the conclusion 
that stillness on the part of the Council is not equal to the recognition of the 
legality of an action.41 This, to some extent, limits the plausibility of both the 
implicit and the express forms of ex post facto authorisation as means of 
subsequent acceptance of a unilateral action. This might be one of the reasons 
why the idea of ex post facto authorisation is not widely supported in the 
science of international law either.42 
40
 Ibid., Article 2. 
41
 Cf.. Gray: op. cit., 163. 
See, e.g. Charney, J. I.: Anticipatory Humanitarian Intervention in Kosovo. American 
Journal of International Law, Vol. 93. No. 4. (October 1999), 835.; Gray: op. cit., 163.; 
McWhinney, E.: The United Nations and a New World Order for a New Millennium. Self-
determination, State Succession, and Humanitarian Intervention. The Hague-London-
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IV. 
In the literature concerning humanitarian intervention we often encounter the 
view that the Charter does not forbid, on the contrary, it generally allows for 
such interventions even in absence of an authorisation by the Security Council. W. 
Michael Reisman expressly submitted that "the advent of the United Nations 
neither terminated nor weakened the customary institution of humanitarian 
intervention", what is more, "the Charter strengthened and extended it".43 
The derivation of a right of humanitarian intervention from the Charter is 
primarily based on the restrictive interpretation of Article 2, paragraph 4, 
according to which this provision does not ban each and every form of the use 
or threat of force, as opposed to the generally accepted construction implying a 
comprehensive prohibition.44 The restrictive interpretation is, on the one hand, 
supported by the idea that Article 2, paragraph 4, "was never an independent 
ethical imperative of pacifism" and it gained its cogency "in the context of the 
Organization envisaged by the Charter and not as a moral postulate",45 and on 
the other hand, by the circumstance that this particular section constitutes merely 
one of the elements of a complex collective security system, so it must be inter-
preted accordingly. For that reason, both the text of the article and the spirit of 
the Charter have to be taken into consideration in the course of interpretation.4'' 
According to the restrictive interpretation, references to territorial integrity, 
political independence and the purposes of the United Nations in Article 2, 
paragraph 4, are not meant to secure the comprehensive nature of the 
prohibition, but to qualify and define the manifestations of force outlawed under 
the provision.47 Namely, these references can barely have a different function, 
assuming that the concerned parts of the text are not superfluous. Therefore, the 
three phrases cover three restrictions, as a consequence of which Article 2, 
Boston, 2000. 74.; Ress, G.: Article 53, in Simma: The Charter of the United Nations, op. 
cit. 733-734. 
41
 Reisman: Humanitarian Intervention to Protect the Ibos. op. cit. 171. 
44
 See, e.g. Abiew: op. cit., 93-95.; Brenfors, M.—Petersen, M. M.: The Legality of 
Unilateral Humanitarian Intervention—A Defence. Nordic Journal of International Law, 
Vol. 69. No. 4. (2000), 466^168.; Reisman: Humanitarian Intervention to Protect the Ibos, 
177.; Tesón, F. R.: Humanitarian Intervention: An Inquiry into Law and Morality. Second 
Edition. Irvington-On-Hudson, 1997. 149-151. 
45 
Reisman, W. M.: Coercion and Self-Determination: Construing Charter Article 2(4). 
American Journal of International Law, Vol. 78. No. 3. (July 1984), 642. 46
 See, ibid., 645. 
47
 Cf., Stone, J.: Aggression and World Order. A Critique of United Nations Theories 
of Aggression. London, 1958. 95. 
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paragraph 4, qualifies "the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity 
or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with 
the Purposes of the United Nations" as unlawful, but it does not encompass the 
forms of force beyond that scope. The argument would sound as follows: since 
humanitarian intervention is designed to stop grave and massive violations of 
human rights, it is conceptually excluded that it is directed against the territorial 
integrity or the political independence of the target state. If an intervention 
forcefully modifies the borders, or it is obviously directed at the destruction of 
the prevailing political order, it does not qualify as humanitarian intervention. 
The exemption of an intervention from the "political independence" clause can 
also be derived in another way. As human rights issues are no longer within the 
domestic jurisdictions of states as pursuant to Article 2, paragraph 7, the 
treatment of individuals by a state does not constitute a segment of "political 
independence" under Article 2, paragraph 4. Because both provisions are parts 
of the same whole, that is, the Charter, the modification of one notion obviously 
48 
affects the other, as well. On that basis, humanitarian intervention does not fall 
within the effect of the first two qualifying phrases of Article 2, paragraph 4. 
A similar conclusion can be reached upon the examination of the third 
phrase. The commitment to the "promoting and encouraging respect for human 
rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, 
language, or religion"44 is mentioned among the purposes of the United Nations 
spelled out in Article 1 of the Charter. This commitment is also framed under 
Article 55(c) and Article 56, as well as in the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, especially, if it is construed as an authentic interpretation of the Charter. 
The British Prime Minister, Mr. Clement Attlee, likewise affirmed the 
importance of this undertaking while opening the first plenary meeting of the 
General Assembly on January 10, 1946.50 
The conclusion, therefore, that humanitarian intervention does not contradict 
the third phrase of Article 2, paragraph 4, seems believable, although the 
maintenance of international peace and security and the peaceful adjustment or 
settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach 
48
 Cf., Reisman, W. M.: Kosovo's Antinomies. American Journal of International Law, 
Vol. 93. No. 4. (October 1999), 861. 
44
 See, Article 1, paragraph 3, of the UN Charter. 
50
 See, Verbatim Record of the First Plenary Meeting, 10 January 1946, U.N. Doc. 
A/PV.l, 41. In a similar manner, see, Annan, K. A.: Standing Up for Human Rights. 
Address to the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, Geneva, 7 April 1999, in 
Annan, K. A.: The Question of Intervention. Statements by the Secretary-General. New 
York, 1999. 19. 
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of the peace are equally included among the puiposes of the Organisation.51 As 
a matter of fact, humanitarian interventions explicitly promote the effective 
implementation of the purpose concerned, because they may prevent future 
52 
acts of aggression. " Finally, there exists a further, but less convincing theoretical 
way to prove that the use of force does not contradict the purposes of the 
United Nations. As Julius Stone submitted, Article 1 of the Charter does not 
necessarily establish additional legal obligations for the member states, but 
merely sets forth the purposes of the Organisation itself.51 
A further interesting point is that the restrictive interpretation of Article 2, 
paragraph 4, has emerged not only in literature, but also in practice. Belgium, 
for instance, made the following statement in the proceedings before the ICJ 
with regard to NATO air operations against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
in 1999: "The purpose of NATO's intervention is to rescue a people in peril, in 
deep distress. For this reason the Kingdom of Belgium takes the view that this 
is an armed humanitarian intervention, compatible with Article 2, paragraph 4, 
of the Charter, which covers only intervention against the territorial integrity 
or political independence of a State."54 
As I have already indicated, such interpretation of Article 2, paragraph 4, is 
an isolated view in the science of international law, and is not really supported 
by state practice either. Furthermore it is equally incommensurate with the 
travaux préparatoires, and the spirit and letter of the Charter. The most serious 
deficiency of the argument is that it identifies the territorial integrity of a state 
with the obligation to respect its borders. The reference to territorial integrity, 
however, must be interpreted as non-violability of the territory; consequently, 
an act of aggression, which transgresses the borders of a state, is in no case 
consistent with Article 2, paragraph 4.55 In view of such content, the whole 
theory is practically refuted—at least with respect to humanitarian inter-
51
 See, Article 1, paragraph 1, of the UN Charter. 
52
 Cf., Murphy: op. cit., 292-293. 
53
 See, Stone: op. cit., 96. 
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 Case concerning Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. Belgium), Public sitting 
held on Monday, 10 May 1999 at 3 p.m. at the Peace Palace, Verbatim Record, CR 99/15 
(translation, uncorrected). 
55
 See, Randelzhofer, A.: Article 2(4), in Simma: The Charter of the United Nations, 
op. cit. 117-118. This is confirmed by Article 3(b) of the General Assembly resolution on 
the Definition of Aggression, according to which aggression is, inter alia: "Bombardment 
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Res. 3314, 2319th plen. mtg., 14 December 1974, U.N. Doc. A/RES/3314 (XXIX), Annex, 
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vention. (Even though the violation of territorial integrity does not occur in the 
hypothetical case of an intervention carried out in a res communis omnius usus 
territory, the injury arising from the coercion employed against the political 
independence of the target state, the attack against its armed forces, or a 
potential violation of the res communis omnium usus status all entail the 
unlawfulness of the action.) 
Although, the restrictive interpretation of Article 2, paragraph 4, can be 
sufficiently challenged by the aforementioned counter-arguments concerning 
territorial integrity, the two other segments—that is political independence and 
the purposes of the UN—has to be briefly dwelled upon, as well. Whether or 
not political independence is violated by an intervention, depends on the 
meaning one attributes to this notion. If political independence is construed as 
the freedom of a government from external pressure or interference, all forms 
of humanitarian intervention will violate it, since it coerces the government 
into such behaviour, which contradicts its will. But if the concept is interpreted 
as the right of a people to freely determine the political system and the form of 
government, one is likely to arrive at a divergent conclusion.56 Faced with such 
a dilemma, an adequate answer is subject to the following, partly morally, partly 
legally implicated question: Is the despotic government satisfactory to the 
population and, primarily, to the victims of atrocities? In exercise of their right 
to a free choice of government, do they wish to sustain the oppressive regime? 
If the answer is positive, the intervention will violate political independence; if 
the answer is negative, it will not. (In the latter case, humanitarian intervention 
can with good reason be seen as "an extension of the domestic right to 
revolution".57) Finally, if political independence is interpreted generally, as 
the existing political system of a state, the conclusion will, once again, be 
ambivalent. Although, humanitarian intervention is not meant to reshape the 
political system, and it merely wishes to impose certain behaviour on the target 
state, this objective cannot always be achieved without the overthrow of the 
government. It is worth noting that assuming the violation of political 
independence in a so-called "failed state"—that is, a state sunk into total 
anarchy—is senseless, since in such an entity no state power or political 
system, which could be violated by the use of force, exists. (Nevertheless, the 
territorial integrity of the target state and, therefore, Article 2, paragraph 4, of 
the Charter, still remain violable. The reason is that "territorial integrity" and 
"political independence" stand in a disjunctive relation in the text of the article.) 
56
 For these two alternative interpretations of "political independence", see, Fawcett, J. 
E. S.: Intervention in International Law. Recueil des Cours, Tome 103 (1961-II), 354. 
57
 See, Tesón: op. cit., 91. 
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By a logically constructed hierarchy among the purposes of the UN, one 
can effortlessly challenge the reasoning, according to which humanitarian inter-
vention is compatible with these purposes. As Eduardo Jiménez de Aréchaga 
wrote: "The context of the Charter demonstrates however that in the field of 
security, and with regard to the use of force, all other purposes of the United 
Nations are to be subordinated to the dominant one stated in Article 1, 
paragraph 1, which is "to maintain international peace and security."58 
Peace in a broader sense is certainly not equal to the absence of the use of 
armed force, as it also requires, inter alia, the observance of human rights. 
Nevertheless, it would be extremely risky to interpret this relationship in a way 
that the use of force for humanitarian purposes promotes peace, and thereby, 
the purposes of the UN in all cases. A mechanical presumption of this relation 
is admissible exclusively with respect to interventions authorised by the Security 
Council. 
The contradictions residing in such reference to the purposes of the UN are 
excellently illustrated by the argument, according to which, if a deviation from 
Article 2, paragraph 4, is admissible in order to promote the protection of human 
rights as provided for under Article 1, paragraph 3, along the same logic, armed 
interventions for economic, social or cultural purposes would likewise qualify as 
lawful, since these potential grounds are also listed among the purposes of the 
Organisation and, in fact, set forth in the same section.59 The sole deficiency of 
this counter-argument is that economic, social and cultural matters, as opposed 
to human rights, have remained predominantly a part of domaine réservé. 
The Preamble of the Charter is also frequently invoked for the justification 
of humanitarian intervention. The second sentence of the Preamble states that 
"the peoples of the United Nations" are determined "to reaffirm faith in 
fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the 
equal rights of men and women". In the subsequent paragraphs, the intention to 
prevent the use of armed force is also framed, but with an important exception: 
"save in the common interest". To ensure respect for fundamental human rights, 
primarily by reason of their connection to international peace and security, is 
probably a legitimate "common interest". Since the Preamble contains the 
general purposes of the Charter, a number of authors think that the legality of 
the use of force for humanitarian purposes can be derived f rom its formu-
58
 Jiménez de Aréchaga, E.: International Law in the Past Third of the Century. Recueil 
des Cours, Tome 159 (1978-1), 91. 
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lation.6" Such actions, as a result of the connection referred to above, seem to 
simultaneously promote the enforcement of the purposes of the UN, both in 
terms of the maintenance and restoration of international peace and security, 
and of the promotion and encouragement of respect for human rights. 
The opinion, according to which the lawfulness of intervention can be 
grounded on the Preamble, is very poorly supported, thus, it chiefly serves as a 
supplementary argument, for instance, to the restrictive interpretation of Article 
2, paragraph 4. Despite that the Preamble is an integral part of the Charter, it 
does not stipulate independent obligations for the members, but enumerates 
the reasons, motives and general ends necessitating the adoption thereof. 
Accordingly, the practical relevance of the Preamble is extremely insignificant; 
so far it has barely been referred to.61 The theory also fails to answer the 
question: Who or what is entitled to establish that a case of "common interest" 
exists with respect to the use of force? In view of the spirit and letter of the 
Charter, this power seems to be assigned to the Security Council. Therefore, 
recourse to the use of force on grounds of "common interest" is permissible only 
in possession of a prior and express authorisation by the Council. 
Since Article 106 of the Charter62 frequently appears in analyses concerning 
the legality of the use of force,63 I think it also needs to be investigated, if this 
provision can justify humanitarian intervention in the absence of an authori-
sation by the Security Council. In spite of the fact that its deletion has also 
60
 See, Reisman: Humanitarian Intervention to Protect the Ibos. op. cit. 172. 
61
 See, Wolfrum, R.: Preamble, in Simma: The Charter of the United Nations, op. cit. 
48. According to Kelsen, the Preamble constitutes an integral part of the Charter, so it 
virtually has "the same legal validity" as other provisions of the Charter. However, by 
reason of its content, the Preamble does not establish obligations, and "has rather an 
ideological than a legal importance". See, Kelsen: The Law of the United Nations, op. 
cit. 9. 
62
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Declaration, signed at Moscow, October 30, 1943, and France, shall, in accordance with 
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behalf of the Organization as may be necessary for the purpose of maintaining international 
peace and security." 
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 Cf., e.g. Schachter, О.: Authorized Uses of Force by the United Nations and 
Regional Organizations, in Damrosch, L. F.—Scheffer, D. J. (ed.): Law and Force in the 
New International Order. Boulder-San Francisco-Oxford, Westview Press, 1991. 65.; 
Scheffer, D. J.: Commentary on Collective Security, in Damrosch—Scheffer: op. cit., 108. 
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arisen as a demand,64 under certain circumstances, Article 106 could ground the 
lawfulness of humanitarian intervention. Though it merely establishes an 
obligation for the permanent members of the Security Council to consult, it can 
theoretically lead to the taking of a "joint action". As both the context of the 
article and references to Articles 42 and 43 therein reflect, joint action implies 
military action.65 
The permissibility of the use of force under Article 106, however, has 
several conditions. In the first place, one should mention the time factor, 
because the stipulation, as a result of the conditions incorporated therein, is 
of provisional nature: it expires as soon as the Security Council, after the 
conclusion of agreements envisaged in Article 43, has sufficient armed force— 
both in quantity and in quality—at its disposal to take enforcement measures 
under Article 42. The determination of this circumstance presupposes a 
resolution by the Security Council, and at least one agreement concluded under 
Article 43. Since such agreements have not been concluded so far, Article 106 
has been in force since 1945, although, it barely has practical relevance. 
The next, implicit condition, which is the most difficult to comply with, is 
the unanimity of the five permanent members. The use of force under this 
article can take place only in case of a consensus among the permanent 
members of the Security Council; thus Article 106 does not prevent veto. This 
conclusion can be drawn from the fact that such actions would be implemented 
"on behalf of the Organization". The requirement of unanimity, however, does 
not entail that the five states would be bound to actively participate in a joint 
action.66 Again, it has to be emphasised that Article 106 only establishes an 
obligation for the permanent members to consult, not "to agree" or "to act". A 
further implicit condition is that the use of force necessitates a determination by 
the Security Council under Article 39, and a conviction that the maintenance or 
restoration of international peace and security requires such an extreme 
measure. Therefore, joint action, despite its prima facie self-authorising 
character, does not constitute an independent exception to the prohibition of 
the use of force. Nevertheless, Article 106 is inapplicable if the Council 
authorises the members or international organisations to use force.67 
64
 See, Geiger, R.: Article 106, in Simma: The Charter of the United Nations, op. cit. 
1151. 
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 See, ibid., 1150, According to Kelsen, the text of Article 106 does not confine joint 
actions to military actions. See, Kelsen: The Law of the United Nations, op. cit. 760. 
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The demonstration or refusal of customary lawfulness is a permanent element 
of scientific disputes concerning humanitarian intervention. It is not at all 
accidental that this issue has gained outstanding relevance. In view of a possible 
veto in the Security Council, as well as the challengeable nature of other 
methods or theories aimed at the demonstration of the legality of humanitarian 
intervention, customary law can be considered the sole source of international 
law, from which the derivation of a right of humanitarian intervention seems to 
be feasible. The scientific significance of views based on customary law is 
remarkably enhanced by references to traditional international law, that is, by 
arguing that such right had existed in customary law for centuries. So far as an 
author resolves to prove the customary lawfulness of humanitarian intervention 
in the post-Second World War period, the most evident solution is to derive it 
from the variously explicable and extremely vague traditional law. If he also 
manages to prove that the entry into force of the UN Charter has not affected 
the continued existence of this customary right, his endeavours are likely to 
end in success. If, however, someone wishes to demonstrate that a customary 
right of humanitarian intervention no longer prevails in the present era of 
international law, he should claim that it either never constituted a segment of 
international law, or, even if it did, its relevance and raison d'être completely 
vanished as a result of the development of law in the first half of the 20th 
century. As such, the customary law of the past can barely be construed as a 
mere curiosity of legal science in this respect. 
Naturally, both extremes are represented in the literature. Several eminent 
scholars claim that the customary right of humanitarian intervention has 
"survived" the beginning of the new era marked by the adoption of the 
Charter, and it still exists. Therefore, humanitarian intervention is lawful, even 
if it is carried out in absence of a prior and express authorisation. But the 
overwhelming majority of international lawyers believe that such right does 
not exist, and if it had ever existed, the Charter ultimately terminated it. In my 
view, a definitive conclusion pertaining to the lawfulness of humanitarian 
intervention under traditional customary law can scarcely be drawn, because 
the essential opinio iuris cannot be unequivocally demonstrated. The spirit of 
19th century international law suggests the legality of humanitarian inter-
vention; however, this spirit is most likely to have gradually altered at the 
beginning of the 20th century. Thus, one cannot exclude the possibility that a 
customary right of humanitarian intervention, which had prevailed for over a 
century, ceased to exist in the period between the two World Wars. By reason 
of the uncertainties concerning traditional international law, I do not consider 
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the derivation of a contemporary customary right of intervention from the past 
as an expedient solution. Furthermore, I think that even if such right had been 
in existence prior to 1945, it could by no means "survive" the entry into force 
of the Charter. 
However, it is not only traditional international law from which a contemporary 
customary right of humanitarian intervention might be drawn. Given that one 
encounters such interventions even in the UN-era, it has to be contemplated, 
whether the practice of states and international organisations could have 
created a new customary right of humanitarian intervention, either "from 
nothing" or by reviving the relevant norm of traditional international law.68 (It 
has to be noted that in the latter case the continued existence of an alleged past 
customary right of humanitarian intervention cannot be conceived, since the 
present hypothesis implies that lawfulness, if it had existed, was disrupted after 
the Second World War. Accordingly, there must have been a period, in which 
humanitarian intervention qualified as an unlawful action, even if one assumes 
that previously it had been a lawful conduct.) 
Naturally, the simultaneous coexistence of the two constitutive elements of 
customary law—notably, state practice and opinio iuris—is indispensable for 
the evolution of an old-new customary right of intervention. The demonstration 
of the existence of state practice seems less problematic, since the use of force 
for humanitarian purposes has occurred several times since 1945 (e.g., in 
East Pakistan, Cambodia, Uganda, the Central African Empire, Liberia, 
Northern and Southern Iraq, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Somalia, Rwanda, the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia). Yet, the question here is how we assess these actions. 
Obviously, the practice of humanitarian intervention exists only if it is 
constituted by such interventions. Due to the absence of a generally accepted 
definition of humanitarian intervention, opinions vary regarding the 
humanitarian quality of particular interventions. It is always easier to prove 
that a military operation has "dishonest"—for example, political or economic— 
goals, than to show that its commencement was indeed dictated by humanitarian 
considerations. So it appears that the presumption is against the altruistic 
nature of the use of force, so far as unauthorised actions are concerned. It is, 
'
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therefore, not accidental that states apparently refrain from the designation of 
their unilateral actions as humanitarian interventions, even if these could be 
qualified as such. On the other hand, in the context of undoubtedly humanitarian 
and lawful interventions, the issue of differentiation may be a source of significant 
problems. A large segment of the practice of humanitarian intervention can be 
effortlessly disregarded, if one does not classify the given actions as such, but 
consider them as enforcement measures under Chapter VII of the Charter, or as 
peace-keeping—more precisely, peace-enforcement—missions. The classification 
is appropriate even in this case, however, these broader categories are able to 
dissolve the category of authorised humanitarian interventions, which relates 
to them as a part to a whole, and thereby to reduce the number of such 
actions. Last, but not least, the demonstration of state practice is impeded by 
the selectivity and the sporadic nature of interventions, as well. The latter 
circumstance can be attributed not only to the reluctance of the states to act, 
but also to the infrequent occurrences of exceptionally blatant human rights 
violations necessitating the use of force. 
One has to take a negative position concerning the existence of opinio 
iuris.69 This is the only conclusion that can be drawn from the peremptory 
character of the prohibition of the use of force, and from the fact that the 
content of this principle is essentially equivalent to the content of Article 2, 
paragraph 4, of the Charter. Furthermore, both the behaviour of members of 
the international community and the declarations made by various international 
bodies indicate the absence of opinio iuris.10 Consequently, it is more likely— 
as opposed to what I have submitted above—that the reason why states are 
reluctant to qualify their unilateral actions as humanitarian interventions is that 
they are convinced that such quality, by itself, is not a legal title, and cannot 
establish lawfulness. 
The evolution of customary law is, however, a fairly long process. The fact 
that no customary right of humanitarian intervention exists today does not 
64
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imply that it may not develop in the future. If respect for human rights received 
such distinguished attention in the future as nowadays and, according to all 
indications, it will, I would not venture to state that a right of humanitarian 
intervention will never constitute an exception to the prohibition of the use of 
force. However, I would not declare it with absolute certainty either. On the one 
hand, the direction of future development of international law is uncertain, but 
state sovereignty will always be a determining element. On the other hand, 
humanitarian intervention can arise as an exception to the prohibition of the 
use of force only on condition that it acquires a cogent nature, as peremptory 
norms of general international law can be modified only by a subsequent norm 
having the same character—but this is an extremely unlikely possibility for the 
time being. Thirdly, and I think, this is the main counter-argument, no such 
exception is necessary. Today, there are more or less adequately operating 
mechanisms applicable to remedy "common" violation of human rights. But a 
similar statement surprisingly seems valid even with respect to extremely grave 
and widespread violations: according to my opinion, Chapter VII of the Charter 
contains the solution. The legal framework is given; its utilisation is merely a 
question of political will. Besides, it is a mistake to assume that the emergence 
of a customary right of humanitarian intervention would solve the problem 
once for all. Firstly, it would establish merely a right, but not an obligation to 
enforce respect for human rights by the use of force, so it would be unable to 
eliminate selectivity. Secondly, it would inescapably create several opportunities 
for abuse. 
At the same time, it cannot be excluded that a customary right of humani-
tarian intervention has entered the first phase of its evolution. Antonio Cassese 
was presumably referring to that, when he stated that the opinio necessitatis 
concerning the NATO intervention in the Kosovo crisis—typically considered 
as a humanitarian intervention—"has been widespread and seems to be in the 
process of crystallizing; however this has not gone unopposed".71 It is 
noteworthy that Cassese does not imply either that a customary right of 
humanitarian intervention has emerged (he emphasises that international law, 
outside the framework of the Charter, does not authorise such actions), how-
ever, there is general agreement concerning the necessity of the institution. The 
UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, similarly expressed himself rather 
cautiously, when he said: "Emerging slowly, but I believe surely, is an inter-
national norm against the violent repression of minorities that will and must 
71
 Cassese, A.: A Follow-Up: Forcible Humanitarian Countermeasures and Opinio 
Necessitatis. European Journal of International Law, Vol. 10. No. 4. (1999), 791. 
THE LEGALITY OF UNILATERAL HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION. 225 
72 
take precedence over concerns of State sovereignty." But the Secretary-
General did not say either that this norm would grant states carte blanche for 
the use of force for humanitarian purposes. On the contrary, in his speeches, 
he consistently argues for the indispensable role of the United Nations, and 
particularly, the Security Council.73 
VI. 
With the acquisition of a cogent character by a few human rights and by the 
fundamental guarantees of international humanitarian law, such peremptory 
norms of international law have come into existence, the significance of which 
can reasonably be compared to that of the "traditional" norms of ius cogens, 
including the prohibition of the use of force and the principle of non-
intervention.74 Therefore, it is understandable that the idea of a conflict of 
cogent norms has also emerged with respect to the lawfulness of humanitarian 
intervention. Namely, the possibility that, at the core of the problems related to 
unilateral humanitarian intervention, there is a conflict between the cogent 
obligation to respect human rights and fundamental guarantees of humanitarian 
law and the equally cogent prohibition of the use of force. So far as this alleged 
conflict is resolved in favour of the obligation to respect human rights, it seems 
that the prohibition of the use of force cannot prevent the commencement of 
unilateral military actions for humanitarian purposes. 
Prima facie, the theory is undoubtedly pleasing and, in view of the 
statements in literature and in practice concerning the primacy of human rights 
over state sovereignty, it might appear to be sufficiently grounded. In fact, such 
conflict does not exist, and cannot even come into existence. The principal 
reason is that the groups of subjects respectively obliged by the peremptory 
norms concerned are different in the case of humanitarian intervention. The 
obligation to respect human rights and guarantees of international humanitarian 
law binds the potential target state, whereas the prohibition of the use of force 
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binds the states or international organisations willing to intervene in absence of 
an authorisation by the Security Council. Furthermore, a conflict is also ruled 
out by the fact that these peremptory norms similarly prescribe an obligation to 
refrain from a certain conduct, so they cannot interfere with one another. The 
first norm obliges subjects of international law to refrain from the infringement 
of human rights or international humanitarian law, whereas the second norm 
obliges them to refrain from the unauthorised use of force, with the exception 
of self-defence. One could speak of a conflict of norms only if an obligation to 
enforce respect for human rights and fundamental guarantees of humanitarian 
law—that is to say, an active conduct—appeared instead of the obligation to 
respect these rights and guarantees. (In this case, even the groups of subjects 
obliged would be the same.) However, none of the peremptory norms of 
international law oblige states or international organisations to secure respect 
for these rights and guarantees in another state by the use of force. Neither 
does a norm of ius cogens providing a right for that exists. 
But a conflict of norms would not be likely, even if such a rule existed. If 
a cogent obligation to enforce respect for human rights and fundamental 
guarantees of international humanitarian law emerged, the content of the 
prohibition of the use of force, rather than the obligation to respect these 
rights and guarantees would change. In other words: a new and independent 
peremptory norm would not come into existence, but an already existing norm 
would be modified. The modification would occur within the framework of 
one single norm, that is, the prohibition of the use of force, thereby excluding 
the possibility of a conflict of different norms. The normative effect of the 
prohibition of the use of force is not affected in any way by the obligation to 
respect human rights and fundamental guarantees of international humanitarian 
law applicable to non-intemational armed conflicts. As a result, the argument 
under deliberation cannot ground the lawfulness of unilateral humanitarian 
intervention.75 
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Conclusions 
As a short summary of the present analysis, it can be stated that an adequate 
recommendation by the General Assembly might be suitable to ground the 
lawfulness of an unauthorised humanitarian intervention, although this pre-
sumption is far from being unchallengeable, as the Charter also allows for an 
interpretation, which categorically excludes this alternative. The applicability 
of the "Uniting for Peace" Resolution is equally dubious, partly by reason of 
the debates concerning its legality, partly due to the criteria set for the adoption 
of a recommendation on the use of force. Furthermore, neither an alleged 
implicit, nor an ex post facto Security Council authorisation can legalise a 
unilateral humanitarian intervention, because both lacks sufficient basis in 
the Charter. Comparing these two theoretical constructions, ex post facto 
authorisation seems more convincing, since it is more or less firmly justifiable, 
as opposed to an implicit authorisation. Nevertheless, it would be a daring 
statement that either of these could substitute a prior and express authorisation, 
and ground the legality of humanitarian intervention. 
A similarly negative conclusion can be drawn upon the examination of the 
text of the Charter. A thorough study of the document reveals that a right to 
unilateral humanitarian intervention cannot be derived from any of the provisions 
of the Charter—the only possible exception being Article 106 concerning "joint 
actions", although its relevance is rather theoretical, than practical. It explains 
why the proponents of intervention on the grounds of humanity, who generally 
resort to all possible instruments and arguments to support their case, 
remarkably ignore this article. Finally, the lawfulness of unilateral humanitarian 
intervention can neither be justified on the basis of present customary law, nor 
by a hypothetical conflict of peremptory norms of international law. 
Hence humanitarian intervention by no means constitutes a "third" exception 
to the prohibition of the use of force, and is not to be classified as an 
autonomous legal title. It is undoubtedly lawful in only one case: if it is 
commenced in possession of a prior and express authorisation by the Security 
Council. In the rest of the cases, however, the presumption is in favour of 
illegality. Given the sometimes unsatisfactory activity of the Council and 
the constant risk of a veto, this "orthodox" conclusion may appear to be 
disillusioning and insufficient. From another point of view, however, both the 
necessary legal framework—that is, Chapter VII of the Charter—and the 
required state and organisational capacity seem to be present for the use of 
force by the international community against governments, which tread upon 
human rights. An effective utilisation of these means, nevertheless, depends on 
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the actual political will of states, therefore it would be unwise to attribute 
anomalies thus emerging exclusively to a fault of legal regulation, but it would 
be an even greater error to seek a solution in its fundamental and irresponsible 
modification. 
1216-2574/USD 20.00 
© 2003 Akadémiai Kiadó. Budapest 
A C T A JURIDICA HUNGARICA 
44. Nos 3-4. pp. 229-243 (2003) 
ANDRÁS NIKODÉM* 
The European Public Prosecutor: Waiting for Godot?1 
A b s t r a c t . This article offers an excursion into the world of fraud-fight in the European 
context. The first part introduces a hypothetical case on the modus operandi of 
perpetrators of trans-national fraud cases. On the basis of this case, shortcomings of the 
current legal mechanisms protecting the financial interests of the European Community 
will be analyzed. Then the article deals with the establishment of the office of the European 
Public Prosecutor (EPP) as a proposed legislative response to the challenges posed by EC 
fraud. 
Keywords : European Community; European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF); European 
Public Prosecutor, EC fraud; European anti-fraud policy; European Judicial Area; Corpus 
Juris; criminal law protection of the Communi ty ' s financial interests 
Introduction 
EC fraud does not only lead to heated debates in expert circles but also excites 
media attention. It is, and it must be, of great public concern. Less welcomed 
is the interest of organized criminal networks in benefiting from the short-
comings of the current legal mechanisms intended to protect the Community 
institutions and the Community citizens from fraud. These perpetrators do not 
wait to exploit the possibilities in the internal market until the burdensome 
European decision-making machinery finds the solution to the challenges 
posed by trans-national EC fraud cases. While the frontier-free Europe became 
a reality, the problems due to the fragmentation of the criminal law enforce-
ment area in the EU remained. Seven magistrates launched therefore the 
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Geneva Appeal in 1996 drawing attention to the legal deficiencies burdening the 
fight against international financial crime." One year later was the Commission 
initiated Corpus Juris study published opening up a public debate on the role 
and forms of criminal law protection in the European Judicial Space.1 In light 
of the Corpus Juris study further assessments of national legislation on the 
protection of the financial interests of the European Community both in the 
Member States4 and in the candidate countries5 appeared. While most of these 
proposed rules belong yet to the category of lex desiderata, the message is 
clear: reshaping the fragmented criminal law-enforcement area of the EC. 
In this process gained the idea of the establishment of the office for a 
European Prosecutor its significance. The enforcement of the measures 
proposed by the Coipus Juris study would be the duty of a common European 
Prosecutor acting on the single European judicial territory.6 In practical terms 
this would enable the European Public Prosecutor to carry out investigations 
within the European Community and prosecute perpetrators before national 
courts of law. The media response was not fully welcoming to the EPP.7 Nor 
was the Nice IGC that did not finally adopt the proposal of the Commission to 
establish the office of the EPP. Hence the latter published its Green Paper to 
encourage further reflection and debate on the idea of a European Public 
Prosecutor. Meanwhile, following the Presidency Conclusions adopted after 
2 
Select Committee on the European Communities. House of Lords. "Prosecuting 
Fraud on the Communities' Finances-The Corpus Juris. With Evidence." Session 1998/99. 
Report 9. HL Paper 62. London, HMSO, 1999. 27. 3
 "Corpus juris portant dispositions pénales pour la protection des intérêts financiers 
de l'Union européenne. " sous la direction de M. Delmas-Marty. Economica. Paris, 1997. 
4
 "La mise en oeuvre du Corpus juris dans les États membres." Delmas-Marty, M. et 
Vervaele, J. A. E. Utrecht, 2000. 
3
 Study on "Penal and Administrative Sanctions, Settlement, Whistle Blowing and 
Corpus Juris in the Candidate Countries". The Protection of the Financial Interests of the 
EU in the Candidate Countries. By Van Den Wyngaert. Final Report. 11 September 2001. 
published in ERA-Forum. 3-2001. 2-59. 
6
 "Contribution complémentaire de la Commission à la conférence intergouver-
nementale sur les réformes institutionelles — La protection pénale des intérêts financiers 
communautaires : un procureur européen". 29. 9. 2000, COM (2000), 608. 
See for example „Alibi-Staatsanwalt für Europa". Financial Times Deutschland. 10. 
8. 2000. 9. or „Ein EU-Staatsanwalt kommt zu früh." von Helmut Bünder. Frankfurter 
Allgemeine. 8.9. 2000. 13. 
8
 Green Paper on Criminal-Law Protection of the Financial Interests of the Community 
and the Establishment of a European Prosecutor (hereinafter Green Paper), 11. 12. 2001, 
COM(2001)715 final 
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the summit in Tampere4 pro-Eurojust was set up10 to coordinate prosecutions. 
Furthermore, the Commission introduced an ambitious proposal for a directive 
on the criminal law protection of the Community's financial interests." 
The emerged proposals would lead to harmonized criminal substantive and 
procedural rules and to the institution of a European prosecutor responsible for 
the enforcement of these rules. The idea is not an absolute innovation but 
harmonization of criminal law was always a very sensitive political topic in the 
course of European integration.12 There is an evident tension between the interests 
of Member States to preserve traditional prerogatives of state sovereignty13 and 
those of the Community to acquire the necessary means to tackle fraud on the 
European level. 
In light of the above said, and in particular concerning the reforms of 
criminal codes in the candidate countries,14 it is useful to overview before the 
next intergovernmental conference following the European Convention what 
specific changes EC fraud necessitates in the acquis. To this aim, a hypothetical 
case puts into a very practical perspective the modus operandi of perpetrators 
of trans-national EC fraud in the first part of this article. On the basis of this 
9
 Conseil Européen de Tampere: Conclusions de la Présidence. Point 46. 
http://ue.eu.int/en/Info/eurocouncil/index.htm 
10
 Council Decision of 14 December 2000. Official Journal, L. 324, 21. 12. 2000. 
" Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
criminal law protection of the Community's financial interests. 23. 5. 2001. COM(2001)272 
final. 
12
 Noteworthy is in this regard a Commission proposal for a draft treaty, submitted to 
Council in 1976, to amend the Treaties establishing the European Communities so as to 
permit the adoption of common rules on the protection under criminal law of the financial 
interests of the Communities and the prosecution of infringements of the provisions of the 
named Treaties. (Official Journal, Vol. 19. C222, 22 September 1976. 2-18. ) As early as 
in 1976 the Commission reasoned the approval of the proposal as follows: '...the criminal 
law of the Member States cannot usually guarantee the protection of the financial interests 
of the Community nor ensure effective punishment of infringements of the provisions of 
the Treaties establishing the European Communities' (ibid. 2.). The proposal was later 
defeated. 
" "Corpus Juris is neither realistic nor practical and would be incompatible with 
national legal traditions."—reaction of a high ranked civil servant from the Home Office 
quoted by Spencer, J. R.: "The Corpus Juris Project-Has it a Future?" Cambridge Yearbook 
of European Legal Studies. 355. 
14
 It is worth noticing that in Hungary, for example, the criminal code had been amended 
since 1990 almost forty times! See Farkas, Á. and Petra, R.: Problematic Issues of Hungarian 
Criminal Law related to the Protection of the Financial Interests of the European 
Communities. Agon. No. 31. 2001. 2-4. 
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imaginary case will the second part tackle selected major problems in the fight 
against EC fraud. The last part of the article deals with a key institution in the 
recent proposals to counteract the perpetrators of trans-national fraud, the 
European Public Prosecutor. 
Part I. 
The phenomenon of EC Fraud: The case of defected wheel bicycle industry 
corporation 
The European Commission publishes every year its annual report on the Fight 
against fraud including an analysis of data on fraud cases and of recent trends. 
As a consequence of Article 280 (5) of the Amsterdam Treaty, which came 
into force on 1 May 1999, the annual report on 2000 contained for the first time 
a report on the Member Sates activities with a view to protecting the 
Community's financial interests. Moreover, various Community legislative inst-
ruments oblige the Member States to report periodically on their investigative 
activities in certain sectors of Community policies. These reports represent a 
regular source of information for researchers on EC fraud. 
To provide a detailed typology of reported fraud cases goes far beyond the 
limits of this article. What I have tried below is to give account for one type of 
fraud schemes, more precisely, of revenue fraud cases. My aim was to shed 
light on the modus operandi of perpetrators in a case where everything is the 
product of my imagination.'5 
The case 
Defected Wheel Bicycle Industry Corporation is a Chinese enterprise specialized 
in bicycles. One of its target areas is the European market. From 1990 onwards 
this enterprise, together with other Chinese firms, sold loads of bicycles in 
Europe at a relatively cheap price. The reaction of the European Community 
was to protect its market by adopting Council Regulation (EEC) No. 2474/93 
of 8 September 1993. The regulation imposes a definitive anti-dumping duty 
on imports into the Community of bicycles originating in the People's 
Republic of China."' The consequence of the regulation is that Chinese traders 
15
 Hypothetical fraud cases prepared by the Commission can be found in the Green 
Paper. See Annexes 1-3. 
16
 Official Journal, L. 228, 09/09/1993, 1-9 . 
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must pay an additional duty to customs if they want their products penetrate 
into the European internal market. Article 1 (2) of the regulation fixes the rate 
of the anti-dumping duty at 30,6%. 
Mr. A. M. C. van Dyck, a Dutch trader, who incorporated the Defected 
Wheel Bicycle Industry Corporation in China in order to spread cheap bikes in 
the Dutch market, became furious as the regulation entered into force. He sat 
together with his partners from Germany, the United Kingdom, Portugal and 
Belgium to discuss how to avoid the payment of the anti-dumping duty and to 
maximize profit. They decided that they ship their bikes first to Thailand where 
they set up a new entity, the Flying Golden Wheels Bicycle Manufacturing and 
Trading Corporation. According to their plan, this latter enterprise should 
transport the bikes to the EC under its own name. The reason behind this plan 
was the lack of anti-dumping measure against Thai bikes in the Community at 
that time. In summary, the traders wanted to disguise the Chinese origin of the 
bikes because of the anti-dumping duty imposed on Chinese bicycles by 
Regulation No. 2474/93. Under the name of the Thai company the bikes will be 
sent in five different consignments to five different European ports (Rotterdam, 
Porto, Hamburg, Ostende, Hull) in order to make it more difficult for the 
various customs authorities to connect the crimes and to trace back the true 
origin of the bicycles. In all ports representatives of five different companies 
of the partners of Mr van Dyck would wait the merchandise. These five 
companies are incorporated in five different Member States. The perpetrators 
were aware of the obstacles to controlling transnational EC fraud in the 90-ies, 
notably of the problems flowing from divergent procedural rules and substantive 
norms in each Member State, the division of responsibility for enforcement, 
insufficient cooperation among Member State and Community authorities and 
the weaknesses of collecting and providing information among national and 
Community authorities.17 
17
 There is an extensive literature on these problems. On behalf of the European 
institutions the Court of Auditors criticized in a number of its reports throughout the 90-ies 
the Commission for inadequate control. A comprehensive critical assessment of the 
workings of UCLAF can be found in Special report No 8/98 on the Commission's services 
specifically involved in the fight against fraud, notably the "unité de coordination de la 
lutte anti-fraude" (UCLAF) together with the Commission's replies. O.J. 1998 C230 of 22 
July 1988. The reports of the European Parliament, particularly of its Budgetary Control 
Committee, represent also very critical views on the functioning of the mechanisms against 
EC fraud. An example is the Bosch Report of the Committee on Budgetary Control of the 
European Parliament of 22 September 1998, A4-0297/98. Outstanding analysis from 
academic circles can be found in Vervaele, J. A. E.: Fraud against the Community: the 
Need for European Fraud Legislation. Deventer, 1992., Delmas-Marty, M.: Pour un droit 
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To understand better the complex procedures that the authorities carry out 
only the route of one consignment will be traced. The first consignment arrives 
in Rotterdam. The merchandise, from the time of their entry into the customs 
territory of the Community, is subject to customs supervision. The procedure is 
governed by Council Regulation (EEC) No. 2913/92 of 12 October 1992 
establishing the Community Customs Code,18 and in addition, by its imple-
menting Regulation (EEC) No. 2454/93 of 2 September 1993.19 First, goods 
must be presented to customs either by the person who brought them into the 
customs territory of the Community or by the person who assumes responsibility 
for carriage of the goods following such entry. In our case, the manager of 
Two Wheels Inc., a Dutch company, takes further care of the bicycles. 
The Community Customs Code determines what steps the trader have to take 
before the bicycles obtain the "customs status of Community goods".20 The 
amount for the customs duties depends on the value of goods for customs 
purposes as set out in Chapter 3 of the Community Customs Code, the tariff 
position of the goods and in certain cases the origin of the goods. The following 
rates would apply for example to bicycles, with product code CN871200, 
originating from China: applicable rate 15% according to Regulation No. 
2261/98 of 26 October 1998,21 tariff preference 10,5% pursuant to Regulation 
commun. Seuil, Paris. 1994., Simone White: Protection of the Financial Interests of the 
European Communities: The Fight against Fraud and Corruption. European Monographs. 
1998., Sieber, U.: Euro-fraud: Organised Fraud against the Financial Interests of the 
European Union. Crime, Law and Social Change 30. 1998. 1-42. 
18
 Official Journal, L. 302/1 of 1 October 1992. 
" Official Journal, L. 253/1 of 11 October 1993. 
Customs status of Community goods results in the same status as if the goods were 
provided in a Member State of the Community, that is to say, they can circulate freely within 
the internal market. Not all the goods arriving into the customs territory of the Community 
receive this status and then circulate freely in the single market. After some goods no 
customs are paid. Some of these cases fall under the transit procedure, others under the 
inward processing procedure again others under customs warehousing. Collectively, these 
procedures are called suspensive arrangements. The name indicates that the payment of 
customs is suspended as a consequence of non-marketing within the Community but 
transiting, processing and the like. Our trader in the imaginary case wants however to gain 
for the bikes equal status with Community goods in the internal market and thus he places 
non-Community goods under the release for free circulation procedure and pays customs 
duties. 
21
 Official Journal, L. 181, 16/07/1999, 38. 
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No. 2820/98 of 21 December 199822 and anti-dumping duty 30,6% as set out in 
Regulation No. 2474/93.23 
Chapter 3 and its implementing provisions regulate in detail how the value of 
a certain product is determined for customs purposes. The calculated value most 
often serves as a basis to count the customs that are computed as a percentage 
of this value. 
The tariff position is a defined place in a list, i.e. tariff, containing the 
percentage of customs duties to be imposed on products. Products are classified 
in this list and the customs authorities have to find the appropriate position for 
each merchandise in question. In practice, the manager of Two Wheels Inc. 
makes a summary declaration when he presents the bikes to customs. 
According to his declaration, the customs authority finds the appropriate tariff 
position.24 
This is the important stage where detection of falsified stamps could lead to 
investigation. However the sheer volume of transactions and the high number 
of legitimate stamps could make even a weak attempt to falsify a stamp a 
successful one."5 So the Dutch authorities did not discover fraud this time. Should 
they have initiated proceedings, a web of multilateral and bilateral conventions 
with third countries would govern their cooperation with competent authorities 
abroad. Even to find the competent authorities for requesting cooperation is 
difficult due to the diversity of the rules from one convention to another, not to 
mention the problems arising from the application of various procedural and 
substantive norms. Part II of the article tackles some of these problems with a 
restriction to the European context. 
Happy end or rather Pyrrhic Victory? 
National customs officers run the day-to-day administration, they face first 
fraud sur le terrain and control consignments. They are responsible for trans-
mitting cases to specialized investigating organs too. The national authorities 
22
 Official Journal, L 61, 10/03/1999, 55. 
23
 Official Journal, L 320, 28/11/1998, 60. 
"
4
 The volume and complexity of rules on the value of goods often lead to errors. Only 
the Common Customs Tariff contains over 4000 product codes for agricultural products 
alone, a further 932 product codes exist for processed goods, and 1416 standard recipes 
and 14000 non-standard recipes. (House of Lords 5th Report 1989. 12.) Officials at the 
local customs stations learn for years the rules and still turn repeatedly to central offices 
specialized in giving advise in certain cases. Sometimes the characteristics of the goods are 
such that expert aid in a laboratory is needed for determining the nature of the product. 
"
5
 See Sieber: op. cit. 10. 
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are obliged to take all the measures necessary to protect the Community budget 
equally as they take all necessary measures to counter fraud affecting the 
national budget. A further obligation is to inform the European Commission of 
national inspection activities and their results26. Moreover, Member States 
prepare an annual inspection report in the light of Article 17(3) of the above 
regulation. These reports make it possible at the European level that the 
authorities can carry out systematic analysis of the data provided. 
To finish this hypothetical case with an optimistic note, I refer to a 
legislative instrument. On the information flowing from national authorities 
the Commission took appropriate counter measures against companies like 
Defected Wheel Bicycle Industry Corporation by legislating a new regulation. 
It proposed shortly after the introduction of anti-dumping duties on Chinese 
• • 27 
bicycles a new regulation" that imposes anti-dumping duties on bicycles 
originating from Thailand. The regulation came into force on 13 April 1996 
and terminated fraudulent businesses like the Defected Wheel Bicycle Industry 
Corporation was pursuing. The prevention of a certain type of fraudulent 
activities does not necessarily guarantee that similar pattern do not reoccur in 
new disguise. 
Part II. 
Challenges posed by the phenomenon of EC Fraud 
EC fraud necessitates legislative reform on substantive and procedural measures 
on the European level as well as on detection and follow up investigation 
leading to prosecution and sanctioning of perpetrators of cross-border financial 
crime. The aim of this part of the article is not to give a full account of 
problems related to EC fraud-fight, rather to indicate in an easy-to-grasp-
framework selected shortcomings that must necessarily be eliminated should 
the fight against fraud be stepped up in the Community. 
The completion of the single market and the removal of frontiers eased in 
many aspects the functioning of organized criminal networks in Europe. Trans-
national EC fraud cases such as the case of Defected Wheel Bicycle Industry 
Corporation reveal this phenomenon and represent a particular challenge to 
effective anti-fraud action. The Commission proposed in its opinion "Adapting 
""Article 6(5) of Regulation No. 1150/2000 requests Member States to report fraud 
cases where the amount involved is higher than 10000 euro. 
27
 No. 0648, 12 April 1996 OJ L91. 
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28 
the institutions to make a success of enlargement" that a legal basis be created 
for the powers and duties of a European Public Prosecutor responsible for 
detecting fraud offences throughout the EU. 
The first and most obvious effect of trans-national EC fraud is on the number 
of proceedings. In our hypothetical case the customs authorities may initiate five 
different procedures, which are competing and partial in comparison with a 
single procedure run by the European Public Prosecutor in a single European 
Judicial Area. Equally damaging is if only one or two consignments are caught 
in the hypothetical case and the others can operate freely and harm the budget 
of the European Communities. Later stages of the process may bring even more 
unacceptable results. This is due to the various substantive and procedural 
norms in the national systems. The worst example is impunity.24 The divergent 
national rules on the validity of evidence could for example easily prove in 
30 
the court phase that long years of investigations were simply wasted. 
Perpetrators—with the aid of expert lawyers—could draw up plans how to 
exploit the shortcomings of the system of criminal law protection against EC 
fraud long before the criminal activity takes place.31 Various causes result 
in severe delays in the proceedings. A famous example is the testimony of 
a prosecutor from a Member State before the European Parliament.32 He 
28
 COM (2000) 34 of 26 January 2000 http://europa.eu.int/omm/igc2000/offdoc/ 
opin_igc_en.pdf 
29
 See the shortcomings of the traditional methods of judicial cooperation between 
Member States. Green Paper, p. 13. 
1(1
 Professor Spencer explains in his paper delivered in the Conference on the European 
Public Prosecutor, Trier, 24—25 June 2002, the problems flowing from the diversity of 
national rules on evidence. Here two illustrations of these issues are provided that could be 
applicable in the "bike"-case. Scenario No 1. The British customs authority took the case 
to court after fraud was detected in Hull. The Prosecution wanted to use evidence gathered 
in France by letters rogatory issued by an examining judge but the Court in the UK 
considered it as hearsay and hence inadmissible. Spencer, J. R.: Diversity of national rules 
on evidence—is the mutual admissibility of evidence feasible? 2-3. Scenario No 2. The 
case is brought before a Belgian court. Evidence obtained abroad legally but not in 
accordance with Belgian laws would lead to exclusion of the evidence. Belgian law has a 
strict approach to illegally obtained evidence, while in Sweden it would be admissible 
almost irrespective of how it was obtained. England and Germany represent again another 
group regarding acceptance of illegally, improperly or irregularly obtained evidence 
because in certain cases it is admissible and in other cases not. ibid. 1-2. 
11
 Recognized aim of the Community is that "criminals must find no ways of exploiting 
differences in the judicial systems of Member States". Conseil européen de Tampere: 
Conclusions de la Présidence. Point 5. 
32
 Green Paper. 79. 
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declared that he had to deal with more than 50 successive actions in a single 
case brought before him to slow down proceedings and benefit from the time 
needed by the judge to dismiss them. Consequently, by the passage of time the 
execution of the international letters rogatory would generally be of no real 
use, not to mention that delays would help the suspects to disappear. Besides 
efforts to obstruct the process, traditional international cooperation inherently 
results in delays. Two examples are provided. On the one hand, Article 125 of 
the Royal Decree of December 28, 1950 states that no documents (or copies 
thereof) pertaining to criminal investigations or similar matters may be issued 
or supplied to others without specific authorization of the procurator-general 
of the Court of Appeal or the auditor-general. Hence Belgian police is not 
authorized to transmit independently information from criminal records or 
current investigations to colleagues in other Member States.33 On the other hand, 
if a judge handles an inquiry in one Member State but administrative authorities 
deal with the same offence in another Member State, direct contact would 
generally be impossible between them.34 The traditional judicial cooperative 
mechanisms have a defect concerning efficiency and timely work. Further-
more, specific problems such as the secrecy of tax and business information 
are so acute that they may lead to the refusal of mutual assistance.35 
The Van Dyck scheme described in the first part of this article resulted in 
no judicial action against the perpetrators. Let me change here a bit the 
hypothetical case and examine in the European context what would have most 
likely happened if, say the Belgian, authorities discover a valuable source of 
information indicating fraud. Customs officers in Oostende—after a tip—learn 
that the bike import is accompanied by falsified documents to avoid customs 
duty. After examination of the accounts of Three Wheels Minus One Inc., a 
Belgian company, the authorities suspect a massive and long standing practice 
of deliberative breach of EC norms. The case is referred to the Belgian juge 
d'instruction. He initiates criminal investigations by police to interrogate 
33
 Vermeulen, G.: A Judicial Counterpart for Europol: Should the European Union 
Establish a Network of Prosecuting and Investigating Officials? 2 UCLA Journal of 
International Law and Foreign Affairs, Fall/Winter 1997-1998. 225. 
34
 "Contribution complémentaire de la Commission à la conférence intergouverne-
mentale sur les réformes institutionelles — La protection pénale des intérêts financiers 
communautaires : un procureur européen". 29. 9. 2000, COM (2000), 608. 5. 
35
 The Final report on the first exercise devoted to judicial assistance in criminal 
matters, approved by the Council on 28.5.2001., states: "The evaluations showed that the 
issue of tax offences remained such a sensitive one that mutual assistance could, on this 
basis be limited and slowed down or at worst be refused.". Tax offences (Heading IlI.e) 
Official Journal, C216, 1. 8. 2001. 
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employers of the Three Wheels Minus One Inc. Investigation in Belgium leads 
to a criminal network, notably with the involvement of a British company, 
Four Wheels Minus Two Inc. and a Portugal one, Five Wheels Minus Three 
Inc. A German company whose name is up to your imagination, dear Reader, 
is also suspected to be part of the criminal network. 
As evidence is transferred to the United Kingdom the British authorities 
note that the written statements of a Belgian citizen will not be admissible 
before a court of law because evidence was gathered in Belgium under 
commission rogatoire and lacking certain preconditions a court in the UK 
would consider this as hearsay and hence inadmissible.36 The manager of the 
German company disappears together with the funds of the company before 
the authorities could take action, thus enforcement will be impossible in case 
of the German company. In Portugal the prosecutor realizes after having 
received the fdes that criminal investigation police gathered evidence and not a 
prosecution service or examining judge. Consequently, the evidence was not 
collected in response to the international letters rogatory in compliance with 
Portuguese law, and it will not be admissible in Portugal either. 
Moreover, supposing that the authorities detect a deliberate attempt to 
breach Community law in all five Member States, official action would be 
governed by five different systems of substantive and procedural laws. In fact, 
as the number of Member States involved in the case increases, the problems 
of national police and judicial authorities grow.37 Particularly difficult would 
be to run the current mechanisms in an enlarged Union. In our imaginary case 
only five countries are involved. If the connection between the five consignments 
were at all discovered, cooperation between the authorities of five nations 
would already be severely hampered by the territoriality principle of national 
criminal laws. The traditional cooperative methods do not suit anymore in an 
ever more integrated Europe as the national authorities are empowered to act 
on their own territory. From the conflicts of jurisdiction and the forum regit 
actum principle to the cumbersome mutual judicial cooperation the fragmented 
European law enforcement area signifies such residual problems that are 
36
 Professor Spencer clarifies that English law was changed in 1988 to enable foreign 
witnesses to give evidence at fraud trials from abroad by means of a live video link. As the 
foreign witness abroad can not be forced to cooperate, this solution is based on the good 
intention of the foreign witness. Spencer, J. R.: Diversity of national rules on evidence—is 
the mutual admissibility of evidence feasible? Conference on the European Public 
Prosecutor, Trier, 24-25 June 2002. 2-3. 
37
 Currently there are seventeen different legal regimes in the EU due to the distinct 
legal systems in England and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. Green Paper. Footnote 
24. 12. 
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leftovers while European integration deepened in other areas. Those are the 
perpetrators who could move without restriction in the Community territory 
38 
and not those responsible for the suppression of crime. 
Even such a brief and selective overview within the limits of this article 
indicates that the creation of a European Judicial Area is indispensable. To this 
aim, common European rules are necessary that change both substantively and 
procedurally the current mechanisms of fraud fight. The enforcement of such 
rules would be the responsibility of the European Public Prosecutor. 
Part III. 
The European public prosecutor: Response to the challenges posed by the 
phenomenon of EC Fraud39 
As indicated above, severe shortcomings restrict the work of law enforcement 
bodies in Europe in the field of fraud fight. An Italian prosecutor quoting 
tragic statistical data on international cooperation burst out: "International 
cooperation in judicial matters does not work".40 The necessity of finding a 
legislative response on the European level motored the European Parliament 
and the European Commission to sponsor a comprehensive study on the 
criminal law protection of the financial interests of the Communities. Essential 
part of this project was to elaborate rules on the elimination of the dispersion 
of the prosecution function against cross-border organized networks harming 
the budget of the European Communities. 
After a decade-long preparation41 the Commission submitted its proposal to 
the Nice IGC with the recommendation on the creation of a European Public 
Prosecutor.42 His responsibility would be detecting, prosecuting and bringing 
to judgment perpetrators of offences detrimental to the financial interests of the 
38
 Delmas-Marty, M.: Combating Fraud—Necessity, Legitimacy and Feasibility of the 
Corpus Juris. Common Market Law Review 37: 247-256, 2000. 248. 
See for detailed analyses conference papers of the Conference on the European 
Public Prosecutor, Trier, 24-25 June 2002., Part II of The Implementation of the Corpus 
Juris in the Member States, eds. Delmas-Marty, M. and Vervaele, J. A. E. Intersentia. 
Utrecht. 2000. Vol. 1. 305-327. and Proceedings of the conference organized by Robert 
Schuman University of Strasburg on the European Public Prosecutor. 19-20 October 2000. 
40
 "La mise en oeuvre du Corpus juris dans les États membres." Delmas-Marty et 
Vervaele: op. cit. 305. 
41
 See the Corpus Juris study. Footnote 3. 
42
 See footnote 34. 
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Community as well as exercising the prosecution function in the national 
courts of Member States. 
Its organizational status would be set out in a new Treaty article, 280a. The 
first paragraph of this new article states that the Council appoints the EPP acting 
by a qualified majority. The Commission with the assent of the Parliament 
proposes a list of candidates to the Council. Its term of office is six years and 
its appointment is non-renewable.43 Concerning the removal mechanism, the 
European Court of Justice may, on application by the European parliament, 
the Council or the Commission, remove the EPP. The Treaty provides on the 
reasons of removal: serious misconduct or not meeting the requirements for the 
performance of his duties.44 
His independence must be beyond doubt. Secondary legislation would 
determine organizational issues such as the structure of the office or its location 
on the basis of Article 251 of the Treaty.45 Similar treaty basis is provided for 
the adoption of (1) rules defining the facts constituting criminal offences relating 
to fraud and any other illegal activity prejudicial to the financial interests of the 
Community, (2) rules of procedure applicable to the activities of the EPP and 
rules governing the admissibility of evidence, and (3) rules applicable to the 
judicial review of procedural measures taken by the EPP in the exercise of his 
functions.46 
The basic duty of the EPP would be to exercise the prosecution function 
across the Community territory in relation to a precisely circumscribed set of 
offences. A harmonized body of criminal law on the European level would 
reduce the problems indicated in the first parts of this article, including the 
clearing up of conflicts of jurisdiction, conflicts of the application of national 
substantive laws and the complexities of international judicial cooperation. 
Furthermore, the European Public Prosecutor would be able to combine 
information from national sources. Thus a more coordinated and centralized 
administration of information would offer a broader picture for the EPP than 
for isolated national prosecution services. On the basis of the so gained 
information the EPP would be able to direct investigations in the European 
Judicial Area. European Arrest Warrants recognized throughout the Community 
territory would aid his work in a single European investigation area concerning 
fraud fight. It is hoped that the introduction of the institution of the European 
43
 Proposed new Article 280a, para.l. Green Paper. 85. 
44
 Proposed new Article 280a, para.2. Green Paper. 85. 
45
 Co-decision procedure with qualified majority in the Council. 
46
 Proposed new Article 280a, para.3. Green Paper. 85-86. 
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Public Prosecutor will significantly increase the efficiency of law enforcement 
against perpetrators of EC fraud. 
The reference above to the Draft Treaty, submitted to Council in 1976, to 
amend the Treaties establishing the European Communities so as to permit the 
adoption of common rules on the protection under criminal law of the financial 
interests of the Communities and the prosecution of infringements of the pro-
visions of the named Treaties, signaled the long-standing cumbersome tension 
on the allocation of criminal powers between the Community and the Member 
States. The lack of political will would damage any effort to constitutionalize 
the EPP. The highly problematic ratification process of third pillar conventions 
in the area of protection of the financial interests of the Community shows 
already bad signs. 
The failure of the Nice IGC did not let the adopted Treaty be nice for the 
ones that expected a breakthrough in regard to fraud fight. The proposal of the 
Commission on the establishment of the office of the EPP was turned down. 
The questions arise naturally how long we can wait for the European Public 
Prosecutor and how many funds must de defrauded until the fight against fraud 
is stepped up. Or, keeping in mind the failure of the Draft Treaty of 197647, 
will the question be after Samuel Beckett: Waiting for the European Public 
Prosecutor? 
Conclusions 
In the course of European integration anti-fraud activities gradually became a 
primary issue on the political agenda. The Maastricht Treaty incorporated the 
assimilation principle into the EC Treaty while the Amsterdam Treaty created 
a first pillar legal base for anti-fraud action and extended the co-decision 
procedure to the prevention of and fight against fraud. 
Pursuant to Article 280 the European Parliament acquired legislative 
authority in the field of anti-fraud policy on an equal footing with the Council. 
In the Council the voting procedure changed from unanimity to qualified 
majority. The Commission gained new capacities and strengthened its autonomy 
vis-à-vis the member states. The recent shift to a horizontal anti-fraud policy 
articulated in the adoption of cross-sectoral legislative instruments. 
The europeanization of anti-fraud policy is a clear tendency from a historical 
point of view. The decisive step to transfer penal power to the European 
level is still not made though. The European Public Prosecutor to enforce the 
47
 See footnote 12. 
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harmonized rules of the Corpus Juris became indispensable in an ever more 
integrated Europe. Without a harmonized legal framework for the Single 
European Judicial Area the puzzle still misses its basic pieces. At the next 
crossroads concerning the power balance between the Community institutions 
and the Member States will be the prospective incorporation of certain parts, 
particularly the European prosecuting authority, of the Corpus Juris into the 
treaties. The next IGC in deciding what features the European Judicial Area 
takes will have to concentrate on transparency and legitimacy of, and politico-
legal responsibility for anti-fraud measures. Only this way can the values of 
European integration be protected together with the financial interests of the 
European Communities. 
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T h e mid-1980s s ignal led the rev iva l of H u n g a r i a n legal ph i lo sophy . By this 
t i m e the Soviet t ype Marx i sm h a s lost ground in legal ph i losophica l li terature. 
Fu r the r con f i rma t ion of the p rev ious ly unques t ionab le p a r a d i g m s have not put 
researchers ' ex i s t ence into r isk any longer. F o r jur is ts c o n c e r n e d with legal 
t heo ry , it was o n l y a choice of va lues to d e c i d e which p a r a d i g m would be 
f u n d a m e n t a l f o r t h e m . One of the fo rms of f i n d i n g new ways w a s provided by 
s tud ies in H u n g a r i a n tradit ions of legal ph i lo sophy before the y e a r of change , 
w h i c h were e a r n e d out by the conce rned resea rche r s still al ive a n d the younger 
genera t ions w h o v iew this k i n d of tradit ion a s a neglected va lue and take 
responsibi l i ty f o r the rehabi l i ta t ion of their p redecces so r s ' work . 1 
A key p recond i t ion for us f o r be ing inc luded in the Eu ro p ean scientif ic l i fe 
aga in is to k n o w our traditions in legal phi losophy and to apply all the research 
f i n d s that our p redeccesso r s h a v e accumula ted . However , w e a l so have to be 
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 See from the literature on the subject: Loss—Szabadfalvi—Szabó—H. Szilágyi—Ződi: 
Portrévázlatok a magyar jogbölcseleti gondolkodás történetéből [Sketches from History of 
Hungarian legal philosophy], Miskolc, 1995; Perecz, L.: A belátásos elmélettől a mező-
elméletig. A magyar jogfilozófia fél évszázada: Pikler, Somló, Moór, Horváth [From the 
theory of discretion to the theory of law field. Half century of Hungarian legal philosophy: 
Pikier, Somló, Moór, Horváth], Századvég, (1998) 10, 73-94; Szabadfalvi, J.: Moór Gyula. 
Egy XX. századi magyar jogfilozófus pályaképe [Gyula Moór. A sketch of a 20th-century 
Hungarian legal philosopher], Budapest, 1994; Jogbölcseleti hagyományok [Traditions of 
legal philosophy], Debrecen, 1999; Bibó István és a szegedi iskola [István Bibó and school of 
Szeged], in: Iván Zoltán Dénes (ed.): A szabadság kis körei. Budapest, 1999; Transition and 
Tradition. Can Hungarian traditions of legal philosophy contribute to legal transition? 
Rechtstheorie, 33 (2002) 2-4, 167-185.; Some Reflections on the Anglo-Saxon Influence in 
the Hungarian Legal Philosophical Traditions, Acta Juridica Hungarica, 42 (2001) 1-2, 111-
119.; Zsidai, Á.: A Tiszta Jogszociológia. (Bevezető tanulmány) [Pure legal sociology. An 
introduction], in: Horváth, В.: Jogszociológia, Budapest, 1995. 11-58. 
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careful about fragmented oeuvres and they are to be compared to the scientific 
level of the concerned period. If we realise that there is a lack of original ideas 
and the theories only belong to the second line, we have to express this. On the 
other hand, however, we should be proud of what is valuable even today. 
We describe below five representatives of 20th century Hungarian Neo-
Kantian legal philosophical thinking in a few words: 
1. 
Bódog [Felix] Somló2 (1871-1920) 
Bódog Somló is the most reputable representative of Hungarian legal 
philosophy of the turn of the 20th century whose oeuvre greatly contributed to 
the development of the Neo-Kantian legal philosophy, the dominant trend 
prevailing in Central Europe et the time, a development that eventually 
resulted in modernisting the legal scholarship and theoretical thought in law in 
Hungary. Somló is a classic authority of social theorising in Hungary. His 
professional activity, relatively limited in time, spanning about a quarter of a 
century, can be divided into two phases. 
His paper on A jog értékmérői [Value standards of law], published in 1910, 
marks the end of his first creative period. This first period of activity is 
characterised by the unconditioned acceptance and re-assertion of Herbert 
Spencer's doctrines, concomitant with personal adherence to his one-time 
professor Gyula [Julius] Pikler's theoretical approach based on natural science 
and psychology within the framework of a slightly materialist version of the 
philosophy of history. In co-operation and co-authoring with Pikier,3 Somló 
2 ' 
Bódog Somló's main works of legal philosophy: Miami beavatkozás és individualiz-
mus [State intervention and individualism], Budapest, 1900; Jogbölcseleti előadások 
[Lectures in legal philosophy], Kolozsvár, 1906; Masstäbe zur Bewertung des Rechts, 
Archiv für Rechts- und Wirtschaftsphilosophie, 3 (1909-10) 508-522.; A jog értékmérői 
[Value standards of law], Huszadik Század, 11 (1910) 1-14.; Das Wertproblem, in: 
Zeitschrift für die Philosophie und philosophische Kritik, (1912) 66-95.; A szokásjog 
[Customary law], in: Farkas Lajos emlékkönyv. Kolozsvár, 1914, 339-369.; A helyes jog 
elméletéről [On the theory of right-law theory], Kolozsvár, 1914; Juristische Grundlehre. 
[2. ed: 1927, and reprinted: Aalen, Scientia Verlag, 1973] Leipzig, 1917; Jogbölcsészet 
[Legal philosophy], Budapest, 1920; Prima philosophic. Gedanken zu einer erster 
Philosophie. Berlin, Lepzig, 1926; Schriften zur Rechtsphilosophie. Budapest, 1999. 
3
 Pikler, J.—Somló, F.: Der Ursprung des Totemismus: Ein Beitrag zur materialis-
tischen Geschichtstheorie. Berlin, 1900. 
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focused his attention mainly on sociological problems taken from a naturalistic 
perspective. During this period Somló became—together with Ágost Pulszky 
and Gyula Pikler—the third outstanding figure determining the future of 
positivist philosophy of law in Hungary. 
The second phase of Somló's scholarly career is defined by his Neo-Kantian 
turn, heralding maybe the most prosperous period that has ever existed in 
Hungarian legal philosophy which—reprezented mostly by his successor, Gyula 
Moór and, later, the renown legal sociologist Barna Horváth—lasted until World 
War Two, when the Soviet military occupation replaced local traditions with 
'Soviet-type' Marxist theory as an all-substitutive panacea. Despite that for early 
Somló legal philosophy and legal sociology were equal instanding, his Neo-
Kantian conceptualisation led to revision and separation of these inter-connected 
areas of legal inquiry. The outcome of this period founded and substantianed 
Somló's scholarly reputation in legal philosophy in Hungary and especially in 
German-speaking territories. Nowadays he is duly regarded as a classic authority 
of Neo-Kantian philosophising on law in Central Europe, among thinkers like 
Rudolf Stammler, Gustav Radbruch, Hans Kelsen and Alfred Verdross. 
In his writings published around the turn of the century, he criticised the 
scholarly ideals established by his contemporaries, from the perspective of 
natural-science-inspired positivism and evolutionism. His positivist theoretical 
outlook was all the way through complemented by scholarly interest and 
personal involvement in public affairs. One of his major works characteristic 
of this period is the book-size treatise on Állami beavatkozás és individua-
lizmus [State intervention and individualism] published in 1900. The greater 
role the state was to play and the formation of monopol capitalism both 
demanded reformulation and adaptation of the respective roles and institutions 
of law, state and politics. In 1906, in his Jogbölcseleti előadások [Lectures in 
legal philosophy], he already advanced-preserving, however, his early positivist 
ties—quite a number of considerations he later developed systematically in his 
magisterial work Juristische Grundlehre. A point of interest in Somló's work 
is that the first edition in 1917, published by Meiner in Leipzig, was promoted 
by Hans Kelsen. Due to favourable welcome and wide interest, the same 
publishing company published the work ten years later again, then in 1973 
Scientia Verlag found Somló's main work worth having a third edition too. 
By differentiating pure and applied sciences (including normative sciences 
in the latter), he laid the foundations of Neo-Kantian philosophising in law, in 
which he proposed to investigate basically two issues: (1) determination of the 
preconditions of law (standing for a research aimed at the concept of law 
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within the framework of the basic doctrine of law), and (2) the search for just 
law or richtiges Recht (standing for the axiology of law). He turnd to Neo-
Kantian philosophising when he was seeking—to Rudolf Stammler's influence— 
thepotentialities of investigation into richtiges Recht, which he completed in 
his Juristische Grundlehre in 1917. Based upon theoretical traditions cultivated, 
among others, by John Austin's Province of Jurisprudence Determined and 
Karl Bergbohm's Jurisprudenz und Rechtsphilosophie, Somló's Juristische 
Grundlehre offers the analysis of the concept and conceptual elements of law 
regardless of the contents, keeping the outlook of the contemporary pre-
dominant Neo-Kantian philosophy. The enthusiastic reception the German-
language book encountered in the region urged him to continue his studies by 
laying the foundations of a legal axiology as well in a similarly methodical and 
comprehensive manner. When preparing for the job, he started the inquiry by 
formulating his own philosophical foundations in a comlex ontological, 
epistemological and axiological perspective, but this came to be published only 
as posthumous fragments after his early death, in 1926. 
Gyula [Julius] Moór4 (1888-1950) 
Gyula Moór, the most recognised figure of Hungarian legal philosophy between 
the two World Wars, was considered by one of his colleagues in the early 1920s 
4
 Gyula Moór's main works of legal philosophy: Stammler „Helyes jogról szóló tana" 
[Stammler's „right-law theory"], Budapest, 1911; Macht, Recht, Moral. Ein Beitrag zur 
Bestimmung des Rechtsbegriffes, Szeged, 1922; Bevezetés a jogfilozófiába [Introduction to 
philosophy of law], Budapest, 1923; Das Logische im Recht, Internationale Zeitschrift für 
Theorie des Rechts, (1927-1928) 3, 157-203.; Zum ewigen Frieden. Gnmdriss einer 
Philosophie des Pazifismus und des Anarchizmus, Leipzig, 1930; A jogi személyek elmélete 
[Theory of legal entity], Budapest, 1931; Reine Rechtslehre, Naturrecht und Rechts-
positivizmus, in: Gesellschaft, Staat und Recht. Festschrift gewidmet Hans Kelsen zum 50. 
Geburtstag, Wien, 1931, 58-105.; Creazione e applicazione del diritto, Rivista Internationale 
di Filosofia del Diritto, 14 (1934) 653-680.; Das Problem des Naturrechts, in: Archiv für 
Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie, 28 (1935) 3, 325-347.; Szociológia és jogbölcselet [Sociology 
and philosophy of law], Budapest, 1934; Jogfilozófia [Philosophy of law] (Budapest, 1936); 
Was ist Rechtsphilosophie?, Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie, "Ungarn-Heft", 37 
(1943) 3-49.; A szabad akarat problémája [Problem of free will], Budapest, 1943; A 
jogbölcselet problémái [Problems of philosophy of law], Budapest, 1945; Tegnap és holnap 
között [Between yesterday and tomorrow], Budapest, 1947. 
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the founder of a 'new Hungarian legal philosophy'. The innovation of Moór's 
philosophy can best be captured in his 'comprehensive attitude', which was 
called by his critics, not without reason, an eclectic theory. 
Being attached to Neo-Kantian philosophy of law, Moór was mainly 
influenced by Rudolf Stammler, with whom he became acquainted with at the 
university of Berlin and his one-time professor, the Hungarian Bódog Somló. 
Hans Kelsen's theory must also be mentioned as a permanent base of 
comparison to Somló's philosophy of law even if they often had divergent 
views. When forming his own philosophical system, Moór is characterised by a 
complex approach to the problems raised by his philosophical and legal 
philosophical antecedents that exerted influence on him. In his first compre-
hensive work Bevezetés a jogfilozófiába [Introduction to the philosophy of law] 
published in 1923 he mentions three independent fields of investigation: (1) 
definition of the concept of law (fundamental doctrine of law), (2) scientific 
investigation of general causality in law (sociology of law) (3) the question of 
correctness of law (value doctrine or legal axiology). In this basic work he 
worded the 'methodology of statutory law' as the fourth field of legal 
philosophy in a wider sense. 
From the late 1920s on Moór wanted to elaborate his legal philosophical 
system on the basis of paradigms of 'Baden' or 'value doctrine school' 
represented by Wilhelm Windelband and Heinrich Rickert, seeking new paths 
in Neo-Kantian philosophy. Meanwhile Moór was seeking connection between 
the world of reality (Sein) and that of value (Sollen)—which as the central 
problem of Neo-Kantian legal philosophy—instead of strictly separating the 
two spheres as some thinkers did by stating an antagonism between them. 
Consequently, he interpreted law as phenomenon belonging to the realm of 
'reality of values'. In the 1930s he thought he could mostly rely on Heinrich 
Rickert's philosophy, but then at the beginning of the 1940s he turned to Neo-
Hegelian philosophical theses of Nicolai Hartmann. In the works published in 
the early 1940s he saw the opportunity to renew the philosophy of law in a 
'new tendency of cultural philosophy', which was a sort of synthesis of Neo-
Kantian and Neo-Hegelian philosophical thoughts. In consequence, he sees in 
law not only a system of statutes containing abstract regulations but also the 
realities of human activities in which the intellectual content of law becomes 
reality. It is regrettable that because of the war and the years of upheaval 
following it, he had no opportunity to elaborate his system of legal philosophy 
based on new philosophical ideas. The most everlasting and also the most cited 
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part of Moór's work is the investigation of the concept of law. It is the issue 
that brought his teacher's, Bódog Somló's most considerable influence. 
Among abundant theories of power and force, Moór carried out a sophisticated 
investigation of the concept of law by transferring the idea of social reality to 
the realm of law and thus he opened up new possibilities for the investigation 
of characteristic features of the regime behind law. 
Barna Horváth5 (1896-1973) 
From the early 1930s, in the prevailing Neo-Kantian philosophy Ваша 
Horváth created a new colour in the Hungarian traditions of legal philosophy. 
His career was first promoted by Gyula Moór in the 1920s and then became 
famous as professor of Szeged university, In his view of legal theory, which he 
preferred calling legal sociology or even 1pure legal sociology' according to 
Hans Kelsen's terminology, his originality was mainly revealed in his so called 
synoptic attitude and the functionally related processional legal view. He has 
created something new by conforming two paradigms that were considered 
antagonistic in contemporary legal philosophy. (See about: Rechtssoziologie, A 
jogelmélet vázlata [Sketch of legal theory]) A parrallel existence of Neo-Kantian 
(Lask, Rickert, Verdross, Kelsen, etc.) and pragmatic-empirical attitudes 
(Pound, American realism, psychologism, etc.) and their relation to each other 
was regarded as a breakthorough not only in Hungarian but also in European 
Barna Horváth's main works of legal philosophy: Die Idee der Gerechtigkeit, Zeit-
schrift für öffentliches Recht, 7 (1928) 508-544.; Természetjog és pozitivizmus [Natural 
law and legal positivism]. Társadalomtudomány, 8 (1928) 212-247.; Gerechtigkeit und 
Wahrheit, Internationale Zeitschrift für Theorie des Rechts, 4 (1929) 1-54.; Die 
Gerechtigkeitslehre der Vorsokratiker, in: Studi Filosofico-Giuridici dedicati a Giorgo Del 
Vecchio. Modena, 1930, 336-372.; Hegel und das Recht, Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht, 12 
(1932) 52-89.; Bevezetés a jogtudományba [Introduction to jurisprudence], Szeged, 1932; 
Rechtssoziologie. Probleme des Geselschaftslehre und der Geschichtslehre des Recht. Berlin-
Grunewald, 1934; Sociologie juridique et Théorie Processuelle du droit, Archives de 
Philosophie du droit et de Sociologie Juridique, 5 (1935) 181-242.; A jogelmélet vázlata 
[Sketch of legal theory], Szeged, 1937; Der Sinn der Utopie, Zeitschrift für öffentliches 
Recht, 20 (1940) 198-230.; Der Rechtsstreit des Genius. I. Sokrates, in: Zeitschrift für 
öffentliches Recht, 22 (1942) 126-162.; Der Rechtsstreit des Genius. II. Johanna, in: 
Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht, 22 (1942). 295-342.; Der Rechtsstreit des Genius, II. 
Johanna, in: Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht, 22 (1942). 395-460.; Angol jogelmélet 
[English legal theory], Budapest, 1943. 
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legal thinking. The consideration of these two influential paradigms is not by 
chance. While between the two World Wars Neo-Kantian paradigm is to be 
considered evident in Middle Europe, pragmatism appeared as a new idea 
mainly in the Hungarian public view of legal philosophy. Barna Horváth's 
susceptibility to empirism can be attributed to two reasons. On one hand, he as 
practising lawyer realised contradictions in norms and reality, which was 
neglected by Neo-Kantian philosophy. On the other hand, during his journey to 
England in the late 1920s, Anglo-Saxon legal culture made a great impact on 
him. After coming home from England, Horváth reported in a number of papers 
on the achievements of both American and English jurisprudence. The experi-
ences and impressions he gained in England urged him to complete the history 
of English legal philosophy. (See about: Angol jogelmélet [English legal theory].) 
The synoptic method elaborated by Horváth is an original interpretation 
of one of the fundamental questions of Neo-Kantian legal philosophy, namely 
the connection between value and reality. The most significant representatives 
of 'contemporary' Hungarian philosophy of law, including Moór, Somló and 
Horváth, all concerned themselves with finding a solution to this problem. 
Horváth's starting point was the essence of legal activity, and considered law 
as a pattern of thoughts in a judge's mind, which is nothing else in this way but 
a 'reflexive theoretical product'. The procedure by a lawyer becomes synoptic 
through his applying a legal case to a legal norm, and at the same time, vica versa, 
relating a legal norm to a legal case. The lawyer, therefore, relates normative 
matters of fact to real matters of fact. In order to do this job, the lawyer 
needs a knowledge of facts selected according to legal rules, and also a 
knowledge of laws selected according to matters of fact. While a practising 
lawyer focuses his attention mainly on a legal case, a theoretical lawyer 
concentrates on statutes of law, but both consider the legal case and the law at 
the same time. 
According to Horváth's processional legal attitude, closely related to his 
synoptic method, law cannot simply be regarded as norm but as an abstract 
behaviourial pattern and relating actual behaviour, or in other words, a con-
nection between norm and behaviour, which is the procedure itself. Procedure is 
the 'genus proximum' of law. That is to say, a continuous relation (of synoptic 
structure) of a legal case to the legal norm will create a procedural process. 
In Horváth's opinion, law as the most developed social procedure establishes 
the most advanced stage of procedures by establishing the most developed 
procedural institution. 
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Barna Horváth's role lies in the fact that traditional German-Austrian ties 
of the 20th century Neo-Kantian Hungarian legal philosophical thoughts were 
'tailored' by him through transferring Anglo-Saxon theories of jurisprudence 
and created new perspectives for further development in Hungarian legal 
theory. Regretfully, the Second World War and the following political changes 
forced him to emigrate in 1949 and there he did not have the opportunity to 
continue developing his theory. 
4. 
József Szabó6 (1909-1992) 
József Szabó graduated from the faculty of law at the University of Szeged and 
he was a student of Gyula Moór, an outstanding legal philosopher of Neo-
Kantian philosophy in the inter-war period. Szabó was a prominent represen-
tative of the gifted and promising generation, who achieved brilliant careers 
during the Second World War, and who were involved in the intellectual and 
scientific renewal of the country after the war. After graduation he became 
acquainted with Barna Horváth, founder of school and an exceptional 
personality of Hungarian legal philosophy. Horváth's personality and his legal 
philosophical approach representing the influence of Anglo-Saxon juris-
prudence and legal culture gave rise to Szabó's enthusiasm. It was the period 
in the Hungarian legal philosophical thinking when, besides the achievements 
of Austrian, German and French legal philosophy, those of English and 
American jurisprudence were also considered. Apart from this, Alfred Verdross, 
professor of international law and legal philosophy at the university of Vienna 
greatly influenced him, and they became friends for life. Szabó's papers were 
frequently published in the Österreichische Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht, a 
journal edited by Verdross 
As a result of Barna Horváth's aim to establish a school, the 'school of 
Szeged' was founded, and it included, besides Szabó, István Bibó, who later 
abandoned legal philosophy, and also Tibor Vas, who became Marxist in the 
1950s and renounced the mentality of the school. Szabó's legal philosophical 
" József Szabó's main works of legal philosophy: A jog alapjai [Bases of law], Buda-
pest, 1938; A jogászi gondolkodás bölcselete [Theory of lawyer's thinking], Szeged, 1941; 
Hol az igazság? A bírói lélektan problémái [Where the justice? Problems of judge's 
psychology], Társadalomtudomány, 22 (1942) 1, 1-55.; Wahrheit, Wert und Symbol im 
Rechte, Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie, "Ungarn-Heft", 37 (1943) 101-121.; Der 
Rechtsbegriff in einer neutralistischen Beleuchtung. Österreichische Zeitschrift für 
öffentliches Recht, 1 (1948) 3, 291-331. 
HISTORY OF HUNGARIAN NEO-KANTIAN LEGAL PHILOSOPHICAL THOUGHT... 253 
thinking bears the strongest marks of the master's irradiant influence. He 
began to elaborate his independent legal philosophical doctrine in the late 
1930s. He was also deeply involved in issues on constitutional and inter-
national laws. 
In his writings on legal philosophy—A jog alapjai [Bases of law] in 1938, 
A jogászi gondolkodás bölcselete [Theory of lawyer's thinking] in 1941, Hoi 
az igazság? [Where the justice?] in 1942, Wahrheit, Wert und Symbol im 
Rechte in 1943, and Der Rechtsbegrijf in einer neurealistischen Beleuchtung in 
1948—Szabó attempts to discredit the Neo-Kantian model by using the 
outcomes of criticism, according to David Hume, and the American legal 
realism. Szabó, in his works published in the early 1940s, attempted to create a 
'neo-realistic' approach to the concept of law. Applying the method common in 
Anglo-Saxon professional literature, he modelled the essence of legal thinking 
with describing legal cases. With this kind of approach, he seemed to discover 
a number of similar features between English and Hungarian 'traditional' legal 
attitudes. Citing the ideas of Jerome Frank, Edward Robinson and Thurman 
Arnold, the most outstanding personalities of American legal realism, Szabó 
abandoned belief in legal security, which was, in his opinion, revived by a 
faulty logical philosophy of law. In his theory he also used Frank's doctrine of 
'fact-sceptics' and 'rule-sceptics'. Szabó claimed that in law enforcement it is 
not merely the legal norms one is to consider when looking for justice, since the 
statement of facts is as important a precondition for a righteous judgement as 
the interpretation of the corresponding law. He believed that legal decisions are 
influenced by 'psychological circumstances'. 
When reading Szabó's works, one can clearly perceive the ideas of 
American legal realism. At that time, in the early 1940s, this kind of theory was 
considered rather exceptional in the Hungarian literature of legal philosophy. 
The influence exerted by the classical representatives of legal realism is 
undeniable. When appreciating Szabó's work one can suggest that, in a similar 
way to the evaluation of Horváth's work, he also gave particular pragmatic 
explanations to the classical Neo-Kantian problems. Doing so, he created the 
possibility for a prolific interrelation of two legal cultures, and abolished the 
previous one-sided Austrian and German orientation in the Hungarian legal 
philosophical thinking. This is considered very important even if we some-
times come across rather eclectic explanations. Neither the master nor his 
student is an exception to this. Regretfully, however, Szabó was not able to 
work out further systematic explanations to his theory of legal philosophy 
called 'neo-realistic'. 
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During the after-war years he was involved in reorganising the legal faculty 
of the university in Szeged. After the 'decisive year' (1949) like the reputation 
of many of his contemporaries, his reputation was also ruined. After his long 
imprisonment, with a short interruption after the revolution in 1956, Szabó 
lived in intellectual exile for a number of decades. Some of his papers and 
reviews were published only abroad. Only the last years of his life, after his 
restitution, brought him the opportunity to be involved in the professional 
public life of the country for a brief period. 
István Bibó1 (1911-1979) 
István Bibó graduated as a student of Barna Horváth—a representative figure 
of Hungarian Neo-Kantian legal philosophy—from the faculty of law at the 
University of Szeged. Bibó was a prominent representative of the generation, 
who had a successful career during World War Two and the subsequent 
period, and he was involved in the intellectual and scientific renewal of the 
country after the war. 
Bibó, as a law student and then as a member of the 'school of Szeged' 
established by his one-time professor, was concerned with legal philosophy and 
issues of international law. In the early 1930s he visited, on several occasions, 
the university of Vienna where he listened to lectures delivered by Alfred 
Verdross, Adolf Merkl and Felix Kaufmann, and later he, as student of the 
Institut des Hautes Etudes Internationales in Geneva, became acquainted with 
Hans Kelsen, Paul Guggenheim, Maurice Bourquin and Guglielmo Ferrero. 
Subsequent to his study trip in Switzerland, he translated, with the approval of 
the author, Kelsen's work titled Reine Rechtslehre into Hungarian. 
With the aim of working out his own system of legal philosophy, he 
published his work under the title Kényszer, jog, szabadság [Compulsion, law, 
liberty] in 1935. He started to elaborate his own theory with thoroughness and 
moderation contrary to his age. From the starting point of the Neo-Kantian 
7
 István Bibó's main works of legal philosophy: Kényszer, jog, szabadság [Compulsion, 
law, liberty],Szeged, 1935; Le dogme du „bellum justum" et la theorie de l'infaillibilité 
juridique. Essai critique sur la théorie pure du droit, Revue Internationale de la Theorie du 
Droit, 10 (1936) 1, 14-27.; Rechtskraft, rechtliche Unfehlbarkeit, Souveränität, Zeitschrift 
für öffentliches Recht, 17 (1937) 5, 623-638. 
8
 Kelsen, H.: Tiszta Jogtan [Pure theory of law], trans. István Bibó, Budapest, 1988 
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paradigm, Bibó examined the functional link between constraint, liberty and 
law, and completed this with Henry Bergson's thoughts on spontaneity as well 
as with Nicolai Hartmann's theses on onthology and ethics. One of the 
cornerstones of his theory was his independent criticism of Kelsen's doctrine 
and that of Barna Horváth's legal attitude. Nevertheless, Bibó considered his 
master's 'synoptic' method suitable for solving the essential Neo-Kantian 
problem, the contradiction between 'Sein' and 'Sollen', in which the law of 
spontaneity plays a major role. Besides this, he borrows his one-time professor's 
idea of objectivism, which he uses as a key concept in his doctrine. 
Bibó claims that there exists a certain balance of the elements of constraint 
and freedom in the experimental material of law. As a result of the old legal 
philosophical debate on constraint, Bibó claims that the essence of law is to be 
found in constraint, either physical or intellectual. In his argument, it is the 
degree of objectivity that makes the legal sanction different from sanctions of 
other social norms. An essential thesis of his, saying that law is considered as 
one of the most objective constraints, is based on this approach. The other key 
paradigm of his legal philosophy declares that law is to be viewed as the most 
essential tool of ensuring human freedom, since the area left free from 
constraint is 'the realm of the most objective freedom'. According to his 
comprehensive definition, law provides the most objective constraint parallel 
with the most objective freedom. Completing his frequently cited thesis on the 
Janus-faced law, Bibó argued that the real power of law is ensured by this dual 
tension, and this fact makes law different from all other social rules. 
In the second half of the 1930s Bibó attempted to describe certain issues of 
legal philosophy. His problem-raising appeared as criticism of Kelsen's theory, 
which exerted an effect of revelation at that time. Among his works written in 
that period, Le dogme du 'bellum justum' et la théorie de l'infaillibilité juridique, 
an essay published in 1936, and his paper titled Rechtskraft, rechtliche Un-
fehlbarkeit, Souveränität, which was published in 1937, are worth mentioning. 
In this latter work he attempted to find new paths in elaborating his legal 
philosophy by extending and making radical changes in his one-time professor's 
synoptic doctrine. 
Regrettably, from the early 1940s Bibó abandoned legal philosophy and 
became more and more deeply involved in issues of political sciences and 
historical philosophy. In 1946, owing to his ouvre in legal philosophy, he was 
selected member of the Hungarian Academy of Science, but at that time he had 
already detached himself from the philosophy of law. His university career was 
finally disrupted after the 'decisive year' (1949). Neither the following period 
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of his intellectual exile, nor his long imprisonment after the revolution in 1956 
could prevent him, a former legal philosopher, from being concerned with 
legal issues. 
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CSABA FENYVESI* 
Current Issues in Criminalistics 
(Criminalistics as Both as a Branch of Science and as a University Subject) 
1. Defining the notions of Criminalistics in international terms 
It appears that the differences between the continental and Anglo-Saxon legal 
systems also extend to Criminalistics, a field based mainly on natural sciences. 
Géza Katona showed not long ago that "criminalistics never took hold in the 
United Kingdom as a scientific concept. The concept of forensic science was 
partly identified with continental criminal technology. The literature of the 
field used the terms 'forensic' and 'scientific' interchangeably. 
The kinds of skills used in the course of investigating and solving crimes 
were not considered to be a part of 'forensic science'. Until very recently 
British literature of the field understood the scientific examination or investi-
gation of crimes in terms of natural scientific methods."1 
In addition to the classic fields of forensic biology, chemistry, ballistics and 
photography, we can add the recently-arrived fields of forensic computer 
technology (including, for example, the computerised examination of the human 
voice and intonation), anthropology (with emphasis on archaeological references), 
analysis of evidence, forensic nursing, engineering failure, Fire science and the 
investigation of explosions, all of which are the legal responsibility of the 
experts." 
In the United States the use of the phrase 'forensic science' has been in use 
for many decades. Under the heading of 'forensic science'3 we typically find 
Lecturer, University of Pécs, Faculty of Law, H-7622 Pécs, 48-as tér 1, Hungary. 
E-mail: tatar@ajk.pte.hu 
1
 Katona, G.: A kriminalisztika és a bűnügyi tudományok (Criminalistics and Forensic 
Science). Budapest, 2002. 39. 
In terms of teaching Criminalistics in higher education, the study of Forensic Science 
in Law courses and Criminal Justice courses at most British universities is continuously 
supplemented by research findings—which are often international. Katona: op. cit. 55. 
3
 "One of the anomalies of the American legal system is that it does not draw a clear 
distinction between the expert evidence used in criminal and civil trials. The 'Federal Rules 
of Evidence' apply equally to both legal areas while also leaving the subject and method 
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the kinds of scientific knowledge used f o r the invest igat ion, examinat ion and 
assessment of physical evidence. Its main branches are criminalist ics and 
forensic medicine. 4 
These days ever m o r e volumes are be ing publ ished under the head ing of 
Criminalistics. The trend began in the 1960s and comes close to the continental 
terms.5 A f ine example of this is Lab Manual which w a s published in 2001 . Its 
subtitle still uses the o ld t e r m i n o l o g y — A n introduction to forensic science, its 
main title, however , is Criminalistics 6 
There are also spec ia l branches of c r imina l i s t i cs to be found that are 
perhaps use fu l and w h i c h can be cons idered methodological ly . Into such a 
category we can put personal i ty profi l ing, molecular gene t ics and biology, and 
safety management . 7 
L o o k i n g at the con t inen ta l count r ies , in France (and in Be lg ium 8 ) the 
study of a reas of c r imina l invest igat ion is connec ted to texts such as Police 
Scientifique (scient i f ic po l ic ing) and, a f t e r Locard , Manuel de technique 
policiere (pol ic ing t echn iques ) , 4 a l though nowadays para l le l use is a l so made 
of the expert's statement open. Hence the 'Federal Justice Centre' which as a branch of 
government acts as a publisher of legal literature for the purposes of informing and 
expanding the knowledge of judges and justice system officers." Katona: ibid. 40. 
4
 Katona: ibid. 41. 
5
 As for the teaching of Criminalistics in the United States, the maintenance of 
independent research institutions by several universities (e.g. Florida International University) 
or research faculties of 'criminal' forensics within the framework of organised departments 
(John Jay University, NY; George Washington University, Washington D.C.) has caused a 
shift in the organisation of research into forensic science, while the results are made use of 
in the taught courses. 
Multi-disciplinary courses are common, e.g. Forensic Science and Criminalistics, 
Chemistry with Forensic Science and Toxicology, or Analytics and Forensic Science. The 
complex tuition of courses indicates the bringing together of 'criminal' justice or crimina-
listics with law. Katona: ibid. 55-57. 
6
 Meloan, C. E.—James, R. E.—Saferstein, R.: Criminalistics an Introduction to Forensic 
Science. New Jersey, 2001. A similar process can be also seen in the works of several other 
authors, for example in the case of O'Hara. In two of his basic works signs of both strands 
appear, see O'Hara, C.—Osterburg, J. W.: An Introduction to Criminalistics. New York, 
1960. and O'Hara, C.—O'Hara, G.: Fundamentals of Criminal Investigation. 6th edition, 
Springfield. 1994. 
7
 Forensic Nursing and Fire Studies are to be found in the USA as well as in the UK. 
s
 See Goddefroy, E.: Manuel élémentaire de police technique. Brussels, 1931.; 
Louwage, F. E.: Technique et tactique de la police criminelle. Ninove, 1948. 
' Locard, E.: Manuel de technique policière. Paris, 1923.; Gayet, J.: Manuel de police 
scientifique. Paris, 1965. 
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of the term 'criminalistics'.10 In 2001 the University of Paris published Manuel 
de criminalistique moderne (Manual of modern criminalistics), the subtitle 
of which is la science et la recherche de la preuve" (Science and the research 
of proof).12 
In German-speaking areas and in Eastern Europe criminalistics has always 
been accommodated and accepted as a term. In Germany it is chiefly the 
scientific institutions of the police force that carry out criminalistic research, 
according above all to the directions and research goals of the Federal 
Criminal Office (BKA) in Wiesbaden.13 
2. Innovations in criminal technology and criminal tactics 
Under this heading I will be discussing innovations that we would wish to 
consider in university courses in Criminalistics and in textbooks on the subject. 
We cannot afford to ignore these innovations, all of which should appear in 
any up-to-date university course in Criminalistics, if only as part of a lecture. 
Criminal technology and criminal tactics comprise the following, listed 
briefly below, without the kind of detail it is the job of the textbook to supply: 
the growing use of spectroscopic procedures, particularly in the case of voice 
identification with the use of a spectogram (the computerised examination of 
111
 See Ceccaldi, P. F.: La criminalistique. "Que sais-je?" Paris, 1962.; Chevet, G.— 
Marand, Ph.: Cours de criminalistique Préfecture de police. Paris, 1981.; Fombonne, J.: La 
criminalistique. Paris, 1996. 
" Buqoet, A.: Manuel de criminalistique moderne (La science et la recherche de la 
preuve). Paris, 2001. 
12
 The title refers to the important fact that there is a very close link between proof and 
criminalistics, and in my view it refers not only to proof in criminal procedures but to 
proof as it occurs in all branches of law and all areas of legal practice, e.g. state 
administration law, employment law, civil law. 
13
 The explanation for this is that the only German university offering courses in 
Criminalistics is Ulm. Before German reunification Criminalistics could be studied at several 
universities in East Germany, notably at Humboldt, but the courses were discontinued 
following reunification in keeping with the structure mentioned above. I note here that the 
library of the Max Planck Institut für Auslander und Internationalen Strafrecht in Freiburg 
im Breisgrau has one of the most extensive criminalistics collections in the world, all of 
which are accessible to researchers of the subject. The University of Lausanne is one of the 
bases of the tuition of criminal sciences in Switzerland. The university's "Institute of 
Police Science and Criminology" conducts a wide range of criminalistic research. A volume 
outlining 'police science' also appeared at the beginning of the last century in Italy. For 
more details, see Ottolenghi, S.: Polizia scientifica. Rome, 1910. 
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the human voice and intonation); the spread of DNA testing; the widespread 
availability of genetic identification; the appearance and development of 
computerised techniques for identifying individuals; the use of mathematics-
based Bayes analysis in identification tests; the growth of crime analysis 
methods for mapping evidence, crimes and data; the appearance of specific 
profiling techniques; identification based on computer script and computer 
printers; judicial fire science, including the investigation and examination of 
explosions. 
3. Possible areas of further development for Criminalistics textbooks 
It is the task of the textbook writer to introduce, describe and expound the 
areas of innovation listed above. In the face of this constantly updating field 
it is apparent that current textbooks—which are mostly general university 
Criminalistics textbooks of techniques and tactics, such as the Textbook, and 
Atlas of Criminalistics14—need to be broadened in scope to include a concise 
overview of the most important crimes (the most common and most significant), 
together with a criminal-methodological description. I believe the following 
should be considered: crimes against life, especially homicide; crimes against 
property, including burglary and theft; robbery; sex crimes, especially violent 
ones; the category of 'special investigations' which includes the areas of 
finance; computers (including identification based on computer script; arson 
and explosions; organised crime; crimes in connection with terrorism. 
4. The role of the laboratory in the teaching of Criminalistics 
There are several arguments to support the view that Criminalistics is the 'odd 
man out' in Law departments in Hungarian universities. Firstly, it is not a 
branch of law but belongs decidedly among the factual sciences, not having 
either legal codices nor detailed laws, but at most a legal framework largely 
because of legislation for criminal procedure. Secondly, it is based mainly on 
natural sciences, whereas law is steeped in principles of sociology. Finally, it 
is a practical area of science, one in which knowledge that has been acquired 
can soon be 'cashed in'; such a step is duly expected, as only then can the required 
14
 Tremmel, F.—Fenyvesi, Cs.: Kriminalisztika tankönyv és atlasz (A Textbook and 
Atlas of Criminalistics). 2002. The 'atlas' part of this successful and useful guide needs to 
be updated to include actual examples and illustrations of the crime methods listed. 
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results and success be achieved. The Department of Criminal Procedures of 
the Faculty of Law of the University of Pécs has set up a laboratory of 
criminalistics in conjunction with Baranya County Police Department in order 
to legitimise and activate this last argument. Here—as can be seen from the 
Latin origins of its name—criminalistic work and practice can be dealt with 
and are dealt with on a regular basis. In an ideal situation each student would 
himself carry out at least the most basic criminalistic—mainly technical—tasks 
(e.g. investigating, developing and securing prints; analysing and recording 
matter remains; carrying out basic identification tests; criminal photography; 
computerised photofits, etc.) in addition to seeing a demonstration. 
Further reforms are required before such an ideal situation can be attained, 
for the moment we will have to breathe life into the key moments of contact 
teaching by using auxiliary materials as well as pictures, objects and video 
recordings in connection with all the branches of Criminalistics. 
5. The 'Pécs Criminal Workshop' and its planned literature for teaching 
and research 
In addition to updating the aforementioned textbook and atlas of Criminalistics 
as well as the laboratory, over the next ten years we plan to publish the following 
materials as teaching resources: lexicon of Criminalistics;15 bibliography of 
Criminalistics;16 Criminalistics case studies;17 annual periodical containing 
15
 There are some works of this type already in print, e.g. Gross, H.: An Encyclopaedia of 
Criminalistics, 1990.; Hamacher, H. W.—Herold, H.—Schreiber, M.—Stümper, A.—Vorbeck, 
A.: Kriminalistik Lexicon. 1986.; Modly, D.: Pirucni kriminalisticki leksikon. Sarajevo, 
1998.; Siegel, J.—Saukko, P. J.—Knupfer, G. C.: Encyclopedia of Forensic Sciences. (Vol. 
1-3), San-Diego-San Francisco-New York-Boston-London-Sydney-Tokyo, 2000., and 
Modly, D.—Korajlic, N.: Kriminalisticki Rjecnik. Tesanj, 2002. 
16
 The last work of this type published in Hungary was edited by the Criminalistics 
Working Group of the Institute of Legal and Administrative Sciences of the HAI (Allam-
és Jogtudományi Intézet Kriminalisztikai Munkaközössége) in 1956 and was en-titled "A 
Bibliography of Hungarian Literature on Criminalistics" (A magyarnyelvű kriminalisztikai 
szakiradalom bibliográfiája). 
17
 To the best of my knowledge such a publication—broad in scope, systematically 
compiled, based on scientific criminalistics results—does not exist in the realm of university 
teaching resources. 
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articles by the staff of the Pécs Criminal Workshop, on the subject of 
Criminalistics, amongst other things.18 
The need is for the last one is the greatest, given that the number of new 
publications on Criminalistics has declined in recent years. As far as I am aware 
titles such as RTF Figyelő (RTF Observer), Magyar Rendészet (Hungarian 
Security) and Technikai Közlemény (Technical Bulletin), all of which covered 
the area in question, have unfortunately ceased to be published. Submitted 
articles to Belügyi Szemle (Home Affairs Review) meanwhile hardly ever deal 
with Criminalistics; in the rare cases that the subject is covered the questions 
of tactics and methods are typically focussed on, not techniques. 
Unfortunately even such a famous scientific workshop as the National 
Criminological Institute (Országos Kriminológiai Intézet) has removed the 
word Criminalistic from its title; researchers and publications have to align 
themselves to the profile that is left in its place. 
Closing thoughts 
The change in attitude towards the teaching of Criminalistics at universities 
which can be found among more and more heads of department appears 
encouraging. In keeping with international tendencies and, as our research 
findings of two years ago showed, Criminalistics is the kind of factual science 
which is not exclusively the domain of investigators, in other words it is not 
'policing science' for police officers. In fact because of its methodology it is 
an area of science that is relevant in the teaching of all branches of law that 
deal with proof, and as such it should be included in the structure of the taught 
curriculum of all law students, future legislators and legal practitioners. 
The common responsibility of all tutors dealing with Criminalistics now 
and in the future is also clear: to write updateable teaching materials and 
resources that reflect modern attitudes. 
18 
The series began with the two commemorative yearbooks published in 2001 and 
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M I K L Ó S HOLLÁN* 
Trilateral Conference on More Harmonized Criminal Law 
in the European Union * 
The trilateral (Austrian-Finnish-Hungarian) seminar devoted to the topic 
"Towards more harmonised criminal law in the European Union" took place 
in Budapest from 1st to 3rd September 2003. The seminar was organized by 
the Hungarian National Group of the International Association of Penal Law 
(IAPL)1 and by the Institute for Legal Studies of the Hungarian Academy of 
Sciences. The predecessors of such events, held at every third year in Helsinki 
and in Budapest in turn, were founded upon the bilateral agreement between 
the Finnish and the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. The co-operation, how-
ever, was never limited to academician researchers, but from the beginning 
representatives of other institutions (e.g. universities, courts) also participated 
at the seminars." The sixth seminar was completed to a trilateral one, because 
besides the Finnish and Hungarian scholars, it was attended by two university 
lecturers from Estonia as well.3 The successive seminars remained in the 
framework of the bilateral co-operation,4 but in 2003 besides Finnish colleagues 
Austrian scholars were also invited to the ninth seminar. The choice has fallen 
naturally on Austria, considering the traditional connections between the 
(criminal) lawyers of the two country reach back as far as the Austro-Hungarian 
Monarchy, but flourish recently as well. 
Research Junior Fellow, Institute of Legal Sciences at the Hungarian Academy of 
Sciences, H-1014 Budapest, Országház u. 30. 
E-mail: hollanm@freemail.hu 
** This article was prepared with the generous support of the OTKA No. T/0337446. 
1
 Official web site: www.penal.org 
See, Fehér, L.: Hungarian-Finnish seminary in Budapest on criminal law. Acta 
Juridica, Vol. 23 (1981) Nos. 1-2. 225-230. 
1
 See, Mohácsi, P.: Finn-magyar-észt büntetőjogi szeminárium (Finnish-Hungarian-
Estonian Seminar on Criminal Law). Állam és Jogtudomány, Vol. 36 (1994) Nos. 1-2. 
180-192. 
4
 See, e.g., Hollán, M.: Eight Finnish-Hungarian Seminar on Criminal Law. Acta 
Juridica Hungarica, Vol. 41 (2000) Nos. Ъ^А, 167-170. 
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The Austrian delegation was composed by Professor Manfred Burgstaller, 
Professor Helmut Fuchs and Honorary Professor Fritz Zeder from the University 
of Vienna. Professor Raimo Lahti, Professor Kimmo Nuotio, Researcher Sakari 
Melander and Researcher Ohisalo Jussi attended the seminar from University 
of Helsinki. The Hungarian side was represented by Professor Imre A. Wiener, 
Professor Lenke Fehér, Researcher Katalin Ligeti, Researcher Réka Végvári and 
Researcher Miklós Hollán from the Institute for Legal Studies of the Hungarian 
Academy of Sciences on the one hand, and Associate Professor Balázs Gellér 
and Adjunct Professor Norbert Kis attended the seminar from the University of 
Győr on the other. 
The patron of the seminar Péter Bárándy (Minister of Justice, Hungary) gave 
the opening reception. In his speech he commemorated the most important 
stages of the co-operation between Hungarian and Finnish lawyers on the one 
hand, and the long-standing connections between Austrian and Hungarian 
colleagues on the other. He expressed his special thanks to Professor Lahti and 
Professor Wiener for their ongoing engagement and support in setting up and 
making flourish the Finnish-Hungarian co-operation. With regard to the 
Austrian-Hungarian co-operation after the Second World War he emphasised 
the importance of the bilateral university exchange programs. In this respect 
Minister Bárándy referred to the inevitable role of Professor Tibor Király 
and Associate Professor Kálmán Györgyi (from Eötvös Loránd University of 
Sciences, Budapest, hereinafter: ELTE) for organising and directing the scientific 
relationships between the two countries from the Hungarian side. He also 
emphasised the significant role of Professor Manfred Burgstaller who was 
given by the title of Doctor Honoris Causa appreciating his merits by the ELTE 
in 1998. He was pleased to note that the younger generation of Austrian and 
Hungarian criminal lawyers continues this fruitful co-operation.5 He referred 
especially to the bilateral seminar in 2001 organised by the Austrian National 
Group of the IAPL, and to the international colloquium held in Budapest in 
5
 On Young Penalist in general see, Ligeti, К.: Young Penalist in the Association. In: 
Csemegi Károly emlékkönyv "Association Internationale de Droit Penal XVI1 Congress 
Internationale de Droit Pénal, Budapest, 5-11 Septembre 1999, Actes du Congress" (ed.: 
Imre A. Wiener). MTA Jogtudományi Intézet, Budapest, 127-130. On the Hungarian Young 
Penalist see Hollán, M.: A Fiatal Büntetőjogászok Fórumának első tudományos tanács-
kozása. Visegrád, 2000. április 14—16. (The First Seminar of Young Penalist, Visegrád, 14-
16 April 2000). Magyar Jog. Vol. 47 (2000) No. 11. 669-675. 
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2002 under the auspices of the Young Penalist Section of the Hungarian 
National Group/' 
In his message of greetings Helmut Epp (Secretary General of IAPL) 
commemorated the importance of the Hungarian National Group in the scientific 
life of the Association by organizing various seminars and conferences, 
especially the Xlth and XVIth International Congresses of Penal Law held in 
Budapest respectively in 1974 and 1999. He also conveyed to us the best 
regards of the President of the Association, Professor CherifM. Bassiouni. The 
Secretary General took advantage of the opportunity and commented substantive 
issues of European criminal law. He argued that taking into account the 
sensitivity of criminal law influenced by national traditions it was wise to keep 
this area within the third pillar. He also pointed out to the constitutional 
problems posed by the framework decision on European arrest warrant agreed 
upon prematurely only to proof that the Council was able to react in a speedy 
manner to security challenges. 
In recognition of his laudable activity for having organized the Finnisd-
Hungarian Seminars during more than two decades Professor Raimo Lahti was 
awarded with an honorary diploma by the Hungarian National Group of the IAPL. 
The seminar was divided into five sessions, each of them contained two or 
three presentations which will be summarized in the following. 
I. Session 
1. The first session was devoted to the topic of the criminal liability of legal 
persons and that of the heads of business. In his lecture Prof Lahti made a 
distinction between the criminal liability of legal persons and the criminal 
liability within legal persons. He analysed various international instruments 
adopted under the auspices of the United Nations (UN), the Council of Europe 
(СОЕ), and last but not least the European Union (hereinafter: EU). He high-
lighted the fact that although criminal liability of legal persons had already been 
introduced in 1995 into the Finnish Penal Code (Chapter 9), the application of 
these provisions has been limited to ten cases approximately. Professor Lahti 
outlined the special provisions on criminal liability of heads of business had 
been included in the Finnish Penal Code since 1995. In the beginning this form 
6
 The material of the second seminar was published in: Young Penalist Conference on 
Corruption and Related Offences in International Business Relations (ed.: Katalin Ligeti). 
"Közlemények /No 18./ Working Papers" MTA Jogtudományi Intézet, Budapest, 2003. 
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of liability has been limited only to labour and environmental offences, but 
f rom 1 January 2004 a more general provision on this subject will come into 
force in the reformed general part of the revised Finnish Penal Code. 
2. In his lecture Professor Manfred Burgstaller summarized the current 
discussions in Austria on liability of legal persons for criminal offences. In 
accordance with European continental tradition only natural persons are presently 
subject to criminal liability in Austria. The Austrian criminal law in its current 
form is, therefore, clearly not in accordance with the global and European 
instruments, which oblige states to ensure that legal persons can be held 
accountable for specified criminal offences. Professor Burgstaller pointed out 
that the controversies have not only referred to the details of corporate 
liability, but also, and even primarily, to the basic issue which area of law 
the direct liability of legal persons for criminal offences should actually be 
located in. Several proponents wanted to implement corporate liability for 
criminal offences into the body of Austrian administrative penal law. There 
are, however, convincing objections against solving the related matter within 
administrative law, e.g. according to decisions of the Austrian Constitutional 
Court only judges are allowed to impose sanctions above a certain level of 
severity. Therefore the criminal law approach is preferred by the prevailing 
view of Austrian experts. He pointed out that according to the final draft of 
the new Austrian legislation the liability of legal persons should not be 
integrated in the Penal Code and the Criminal Procedure Act, but should be 
framed in a separate statute. Professor Burgstaller also analyzed several 
details of the legislation, e.g. the types of criminal offences, the inclusion 
of unincorporated associations, the exclusion of corporations with govern-
mental functions, the connection of the legal entity to the offence and the 
applicable sanctions (organizational fine, ban to carry out determined business 
activities etc.). 
3. The presentation of Professor Imre A. Wiener concerned the negligence 
and omission of heads of businesses. He pointed out that criminal liability of 
heads of business had been introduced into the Hungarian Criminal Code by 
Act CXXI of 2001 with reference to the Convention on the protection of the 
European Communities' financial interests (Article 3) and to the Convention 
on the fight against corruption (Article 6). He pointed out that criminal liability 
of heads of businesses differs in several respects from traditional criminal 
liability known to Hungarian law. According to the offence description actus 
reus of the criminal liability of heads of businesses comprises the following 
elements: the fraud or active corruption of the employee committed acting on 
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behalf of the business organization, omission by the head of business (breached 
of duty element) and the relevance of the omission. The means rea of the 
criminal liability of heads of businesses is either intentional or negligent. 
Professor Wiener outlined the common elements equally applicable both for 
the protection of the financial interests of the European Communities and for 
the fight against corruption, but he also paid attention to the considerable 
differences in the way criminal liability occurs in connection with the two 
offences. While fraud related to the administration of the European communities' 
financial interests could and must be controlled by the higher-ranking managers, 
because it is not the entire activity which is secret, but only the falseness of 
documents presented. Opposite to fraud, however, corruption is a hidden and 
concealed behaviour, the detection of which is rather difficult even for the law 
enforcement bodies. In the opinion of Professor Wiener it is unreasonable and 
unrealistic to set up a control mechanism to prevent active bribery, therefore 
criminal liability of higher-ranking managers should not have been established 
for omitting to set up such a system. 
II. Session 
4. Professor Kimmo Nuotio gave his lecture with the title "Third Pillar of the 
European Union—and Beyond. " He referred to the relatively recent but 
increasing interest of the EU in criminal-law related issues not only to enhance 
the intensity of legal co-operation between the Member States, but also to 
harmonize the contents of substantial criminal law. He noticed, however, 
that the sphere of direct harmonization of criminal legislation is restricted to 
some specific fields of transnational or cross-border criminality. Therefore 
the divergences of the domestic systems of law should not be underestimated. 
Professor Nuotio pointed out that institutional side of harmonization (e.g. 
European Public Prosecutor's Office in the Corpus Juris proposal) is also 
related to the more general issues of the identity and structures of the EU, and 
often they would not be realizable without renegotiating the Treaty framework. 
Professor Nuotio examined the criminal policy assumptions behind common 
European proposals and also the possibilities of different approaches in different 
geographical parts of the European Union in the future. 
5. Honorary Professor Helmut Zeder s presentation dealt with two recent 
developments accompanying the approximation of penal law in the EU: 
strengthening the ne bis idem principle on the one hand, and the introduction 
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of the European arrest warrant on the other. With regard to the ne bis idem 
principle he referred, inter alia, to the debate whether the same fact or the same 
offence should be an obstacle of the second prosecution. He also analyzed the 
exceptions to the international validity of the ne bis in idem principle, provided 
e.g in Article 55 of the Schengen Convention. Honorary Professor Zeder also 
dealt with various aspect and details of the European arrest warrant, e.g. the 
relevant offences and the problems related to grounds for mandatory and 
optional non-execution. 
6. In her lecture Researcher Katalin Ligeti undertook to give an overview 
of the major developments in the law of mutual legal assistance in the 
European Union. She focused to the fact that within an area of freedom, 
security and justice (as proclaimed by Title IV of the TEU) traditional require-
ments and grounds of refusal to mutual legal assistance should be cut down. 
Researcher Ligeti also pointed out that the simplification and acceleration of 
the procedure, which enjoys absolute priority in the European Union, does 
not only increases the efficiency of mutual legal assistance, but also serves 
the interest of the individual affected by mutual legal assistance. She also 
make us acquainted with the intricacies of the new forms of mutual legal 
assistance in the European Union connected with new telecommunication 
possibilities, like videoconference or the interception of telecommunication. She 
emphasized that the scope of mutual legal assistance has been considerably 
expanded in the European Union. Besides judicial authorities, which were the 
traditional actors of mutual assistance in criminal matters, police authorities 
and administrative bodies become to play an important role. She pointed out 
that the latest instruments on mutual legal assistance included a growing 
number of provisions on police and administrative cooperation. She put the 
question whether this development was an evasion of the rule of law or a mere 
emergence of a transprocedural approach. 
I I I . Session 
7. Professor Helmut Fuchs's presentation dealt with the economic criminal law 
in the EU. He posed and analysed the question whether and to what extent 
economy should be regulated by market or by (criminal) law. He offered two 
explanations for the necessity of control of economy through criminal law: law 
as a means of the protection of the weaker or as a means of establishing 
equality of competition. Both approaches could be relevant in the EU, because 
TRILATERAL CONFERENCE ON MORE HARMONIZED CRIMINAL LAW IN THE EU 269 
this is an economic community based on free trade in order to promote 
prosperity of the citizens. He outlined and analysed the main fields in the EU 
where economy controlled by criminal law, namely by anti-trust laws, by 
environmental offences, and by the prohibition of insider dealing. Professor 
Fuchs also pointed out the deficiencies of EU rules, namely the lack of 
democratic legitimisation and judicial control, the vague offence descriptions 
and the strong dependence of criminal provisions on administrative law. With 
reference to the proposal of Professor Tiedemann on the so called "Europa-
Delikte", he also outlined those fields of economic criminal law which in the 
near future should have been regulated by European law, e.g. insolvency law 
(bankruptcy offences). 
8. Professor Lenke Fehér presented her lecture on a comprehensive 
European policy against trafficking in human beings. In the very beginning of 
her presentation she made us acquainted with the fact that one hundred and 
twenty thousands women and children a year were lured from the countries of 
Central Europe to the European Union. She identified trafficking in human 
beings as a grave and multiplied violation of human rights, which renders huge 
profit for the offenders, who at the same time face only low risk. She pointed 
out to the fact that besides UN instruments, there are considerable European 
efforts to combat this phenomenon. She stressed in this respect not only the 
Council Framework Decision of 19 July 2002, but also the Brussels Declaration 
on Preventing and Combating Trafficking in Human Beings (2002). She also 
referred to the fact that Council of Europe will start drafting of a European 
Convention on this issue in 2003. The presentation of Professor Fehér 
thoroughly highlighted various definitions of trafficking in human beings in the 
relevant international instruments, and provided a brief insight into the 
Hungarian situation in this respect. 
9. Associate Professor Balázs Gellér scrutinized the results and prospects 
of fighting terrorism with criminal law in the EU. He analyzed the various 
approaches conceptualizing terrorism in the most important international 
conventions adopted by UN bodies. He focused especially to the problem 
inherent in the approach of the International Convention for the Suppression of 
the Financing of Terrorism which refers to other international instruments, e.g. 
to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (1970). 
He also analyzed the intricacies of the Council of Europe solutions, especially 
the political offence exception in the light of the Convention on the 
Suppression of Terrorism (adopted in 1977 and amended in 2003). Associate 
Professor Gellér paid also considerable attention to the provisions of the Council 
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Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism (13th June 2002). Besides the 
intricacies of the above mentioned international instruments he also dealt with 
the question whether torturing terrorist in order to save the life of the abducted 
victims is in line with fundamental human rights, enshrined e.g. in Article 3 of 
European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. 
IV. Session 
10. The presentation of Adjunct Professor Nobert Kis dealt with the principle 
of culpability in European criminal law systems. Adjunct Professor Kis pointed 
out that the European harmonization and comparison of criminal law have paid 
very little attention on the principle of culpability, which is not a necessarily 
corollary of the requirements of individual responsibility. He argued that we 
have to rethink the concept of culpability on which the European instruments 
of harmonization have been and will be founded. He stressed that the principle 
of culpability had been facing a deep regression in certain fields of criminal 
law. a) Certain European countries (France and Belgium) apply an objective 
and abstract assessment of negligence in the judicial practice, without applying 
to individualized conditions of liability, b) The objective approach is also 
relatively widespread in the case law of recklessness according to which it is 
sufficient to prove it that the risk of damage would have been obvious to any 
reasonable person in the defendant's position. He explained these facts by a 
recent judicial approach focusing primarily on the prevention rather than 
retribution, с) European criminal justice systems, as he mentioned, apply purely 
objective standards (so called strict liability) for some harm in almost identical 
groups of crimes, e.g. with regard to regulatory offences. 
11. Researcher Sakari Melander chose framework decisions, instruments 
described in Article 34 of the Treaty of European Union, as an example to 
illustrate the implementation of EU instruments on criminal law in Finland. He 
pointed out that with regard to EU-connected criminal law issues the role of 
the domestic law drafters has been changed: After taking part of the law 
drafting process in the EU Council Working Committees, they should also 
implement the adopted framework decisions into national law. He emphasised 
that since framework decisions leave open the method by which the result 
described in them is achieved, their implementation process in the Member 
States is very important. Ultimately Researcher Melander illustrated the above 
mentioned thesis with examples from the implementation provisions of the 
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council framework decisions in Finland with regard to substantive criminal law 
issues. 
12. In her presentation, Researcher Réka Végvári analysed the implemen-
tation of EU instruments concerning the fight against corruption in Hungary. 
She outlined the main criminal law conventions in this field adopted under the 
auspices of various international organisations, including the EU. Researcher 
Végvári pointed out that the concept of criminal corruption expanded con-
siderably in the last two decades at the international level. The notion comprises 
not only the offence of bribery, but also trading in influence. According to 
the international conventions not only bribery with regard to domestic public 
officials should be penalised, but national criminal law provisions should also 
cover cases committed by or involving foreign and international officials. She 
emphasised that considerable number of international instruments, inter alia 
the new council framework decision adopted on 22 July 2003, concern the 
penalisation of corruption in the private sector. She concluded that these 
extensions of criminal liability are necessary to provide protection for proper 
functioning and integrity of these social values in the context of increasing 
international cooperation and economic integration. Finally Researcher Végvári 
analysed the implementation of the relevant international treaties in Hungary, 
referring both to the developments and weaknesses of the Hungarian criminal 
law in this field. 
V. Session 
13. In his presentation Researcher Ohisalo Jussi examined how in fact the 
Finnish public administration (namely the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry) 
had controlled agricultural subsidies from the Community budget. He scrutinised 
whether the demands for increased use of criminal law sanctions emanating 
from the European level (from the Commission) had mirrored in the day-to-
day work of the officials in the Ministry and the related administrative bodies. 
Researcher Ohisalo introduced us the result of a brief empirical study comprised 
of interviews of a small number of relevant officials. He concluded that the 
different objectives behind the agricultural subsidy schemes (development of 
certain underdeveloped regions or the regulation of the harvested field) affect 
how stringent control and scrutiny is possible and preferable. He emphasised 
that one should not merely look at the matter as furthering the legitimate goal 
of protecting the Community budget, but also take into consideration what 
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happens in practice. Therefore the strategies should also be adapted to some 
degree to the characteristics of the various systems in the Member States. This 
is a formidable challenge, he concluded, especially on the eve of enlargement. 
14. Researcher Miklós Hollán held the last presentation on the topic of 
confiscation in the European Union. At the beginning he made a distinction 
between fragmental provisions on confiscation in various conventions on 
particular wrongful behaviours on the one hand, and instruments adopted solely 
on the deprivation of instruments and proceeds of crime on the other. He 
emphasised that the second form of international instruments on confiscation 
has been adopted firstly at the European level, namely the СОЕ Convention on 
Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime (1990). The EU Joint Action and Frame-
work Decision on confiscation of instruments and the proceeds from crime 
followed this approach, but contain stricter obligations than their СОЕ 
counterpart. The presentation also examined whether the various EU provisions 
on confiscation form not a mere "mass", but a system of rules. Researcher 
Miklós Hollán concluded that only nucleuses of the intentional system building 
are present in the EU provisions on confiscation. Finally he scrutinised the 
limits of domestic jurisdiction set by European law in the light of the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
and the decisions of the European Commission and Court of Human Rights 
(Cases of Salabiaku, Welch and Phillips). 
Remarks of Professor Wiener, followed by the acknowledgements and 
comments of the participants, closed the final session of the seminar. It was 
announced that written forms of the presentations would be published in the 
near future. 
* * * 
Considering the atmosphere and the spirit of the sessions it is certain that the 
co-operation among Austrian, Finnish and Hungarian criminal lawyers will be 
remained at least as fruitful as recently. 
1216-2574/USD 20.00 
© 2003 Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest 
A C T A JURIDICA HUNGARICA 
44. Nos 3-4, pp. 273-286 (2003) 
BOOK REVIEWS 
GÁBOR HAMZA: Az európai magánjog fejlődése. A modern magánjogi 
rendszerek kialakulása a római jogi hagyományok alapján [Trends in the 
Development of Private Law in Europe. The Role of the Civilian Tradition 
in the Shaping of Modem Systems of Private Law]. Nemzeti Tankönyvkiadó, 
Budapest, 2002, 362 p. 
It was the end of year 2002 when the monograph Az európai magánjog fejlődése 
(Trends in the Development of Private Law in Europe) was published by Gábor 
Hamza. Gábor Hamza is full professor of Roman Law and Comparative law at 
the Faculty of Law, Eötvös Loránd University of Sciences, and he is the head of 
the Department of Roman Law, as well. The aim of this monograph is to 
describe the formation of the private law-systems of today based on the Roman 
Law traditions. Being the editor of this book I intend to give a short presen-
tation, which might be encouraging for further reading of the book. 
Gábor Hamza purposed to present the formation and the structure of the 
modem private law systems with the method of the comparative private law 
with special emphasis on the subsequent fate of Roman Law. It has to be taken 
into account that there are several studies in the international literature, which 
deal with the general presentation of the universal history of private law. There 
are also numerous general introductions to the comparative law (droit comparé), 
too. I refer hereby—as examples—to the works of René David1 and Franz 
Wieacker. Taking into consideration these studies one has to underline the 
specific methodological basic-principle of Professor Hamza's book. To sum it 
up one can say that the author attempts to compound those scientific approaches, 
which are applied by the international legal literature. As a consequence of this 
it is not only the história externa of private law, which can be found in the 
book, but one may also collect several pieces of information on the dogmatical 
questions and the history of institutes of private law in the present book. 
Nevertheless one can find useful datas on the history of the science of private 
law, as well. 
1
 David, R.—Jauffret-Spinosi, C.: Les grands systèmes de droit contemporains. Paris, 
2002." In English: David, R.—Brierley, J. E. C.: Major Legal Systems in the World 
Today. An Introduction to the Comparative Study of Law. New York, 1978. 
2
 Wieacker, F.: Privatrechtsgeschichte der Neuzeit. Göttingen, 1967". 
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If one pays attention to the essence of this methodology it may not be 
surprising that the author puts high emphasis on Roman law and on the sub-
sequent fate of Roman law. It is absolute beyond doubt that Roman law can 
function as a possibility for integration among the national legal systems. Over-
whelming as it may be but Roman law can be regarded as a lingua franca of law. 
If one takes a short look on the title of the present book, one may think that 
the monograph concerns only the European countries. If one takes the table of 
contents under close inquiry one may see that this book is not exclusively on the 
development of law in Europe. Nevertheless we may find the short legal history 
of private law of every European country. Additionally the book gives detailed 
analysis on the impact of the European civilian tradition on countries outside 
Europe. One can read chapters on the legal development of North America, 
Central America and South America, South Africa and some countries of Asia, 
as well. 
Professor Hamza's book is divided into four large parts, as follows: 
1. The Origins of European Private Law; 
2. The Development of European Private Law in the Middle Ages; 
3. The Development and Codification of European Private Law in Modern 
Times; 
4. The Influence of the European Civilian Tradition on Countries Outside 
Europe. 
I think that the titles of the parts themselves testify upon the historical and 
comparative approach of the book. This may result that one can regard this 
monograph as legal history, although I am convinced that the book itself is more 
than a summary of history of private law. 
The first part of the book gives a very useful introduction to the beginnings 
of the European private law. The very first paragraphs of the book are on the 
fate of Roman law after the demise of the West-Roman Empire. This chapter 
also contains an analysis on the codification of Roman law in the Roman 
(Byzantine) Empire during the reign of Justinian. This codification can be 
regarded as the most important and most famous codification-process of the 
antiquity. I refer hereby to David Dudley Field, the famous American jurist in 
the 19th century who said that the code of Justinian is "a great achievement of 
human geniusIt is absolutely beyond any doubt that the Code of Justinian 
had a huge impact on the codifications of Europe in the modern times. 
The second part of Professor Hamza's book begins with a theoretical 
definition on the term of ius commune. As it is well-known there are many 
interpretations of ius civile in the legal literature. In the favor of a better 
3
 Cf.: David Dudley Field Centenary Essay (ed.: A. Reppy). New York, 1949. 
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understanding it 's worth quoting the definition of ius civile applied by the 
author: 
"lus civile is nothing else but the surviving Roman law, which is functioning 
as a common legal system of the Europe of the Middle Ages and the very 
beginning of the Modern Times, including the countries having particular 
legal systems. This legal system is followed by the civil codes and other acts 
of the nations from the middle of the 18th century to the 19th century. "4 
This chapter gives a very detailed analysis on the development of law in 
Europe in the Middle Ages. Nevertheless one finds very useful pieces of 
information on the legal development of bigger countries, such as France or 
the Holy Roman Empire, but one can gather really important datas on the 
smaller countries, as well. For instance we can read some paragraphs on the 
law of Wales, which became the part of England in 1283. It may be interesting 
to pay attention to the fact that the English legal system was introduced in 
Wales no sooner than in 1536 and 1543, based on the Acts of Union. 
The book contains outstanding information on the field of history, too. We 
can make out that it was Ivan, the Third (1462-1505) in Russia who used the 
title 'tsar in international relations for the first time. The title 'tsar is in very 
tight connection with the well-known theory of the Third Rome\ (We can also 
find very detailed bibliography on the theory of third Rome.)5 
It is absolutely beyond any doubt that the most sophisticated part of the 
book is chapter 3, "The Development and the Codification of European Private 
Law in Modern Times". Incredible as it may seem this chapter includes every 
European country without any exception. The first point of the chapter 
introduces the development of the European jurisprudence at the beginning of 
the modern era by sketching the most important scientific tendencies. Never-
theless we can also read about the history of the science of law in the legal 
history of the countries, as well. 
The first part of chapter 3 deals with countries of German language in 
Europe. Gábor Hamza gives a very detailed picture on the codification of the 
German Civil Code, BGB, which was put into force on the 1st of January, 1900. 
This Civil Code had huge influence on the codification of other European and 
non-European countries. Concerning Roman Law this code has particular 
relevance. As this code became effective in Germany the force of the previous 
law, the so-called law of Pandects—which is a subsequent version of classical 
and post-classical Roman law—ceased to exist. 
4
 Cf. Hamza: op. cit. 45. 
5
 Cf. Hamza: op. cit. 89. 
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Upon reading this chapter one gets familiar with the background of the 
German Civil Code, i.e. with the German science of private law. Historische 
Rechtsschule, Begriffsjurisprudenz, etc. 
As it is wide-known after the second World War Germany was separated 
into two parts, Bundesrepublik Deutschland (BRD) and Deutsche Demokratische 
Republik (DDR). DDR belonged to the socialist world, therefore its legal 
system had to be taken into accordance with the socialist theory and economic 
structure. As a consequence of this there were many modifications on the legal 
system after the changes. It is worth mentioning that DDR adopted its own 
Civil Code, called Zivilgesetzbuch in 1976. After the reunification of the two 
parts of Germany, BGB became effective on the territory of the former DDR, 
as well. 
One has to take into account as well, that Professor Hamza's book—which 
was published in 2002—pays attention to the very important modifications of 
BGB, which were adopted at the very beginning of 2002. 
Chapter 3 gives a very thorough description on the law of Switzerland, 
containing private law doctrine and the codification of private law, too. One 
can clearly see how ZGB and OR was composed with regard to the law of the 
cantons in Switzerland. 
It is not only BGB, which had huge impact on the codification of smaller 
countries. Under no circumstances can we underestimate the influence of the 
French Civil Code, Code civil, adopted in 1804. This Code declares in Art. 
1732 that damages, which are caused against law, should be compensated by 
the liable person: 
"Art. 1382. — Tout fait quelconque de l'homme, qui cause á autrui un 
dommage, oblige celui par la faute duquel il est arrivé, á le réparer."6  
This principle is the very basic of the delictual liability.1 This principle shows 
up in the modern civil codes, too.8 
Gábor Hamza analyses the composition of the French Code civil, as well. 
He clarifies that the codificators of Code Civil paid attention to the prior 
French written law (droit écrit) and customary law (droit coutumier), as well. 
As it is known, Code civil had four fathers ("Pères du Code civil"), two of 
them were experts of Roman law (Jean-Etienne Marie Portalis and Jacques de 
Maleville), while two of them were specialists of French customary law (Félix-
Julien-Jean Bigot de Préameneu and François-Denis Tronchet). 
6
 Code civil, 1990. (red.: Lucas, A.). Paris, 1990. 629. 
7
 The term of delictual liability is pretty much equivalent with the term tort liability 
applied by Common Law countries. 
8
 Cf. § 339 of the Hungarian Civil Code of 1959. 
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French law is also in effect in the oversea-counties and oversea parts of 
France, as well: départements d'outre-mer (French-Guyana, Guadeloupe, 
Martinique and Réunion), collectivité départementale (Mayotte), collectivité 
territoriale (Saint Pierre, Miquelon) and territoires d'outre-mer (French Polinesia, 
New-Caledonia, Wallis and Futuna). One has to take into account that there are 
several differences of legal and administrative nature between these territories. 
Professor Hamza gives a good introduction to the law of the so-called mini-
states in Europe. Hence, we may get information on Monaco, as well. It is not 
widely known that at the present day Monaco does have its own civil code— 
called Code civil—, consisting of 2100 articles, which is not equivalent with the 
French Code civil. 
One can learn a lot about such mini-states, as the Channel Islands or the 
Isle of Man. These parts may be very interesting or useful for businessmen, 
hence these islands are really good opportunities for off-shore companies in 
Europe. 
I figure out that the Hungarian lawyers and researchers may find extremely 
interesting those parts of the book, which deal with the Central-Eastern European 
countries (Hungary, the Czech Republic, etc.), the former Yugoslavian territories 
(Slovenia, Croatia, etc.) and the Soviet-successor states (Estonia, Armenia, 
Ukraine, etc.). It is not overwhelming to declare that many important historical 
and economic changes have happened in these territories, which have 
immeasurable legal significance, as well. Professor Hamza's book is the first to 
report about them in Hungarian language. Being the modifications in the legal 
system of these countries in close connection with the historical changes 
Professor Hamza provides a thorough historical and political introduction. 
These parts might have relevance for historians and political scientists, as well. 
I am sure that without a good view to the historical changes one would not 
be able to understand those legal changes of high relevance, which were able 
to build the very basic of the market economies in these former Socialist 
countries. Of course this transition has not been put into practice to the same 
extent in each country. It has many reasons of political, social, economic 
nature. We have no possibility to analyze them, because that would need very 
detailed study on these countries. To sum it up having read this part of the 
book one may see the common legal roots of these countries and may find 
ideas how they will find their place in Europe of the future. As it is widely 
known, some of these countries—e.g. Hungary—are going to be members of 
the European Union in the short run, while others join the EU in a longer run. 
The fourth and last part of Professor Hamza's book deals with the influence 
of the European civilian tradition on countries outside Europe. This chapter 
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makes known what kind of impact the European tradition of private law had on 
states, which are not located in Europe. 
Hence, we find very relevant information on the legal development of 
North America, Central America and South America, South Africa and some 
countries of Asia. 
The author gives full particular of the role of the European private law in 
legal development of Louisiana. Louisiana does have a very specific situation 
among the member-states of the USA, hence this state was bought by the USA 
from France in 1803. The first civil code of Louisiana, Louisiana Civil Code 
was adopted in 1808. This code, which was originally composed in French is 
based on the French Code civil of 1804, but it has also many connections to 
Roman law, as well.9 In the present days Louisiana does have its third civil 
code, which was adopted in 1870. The travaux préparatoires to modify this 
Code began in 1979. This Code still maintains the characteristics of the 
European civil law, but one may also realize the influence of the Common 
Law, as well. All things considered the legal system of Louisiana—being mixed 
jurisdiction—is unique among the member-states of the USA. 
One has to take into consideration that the legal system of Canada is also 
very similar to the European—mainly the French—law from many aspects. 
It is not only the legislation where European civilian traditions had influence 
in North-America. There are very important connections between the American 
and the European jurisprudence, as well. Professor Hamza provides a good 
summary on that. 
The author summarizes the legal development of the Central American and 
South-American states. It is very important to pay attention to the efforts to 
unify private law in the Central American and South American states. These 
trends for unification are rooted in the common legal traditions, which are 
undoubtedly based on Roman law.10 From this point of view the conference 
of Arequipa (Peru), which was held between 4-7, of August, 1999 with the 
participation of Argentina, Bolivia, Peru and Puerto Rico, has particular signi-
ficance. On this conference the Acta de Arequipa was passed, which contains 
the basic principles for unification private law in Central America and South 
America. 
9
 Herman, Sh.: Der Einfluß des römischen Rechts auf die Rechtswissenschaft Louisianas 
vor dem amerikanischem Bürgerkrieg. ZSS RA 113 (1996) 293-345.; Palmer, V. V.: Two 
Worlds in One: The Genesis of Louisiana's Mixed Legal System, 1803-1812. In: Louisiana: 
Microcosm of a Mixed Jurisdiction (ed.: Palmer, V. V.). 1999. 
1,1
 Garro, A. M.: Unification and Harmonisation of Private Law in Latin America. 
AJCL 40 (1992)587-616. 
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From the aspect of the Romanists the part, dealing with South Africa is 
extremely interesting. It is not hard to find out the reason for that. In the South-
African Republic the so-called Roman-Dutch Law is still valid. The expression 
Roman-Dutch Law comes from Simon van Leeuwen who used it first in Latin 
then in Dutch. In Afrikaans language Roman-Dutch Law is Romeins-Hollandse 
reg. Nowadays, with regard to the influence of Common Law the legal system 
of the South-African Republic can be considered as a mixed-jurisdiction, as 
well. 
Although we cannot find the legal history of every Asian country in this 
book, we may gather very interesting information on the legal development of 
several Asian states. For instance it is very fascinating to keep in mind that the 
German law, especially BGB had huge impact on the legal development of 
Japan and South-Korea. It is in connection with the very strong economic 
relationship between the countries mentioned. Gábor Hamza puts high emphasis 
on the scientific emphasis on Roscoe Pound who played very important role in 
the spread of Roman law traditions and comparative law in China. 
One has to pay attention to the fact that Professor Hamza provides a very 
rich bibliography to his book. To be clear the bibliography can be divided into 
two parts. On the hand one can find bibliography by each country. On the 
other hand one can read a twenty-five-page long general bibliography at the 
end of the book, which may serve as a perfect guide for further researches. The 
list of abbreviations, the index and the table of contents in six languages 
(Hungarian, English, French, German, Spanish and Italian) makes the entire 
work easy and quick to use. It is very likely that the English edition of this 
book is to appear soon. 
Professor Hamza's book can be regarded as a course-book and handbook, 
as well. I find it very important to highlight that the monograph assumes the 
basic knowledge of history and institutes of Roman law. Hence it is advisable 
to use it together with the textbook of Roman law by Professor András Földi 
and Professor Gábor Hamza, which was published in the fall of 2002 in its 
seventh revised and extended edition." 
I am convinced that Professor Hamza's monograph on the development of 
private law in Europe is outstanding in international measures, as well. This 
book is strongly recommended for law-students or for researchers. Not only 
does have the book an extremely rich database on the development of private 
law but it also does analyze the most important trends of the present and future 
in a very logical and clear system. Therefore this book might be also useful for 
practicing lawyers, as well who often meet problems of conflicts of law or 
11
 Földi, A.—Hamza, G.: History and Institutes of Roman Law. Budapest, 2002. 
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international commercial law. The book is especially current in our days, when 
the composition of the ius commune (privatum)Europaeum is in progress. All 
in all one can offer this book to those who intend to have a general but very 
deep summary on the development of private law in Europe and countries 
outside Europe with special emphasis on the trends of the future. 
Adám Boóc 
FRANÇOIS GENDRON: L ' i n t e r p r é t a t i o n d e s c o n t r a t s . M o n t r éa l , 2002. 225 p. 
It was the year 2002, when the book L'interprétation des contrats was 
published by François Gendron in Montréal. The author is attorney-at-law and 
also professor at the Collège militaire royal du Canada. In the past he wrote 
books on historical issues.1 François Gendron is also doctor of history at the 
University of Paris. This book of him however deals with a typical civil-law 
topic. The interpretation of a contract ot agreement is undoubtedly a classical 
question of private law, no matter if we regard national legal systems or 
international private law. Therefore it is always useful to have a good summary 
on this key-issue of civil law. To begin with I may affirm that François 
Gendron did compose a really important and interesting work in this matter. In 
the followings I try to present a short summary of the book with the intent to 
encourage the reader to study the entire work of François Gendron. 
The preface of the book is written by Jean-Louis Baudouin who is a judge 
at the Court of Appeal in Québec (Cour d'appel du Québec). Baudouin really 
trusts that the work of Gendron is to become a classical one on this topic soon. 
Gendron's book is divided into seven chapters as follows: 
1. L'acte d'interprétation; 
2. La règle des règles: l'intention; 
3. La méthode textuelle', 
4. La méthode logique; 
5. La méthode objective', 
6. L'interprétation du contrat d'adhésion; 
7. Conclusion. 
Nevertheless, the author presents a wide view of the dogmatic questions with 
reference to legal history and legal systems of several countries. He focuses 
however on the civil law of Canada. Therefore he refers very often to the Code 
1
 La jeunesse sous Thermidor. Paris, 1983.; The Gilded Youth of Thermidor. Montréal, 
1993.; Dictionnaire historique de la Révolution française. Paris, 1989. 
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civil du Québec (hereinafter C.c.Q.), and quotes many expressive examples 
from the Canadian jurisdiction. 
As it is known the first Civil Code of Canada came into force in 1866 with 
the title Code civil de la province de Québec. Originally the official title of the 
code was Civil Code of Low Canada. The editors of this code put extremely 
high attention to the French Code Civil of 1804, concerning especially the first 
three books of the code. Nevertheless the so-called Coutume de Paris—which 
used to be considered as effective law in Québec—and the works of Robert-
Joseph Pothier, the great French jurist from Orléans did have huge influence 
on the Canadian Civil Code.2 One can also find the impact of the Common Law 
in the Canadian civil law, as well. 
It was the year 1994, when the new Canadian Civil Code, the Code civil du 
Québec (Code civil of Québec) was put into force. The new Canadian Civil 
Code consists of ten books, and safeguards traditions of Roman law, as well. 
Gendron quotes the provisions of the new Canadian Civil Code many times, by 
marking it as new law. All in all one can remark that the Canadian legal 
system can be regarded as a mixed jurisdiction,3 
The book of Gendron begins with an introduction to the three terms of high 
importance on the field of the interpretation of contracts. In Gendron's opinion 
when one interprets a contract one has to pay attention to the qualification of 
the contract. One has to take into consideration those proofs and elements of 
each case, which may be helpful to the appropriate qualification of the contract. 
In many situations it is also the task of the judge to qualify the contract and 
there are also many cases, when the qualification is not obvious. 
There are cases however when there is only one possible way of inter-
pretation. For cases with only one possible interpretation one can find good 
examples in Canadian law, too. Let me refer nonetheless to the law of the 
European Community, in which the principle of the acte claire is laid down, as 
well.4 To be very short the principle of acte claire regulates that there are 
provisions of law, which can be interpreted only in one way. It is known that 
the contract can be viewed as a law of the parties—I refer hereby to the Latin 
regula: contrahentibus contractus legem ponit—hence the principle of the acte 
t 
About Pothier see esp.: Montmorency, J. E. G.: Robert Joseph Pothier and French 
Law. In: Great Jurists of the World (ed.: By Sir J. Macdonell and E. Manson). Boston, 
1914. reprint: New Yersey, 1997. 
1
 Cf. Hamza, G.: Az európai magánjog fejlődése. A modern magánjogi rendszerek 
kialakulása a római jogi hagyományok alapján. Budapest, 2002. 273-274. 
4
 Cf. the following cases: Wienand Meilicke с. ADV/ORGA F. A. Meyer A.G. 
(C/83/91.), and SRL CILFIT et al. с. Ministem della Sanitá (C-283/81). 
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claire can be applied for the interpretation of the contracts, too. In this context 
Gendron refers to a famous statement of the French Cour de Cassation from the 
15th of April, 1872: 
"// n 'est pas permis aux juges, lorsque les termes des conventions sont 
clairs et précis, de dénaturer les obligations qui en résultent et de modifier 
les stipulations qu 'elles renferment. "5  
Of course, Gendron is aware of the fact that there are limits of the qualification 
of the contract. As qualification does have major influence on the entire inter-
pretation of the contract, the qualification should be in accordance with the 
mandatory law, depending obviously on the law of the contract. 
As it can be seen from the titles of the chapters, Gendron puts special 
emphasis on the intent of the parties. The intent of the parties should be the most 
important element for the correct interpretation of the contract. When one is 
about to interpret a contract one has to take under close inquiry the common will 
of the parties. The Art. 1425 of C.c.Q. gives the following regulation for this: 
"Dans l'interprétation du contrat, on doit rechercher quelle a été la commune 
intention des parties plutôt que de s'arreter au sens littéral des termes utilisés." 
In this aspect I refer to the paragraph 207 of the Hungarian Civil Code, 
regulating as follows: 
"207. § (1) The contractual declaration in case of debate should be 
interpreted as the other party had to interpret it according to the generally 
accepted meaning of the words with regard to the supposable intent of the 
declaring party and the circumstances of the case." 
As wee see it the Hungarian Civil Code puts really high emphasis on the so-
called Erklärungstheorie, which is based on the declaration of the party. The 
opposition of the Erklärungstheorie is the Willenstheorie, which rather 
highlights the will of the party. I refer hereby to the different opinions of the 
German Pandectists of the 19th century.6 Gendron himself also deals with 
question on page 63 of his book. On page 63 he states generally that when 
interpreting the contract the French tradition supports rather the inner will, 
while the German tradition favours the declaration, i.e. the German tradition is 
based on the Erklärungstheorie. 
I would like to emphasize hereby that the Hungarian legal system is in 
quite tight connection with the German law, based on historical grounds.7 
5
 Gendron: op. cit. 28. 
6
 Cf. Földi, A. — Hamza, G.: A római jog története és institúciói. Budapest, 20027. 588. 
7
 Cf. Hamza, G.: Die Entwicklung des Privatrechts auf römischrechtlicher Grundlage 
unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Rechtsentwicklung in Deutschland, Österreich, der 
Schweiz und Ungarn. Budapest, 2002. 131-147. 
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Gendron also purports that this general statement regarding French tradition 
and German tradition can be debated, because the German BGB (Bürgerliches 
Gesetzbuch) from 1900 contains also provisions, which strengthens that one 
should take into account the inner will of the party, as well. Gendron refers to 
par. 133 of BGB, which rules, as follows: 
"133. §. Bei der Auslegung einer Willenserklärung ist der wirkliche Wille zu 
erforschen und nicht an dem buchstäblichen Sinne des Ausdrucks zu haften". 
Gendron 's opinion seems to be shared by Helmut Köhler who has the following 
point of view about this paragraph of the BGB: 
"... § 133 (d.h. des BGB) verlangt, daß bei der Auslegung einer 
Willenserklärung der wirkliche Wille zu erforschen ist".* 
As I have mentioned the Canadian law is in very close connection with French 
law. Therefore it may be useful to quote the relevant article of the French Code 
Civil, which contains the following provision: 
"Art. 1156. On doit dans les conventions rechercher quelle a été la commune 
intention des parties contractantes, plutôt que de s'arrêter au sens littéral 
des termes. " 
According to the Commentary of the French Civil Code the judge—inter-
preting the intents of the parties—should also pay attention to the ultimate 
behaviour of the parties, as well: 
"Pour déterminer quelle a été la commune intention des parties, il n'est 
pas interdit aux juges du fond de reliever leur comportement ultérieur. "9 
Gendron also mentions that the behaviour of the contracting parties should be 
thoroughly analysed when one interprets a contract. 
Gendron underlines that we should be aware of the fact that the natural 
meaning of the words can be absolutely important during the interpretation of 
a contract. In this context (La méthode textuelle) he refers to a case, in which 
the Court of Appeal stated that the English word 'to ship' can mean 'expedier 
and it is not relevant that the item of transportation was not boot."' 
The author shows and describes many important ways of the interpretation 
and draws the attention to several principles to follow. As an example I refer 
hereby to the règle de l'effet utile. Gendron leads back the origin of this 
principle to Ulpian the Roman iurisconsultus from the 3rd century, A.D.:11 
8
 Köhler, H.: BGB. Allgemeiner Teil. Ein Studienbuch. München, 1983. 166. 
9
 Code Civil (ed.: A. Lucas.). Paris, 1990. 531. 
Iu
 Gendron: op. cit. 68. 
" About Ulpian, see esp.: Honoré, A. N.: Ulpian. Oxford, 1982. 
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"Quotiens in stipulationibus ambigua oratio est, commodissimum est id 
accipi, quo res, qua de agitur, in tut о sit."1' 
Gendron also describes the diverging opinions of Domat and Pothier in this 
matter. 
The author provides a very deep analysis on the objective method (la 
méthode objective) of the contract. Gendron finds the root of this method in 
the intellectual mainstreams of the Great French Revolution. He deals with the 
question of the good faith (bonne foi, bona fides in Latin), as well. He cites the 
Article 6 of the C.c.Q., which is a provision of the new Civil Code. This 
principle creates an obligation for the persons to act in good faith. Article 1375 
of the C.c.Q. regulates that the good faith has to govern the parties during their 
contractual relationships, as well: 
"Art. 1375. La bonne foi doit gouverner la conduite des parties tant au 
moment de la naissance de l'obligation qu'à celui de son exécution ou de 
son extinction." 
One can also take into consideration that the Hungarian Civil Code in par. 277 
also creates an obligation for the parties to cooperate when performing their 
contractual obligations. Gendron underscores that C.c.Q. does not contain any 
definition for the term good faith. Therefore the question arises that this term 
may be interpreted in the so-called subjective and objective sense. The good 
faith has to do a lot with the so-called culpa in contrahendo and also with the 
behaviour of the 'honest man' in Gendron's wording. (The term reasonable 
person may be used as a sort of synonym for the honest man.) The author 
thinks that the good faith is an element of high importance during the process 
of inteipretation: 
"La bonne foi constitue un principe directeur d'interprétation, principe 
d'application universelle, et qui commande d'interpréter le contrat d'après 
le sens qui, normalement, s'imposerait á l'honnête homme. "I3  
It is worth mentioning that a very comprehensive, comparative and historical 
analysis of the term good faith (bona fides) was published by a Hungarian 
Professor of Roman law, András Földi in 2001.14 
Gendron gives many important advices to the right interpretation of a 
contract. His work can be considered as a fine guide for the appropriate 
inteipretation of the contract. His final conclusion is that the most important 
aim of the interpretation is the search for the common intent of the parties (la 
12
 Quoted by: Gendron: op. cit. 87. 
11
 Gendron: op. cit. 113. 
14
 Földi, A.: A jóhiszeműség és tisztesség elve. Intézménytörténeti vázlat a római jogtól 
napjainkig. Budapest, 2001. 
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recherche de l'intention commune des parties). In his point of view every 
contract can be regarded as a way of the reconciliation of several interests of 
the parties. They provide services to each other in other to satisfy their 
different needs. Gendron refers back to Roman law, in which the contractus 
innominati were categorised, as follows: do ut des; do ut facias, facio ut, des, 
facio ut facias.1* According to the author these categorisations can abridge the 
entire purpose of the contracts in general. Gendron attached a very useful 
index to the book, including recommended bibliography to this issue and the 
twelve regulations of Pothier to the interpretation. 
I am convinced about the fact that the book of François Gendron is an 
extremely useful, constructive and valuable analysis and summary of the 
interpretation of contract, which can be regarded as an evergreen question of 
private law. On the one hand this book can be recommended to the researchers 
of civil law, researchers dealing with theoretical problems of civil law. On the 
other hand the present work of François Gendron can be additionally applied 
by practising lawyers who meet often problems of interpretation during their 
everyday job, no matter if they are active in Canada or in other countries. 
Ádám Boóc 
GÁBOR JOBBÁGYI—JUDIT FAZEKAS: Law of contract in Hungary. Kluwer 
Law International, The Hague-London-New York, 2003. (From the series: 
International encyclopaedia of laws; general editor: Prof. Dr. R. Blanpain) 
We had to wait for a long time to finally have the whole Hungarian law of 
contract available collected in a single book. The Kluwer Law International 
publisher released the handbook especially written for foreign lawyers who 
work in this field or are simply interested in Hungarian private law. The book 
is updated to July 2002—it is to be mentioned that since then the law has been 
changed. The authors are both university professors who have been working in 
the area of private law not only in the scientific field but also as practising 
lawyers for decades. 
Gábor Jobbágyi, whose main research topics are medical law, law of life 
and family law, is the Head of the Private Law Institute at the Pázmány Péter 
Catholic University in Budapest. Judit Fazekas, currently working as an under-
secretary at the Ministry of Justice, is a professor of law both at the Pázmány 
15
 Cf.: Käser, M.: Römisches Privatrecht. Ein Studienbuch. München, 1968. 179.; 
Földi—Hamza: op. cit. 504. 
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University and at the University of Miskolc; she is also an expert in European 
and international law. 
The book begins with a general introduction in which the reader obtains an 
overall view of Hungary's geography and population, political system and the 
short history of the country as well as the history of the constitutional 
development and Hungarian law as an independent legal system with Roman 
and Austrian-German influences. This chapter is followed by a bibliography 
which collects the most important works written about the law of contract in 
Hungary in the last hundred years and also an updated and operative collection 
of the major sources of law. 
The first part (written by Gábor Jobbágyi) deals with the general rules of the 
law of contract. The different chapters analyse the most relevant issues of the 
topic. The set-up of the book follows the system and order of the Civil Code of 
Hungary in order to ease its usage. These most significant issues are: formation 
of contract; invalidity of contract; collateral obligations securing contract; 
modification of contract; performance of contract; termination of contract 
without performance; prescription; breach of contract; faulty performance; 
delivery; contract for delivery of agricultural products; contract for public utility 
subsequent impossibility; several parties to a contract. 
The second part (written by Judit Fazekas) deals with the most frequent 
specific types of contracts. Among these are: contract of sale; contract of 
services; contract of locatio conductio operis; contract of lease; lease of living 
quarters; tenancy; concession; contract of financial lease; franchise contract; 
deposit; agency; contract of commission; contract of carriage; contract of 
forwarding; financial obligations; insurance contract; contract of donation; 
contracts for maintenance and life annuity. 
The main characteristic of the book is that it manages to summarise the law 
of contract in not more than 284 pages. It is needless to say that this extent 
cannot cover all the areas and details of the area neither the judicial practice. It 
offers an introduction, comments and explains the rules of the Civil Code. 
The book, published also in Hungarian, is the coursebook of the law 
students at the Pázmány University. Its English version is a useful handbook 
for all the lawyers and for anybody showing an interest. Hopefully it can break 
new ground for more English-written handbooks about the Hungarian law to 
be published in the near future. 
András Koltay 
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